



 LOUVAIN
RESEARCH INSTITUTE
IN MANAGEMENT
AND ORGANIZATIONS

WORKING PAPER

2018/09

The influence of personal
actions on generosity to
charitable organizations

Etienne DENIS

Louvain Research Institute in Management
and Organizations

Claude PECHEUX

Edhec Business School

Louvain Research Institute in Management and Organizations

Working Paper Series

Editor: Prof. Frank Janssen
(president-lourim@uclouvain.be)

The influence of personal actions on generosity to charitable organizations

Etienne Denis, Louvain Research Institute in Management and Organizations
Claude Pecheux, Edhec Business School

Summary

Numerous studies have focused on how to elicit emotions in the context of fundraising campaigns. However, we still know little about the impact of these emotions on people's generosity. Investigating the influence of positive and negative feelings resulting from past deeds, this paper provides evidence that whereas negative feelings increase generosity, positive feelings can have the opposite effect. We show that, depending on people's emotional sensitivity, guilt feelings drive people to donate to redeem themselves whereas positive feelings would exempt them from donating. We also test the extent to which these findings can be applied to the case of anticipated feelings. Theoretical and managerial contributions are discussed and directions for future research are finally presented.

Keywords : Charitable giving, prosocial, guilt, feelings.

JEL Classification: D12, D6

Corresponding author :

Etienne Denis

CERMA

Louvain Louvain Research Institute in Management and Organizations / Campus Mons

Université catholique de Louvain

Chaussée de Binche, 151

B-7000 Mons, BELGIUM

Email : etienne.denis@uclouvain.be

The papers in the WP series have undergone only limited review and may be updated, corrected or withdrawn without changing numbering. Please contact the corresponding author directly for any comments or questions regarding the paper.

President-lourim@uclouvain.be, LouRIM, UCL, 1 Place des Doyens, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, BELGIUM

<https://uclouvain.be/en/research-institutes/lourim>

THE INFLUENCE OF PERSONAL ACTIONS ON GENEROSITY TO CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS

Etienne DENIS

*Louvain Research Institute in Management, Université catholique de Louvain,
151, Chaussée de Binche, Mons,, BELGIUM
etienne.denis@uclouvain.be*

Claude PECHEUX

*Edhec Business School,
24, Avenue Gustave Delory, Roubaix, France
claude.pecheux@edhec.edu*

Numerous studies have focused on how to elicit emotions in the context of fundraising campaigns. However, we still know little about the impact of these emotions on people's generosity. Investigating the influence of positive and negative feelings resulting from past deeds, this paper provides evidence that whereas negative feelings increase generosity, positive feelings can have the opposite effect. We show that, depending on people's emotional sensitivity, guilt feelings drive people to donate to redeem themselves whereas positive feelings would exempt them from donating. We also test the extent to which these findings can be applied to the case of anticipated feelings. Theoretical and managerial contributions are discussed and directions for future research are finally presented.

Keywords: Charitable giving, prosocial, guilt, feelings.

Introduction

Driven by an increasing need for funds from nonprofit organizations (Chang & Lee, 2009), numerous studies on how to elicit emotions with marketing campaigns have been recently published (Chédotal, Berthe, de Peyrelongue & Le Gall-Ely, 2017). The emotional dimension of prosocial behaviors is now unanimously acknowledged and research has grown accordingly (Small & Verrochi, 2009). Donors go through several emotions, from guilt when exposed to victims of a disastrous situation to the positive feelings of doing something good. In the first case, charities either try to make the donor responsible for the situation (e.g. environmental issues), or lead the donor to anticipate the guilt (s)he will experience if (s)he does not act. When using more positive feelings, organizations often highlight the personal satisfaction the donor will experience by doing good. Based upon the assumption that an emotional response leads to a behavioral response, authors have focused on the antecedents of emotions and very limited research has been conducted to identify the conditions under which emotions lead to generosity (Chédotal et al., 2017). However, authors are not unanimous on the consequences of such emotions as studies have often led to mixed results. Although guilt is regularly used in nonprofit campaigns (Chédotal et al., 2017), few studies have confirmed the positive effect of guilt in the context of charitable giving. The positive feelings that we can derive from a good deed and that are generally considered as the best opposition to guilt (Black & London, 1966; Forrest, 2006) have also been increasingly regarded as key motives to donate. However, some authors have reopened the debate, proposing that such feelings may sometimes exempt donors from giving if they result from previous good deeds (Merritt, Effron & Monin, 2010).

To explain these inconclusive results, authors often refer to the lack of consideration given to individual differences in emotional tendencies (Lindsey et al., 2007) as people are not all equally sensitive. Furthermore, emotional reactions towards people would also depend on the perceived proximity with the victims (Baumeister, Stillwell & Heatherton, 1994). Manipulating the emotional valence (negative vs. positive) as well as the proximity between the donors and the beneficiaries, we show that whereas guilt feelings lead to more generosity, positive emotions have the opposite effects. We also detail the moderating role of empathic tendencies and proximity. Theoretical and managerial implications are developed and suggestions for future research are finally presented.

1. Theoretical Framework

Defined as an “*individual’s unpleasant emotional state associated with possible objections to his or her actions, inaction, circumstances or intentions*” (Baumeister et al., 1994; p. 245), guilt has been increasingly regarded as a key motive in the adoption of prosocial tendencies (Xu, Bègue & Bushman, 2014). Caused by the emotional distress from being in the wrong or from other’s perception that one is, guilt feelings would indeed lead people to redeem themselves by adopting others-oriented behaviors (De Hooge, Nelissen, Breugelmans & Zeelenberg, 2011). At the other end of the emotional spectrum, the good feelings that people experience when doing something good are generally considered as the best opposition to guilt (Black & London, 1966; Forrest, 2006). Unlike guilt, the confidence that people would get from a good deed would balance future immoral actions (Merritt et al., 2010). Consequently, such positive feelings would reduce people’s likelihood to adopt others-oriented behaviors.

1.1. Charitable giving to redeem ourselves

When people experience feelings of guilt, it is often the result of an internal conflict for not living up to expectations (Hauge, 2016). As a result, people would be willing to adopt an “others-oriented” behavior to redeem themselves and get rid of the unpleasant feeling (Nelissen & Dijk, 2007). In that respect, Lindsey et al. (2007, p. 469) even referred to guilt as “*a form of emotional distress based in social relationships that motivates and encourages prosocial behavior*”. Consequently, several authors have considered guilt as a possible determinant of charitable donations (Albouy, 2017). In recent years, the influence of guilt has been investigated in different prosocial contexts (Roberts, Strayer & Denham, 2014; Roos, Hodges & Salmivalli, 2014; Vaish et al., 2016). Generally, authors have all concluded in a positive impact on others-oriented behaviors. Although studies have been less numerous and less conclusive, there has been no definitive proof to suggest that the effect would differ in the context of charitable giving. Indeed, this form of generosity offers a good way to make amends for prior negative actions.

Although we assume that guilt leads people to behave prosocially, many authors also insisted on the influence of individual specificities on the magnitude of one’s emotional responses (Davis et al., 1999). Defined by Eisenberg and Miller (1987) as “*an affective state that stems from the apprehension of another’s emotional state or condition and that is congruent with it*” (p.91), empathy has often been considered as a key determinant of others-oriented behaviors (Dovidio, Allen & Schroeder, 1990; Batson, 1998). One special aspect of charitable giving is the almost systematic absence of interaction between donors and beneficiaries. On an equivalent level of guilt, someone with stronger predispositions for empathy would therefore be more likely to donate since s/he would feel more concerned by

the suffering of the victim(s). We therefore hypothesize that the positive effect of guilt on generosity is stronger among people who have a high predisposition for empathy.

We consider empathic concern as people's overall tendency to feel empathy (Davis, 1980). Just as empathic concern would be crucial to donate when confronted to the suffering of strangers, this predisposition would be strongly conditioned by what Kurdek (1978) first identified as *perspective-taking*. Defined as "*the ability to infer another person's thoughts, attitudes, or intentions*" (p.21), the author envisioned it as an expression of cognitive empathy. Stürmer, Snyder and Omoto (2005) insisted on the adoption of a perspective-taking approach rather than granting a too big influence to empathic concern to explain prosocial tendencies. Lindsey et al. (2007) failed at identifying a moderating effect on the relationship between guilt and generosity. However, the authors considered perspective-taking and empathic concern separately, ignoring potential interactions between the variables. Sargeant (1999) insisted on the combined effect of empathic concerns and perspective-taking in the adoption of others-oriented behaviors. In his conceptual model of generosity, the author referred to perspective-taking as an operationalization of empathy. Then, the impact of guilt feelings on generosity would also depend on commonality (Baumeister et al., 1994). When the perceived (social, cultural and/or geographical) distance between the individual and the victims is limited, it will result in a sense of responsibility, facilitating the positive impact of guilt on charitable giving (Basil, Ridgway & Basil, 2006). Conversely, when the perceived distance is high, the sense of responsibility is lower and charitable giving appears less natural as a way to alleviate guilt. In that respect, Audet (2017) justified the limited mobilization from most European countries for the natural disasters in Pakistan (2005 and 2010) by this lack of cultural proximity with the victims.

1.2. The self-licensing effect

Just as bad behaviors result in negative feelings, positive actions generally lead to the pleasant feeling of being on the right track. Whereas guilt feelings would encourage us to redeem ourselves by adopting others-oriented behaviors, these positive feelings would sometimes increase people's propensity to adopt immoral behaviors (Monin & Miller, 2001). Referred to as *moral self-licensing*, the phenomenon would occur because when having done something good, people would feel more secure in their moral self-regard (Merritt et al., 2010). People would derive confidence from past good deeds to balance future less positive behaviors and would therefore be more likely to do bad things without worrying. In the context of charitable giving, we can presumably assume that recent good actions would therefore reduce people's likelihood to consider charitable donations.

People generally seek to monitor their feelings of moral self-worth and eventually engage in prosocial behaviors to restore their moral balance (Sachdeva, Iliev & Medin, 2009). As

explained above, bad deeds will generally result in a need to redeem ourselves, whereas good deeds will provide confidence and will momentarily decrease the need to adopt other-oriented behaviors. Although recent good actions help to justify future less moral behaviors, the extent to which a behavior is regarded as moral or not is largely dependent on people's own judgement. When people are confronted with others' distress, strong empathic tendencies help to better perceive suffering and discomfort. Accordingly, for people with stronger empathic concern, not helping when confronted with others' suffering will be considered as highly immoral. It is therefore logical to assume that when empathic concern is high, people are less likely to experience the self-licensing effect of good deeds. Furthermore, we also hypothesize that, just as with guilt feelings, the effect of empathic concern is conditioned by people's ability to put themselves in the place of the victims, namely their perspective-taking ability. Again, the arguments presented before on the influence of commonality may apply to the phenomenon of self-licensing. Indeed, we can assume that when the perceived proximity with the victims is higher, not helping would be seen as more immoral as we feel more responsible (Baumeister et al., 1994; Basil et al., 2006). We therefore assume that when the perceived distance with the victims is smaller (higher commonality), people are less likely to experience the self-licensing effect of good behaviors.

2. Methodology

We conducted two online experiments in which we manipulated feelings resulting from past behaviors (negative vs. positive) as well as the level of perceived proximity between donors and beneficiaries (low commonality vs. high commonality). Questionnaires in the different experiments were submitted to students in two business schools in northern France. As a cover story, people were asked to answer questions about their viewing habits and choices of television programs. Participants were told that researchers were studying the relationship between moods and viewing habits. In all studies, participants were all native French speakers and were randomly assigned to the different conditions. Empathic concern and perspective-taking were measured using the 28-item, five-point Likert-type scale from Davis (1980) on individual differences in empathy, ranging from 1 (*does not describe me well*) to 5 (*describes me very well*). The scale consists of four seven-item subscales, each measuring a separate aspect of the global concept of empathy. This scale provides separate assessments for the cognitive, perspective-taking abilities of individuals and their emotional reactivity.

2.1. Study 1

The first study had two objectives. First, the goal was to study whether empathic concern and perspective-taking moderate the causal relation between guilt feelings and generosity. Then, we also aimed at assessing whether the impact of guilt on generosity was moderated by the perceived proximity with the beneficiaries. Participants were invited to participate in an online survey about viewing habits and television programs. When investigating the effect of guilt feelings on behaviors, the major issue remains the elicitation of guilt itself. In most studies, guilt is elicited by forcing participants to face dramatic situations such as a starving child or a natural disaster. However, this methodological approach is not without limits. As Cotte, Coulter and Moore (2005) explained, the elicitation of guilt is in that case conditioned by two factors: the credibility of the advertisement and the advertiser's manipulative intent identification. The more credible the ad appears, the less manipulative it is perceived. In the case of guilt, the authors demonstrated that when consumers identify the manipulative intent, they are less likely to feel guilty and more likely to feel angry and irritated. To overcome that issue, some authors have encouraged a more natural form of elicitation that is based on personal deeds (Smith, Webster, Parrott & Eyre, 2002; Xu et al., 2014). In this study, participants in the "*guilt condition*" were thus given some time to write a description of an event in which they had done something negative about someone important to them (*writing task* vs. *no writing task*). The methodology has been increasingly used to elicit guilt feelings and has proved to be very effective in different contexts (Smith et al., 2002; Xu et al., 2014).

A manipulation check was made to ensure differences in immediate guilt feelings ($F = 232,88$; $p = 0.000$). After completing the questionnaire, participants were financially rewarded (5 euros) for participation. They got the opportunity to keep endowment for themselves or to donate the amount to a charitable cause. The principle of commonality is based on a "*positive interpersonal attraction*" (Hogg and Turner, 1985; p. 61). It required a certain level of social similarity, and often implied communal relatedness or fellow feelings (Baumeister et al., 1994). In the *low commonality* conditions, people were given the opportunity to donate to a fictional charitable organization helping the needy from a remote area (former Soviet bloc countries). In the *high commonality* conditions, people were given the opportunity to donate to a cause helping the needy from a geographically close area (country of the participants). The cause to support was the same in the different conditions. The only difference stood in the location where the help took place. To ensure differences in commonality between conditions, the manipulation was pretested among a sample of 35 individuals. No validated measure of commonality was available but an extensive literature review enabled us to identify the major aspects that emerged when defining the concept. Indeed, authors debating on its role generally refer to four different dimensions: *interpersonal*

attraction, social similarity, communal relatedness and fellow feelings. A list of items was produced to assess the level of perceived proximity with the beneficiaries and for each statement, participants had to indicate the extent to which they agreed (1 = *fully disagree*; 7 = *fully agree*). Results of the pretest showed a significant difference between *low* and *high* commonality conditions ($F=68.18$ $p=0.000$). Participants were randomly assigned to a 2 (*no task* vs. *writing task*) $\times$ 2 (*low* vs. *high commonality*) between-subjects experimental design. Participants had the opportunity to either donate or keep the full amount and the dependent variable in our different analyses was therefore binomial (0 = no donation; 1 = donation). The questionnaire was distributed online and a total of 127 valid questionnaires were collected (60.63% female, $M_{age} = 22.69$, $st.dev = 1.73$).

2.2. Findings

We performed a logistic regression on the decision to donate with four independent variables: guilt feelings (not elicited = 0; elicited = 1), the level of empathic concern ($mean = 3.39$; $st.dev = 0.67$; $min = 1$; $max = 5$), the level of perspective taking ($mean = 3.47$; $st.dev = 0.83$; $min = 1$; $max = 5$) and the level of commonality (0 = low; 1 = high), testing for main effects and interactional effects. The presence of guilt feelings appears to positively impacts generosity ($\beta = 1.54$; $p = 0.00$). The results also show a significant interaction between the level of empathic concern and the elicitation of guilt feelings ($\beta = 1.92$; $p < 0.01$), supporting H_{1A} . A floodlight analysis (Spiller, Fitzsimons, Lynch & McClelland, 2012) showed that the effect of the manipulation becomes significant at a score of 3.03 for the level of empathic concern. The results also indicate a significant interaction between the level of commonality and the elicitation of guilt feelings ($\beta = 1.88$; $p < 0.05$), supporting H_{1C} . Results on the level of perspective-taking appear non-significant and H_{1B} is therefore not supported. To confirm the nature of these interaction effects, additional analyses were conducted through Preacher and Hayes' (2008) macro (*model 2*) with bootstrapped samples (5000). The results reveal that the relationship between guilt and generosity is moderated by both commonality and empathic concern.

2.3. Discussion

The positive impact of guilt feelings resulting from past behaviors on generosity appears to depend on two factors: people's empathic concern and the perceived proximity with the victims. While Basil et al. (2008) showed that immediate empathic feelings were antecedents of guilt, our results suggest that individual tendencies to feel empathy moderate the influence of guilt feelings. Then, the positive impact of guilt on generosity would also be stronger when the perceived proximity with beneficiaries is higher. As pointed out by Basil et al. (2006), responsibility is key in the decision-making process of charitable giving. This interactional effect could therefore be explained by the fact that people would feel more responsible for

geographically and culturally close people than for more distant ones (Baumeister et al., 1994; Audet, 2017). Finally, perspective-taking appears non-significant in the process, which brings understanding over the debate on the decision to consider either empathy or perspective-taking when dealing with charitable donations.

2.4. Study 2

In a second study, we evaluated how positive feelings that one can derive from past good deeds impact generosity and how this causal relation is affected by individual variables. As in the first study, participants were invited to participate in an online survey about viewing habits and television programs. To elicit positive feelings, participants were given some time to write the description of a recent good thing they did for someone else (*writing task* vs. *no writing task*). The methodology was inspired by the recent work from Sachdeva et al. (2009). A manipulation check was made to ensure differences in positive feelings ($F = 158.63$; $p = 0.000$). After completing the questionnaire, participants were financially rewarded for their participation and given the opportunity to keep or to donate the endowment. The manipulation of commonality was identical to *Study 1*. People had the opportunity to keep or to donate to a fictional charity operating in a country of the former Soviet bloc (*low commonality*) or in the country of the participants (*high commonality*). Participants were randomly assigned to a 2 (*no task* vs. *writing task*) $\times$ 2 (*low* vs. *high commonality*) between-subjects experimental design. Participants had the opportunity to either donate or keep the full endowment and the dependent variable in our different analysis was therefore binomial (0 = no donation; 1 = donation). The questionnaire was distributed online and a total of 134 valid questionnaires were collected (55.97% female, $M_{\text{age}} = 22.83$, $\text{st.dev} = 1.35$).

2.5. Findings

We performed a logistic regression on the decision to donate with four independent variables: positive feelings (not elicited = 0; elicited = 1), the level of empathic concern ($\text{mean} = 3.14$; $\text{st.dev} = 0.77$; $\text{min} = 1$; $\text{max} = 5$), the level of perspective taking ($\text{mean} = 3.24$; $\text{st.dev} = 0.87$; $\text{min} = 1$; $\text{max} = 5$) and the level of commonality (0 = low; 1 = high), testing for main effects and interactional effects. The presence of positive feelings appears to reduce generosity ($\beta = -0.77$; $p = 0.05$). However, results show no significant interaction between positive feelings and the level of empathic concern or perspective-taking. The interaction between positive feelings and commonality also appears non-significant. While these results support the general hypothesis on the negative effect of positive feelings (H_2), hypotheses on the interaction effects (H_{2A} , H_{2B} , H_{2C}) are not supported.

2.6. Discussion

Our second study supports the hypothesis that positive feelings from past good deeds reduce generosity. Building on the moral self-licensing effect, results suggest that not only past good deeds liberate individuals to engage in immoral behaviors, but also reduce their likelihood to engage in good behaviors. This study also shows that this negative influence would not depend on empathic tendencies, nor on the perceived proximity with the victims. As proposed by Merritt et al. (2010), the positive behavior would lead people to feel temporarily exempted from doing the right thing. To explain the absence of interaction effect with empathic concern and commonality, we propose that the good feelings derived from a prior good behavior lead participants to not consider giving at all. In other words, as soon as the moral self-concept is reinforced (Sachdeva et al., 2009), participants would not give much consideration to the opportunity to give. Therefore, neither the proximity with the beneficiaries nor individuals' empathic tendencies would interfere since charitable giving is no longer a considered option.

3. General discussion

This research provides relevant findings to support the impact of emotions on generosity. Investigating negative and positive feelings that one can derive from personal deeds, our results suggest opposing effects on charitable donations. First, we show that guilt feelings resulting from recent bad behaviors have a positive impact on generosity. As suggested by De Hooij et al. (2007), people would engage in others-oriented behaviors to redeem themselves and therefore solve the unpleasant feeling associated with guilt. Contributing to a better understanding of the role of guilt, we suggest that this positive effect is moderated by both personal empathic tendencies and the perceived distance with the beneficiaries. Building upon the work of Lindsey et al (2007), we show that the positive effect of guilt on generosity appears stronger among people with higher predispositions for empathic feelings. As suggested by Audet (2017), a lack of cultural, social or geographical proximity with the beneficiaries would reduce people's likelihood to donate. Going one step further, we identify the moderating nature of this effect on the relationship between guilt and generosity. In our different studies, when the perceived proximity with the beneficiaries is higher, guilt feelings always lead to more charitable donations. At the other end of the emotional spectrum, this research also sheds light on the negative effect of positive feelings on generous behaviors. Recent positive behaviors would indeed provide confidence and lead people to feel temporarily exempted from doing good (Merritt et al., 2010). Furthermore, this negative effect does not seem to be impacted by emotional sensitivity nor by the perceived proximity with beneficiaries. As suggested by Sachdeva et al. (2009), people monitor their moral self-concept using cleansing behaviors when necessary. A reinforced moral identity would therefore lead people to feel exempted from doing good or in some cases to feel licensed to

act immorally. In such circumstances, predisposition for empathy or proximity with the victims would not interfere since most people would not consider giving to charity as an option.

Finally, our findings on the influence of emotions appear equally valid in the case of anticipated feelings. Just as the perspective of an immoral behavior in a near future appears to increase donations, the anticipation of good deeds would reduce their likelihood to donate. Answering the call from Renner et al. (2013) who worked on blood donations, we contribute to a generalization of the effect of anticipated feelings by investigating the context of monetary donations. In that respect, we provide additional insights by identifying the moderating effects of personal empathic tendencies and commonality.

4. Conclusion

This research contributes to a better understanding of the role of emotions that people experience after engaging in good or bad behaviors on charitable giving. Although the positive (negative) impact of negative (positive) feelings on prosocial behaviors had already been suggested in prior studies (Sachdeva et al., 2009; Renner et al., 2013), we clarify the debate by identifying the conditions under which such effects take place. Then, we also extend these findings to the case of anticipatory feelings. Furthermore, we show that a relationship between the origin of the emotion and the promoted charitable cause is not crucial. From a management perspective, this finding is key as it broadens the scope of action for charities.

However, there are limitations to the results of our study, each of which is an avenue for future research. Although the design of our questionnaires aimed at providing natural settings for participants, the ecological validity of this research remains limited. Laboratory experiments have become very popular to study prosocial behaviors, but very little has been done to examine whether these methods tell us anything about people's behavior in the real world (Gurven & Winking, 2008). Then, we investigated the immediate causal effect of feelings on generosity but one can wonder whether these effects persist in the medium and long term. We therefore encourage scholars to undertake research in that direction. Finally, although our findings on anticipated feelings shed some light on the issue, we did not consider the effect of charitable giving on feelings. In that respect, it would make sense to investigate whether donations alleviate feelings of guilt and whether not donating reduces positive feelings.

References

- Albouy, J. (2017). Emotions et comportements prosociaux: étude de l'efficacité des campagnes humanitaires émotionnelles. *Recherche et Applications en Marketing*, 32(2), 5-26.
- Audet, F. (2017). *Comprendre les organisations humanitaires: développer les capacités ou faire survivre les organisations?*. PUQ.
- Basil, D. Z., Ridgway, N. M., & Basil, M. D. (2006). Guilt appeals: The mediating effect of responsibility. *Psychology & Marketing*, 23(12), 1035-1054.
- Basil, D. Z., Ridgway, N. M., & Basil, M. D. (2008). Guilt and giving: A process model of empathy and efficacy. *Psychology & Marketing*, 25(1), 1-23.
- Batson D. (1998), Altruism and Prosocial Behavior, In *Handbook of Social Psychology*, Vol. 2, ed. Daniel T Gilbert, Susan Fiske and Gardner Lindzey, 282-316. New York: McGraw Hill.
- Baumeister, R. F., Stillwell, A. M., & Heatherton, T. F. (1994). Guilt: an interpersonal approach. *Psychological bulletin*, 115(2), 243-267.
- Black, M. S., & London, P. (1966). The dimensions of guilt, religion, and personal ethics. *The Journal of social psychology*, 69(1), 39-54.
- Chang, C. T., & Lee, Y. K. (2009). Framing charity advertising: Influences of message framing, image valence, and temporal framing on a charitable appeal. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, 39(12), 2910-2935.
- Chédotal, C., Berthe, B., de Peyrelongue, B., & Le Gall-Ely, M. (2017). L'utilisation de la culpabilité en communication. *Recherche et Applications en Marketing*, 32(4), 97-116.
- Cotte, J., Coulter, R. A., & Moore, M. (2005). Enhancing or disrupting guilt: The role of ad credibility and perceived manipulative intent. *Journal of Business Research*, 58(3), 361-368.
- Davis, M. H. (1980). A multidimensional approach to individual differences in empathy. JSAS: Catalog of Selected Documents in Psychology, 10, 85.
- De Hooze, I. E., Nelissen, R., Breugelmans, S. M., & Zeelenberg, M. (2011). What is moral about guilt? Acting "prosocially" at the disadvantage of others. *Journal of personality and social psychology*, 100(3), 462-473.
- De Hooze, I. E., Zeelenberg, M., & Breugelmans, S. M. (2007). Moral sentiments and cooperation: Differential influences of shame and guilt. *Cognition and emotion*, 21(5), 1025-1042.
- Dovidio, J. F., Allen, J. L., & Schroeder, D. A. (1990). Specificity of empathy-induced helping: evidence for altruistic motivation. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 59(2), 249-260.
- Eisenberg, N., & Miller, P. A. (1987). The relation of empathy to prosocial and related behaviors. *Psychological bulletin*, 101(1), 91-119.

- Forrest, P. (2006). Collective guilt; individual shame. *Midwest studies in philosophy*, 30(1), 145-153.
- Gurven, M., & Winking, J. (2008). Collective action in action: Prosocial behavior in and out of the laboratory. *American Anthropologist*, 110(2), 179-190.
- Hauge, K. E. (2016). Generosity and guilt: The role of beliefs and moral standards of others. *Journal of Economic Psychology*, 54, 35-43.
- Hogg, M. A., & Turner, J. C. (1985). Interpersonal attraction, social identification and psychological group formation. *European journal of social psychology*, 15(1), 51-66.
- Kurdek, L. A. (1978). Perspective taking as the cognitive basis of children's moral development: A review of the literature. *Merrill-Palmer Quarterly of Behavior and Development*, 24(1), 3-28.
- Lindsey, L. L. M., Yun, K. A., & Hill, J. B. (2007). Anticipated guilt as motivation to help unknown others: An examination of empathy as a moderator. *Communication Research*, 34(4), 468-480.
- Merritt, A. C., Effron, D. A., & Monin, B. (2010). Moral self-licensing: When being good frees us to be bad. *Social and personality psychology compass*, 4(5), 344-357.
- Monin, B., & Miller, D. T. (2001). Moral credentials and the expression of prejudice. *Journal of personality and social psychology*, 81(1), 33-43.
- Nelissen, R. M., & Dijk, A. J. (2007). How to turn a hawk into a dove and vice versa: Interactions between emotions and goals in a give-some dilemma game. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 43(2), 280-286.
- Renner, S., Lindenmeier, J., Tscheulin, D. K., & Dreves, F. (2013). Guilt appeals and prosocial behavior: an experimental analysis of the effects of anticipatory versus reactive guilt appeals on the effectiveness of blood donor appeals. *Journal of Nonprofit & Public Sector Marketing*, 25(3), 237-255.
- Roberts, W., Strayer, J., & Denham, S. (2014). Empathy, anger, guilt: Emotions and prosocial behaviour. *Canadian Journal of Behavioural Science/Revue canadienne des sciences du comportement*, 46(4), 465.
- Roos, S., Hodges, E. V., & Salmivalli, C. (2014). Do guilt-and shame-proneness differentially predict prosocial, aggressive, and withdrawn behaviors during early adolescence?. *Developmental Psychology*, 50(3), 941.
- Sachdeva, S., Iliev, R., & Medin, D. L. (2009). Sinning saints and saintly sinners: The paradox of moral self-regulation. *Psychological science*, 20(4), 523-528.
- Sargeant, A. (1999). Charitable giving: Towards a model of donor behaviour. *Journal of Marketing Management*, 15(4), 215-238.
- Small, D. A., & Verrochi, N. M. (2009). The face of need: Facial emotion expression on charity advertisements. *Journal of Marketing Research*, 46(6), 777-787.

- Smith, R. H., Webster, J. M., Parrott, W. G., & Eyre, H. L. (2002). The role of public exposure in moral and nonmoral shame and guilt. *Journal of personality and social psychology*, 83(1), 138-159.
- Spiller, S. A., Fitzsimons, G. J., Lynch Jr, J. G., & McClelland, G. H. (2013). Spotlights, floodlights, and the magic number zero: Simple effects tests in moderated regression. *Journal of Marketing Research*, 50(2), 277-288
- Stürmer, S., Snyder, M., & Omoto, A. M. (2005). Prosocial emotions and helping: the moderating role of group membership. *Journal of personality and social psychology*, 88(3), 532.
- Vaish, A., Carpenter, M., & Tomasello, M. (2016). The Early Emergence of Guilt-Motivated Prosocial Behavior. *Child development*, 87(6), 1772-1782.
- Xu, H., Bègue, L., & Bushman, B. (2014). Washing the guilt away: effects of personal versus vicarious cleansing on guilty feelings and prosocial behavior. *Frontiers in human neuroscience*, 8, 97