

Ecocracy

A global democracy for the care and protection of
environmental global commons

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en vue de l'obtention du grade de
Docteur en Philosophie

Institut Supérieur de Philosophie
Université catholique de Louvain

Louvain-la-Neuve
Année académique 2014-2015

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Introduction

There is a linear *ratio* that unifies universality, enlightenment (*Aufklärung*), and ecocracy. Universality is the only perspective that can project any ordering *light* over a disperse and chaotic *cosmos*. Any order regarding diversity, and the diverse ways to conceive universality and chaos. Enlightenment can be conceived as a condition in which individuals' perspectives observe diversity as a harmonious coexistence. Such a stage would be progressively reached by humanity through moral evolution. Kant explored two different ways to make universal assessments. One way is to make it through moral judgements, which discover through reason some universal given moral truths. Another way is to make it through aesthetic assessments, which construct through reason some universal reflexive judgments. Mixing both ways, Hannah Arendt argues that universal moral truths might be reached as a result of an

“aesthetic” construction¹; in the heritage of Habermas, she proposes a universal *discursively constructed* moral judgement. This idea is coherent with a gadamerian hermeneutical perspective, according to which any truth, including moral truths, is constructed through conversation.²

This work incorporates both arendtian and gadamerian convictions, with the intention to make out of ecocracy a universal morally acceptable proposal. Conversation also defines the presentation procedure, along which a universal proposal of a global democracy for the care and protection of environmental global commons will be constructed, addressing relevant ideas and authors. An abductive method will be followed; in the absence of any general theory to be applied, and with meaningfully diverse theoretical inputs, a political institutional global design of universal reach will be proposed.

Ecocracy is based on two normative principles. The first one is individual freedom, which leads to prefer democracy over any other form of government. The second pillar is a moral obligation, for human individuals as well as for humanity as a whole, to take care of the planet. It starts from a particular conception of political power, according to which, as Hannah Arendt would say, *potentia* is on the

¹ Ferry agrees with this interpretation of Arendt’s conception, by saying that Arendt “se tient en quelque sorte à mi-chemin entre le jugement esthétique et le jugement éthique” (Ferry, 1987, 84).

² For a complete account of conversational hermeneutics, see Gadamer, 1989.

basis of any form of continuous political power;³ it is only massive moral acceptance what gives birth -and keeps on going- any form of political institution.

The particular landscape our mind disposes of at every single moment is unique. Even in spite of different global schedules and jetlags, languages, colors, *etcaetera*; even in spite of all of those simultaneous differences, we are all inhabitants of a same planet.⁴ According to Silvia Rivera-Cusicanqui's view of time, past and present find themselves in a continuous struggle, which is to be won by a future of freedom and collective wealth. Such a view could be observed by analyzing a dialectic tension that would exist between nationalism and universalism, in the present time.

Although the planet is *one*, history follows different metrics as human evolution advances at diverse velocities. This *parametric* way of existence of time in history, is internalized into this thesis through the

³ According to her, "ce qui confere puissance aux institutions et aux lois d'un pays, c'est le soutien du peuple, lequel n'est quant à lui que la continuation de ce consensus originaire qui a appelé à la vie lois et institutions... Toutes les institutions politiques sont des manifestations et des matérialisations de puissance; elles se figent et s'écroulent aussitôt que la vivante puissance du peuple ne se tient plus derrière elles pour les soutenir. C'est ce que pensait Madison, lorsqu'il disait que tous les gouvernements reposent ultimement sur l' 'opinion'" (Arendt, 1970, 42).

⁴ This does not deny the fact that we are also socially unequal; recall the famous concept of a "ciudadanía a medias" taken from a latinamerican understanding of Marx, about the explicit social inequality that takes places in the framework of formal political equalities.

methodological category of “parametric universalism.”⁵ Universal values are *universal*, in disregard of the fact that we all remain diverse in an infinite and unique way; as individuals and as peoples. Monadic liebnizian universe is now open to pluriversal intersystemic epistemologies. Universe is no longer one, but many. Each universe has its own systemic epistemology, or its own greek *episteme*.⁶ A society gets more and more complex, the more and more it is able to internalize external chaos. How solid such an internalization is, is a progressive feature. The more “intelligent” a society is, the more “open minded” its epistemic conception is. Tacit universal consensus may arise from differences.

Water, air and earth are common goods to be protected through a global democracy called *ecocracy*. A traditional theoretical basis to accept the universality of this commons can be found in the *four elements’ principle*. According to this principle, every life form on Earth is, in his deepest roots, made of a certain combination of air, water, earth and fire, and therefore need them all to survive. Water, air and earth are actually damaged through human action, and need to be protected through human action. Human beings -no matter religion, country, nor any other differential- need to give a priority to the care of these environmental primary goods, for their own sake.

⁵ According to Simon Caney, parametric universalism “affirms a set of universal values but adds that they are applicable only when certain conditions are satisfied... Bearing this in mind, one could affirm as a transcultural value the importance of democracy and yet, consistent with this, deny that every society should have democratic institutions right here and now. There is a universal value but its relevance depends on some empirical conditions being met” (Caney, 2005, 29).

⁶ Niklas Luhmann very deeply got into the intersystemic way of life of societies (Luhmann, 1995).

Even if peoples do create an infinitely irreducible diversity of values regarding water, air and earth -since “the community itself provides the locus of values” (Brennan, 1995, 192)-, a political global regime to take care and protect this three common goods is needed by all.

Water, air and earth are common goods for every single way of life on this planet. Not to take care of these fundamental goods is morally unacceptable in front of present and future generations. Political contemporary world is proving to be unable to take care of them in a global scale. Global environmental problems force us to revisit a current confinement of democracy to a national scale. We need to make a shift from democratic participation as a political dynamic based on national membership status, to a more contemporary criterion of a qualified “all affected” principle, according to which every person should have a right to politically influence decisions regarding the care of water, air, and earth.

What kind of institutional design do we need to take care of these environmental global commons? This thesis is about to conceive a good institutional design that would allow humanity to take care and protect this goods through globally unified strategies. It is contrary to the common sense to divide into disperse and non continuous strategies the care of water, air and earth, since these elements are globally interconnected; local damages generate global harms.

Ecocracy assumes the fact of moral evolution.⁷ On that basis, this thesis will intellectually design a political model, in accordance to a hypothetical rise up of mass moral standards. It would be necessary to adopt a platonic position to do so, in order to propose a model of global democracy for morally evolved agents. Ecocracy is not meant to be a *good for all* global political model; it aims to a somehow minimal global democracy, only focused on the care and protection of water, air and earth. For the sake of environmental global commons, it would undertake a work of institutional political architecture. It assumes that we are all free and entitled of equal fundamental worth, and it takes as a design guideline an equal concern for all members of the global political community. The result will be an institutional design for a global democracy for the care and protection of environmental global commons.

The thesis is divided into two parts. The first one presents a theoretical state of art of contemporary cosmopolitanism. An extensive analysis of moral, cultural and political concerns of such a political-philosophical field, will be addressed. This first part will present main achievements and open questions, that such a theoretical corpus would have introduced. On top of both (achievements and open questions), the second part of the thesis will present a philosophical and institutional proposal named *ecocracy*. This second part will reconsider in a new perspective main subjects that contemporary cosmopolitanism has addressed. Ecocracy will be

⁷ This complex issue will be discussed at the beginning of the second part. Many authors would argue in favor of moral evolution: “the evolution of life... must be considered an *inevitable* process despite its indeterminate course... Astronomers speak with excitement of an ‘anthropic principle,’ which holds that the universe is constructed with a tendency to evolve life and mind” (Rolston, 1988, 196).

clearly shown as a heiress of such a political and philosophical debate. This second part would offer an institutional proposal, from which contemporary cosmopolitanism is lacking.

Part I

Contemporary cosmopolitanism

Cosmopolitanism envisions to create a unique global community of people of the world. As ancient as other greek concepts (see Harris, 1997), this notion has given the floor to numerous theoretical versions, focusing on institutions, morality, market, culture, and so on. In general, cosmopolitan theories can be primarily classified into three categories; those arguing in regard of *moral* cosmopolitanism, in regard of *political* cosmopolitanism, and in regard of *cultural* cosmopolitanism. Moral, political and cultural cosmopolitanisms refer here to either an accent on a common moral sensitiveness of humanity towards common issues (moral), or an accent on common institutions that would be needed in order to take care of common issues (political), or the very existence of any global community (cultural). The content of these concerns, even if wide, shall not be

considered as conceptually independent of one another. They are not mutually exclusionary, to the extent to which moral, political and cultural arguments tend to be merged. In fact, moral, cultural and political arguments are frequently referred to each other. Even if references are not always explicitly made, any idea that could be ascribed to one of these lines of argument would have direct implications for ideas that could be ascribed to the others.

Contemporary cosmopolitan literature can be analyzed in many different ways. Some would prefer to establish a gradation, according to which there would be *strict*, *moderate*, and *anti* cosmopolitanisms. This gradation would refer to a certain level of commitment (or rejection) towards cosmopolitan principles of human belonging to a single community, and to subsequent institutions that would be needed and pertinent (Kliengeld and Brown, 2014). In general kindly diffuse, contemporary cosmopolitan literature can be addressed through a multiple set of scopes. In this first part, contemporary cosmopolitanisms will be divided into a more subtle and varied categorization, inside of which moral, cultural and political arguments could be analytically differentiated. A wide state of art could be built on top of different issues that appear among contemporary theories. It would be unavoidable to leave, in each chapter, some open questions that would be eventually closed in other chapters.

A great variety of contemporary cosmopolitan theories will be presented by giving them a conceptual unity, and by introducing nuances when necessary. After an exhaustive presentation of cosmopolitan arguments concerning moral, cultural and political concerns, a remind of the main critiques and answers will be

committed. Finally, a situation of ecocracy in front of such a state of art will be presented. As a heiress of this variety of theories, ecocracy will be deeply presented in the second part. Ecocracy tries to incorporate main cosmopolitan arguments, and to give answers for open questions, through a global institutional proposal. Ecocracy will also offer an acceptable institutional answer to an urgent call to take care and protect environmental global commons.

As far as ecocracy is a contribution to contemporary cosmopolitanism, to situate main arguments of such a line of thought would be pertinent. For the purposes of this state of art, contemporary cosmopolitan literature is a *theoretical corpus* composed of recently published works (mostly from 2010's, 2000's and 1990's, and never from before 1970's, exempt from classical references), where strict cosmopolitan arguments are developed. Even if in some of those works the main field of analysis is not cosmopolitanism, references can be included when relevant and strictly cosmopolitan arguments are found.

This state of art retains and presents pertinent reasonings for political, moral and cultural cosmopolitan concerns. Such a presentation will be structured around different lines. First, moral concerns will be addressed, by dividing them into considerations regarding the moral background and the moral prospective of cosmopolitanism. Such a moral background will be composed of arguments in favor of moral universalism. The moral prospective will be composed of ideas regarding a projection of a cosmopolitan worldwide society. Second, cultural assessments about a global-local dilemma and about subsequent global-local belongings in regard of a

global citizenship will be considered. Finally, strictly political matters will be presented, by dividing them into problems of global political rights, the nation state and the issue of a global governance.

1

Moral background (moral concern I)

Cosmopolitanism needs to accept moral universalism. Simon Caney introduces a softened view of moral universalism, acceding to which it would only imply an acceptance of some norms that “should be applied everywhere on this earth”; a moral/legal conception that “maintains that there are some moral values that are valid across the world” (Caney, 2005, 25, 26). Onora O’Neill qualifies this point by saying that any moral universalism would need to combine a universal form (the same statement must be valid for all) and a

universal scope (such a statement must be applicable to all) (O'Neill, 1996). In addition, Brian Barry would argue that any universal value would be one that "cannot be rejected by any reasonable person" (Barry, 1995).

Instead of pre-given moral universal values, a plausible alternative for cosmopolitanism would be to opt for a *constructed* moral universalism, that would be accepted by all, as long as it would be a result of a global overlapping consensus building venture. An overlapping consensus refers to a dialogic mechanism through which supporters of different conceptions of the good could agree on specific universal values, without resigning their own systems of beliefs. A moral universalism would be therefore reached within a diverse world through such a dialogic mechanism:

"moral universalism would be satisfied in a world in which people of different cultures observe the same (just) values even if they do so for different reasons and on the basis of different moral doctrines. Adopting a terminology created by John Rawls, a number of thinkers have argued that there is an international 'overlapping consensus' on some moral values. By this they mean that different faiths or secular traditions (what Rawls terms comprehensive doctrines) can and do converge on some moral values. There is thus an 'overlapping consensus' on values even though there is no consensus as to which moral theory is the most plausible" (Caney, 2005, 29)... "Some philosophers have argued that although people affirm different comprehensive doctrines (such as Islam or Buddhism or Taoism) they can do converge on some specific ethical prescriptions" (Caney, 2005, 46).

Heiress of John Rawls, to whom the authorship of the theory of a moral overlapping consensus could be assigned, Martha Nussbaum

argues that a global overlapping consensus is fully available, and that it would be extremely valuable both for reasons of acceptability and for reasons of respect of politics:

"Unlike Rawls, and like the framers of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, I view such a consensus as fully available internationally across lines of tradition and religion. Our hope for an overlapping consensus does not require an additional premise that all materials in our argument are drawn from the traditions of Western democracies. But I still retain a role for the notion of overlapping consensus and the related notion of agreement. Thus it is part of what justifies the conception: that it can over time be justified to people who hold different comprehensive conceptions of the good life. Justification thus involves an idea of acceptability to all, or at least to the major conceptions of value. Acceptability is relevant to justification both for reasons of stability -a conception that is acceptable to all can be stable over time- and for reasons of respect" (Nussbaum, 2006, 161).

Amartya Sen says that to neglect the possibility of a global overlapping consensus is just a derivation of a mistaken prejudice; there are supposedly irreconcilable differences between western and non-western cultures. Such is only an *imagined dissent*, based on illegitimate presumptions and prejudices about non-western peoples:

"the liberty that is increasingly taken in quick generalizations about the past literature of non-Western countries to justify authoritarian Asian governments seems to have its analogue in the equally rapid Western belief that thoughts about justice and democracy have flourished only in the West, with the presumption that the rest of the world would find it hard going to keep up with the West. The world is perhaps less doomed than that" (Sen, 2002, 118).

The possibility of a fundamental global moral overlapping consensus, would render plausible a concrete moral universalism. A global overlapping consensus would need to consider that, given factual and social differences, such a moral universalism could crash against concrete conditions that would make it difficult to identically apply universal values to all. As a response to this challenge, Simon Caney proposes to consider universalism through a *parametric perspective*, according to which acceptable universal values would be those that being universally valid, could be applied according to different cultural-local circumstances (Caney, 2005, 29). A universal overlapping consensus about the care of water, air and earth, would be accepted by every local culture, by virtue of different moral reasons and within different practical contexts. Given the fact of diversity amongst peoples, universal values should be incorporated in a parametric way.

Moral universalism refers here to a conception about what is good for all of human beings. According to Martha Nussbaum, moral universalism is made of a universal scope, which she calls “the world”. She says that a moral universalism “asks us to give our first allegiance to what is morally good (the allegiance to the world) - and that which, being good, I can commend as such to all human beings” (Nussbaum, 2002, 5). Nussbaum incorporates a twofold structure of moral universalism, according to which a global agreement about what is good for all could seemingly coexist with a lack of agreement in front of the reasons to accept such agreed moral values.

As far as a universal moral overlapping consensus could be reached by individuals, it would be logical to adhere to individuals as units of ultimate moral concern. This line of thought neglects any form of "morality of states", since states are considered as instruments to realize moral commitments, for which human individual are the sole relevant unit. Kok-Chor Tan would argue that:

"a cosmopolitan global justice differs from the state-centric one in that it does not treat states as the ultimate unites of concern. The "morality of states" view thinks that an explicitly state-centered focus is sufficient. The cosmopolitan view, in contrast, insists that we need to maintain an individualistic focus... The cosmopolitan view is not that states are irrelevant, but that they should not be seen as the primary subjects for the purpose of global justice. A literally *international* theory of justice does not go far enough" (Tan, 2006, 38-39).

An additional argument in favor of this preference towards individuals in spite of groups, is that moral references to groups, such as nations or tribes, have been very frequently used as hypocrite arguments to justify evil done to individuals (Bok, 2002, 40). Nevertheless, such a preference would not imply a necessary contradiction between cosmopolitanism and statism. This point has been clarified by Charles Beitz, according to whom:

"There is no inconsistency in holding both that the ultimate appeal in questions of international justice is to the interests of individual persons and that, for political (and perhaps other) reasons, we must regard a decentralized world order as here to stay and work for reforms within its basic structure" (Beitz, 2000, 681).

A cosmopolitan focus on individuals has opened the gate for a debate about either or not cosmopolitanism is *per se* an egalitarian doctrine. Bridges between cosmopolitanism and egalitarianism have been built in different manners. One has been to affirm that global-egalitarianism is a universally valid principle, by verifying “the spreading of an egalitarian conception of global justice in the ethical convictions people hold in reflective equilibrium across the globe” (Van Parijs, 2011, 27). Relevant cosmopolitan authors, like Lea Ypi, have noted that, even if such a coincidence could be real, cosmopolitanism may not be considered as an egalitarian doctrine as such.

Egalitarianism, primarily, maintains that all humans are equal in fundamental worth. Cosmopolitanism is necessarily based on a fundamental egalitarian conception. By consequence, a suitable form of global democracy would need to incorporate a universal politically egalitarian conception, to the extent to which every person on earth would have an equal right to exercise political influence over global decisions.

Even though, cosmopolitanism is not always committed in favor of economic-egalitarian doctrines, for it would not necessarily entail forms of global economic distribution. Furthermore, a parametric universalist conception of cosmopolitanism would be in a conceptual contradiction with any *forced* egalitarianism. From a conceptual point of view, cosmopolitanism should be distinguished from egalitarianism. According to Ypi,

"It should be noted that not all cosmopolitans defend global egalitarianism. Many are limited to supporting a

rights-based conception of global justice, others pursue needs-based accounts, and others still endorse theories of global democracy... if more demanding forms of cosmopolitanism can be defended, the route to integrating and reforming is straightforward" (Ypi, 2012, 180).

As a theoretical derivation, the floor has been given to a debate about a linkage between cosmopolitanism and global distributive justice. Well known authors like John Rawls have argued against any form of global distributive justice, considering it as impossible (Rawls, 1999). Again, there is not a conceptual necessity in such a linkage. A cosmopolitan concern about individuals, regardless of nationalities or cultural boundaries, would not necessarily imply distributive assessments. Cosmopolitanism is not equivalent to global distribution of wealth. This point has been made by Kok-Chor Tan, according to whom:

"the cosmopolitan conception of global distributive justice obviously affirms cosmopolitanism as a doctrine about justice. It holds that our principles of distribution ought to apply to all individuals globally, and not be restricted and shaped by national boundaries. But this idea of justice, as shown above, is independent of cosmopolitanism understood as a doctrine about culture. Cosmopolitan distributive justice, fundamentally understood, says nothing about the value or disvalue of membership in a national culture. Distributive justice is foremost concerned with how resources and wealth are to be fairly allocated, and can remain neutral about the separate issue of culture and individual freedom" (Tan, 2002, 444).

A moral background for contemporary cosmopolitanism could be made of a logic concatenation of a moral parametric universalism and an individual centered approach. If there are universal values, it is because every individual around the world agrees about its validity,

regardless of national, cultural, or any other kind of collective differentiation. Collective, cultural and social differences are a reason to accept parametric applications of universal values, but never a reason for any alleged global incompatibility.

Therefore, cosmopolitanism, being a primarily individualistic doctrine, would assume the existence of what should be called *global commons*. Global commons are goods or resources that are accessible and necessary to all of human beings. Natural goods such as water, air, and earth, would be global commons *par excellence*. Earth is here conceived as vegetable earth. These global commons are a material basis to build a global overlapping consensus. The care of natural global commons could be assumed as an implicit transcultural agreement. By consequence, the moral values allocated to its care, and the subsequent strategies to protect them, would be a core subject of a plausible global overlapping consensus building venture. Ecocracy is a proposal for an institutional scenario, both to build such an overlapping consensus and to effectively take care of water, air, and earth at a planetary scale.

A commons-based moral universalism leads to an institutional cosmopolitanism. In this respect, some have noted that a plausible care of global commons would need a institutional backrest, otherwise being condemned to failure. Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu argue that:

“if the impact of each party is negligible, since the number of parties involved is big and, consequently, the reluctance to be unfair to other parties tends to be weak because most of the other parties will scarcely know each other,

then the tragedy of the commons will be especially hard to avoid" (Persson and Savulescu, 2012, 72).

A point that can be derived from this idea, is that being an individual-based doctrine, cosmopolitanism could not be based on the sole action of individuals to succeed in the protection of global commons. A commons-based moral cosmopolitanism would refer, necessarily, to any form of a structured, institutionalized and coordinated global action.

An articulation between individuals' cultural diversities and the need of a globally unified institutional action, imposes to cosmopolitanism a challenge to incorporate the values of self-determination of communities. According to Simon Caney,

"Those who favor cosmopolitan institutions must provide answers to serious questions: whether the democratic principle represented by 'cosmopolitan democracy' conflicts with other moral values. For example, would democratic global institutions be illiberal and intolerant? Or, would cosmopolitan democracy prove incompatible with honoring other values like self-determination of communities?" (Caney, 2005, 158).

As a cosmopolitan institution, ecocracy derives from a commons-based moral cosmopolitanism. A concern about an institutional unification of the world needs to incorporate moral concerns about self-determination of communities and to be difference sensitive. As Persson and Savulescu suggest, individuals would need to see their individual impact in global decisions enhanced. A combination of difference sensitivity and an enhanced individual impact inside of a

global institution, would lead to prefer a global *democracy* over any other form of collective decision making procedure.

Contemporary cosmopolitan literature seems to have an agreement in front of adopting an instrumental approach to institutions. As it will be shown afterwards in this state of art, such a theoretical decision is specially relevant in regard of the nation state. From the moral background of a plausible cosmopolitanism, as the one that has been presented here, a democracy could be deduced as a preferable political system.

Democracy refers primarily to *the government of the people*. In more concrete terms, it refers to the power that people has over an institution. Why a cosmopolitan institution would need to be democratic? An answer would need to identify global moral agreements and to see whether a democratic regime would be a fitted instrument to further them. Some arguments will be presented in this chapter. Some other arguments in favor of a global *democracy* will be presented by the end of this first part.

A first cosmopolitan moral concern would be to build a global overlapping consensus. A global overlapping consensus is the sole acceptable moral global consensus, given the fact of an extreme diversity. Such a consensus could only be built by individual actors; such a consensus building process would need lay people's participation. As long as a global moral overlapping consensus would need to gain a legal stability to orientate further policies, an adequate mechanism to incorporate such a consensus would be a global

constitution. A democratic constitution would be a fitted mechanism in regard of environmental moral concerns.

A second moral concern of a cosmopolitan institution would be to protect environmental global commons. For such a purpose, such a global institution would need to be *global*, to the extent to which it would need to unify the protective action, which would otherwise be disseminated due to the discreteness of the interstate system. Given the fact of diversity, such a unified protective action would need to take into consideration different ways in which local peoples relate themselves to water, air, and earth. An enhanced democratic participation would be a fitted mechanism to create difference sensitive sets of global norms.

A third moral concern of cosmopolitanism in front of a global political institution is to defend the self-determination of local communities. Local communities and individuals need to exercise any degree of influence over decisions regarding the care of our fundamental commons. Democratic participation and representation would be fitted mechanisms to incorporate communities' and individuals' self-determination into a global decision making process.

As long as a cosmopolitan institutional arrangement is valued only *as an instrument to further* moral goals, a democratic cosmopolitan regime would be preferable than any other form of collective decision making mechanism (namely technocracy, monarchy, aristocracy, etc). An assumption of the former theoretical decision is that there is a global acceptance of the legitimacy of a public institution which is ultimately ruled by the people. Something as a *democratic culture*

(which would consist on an acceptance of the legitimacy of an institution that is ultimately ruled by the people) can be identified in any contemporary culture.

2

Moral prospective (moral concern II)

Based on the formerly presented moral background, a possible way to conceive a consistent contemporary cosmopolitan view of future, needs to incorporate a parametric perspective and a global overlapping consensus building venture. Cosmopolitanism conceptually expects a world that would have advanced in a direction globally shared normative standards, in disregard of whatever kind of boundaries. As long as such shared principles would be constructed within a moral overlapping consensus building venture, institutional

cosmopolitanism expects to create a global scenario where such a global consensus could be built.

Omar Dahbour pleads for the creation of a cosmopolitan global institution, conceived as a community of law, where common global procedures and institutions would be applied without restriction by particular states or local laws. He argues that:

“A community of law focuses on the creation of a borderless world through the establishment of laws, rules, procedures, and institutions that will gradually supersede particular sovereignties and political loyalties. Transnational organizations of all kinds, whether governmental or nongovernmental, have a role to play in this process. But the goal is a world in which global standards of justice are eventually applied universally, without restriction by particular states or local laws” (Dahbour, 2005, 203).

Along with an institutional unification, a moral minimal unification has been also envisioned. Hans Küng insists in a global ethical unification through the creation of a minimal basic consensus. For this kind of view, cosmopolitanism would bring to a moral *reestablishment* of humanity, by formulating global normative standards. According to Hans Küng,

"the one world in which we live has a chance of survival only if there is no longer any room in it for spheres of differing, contradictory, and even antagonistic ethics. This one world needs one basic ethic" (Küng, 1991, 9).

A moral unification would not necessarily imply a political destruction of nation states. David Held considers that cosmopolitan objectives

could be satisfied in a cosmopolitan framework, inside of an international community of democratic states, which would be a *cosmopolitan democratic community*. David Held holds this position, by saying that:

“a commitment to this form of cosmopolitanism entails a duty to work toward the establishment of an international community of democratic states and societies committed to upholding democratic public law both within and across their own boundaries: a cosmopolitan democratic community” (Held, 1995, 423).

Simon Caney argues that such a political or moral unification could only be built on the basis of global *commons*. A global moral unification of the world, that would give place to an effective moral universalism, could not be built on the vacuum nor on theoretical principles, but only on top of relevant *commonalities*, namely, commonly shared goods such as water, air, and earth. Simon Caney stands, in this respect, that:

“if there are to be rules with a universal form (they apply without exception to all in the relevant group) and with a universal scope (the relevant group encompasses all humanity), then there must be relevant commonalities” (Caney, 2005, 38).

A reason why theoretical principles would not be considered as pertinent basis for a moral unification of the world, is that moral principles are always considered, by their own believers, as universally valid. From a first person's perspective, different moral values would be formally identical, since they would all have the form of a universal validity. Because of the same reason, such moral

assessments could be mutually exclusionary. This phenomenon is explained by Caney in the following terms:

“from *within* a practice persons think of their convictions as being universally valid. The relativist position may work as a third-person account of other people’s views (*they* are just following the norms of their culture) but is incompatible with the first person perspective of the participants themselves” (Caney, 2005, 43).

Instead of theoretical moral principles, it would be preferable to look forward for a moral and institutional unification of the world, based on top of *global commons*. For diverse communities, with different moral conceptions, it would much more feasible to find moral agreements in regard of the care of water, air, and earth, than with regard of what kind of principles should rule their ethical behavior.

To resign a “theoretical” consensus regarding moral abstract principles, would not mean to resign a unification of the world regarding other matters. A unification through a consensus regarding environmental global commons would lead to a further unification regarding other concrete topics. In that sense, Kok-Chor Tan considers that such a unification would also mean to give a moral order to a currently chaotic economic interdependency. According to Kok-Chor Tan,

“What is needed, in other words, is not an outright renunciation of global economic interdependency, but better global principles and institutions to regulate this interdependency, and to distribute the burdens and benefits of globalization more equitably. The current failings of globalization are due more to the lack of proper

governance of economic integration than to the fact of integration itself” (Tan, 2006, 32).

A commons-based cosmopolitanism would give a moral consistency to economic integration, thanks to its individual-centric perspective. Tan considers that the current social failure of economic interdependency is due to a non cosmopolitan, state-centric approach to international relations. An individual-centric approach provides an alternative for a better prospective of a future economic development, which would take into account its consequences for concrete people. In this sense, Tan says that:

“it is due to such a state-centric approach, I would conjecture, that structural adjustment programs of the IMF have failed miserably in terms of human development. IMF structural adjustments aim to bolster a country’s faltering economy, but largely neglect the social and economic costs of these programs to certain groups of *individuals*, penalizing more often than not the most needy individuals (e.g., those who rely on government subsidies for food, fuel, etc.). A cosmopolitan focus will keep the well-being of individuals firmly in our sight, and not overlook the human and social dimensions to development, and hence be less prone to making such costly mistakes” (Tan, 2006, 38).

An individual-based global democracy would give a voice to lay people, even if they come to be situated inside non democratic national regimes. By addressing lay people in a democratic way, a global democracy would help to produce democratic transformations over current national institutions, by enhancing democratic beliefs in individuals, and therefore promoting national adaptations to growing national democratic cultures. An exponent of this argument is David Held, for whom:

"The (global democratic public law) lays down a range of criteria which may be deemed to conflict with a country's or community's actual institutions, organizations and practices. It set up, thereby, an agenda for change and a direction for policy to which 'offending' institutions, laws and policies could, in principle, adapt if they are to claim justifiably the mantle of democracy" (Held, 2005, 205).

A transformation of national institutions would be a consequence of the fact that individuals, by virtue of their participation into a global democracy, would internalize democratic cosmopolitan principles. National democratic (and non democratic) regimes would adapt their selves to individual's transformations. In other terms, such an adaptation would bring about a transformation of the role of the national citizen, by the fact of the implementation of a global citizenship. According to David Held, such a tendency could bring national and global citizenships to coincide:

"The principles of individual democratic states and societies could come to coincide with those of cosmopolitan democratic laws. As a consequence, the rights and responsibilities of people *qua* national citizens and *qua* subjects of cosmopolitan law could coincide, and democratic citizenship could take on, in principle, a truly universal status" (Held, 2005, 233).

This possible coincidence presented by Held, would answer to an argument which is often presented against cosmopolitanism in the name of patriotism. Roughly, patriotism can be conceived as a devotion to one's country. As shown by Held, patriotism would not necessarily entail a contradiction in front of cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitanism considers patriotism as an illegitimate bias, *if and only if* it is presented in contradiction with cosmopolitanism. To be more specific, a patriotism could be in contradiction with

cosmopolitanism if it stands a form of national superiority in front of other nations (in other terms, if patriotism turns into a *chauvinism*). In the name of a broadened human belonging, a moral prospection of cosmopolitanism would be to supersede such a chauvinist bias, which would introduce a non necessary contradiction between patriotism and cosmopolitanism. An exponent of this argument is David Miller, for whom:

“It might seem that the argument from social trust to patriotic bias underrates the bearing of foreign needs on respect and trust, in two different ways. First of all, this argument might seem to ignore the existence of international economic interdependence. But the argument is only meant to justify a bias, and only relies on the fact that interdependence among compatriots is specially intense and specially vulnerable to distrust and disrespect” (Miller, 1998, 213).

To supersede a chauvinist bias, together with a transformation of national regimes in a cosmopolitan way, would finally bring about the construction of what some consider to be the ultimate prospection of cosmopolitanism, which is to build a truly global cosmopolitan democracy. A plausible contemporary cosmopolitan prospection would be made of national transformed units able to coexist with a cosmopolitan global democracy. Such a global democracy would be a political scenario where individual people around the world would build a global overlapping consensus, in regard of shared global commons. Such a cosmopolitan achievement would bring about a desirable renouncement to *illegitimate* contradictions between traditional national claims and cosmopolitan ones.

3

Local-global dilemma (cultural concern I)

Cultural concerns have represented major challenges for cosmopolitanism. A strong and widespread critique to universalism is related to cultural differences. In a radical perspective, cultural diversity is often presented as an unbearable burden for any universalistic claim. Given such a supposed concrete impossibility, universalism would be seen as an ideological facade behind which imperialistic intentions would be hidden. Richard Falk shows that

such an imperialistic position is not longer suitable, since the colonial order has fallen:

“In the case of decolonization, the values of self-determination and the ideology of nationalism had long challenged the legitimacy and stability of the colonial order. The story of decolonization is, of course, many stories. Each struggle was distinct, but there were general conditions that resulted in an overall shift in the relation of forces within the wider colonial reality. A new flow of history ensued that could not have been reasonably anticipated even a few decades before it occurred” (Falk, 2000, 319).

A cosmopolitan answer to that critique consists in a differentiation between colonial universalistic discourses and emancipatory ones. It is forcible to acknowledge that universalistic discourses could embody either of two. A plausible contemporary cosmopolitan discourse would be one that would universalize self-determination and autonomy, in a framework of global democratic institutions. In regard of such an assertion, David Held explains that:

“It could be objected that the language of autonomy and self-determination has limited cross-culture validity because of its Western origins. But a distinction must be made between those political terms and discourses which obscure or underpin particular interests and power systems and those which seek to test explicitly the generalisability of claims and interests, and to render power, whether it be political, economic or cultural, accountable” (Held, 2003, 472).

Charles Beitz argues that a cosmopolitan generalization of the value of self-determination of peoples would be in accordance with a

rawlsian claim of the self-respect of peoples, which would be in some cases used to criticize cosmopolitanism. Reading Beitz:

“Why should the Law of Peoples be considered in two steps, first from the perspective of liberal societies and then from that of decent non-liberal ones? Part of the answer is that liberal and decent peoples have different fundamental interests which they bring to bear on the appraisal of principles for foreign policy. These differences reflect the differences in their political cultures: each type of people is fundamentally interested in securing international conditions in which their cultures and institutions can flourish. They are interested, moreover, in a “proper self-respect of themselves as a people, resting on their common awareness of their trials during their history and of their culture with its accomplishments.” Therefore, they insist “on receiving from other peoples a proper respect and recognition of their equality” (pp. 34–35). They would want to be assured that acceptance of any particular international principles would be compatible with their self-respect as a people” (Beitz, 2000, 675).

Another line of argument that disputes against cosmopolitanism argues that local communities and traditions are the unique field in side of which authentic moral values are created and reproduced. Such, given that, as Michael Sandel says:

“as members of this family or community or nation or people, as bearers of this history, as sons or daughters of that revolution, as citizens of this republic” (Sandel 1981, 179).

A consistent cosmopolitan account would accept that local belongings, and derived national citizenships, are not morally nor politically arbitrary, since moral duties are frequently defined by local ties. Bikhu Perekh argues that “while we have duties to human beings in general, we also have duties or obligations to those to

whom we are bound by special ties. The basis and content of these special duties are defined by the nature of the ties involved" (Perekh, 2003, 6). In coherence, Appiah adduces in favor of proximity ties, by saying:

"Since human beings live in political orders narrower than species, and since it is within those political orders that questions of public right and wrong are largely argued out and decided, the fact of being a fellow-citizen -someone who is a member of the same order - is not morally arbitrary at all" (Appiah, 2002, 28).

Even more, Putnam says that traditions are not only morally pertinent, but also epistemologically necessary. Such an heuristic pertinence of local traditions would open the gate for local reinterpretations of cosmopolitanism. Hilary Putnam says:

"My appeal to traditions, and my defense of their necessity, should not be misunderstood. As I have argued elsewhere, something we have learned from the conduct of moral inquiry itself is that inherited moral beliefs can be criticized, and that discovery is truly precious legacy of the Enlightenment. But without inherited ways of life there is nothing for critiqueism to operate on, just as without critical reason there is no way for us to distinguish between what should be saved (perhaps after reinterpretation) and what should be scrapped from our various traditions" (Putnam, 2002, 96).

A combined version of the previously exposed critical positions would argue that it would be impossible to postulate a single universal conception of the good, because cultural insights cannot be unifiable through mathematical mechanisms. This is Hilary Putnam's point, when saying:

"There is no such a thing as a universal conception of "the good life". Why is this? First, of course, because there isn't just one form of life that is "good". The life of a genuinely spiritual religious community, the life of a group of inspired bohemian artists, the life of a dedicated group of community organizers, the life of a creative group of computer programmers, and many other lives can all be good in utterly incompatible ways (of course, they can also be terrible). And second, because good lives do not just spring from rational insights, in the way in which the proof that the area of a circle is π times the square of the radius sprang independently of the minds of ancient Greek and ancient Chinese mathematicians" (Putnam, 2002, 94).

Recognizing cultural-localists' arguments, a consistent contemporary cosmopolitanism could turn into what I call a transformed *communitarian cosmopolitanism*. A communitarian cosmopolitanism is a *built* cosmopolitanism. A building that would be built by local communities through dialogue with other communities around the world. A cosmopolitanism that would be both a process and an achievement of global overlapping consensus building venture.

Such a communitarian cosmopolitanism would look for the building of a *second order* global community, on the basis of *first order* local communities. First and second order communities would not be contradictory, to the extent to which one person would not need to resign his or her cultural belongings towards a local culture or nation to satisfactorily vindicate a global belonging to a global community. Besides this non contradictoriness, the unification of the terms communitarianism and cosmopolitanism would imply that this sort of cosmopolitanism could promote the strengthening of local ties, which would meanwhile strengthen their own ties with a global community.

The communitarian aspect of this sort of cosmopolitanism would be a logical derivation of the moral principle of self-determination of communities. This kind of cosmopolitanism would base any global consensus, whether moral or institutional, on top of local communities. A *communitarian cosmopolitanism* would be consistent with an acceptance, that can be found within communitarian literature, of a “minimal and universal moral code” (Walzer 1987, 24). The construction of such a minimal moral code could coincide with a global overlapping consensus building venture. According to Charles Taylor:

“we would agree on the norms while disagreeing on why they were the right norms, and we would be content to live in this consensus, undisturbed by the differences of profound underlying belief” (Taylor 1999, 124).

In accordance with a line of argument presented in the previous chapter, such a consensus could be reached in regard of global commons. This kind of shared natural goods would coincide with a feature of what local communities use to base their ties on, which is called by Charles Taylor “higher, strongly evaluated goods” (Taylor 1989).

Instead of disputing the communitarian roots of moral belongings, a consistent contemporary cosmopolitanism would prefer to separate communitarian arguments from statist ones. Lea Ypi argues that from local attachments one shall not derive political boundaries for cooperation. Lea Ypi says that:

“it is often emphasized how the (statist) view arbitrarily restricts the sphere where relevant associative relations of coercion and cooperation might be found. These, it is often said, hardly ever characterize *only* institutional relations mediated by the states and might also be presented in sub-state or supra-state units affecting individuals’ life more broadly conceived” (Ypi, 2012, 73).

In coherence with what I call a *communitarian cosmopolitanism*, an attention to this local-global dispute has given the floor to a version of cosmopolitanism known as the “autonomous communities model”. A major exponent of this conception is Omar Dahbour, for whom :

“Communities conceiving of the world as a community of autonomous communities is most attractive to those seeking protection for regions, and localities faced with subsumption by aggressive states and corporations within a global market or political empire... If moral cosmopolitanism is equivalent to a view of all human beings as having equal dignity and worthiness, this sort of cosmopolitanism is not inconsistent with a particularistic political philosophy - indeed, it is presupposed by it, since the notion of the self-determination of peoples that underlies the ideal of communal autonomy is based on just such a logically outlook... the underlying principle that define this autonomy -including those of sustainability and self-sufficiency- are universalist and rooted in an ecological perspective” (Dahbour, 2005, 204, 222, 223).

An extremely particularistic view could emphasize in a critique to the very conceptual roots of cosmopolitanism. According to such a critique, a cultural problem of cosmopolitanism is precisely its holistic vision, which would necessarily hypostatize particular versions of experience. Nicholas Birns exposes this critique by saying:

“This leads to the other, more conceptual problem with holism. Its stress that the whole inevitably exercises a discursive constraint on the partial constituents it seeks to include. In its organicist emphasis on coherence and totality, it is bound to hypostatize some particular version of experience even when it claims to be integrating its parts into an overarching whole” (Birns, 1992, 151).

A possible answer to this critique would be to adopt an hermeneutical vision of local discursive interaction and deliberative construction of particular experiences. According to such an hermeneutical perspective, local experiences would be constructed on the basis of pre-interpretative and interpretative interactions, that would open the gate to a comprehension of foreign others, in a sequence that would forcibly reach an openness to a global consensus. This point has been introduced by Orosco, when saying:

“the dynamics within a community of interpretation support the development of a rational and moral point of view among its members and model a conception of public reason appropriate for conflict resolution. By encouraging parties to enter into a reciprocal and interpretive conversation with others, the community of interpretation promotes dispositions of fairness, open-mindedness, and a willingness to alter one's position when reason or evidence demands it... The formation of any global community that can support the kind of world citizenship that cosmopolitans cherish will gain legitimacy only by institutionalizing those global norms and values developed through dialogue within a just international civil society” (Orosco, 2003, 211, 214).

Such a phenomenon of cultural open-mindedness would be a necessary condition for any global community building venture. Some cosmopolitan authors provide examples on how a global

community building venture would help local perspectives to find sympathies in different latitudes. A point made by Charles Bray:

“A (global) community-building venture would simultaneously appeal to the deep idealism in the American soul (and America’s urgent needs at home) and the legion of idealist in other lands. America would be helping itself even as it helped others” (Bray, 1993, 95).

The acceptance of an hermeneutic open-mindedness would bring to consider a local-global dispute as being partially resolved, thanks to an enhanced universal communication. Universal communication is considered by cosmopolitan authors as a basis for a global community building venture. Fonna Forman-Barzilai fundamentals this consideration on top of an smithian theory of sympathy, according to which it would be global mutual association and connexion what would give the floor to a mutual feeling of sympathy and to a derived feeling of community in a global scale. Fonna Forman-Barzilai says:

“We come now to a second, somewhat overlapping, space within which Smith considered the possibility of sympathy: that of affective space. Affect for Smith is the emotional outcome of "association" and "connexion" with others over time, which commonly evolve through our physical proximity and shared experiences with them” (Forman-Barzilai, 2005, 200).

A consistent contemporary cosmopolitanism would not seek to eliminate local attachments. It would, instead, plead to pluralize the ties of sympathy in a global perspective. This clarification is also made by Patrap Mehta, who argues that:

The form of affective identification much of the new cosmopolitanism envisions is also different... it seeks to

more effectively pluralize our attachments, enhance our solidarities, especially with groups that exemplify transnational modes of belonging, in a way commensurate with the complex macrointerdependencies that affect us” (Mehta, 2000, 623).

A communitarian cosmopolitanism considers that local cultures are not separable from wider processes of global integration. In other terms, it would not find a contradiction between localities and universalism. Such an assertion would both circumvent ethnocentric’s and cultural-imperialistic’s critiques. This kind of cosmopolitanism would be presented by Mehta as one that would be consonant with demands of taking cultural diversity seriously:

“the image of culture as something that can be individuated and identified apart from its immersion in wider processes is a mistake. There usually are no "natives", fixed and localized as opposed to cosmopolitans traveling freely. The natives themselves are immersed in intercultural communication and exchange; there are few localities that exist apart from the world... I firmly believe that cosmopolitanism and its kindred concept, universalism, need not be ethnocentric in the sense of being identified with the practices of one particular set of cultures” (Mehta, 2000, 631, 633).

Local cultures’ global interconnection is enforced by *technological globalization*. A phenomenon of increased global interconnectedness, is an additional argument in favor of a conception of culture as a dynamic and globally integrated experience. In general terms, culture refers to share habits and capabilities acquired by persons as participants in the social learning networks of a society. Therefore, an increased global communicative interconnection would bring about a global network of social learning that would help to build a globally

integrated culture. Specifically, technological interconnection has been pointed out as a matter of increased shared visual consumption. Kristy Best, for example, argues:

"I suggest that shifting circumstances in modes of visual consumption of environments produce new intensities in our relationships with physical environments. As screens become increasingly portable and digitized, they modify our relationships with environments" (Best, 2004, 68).

Such an increased technological exchange is considered by Mustapha Kamall Pasha as an experience that could enhance and qualify social and cultural interconnectedness, in a way that would not be limited to global market. In this sense, he says that:

"It would be a mistake, however, to neglect new forms of social connectedness on a global scale, often occasioned by the expansion of the global market, but not limited to its logic" (Kamall, 2002, 123).

A communitarian cosmopolitanism would still have a dispute with cultural relativists, for whom local cultures would be determined *only* by local contextual criteria, which would be altered -or denied- by global dominant contextual dynamics. A possible way to answer is to say that cultures, and moral values, are not only *determined*, whether by local or global contexts, but that they are also rationally built. Recognizing a human wide rationality, and an increased ability to communicate one-self, it would be possible to refute strict relativists, adducing that they hold a reduced deterministic understanding of culture. This point has been made by Garret Brown:

“The second normative concern with the dependency thesis is that casual conditioning does not seem to be based on any rational human process, but seems to be a purely determined and conditioned response to cultural embeddedness. By holding a singular view of moral conditioning, cultural relativists seem to dismiss human reason as a possible source of moral identification and therefore devalue any imperatives people might develop for holding certain universal morals as true. What is troubling with this account is the level of reductionism that relativists assign to their understanding of culture. For cultural relativists seem to be basing their normative arguments on strict determinism, maintaining that the reasons for holding certain moral beliefs are not predicated on any rational criteria, but are simply determined by bounded cultural circumstances” (Brown, 2009, 135).

In front of a pretended cultural local-global dilemma, a consistent contemporary cosmopolitanism would react by resigning a strict globalist cosmopolitanism in favor of a communitarian one, based on top of an increased global interconnection and a coexistence of both local and cosmopolitan values. Even more, such a dilemma would be superseded by a recognition of the fact that cosmopolitan values would be attained by local actors embedded in local cultures. In consequence, such a local-global dilemma would be considered as a non necessary one; it would be plausibly superseded through a *communitarian cosmopolitanism*. Such a sort of cosmopolitanism would have institutional implications, to the extent to which a global institution would need to enhance local ties by giving to local actors an important role to play in cosmopolitan definitions. For a communitarian cosmopolitanism, to promote a reconciliation and convergence of local communities and a global community would be a task, that it could seemingly undertake through creative institutional arrangements.

4

Citizenship: local-global belongings (cultural concern II)

A global democracy necessarily implies a global citizenship, to the extent to which a *citizenship* is considered as a status of political recognition given to individuals by a political institution. If citizenship is related to nation states, it is because such political institutions give a political recognition to its individual members. A shared citizenship implies shared political rights, given that political rights use to be a necessary content of a citizenship. An objection to a global citizenship says that a citizenship needs to be based on a shared political culture, that would make meaningful the exercise of a shared

citizenship. A possible way to answer to this objection is to explain that a global citizenship within a global democracy needs to be based on top of a shared global democratic culture. A minimal democratic global culture consists on a seemingly globally shared acceptance of the *legitimacy* of an institution ruled under the power of the people.

A factor which is frequently adduced as giving meaningfulness to national citizenships, is the fact that the concerned set of people share a common culture. An argument to favor a global citizenship would need to identify a common global culture, and would need to define the scope of the rights granted by a global political institution. It would be plausible to identify a democratic global culture, on top of which a global democracy would be based. On top of this assumption, a consistent cosmopolitan account favors the creation of a global citizenship. A global citizenship is a necessary feature of a democratic cosmopolitanism. An exponent of this dominant perspective is Simon Caney, how argues that:

“Institutions on their own are not guaranteed to produce benign policies and what is needed are certain character traits and certain culture as well. This is brought by David Campbell who commends a certain ethos -what he terms ‘the ethos of democracy’ (1998: 196)- by which he means a culture in which people call into question established identities, entrenched understandings about the way things ought to be, and ways of framing questions about what we ought to do and who we are (1998: 195-208, 219)... Without a democratic culture, cosmopolitan institutional frameworks are likely to stagnate and are less likely to be able to challenge and contest prevalent attitudes (towards, among other issues, duties to those overseas). Global political institutions should thus be complemented with, rather than replaced by, a transnational democratic culture” (Caney, 2005, 173).

A democratic cosmopolitanism is deeply rooted in a communitarian one. A communitarian democratic cosmopolitanism, on the one hand, assumes the existence of a minimal global democratic culture, and, on the other hand, assumes as a task the reproduction of such a culture among self-determining local peoples. A cosmopolitan democracy would be based on an idea of the self-determination of peoples. As long as this is so, such a global democracy would not be in a contradiction with national nor local cultures. Simon Caney argues that “people clearly care about their well-being and quality of life generally” (Caney 2005, 177) and that “people wish to see their nation flourish” (Caney, 2005, 178), in a sense that respecting local cultures is fully compatible with an ideal of a cosmopolitan democracy. Even if global and local cultures are not necessarily convergent, a task of a global democratic institution would be to create a scenario inside of which a positive dialogic relationship between a global democracy and local cultures would take place. Again, Simon Caney argues that:

“The reasoning underlying this claim is simply that self-determining nations (when this includes both weak and strong forms of self-determination) have both the incentive and the ability to foster their nation’s culture and heritage” (Caney, 2005, 178)... “Respecting people’s interests in local cultures is thus compatible with the ideal of cosmopolitan democracy... The construction of political institutions should bear in mind their effect on people’s cultures including their national cultures” (Caney, 2005, 181-182).

Amy Gutmann considers that a local-global dispute is in fact a false dilemma, which would not only be misleading but also politically

dangerous. Gutmann rejects any obligation to choose between national and global citizenships. Referring to school education, she argues that:

“Schools should also teach students that there are demands of morality and justice that do not depend on democratic citizenship for their realization -for example, the demands of family and friendship. But to teach either lesson with intellectual integrity, schools must move beyond the morally misguided and politically dangerous idea of asking us to choose between being, above all, citizens of our own society or, above all, citizens of the world. We are, above all, none of the above” (Gutmann, 2002, 71).

Cosmopolitan arguments in regard of a global culture are criticized because of their supposed implications in front of nationality and patriotism. According to that kind of critique, national identity and patriotism would turn out to be irrelevant within a cosmopolitan cultural framework. Amartya Sen reminds some of such reactions against cosmopolitanism, in the following terms:

“Sissela Bok is worried that... “all claims to national or other identity” are “morally irrelevant”. Bok finds Nussbaum perilously close to William Godwin’s view that “if two persons are drowning and one is a relative of yours, the kinship (or, presumably, nationality -Bok’s addition) should make no difference in your decision as to whom to try to rescue first”. Bok argues cogently, quoting Rabindranath Tagore, whom Nussbaum also quoted, that “there is nothing wrong with encouraging children fully to explore their most local existence in order eventually to reach beyond it”. Second, Hilary Putnam attacks the rejection of patriotism that is entailed by Nussbaum’s position, and argues that “the best kind of patriotism - loyalty to what is best in traditions(s) one has inherited- is indispensable” (Sen, 2002, 112).

Nationality and patriotism are defended on the basis of a justification of the solidarity belonging ties which are created thanks to traditional symbols' sharing and proximity relationships, generated by nations. Local belongings would therefore confer a fundament to national citizenships. Given the absence of a global political institution which would create the scenario of a global citizenship, a global citizenship would be rejected *ex ante*. Amartya Sen shows that, from the perspective of those critiques, a world citizenship would render irrelevant the very notion of citizenship:

“Gertrude Himmelfarb presents the argument, among others, that the terms *world citizen* and *world citizenship* have “little meaning except in the context of a state”. Michel Walzer takes a similar view. The implication of Nussbaum's position, Himmelfarb argues, is to render irrelevant “the polity that defines the nation” and even the normal idea of “citizenship” -and even “all of history”. Himmelfarb also notes the importance of “justice”, “right”, “reason”, and “love of humanity”, and claims that “not even the most ardent cosmopolitan would argue that this are the values of ‘humanity as a whole’”. She argues that these are “predominately, perhaps even uniquely, Western values (Sen, 2002, 112).

A reason bestowing coherence to those reactions would be that local cultural belongings do confer solidity to the functioning of national citizen's democracies. Such an underlying argument has been presented by Charles Taylor, in the following terms:

A citizen democracy can only work if most of its members are convinced that their political society is a common venture of considerable moment and believe it to be of such vital importance that they participate in the ways they must to keep it functioning as a democracy. Such a participation requires not only a commitment to the

common project, but also a special sense of bonding among the people working together (Taylor, 2002, 120).

A consistent contemporary cosmopolitanism could accept the above mentioned premises about the cultural solidity of any citizenship, but would reject its conclusions about the inconsistency of a global citizenship. From Taylor's perspective, a community cannot be global, because it would intrinsically lack binding commonalities that are necessary for a relevant community to exist. As it has been shown here in regard of environmental global commons, such would be a false assumption. There is no problem about accepting that cultural belongings are an ineluctable basis for any, national or cosmopolitan, citizenship to work properly. What is identified by a cosmopolitan account is that people do belong, simultaneously, to different communities, which significantly affect them. Such communities are defined in terms of the extent of the commons begin affected, which could be in fact whether local, national, regional or global. As long as a community could be based on top of global common goods, that would awake a globally common sense of bounding among the people around, that would bring people of the world to work together. By consequence, national and global political recognitions could coexist; people would be able to consistently enjoy multiple citizenships. David Held presents this argument in the following terms:

"People would come, thus, to enjoy multiple citizenships - political membership in the diverse political communities which significantly affected them. They would be citizens of their immediate political communities, and of the wider regional and global networks which impacted upon their lives" (Held, 2005, 140).

It is be possible to argue in favor of multiple levels of pertinent citizenships. This is not only an adequate reflect of different levels of commons' affections, but also a necessary answer to some crucial contemporary problems - as refugees' rights, James Bohman would say:

“While the international law on refugees has certainly been strengthened over the last decades, it still leaves political rights and citizenship up to states and does not even indirectly invoke membership in the human political community as an effective substitute to Locke’s “appeal to heaven” (Bohman, 2004, 343).

Critiques against a global citizenship would be sometimes not directed to its cultural consistency, but to its cultural acceptability. A counterargument against global citizenship would be based on a vision of situated and global moral perspectives as being mutually exclusionary. Dominique Leydet illustrates that critique in the following terms:

“Critiques argued that the model proves exclusionary if one interprets universal citizenship as requiring (a) the transcendence of particular, situated perspectives to achieve a common, general point of view and (b) the formulation of laws and policies that are difference-blind (Young 1989). The first requirement seems particularly odious once generality is exposed as a myth covering the majority's culture and conventions. The call to transcend particularity too often translates into the imposition of the majority perspective on minorities. The second requirement may produce more inequality rather than less since the purported neutrality of difference-blind institutions often belies an implicit bias towards the needs, interests and identities of the majority group. This bias often creates specific burdens for members of minorities, i.e. more inequality” (Leydet, 2006).

Arguing in favor of a multiple citizenship's model, Leydet shows that a central cosmopolitan argument refers to the integrative effects of citizenship. An integration that would also promote a diverse reproduction of feelings of belonging. According to her:

“The debate between supporters and critiques of differentiated citizenship centers on the model's supposed effect on civic integration. It is assumed that democratic citizenship, properly construed, can indeed function as a significant lever of integration. The idea is that citizenship as a set of civil, political and social rights and as a political practice can help generate desirable feelings of identity and belonging” (Leydet, 2006).

Ross Posnock deepens into this problematic of global civic integration, observing that a global citizenship would need to come along with a radical suppression of the condition of foreignness. Posnock argues that:

“How to solve the identity/difference problem of "Others", Elaine Scarry has noted, should involve constitutional design and not merely "unanchored good will". The constitutional solution would "seek to eliminate altogether the inherently aversive structural position of 'foreignness'" (Posnock, 2000, 809).

A contemporary communitarian cosmopolitanism could be able to solve such a discussion by an integrative, holistic and “impure” combination of different layers of citizenship. Bruce Robbins is an exponent of such an alternative:

“I prefer a third option: cosmopolitanism as the provocatively impure but irreducible combination of a

certain privilege at home, as part of a real belonging in institutional places, with a no less real but much less common (and therefore highly desirable) extension of democratic, anti imperial principles abroad” (Robbins, 1993, 211).

Cultural belongings have been raised as a main objection to a global citizenship. That would be a valid critique *if and only if* such belongings would be uniquely local. A consistent cosmopolitan answer issues to say that there are different pertinent layers of belongings, not only circumscribed to nation. Depending on the commons at play, different levels of geographical belongings may appear. Along with a conviction on rationality, cosmopolitanism would plead in favor of a global citizenships on the basis of a democratic global culture, which would be based and reproduced on top of the care of global commons. Such a global citizenship would be a correlate of a political recognition of worldwide’s individuals through the granting of global political rights.

5

Global political rights (political concern I)

Derived from observations in regard of the cultural plausibility of global citizenship, a subsequent aspect of cosmopolitan concerns on a global bestowing of political rights. A concession of global political rights necessarily concerns those who plead in favor of a democratic cosmopolitanism. A conceptual basis for granting citizenship's global political rights to people is, more than a membership status, an all-affectedness principle, according to which the existence of global commons being affected by global dynamics would justify the foundation of a global democratic political framework, within which lay people could exercise any degree of influence over the necessary

decisions concerning these goods. A theory of this kind is presented by Simon Caney:

“The rationale for the democratic right to exercise control over the institutions and processes that affect persons’ ability to exercise their rights entails (given globalization) that there should be a global democratic political framework” (Caney, 2005, 159).

Global political rights are a derivation of a global democratic framework. A major concern in this regard is global political representation. In fact, any global political citizenship would encompass a form of global political representation. Even if technocratic alternatives could be available to avoid representation, a democratic cosmopolitanism would not be able to resign it. In a democratic regime, whether national or global, any person’s interests should be able to attempt to be represented:

“It is implicit in the role of political citizenship in an open society that the option remains open for one to speak for, or represent, one’s own interests. Political citizenship in democracy would be a hollow category indeed if it did not encompass the idea that in a range of ways and on a range of matters citizens could rightly attempt to represent themselves” (Saward, 2010, 101).

Political representation can be considered as a political correlate of an all-affectedness principle. According to this vision, representation would be meant to be a mechanism through which people could perform any degree of influence over decisions affecting them in regard of pertinent matters.

It is implicit to this vision that a successful representation would need to be *meaningful*. A successful meaningful communicative act is one in which the sender of a message conveys to a receiver what he or she is willing to convey. In political representation, a vote is a mechanism through which a person sends a message regarding his or her will to include a person inside a representative instance. A vote would be a meaningful message to the extent to which that preference would be necessarily taken into account to define the winner(s). This point, crucial and common to most theories of representation, is presented by Bernhard Wessels as follows:

"The basic claim of democratic theory and its responsible party model is that elections are meaningful. They are presumed to be the starting point of political representation; without them democratic representation is virtually inconceivable. Through elections, representatives win a mandate to act on behalf of the represented. The people are sovereign, hence representatives are their agents. However, this principle of democratic representation can only work to legitimate a political system and the actions of its representatives if the basic institution of elections is perceived as effective enough to hold the elected accountable" (Wessels, 2011, 100).

It is important to note, nevertheless, that even if such a voting preference turns out to coincide with a winner, a person's participation through a vote, is limited to communicate a political preference regarding one single person.

Taking the former into consideration, it is possible to enhance the meaningfulness of political representation. On the one hand, by implementing a voting mechanism through which a person could communicate his or her preference in regard of favorite candidates,

as well as in regard of the composition of the chamber. This communicative enhancement of the voting mechanism could be done through the adoption of a *complete vote mechanism*, through which a person would vote for a subset of candidates, including into his or her political message, considerations about the composition of the chamber. On the other hand, an enhancement of the meaningfulness of political representation could be done through the establishment of a cogent subordination of the elected in regard of the electors.

This feature of a democratic representation has been called by Suzanne Dovi as “substantive representation”. By this she means “the activity of representatives—that is, the actions taken on the behalf of, in the interest of, as an agent of, and as a substitute for the represented” which arises as a main question if “the representative does advance the policy preferences that serve the interests of the represented”. This conception implies an evaluation standard in regard of the representative, who would be valued “by the extent to which policy outcomes advanced by a representative serve “the best interests” of their constituents” (Dovi, 2006). To enhance the meaningfulness of political representation could refer both to increment the range of the voter’s communicative act, in regard of the preferred composition of a representative chamber, and in regard of the policies that a voter would like such a chamber to promote.

A major challenge for a global democracy is to increment the meaningfulness of global political rights. A qualification of political representation is crucially needed by a *global* democracy. First, the political assessment expressed by a person through the vote would need to remain meaningful, specially if global elections would,

numerically, reduce the influence of each individual's vote. Second, political subordination of representatives in front of voters would need to be enhanced, taking into account a plausibly enlarged distance between both of them. Third, the representative instance would need to incorporate the highest degree of diversity, without being extremely big.

A verification of the need to reconsider political rights in front of global affecting dynamics, have pushed some theorists to examine representation as a process that would stream beyond legislatures. This is the case of Saward, for whom:

“To define representation in terms of elective and legislative representation, both in and apart from this one vital instance of it, will enable us to examine representation as a creative process that spills beyond legislatures” (Saward, 2010, 31).

According to Saward, a consistent cosmopolitan account of political rights could incorporate a vision of political representation, as being complemented by political participation. In other terms, representative claims could be satisfactorily considered within an institutional framework, which would be based on a combination of representative and participatory dynamics.

A prior assumption for a consistent cosmopolitanism to advance an acceptable proposal in regard of a meaningful global representation, is to verify that representation is not an ethnocentric political dynamic. Even if western political theories emphasize this feature as necessary of a liberal regime, it could be widely accepted that

representation is a transcultural value. Political representative claims cannot be reduced to democratic traditions. Saward shows that:

“Representative claims varies widely across different political cultures... Representative claims operate in and across all cultures, democratic and non democratic, liberal and non-liberal” (Saward, 2010, 103).

A second prior assumption is that a global representation is not exclusionary in front of instances of local participation. In other terms, that a global representation dynamic would not undermine local participation. Such is a risk that Gerald Thielbar points at, when saying:

“local community case studies of localism-cosmopolitanism have demonstrated, nevertheless, that the locality (generally some named residential place) constitutes for some persons a major avenue of social participation. Participation in a social world of larger scale is alleged on both logical and empirical grounds to constitute an explanation for the absence of local attachment. These studies lend support to the notion that locality specific and larger units of social organization tend to compete with each other as foci of social involvement” (Thielbar, 1970, 246).

Competence between locality specific and larger units of political organization would rise a challenge for a cosmopolitan democracy. A global democracy needs to build an institutional scheme inside of which local and global participation would not be mutually exclusionary.

A plausible route to answer to such a challenge would be to, methodologically, adopt a theory of scales of political involvement.

What such a theory points at, is that social concerns may obey to different criteria according to the geographical scale to which it refers. An exponent of such a kind of theory is Thielbar, who argues that:

“A theory of scales adds a clarifying dimension, for example, to stratification theory, which faces the problem of incorporating within a single framework local inequality arrangements and national inequality arrangements” (Thielbar, 1970, 249).

To adopt different criteria to consider *local* political involvement and *global* political involvement could be interpreted as a justification to consider *global* representative dynamics along with *local* participatory/deliberative dynamics. A theory of scales would justify the implementation of two different kinds of mechanisms in regard of local and global political involvement. A cosmopolitan application of a theory of scales would need to take into account that such a local-global complementarity needs a combination of a range of direct and indirect institutions for its functioning. This observation has been made by Saward, regarding what is needed for a direct democracy to work:

“In brief, if we begin our analysis with direct democracy, we quickly realize that a range of indirect institutions are required for their functioning (Saward, 1998). Like Robert Nozick (1974) backing into a state without really trying, direct democrats run into the need for indirect institutions by simply following their own logic. Nozick’s state of anarchy required a minimal state to ensure its persistence; a system of “pure” direct democracy requires state-like representative structures for similar reasons. If direct democracy is valuable, it ought to be made to persist; for it

to persist, it needs a permanent framework of indirect institutions to support it” (Saward, 2010, 162).

A cosmopolitan democracy needs to incorporate both direct and indirect institutions. Direct institutions represent *per se* mechanisms that would politically include social and cultural differences and diversity, and that would give to minorities a political relevant voice. Such an inclusion is a necessary feature, given that, inside of a global democracy, a major concern would be a seemingly huge quantity of numerical minorities that would arise. In fact, most of national peoples would become numerical minorities inside of a global democratic framework.

The meaningfulness of a global representation is, in a first instance, to be enforced by the concrete inclusion of minorities’ voice through local deliberative participation. A local deliberative participation is valuable *if and only if* such a participation is provided with a ny kind of compulsory force in front of global norms. The alleged necessary complementarity between local-participatory dynamics and global representation, for the sake of diversity and minorities’ inclusion, would dismiss a conception according to which a political representation, uniquely based on the vote, would be satisfactorily inclusive. Sonia Alonso argues, inversely, that electoral competition would intrinsically include minorities and diversity:

"The logic of electoral competition has a second positive effect upon the unfolding relationship between representative democracy and minority nationalism: it gives incentives to central elites to decentralize power. If minority nationalist parties establish themselves successfully in the electoral arena, state-wide parties will not sit idly watching nationalist parties’ success. The

response of state-wide parties to the electoral growth of minority nationalism is eventually to include the partial (sometimes total, as in Belgium) adoption of the nationalist parties' agenda of cultural and territorial autonomy" (Alonso, 2011, 175).

It is not straightforward to say that electoral dynamics would intrinsically ensure minorities' visibility. That fact would depend on the kind of configuration of the electoral system. Three challenges imposed by a cosmopolitan democracy to a global representation are: 1. to enhance the communicative force of individual votes; 2. to increase the degree of subordination of the representative in front of the voter; 3. to increase the degree of inclusion of diversity and minorities within representative chambers. Such demands innovative electoral systems, complemented by innovative participatory ideas, satisfactorily articulated.

As a matter of principle, a communitarian difference-sensitive cosmopolitanism could incorporate a global representative mechanism *if and only if* it would be complemented by any sort of political arrangement built to give voice to minorities. In a way, such a challenge to a global democracy finds an answer in a theory of "institutions of minority democracy". A theoretical foundation of such a theory, can be found in what John Keane says about the issue:

"The new institutions of minority democracy are further defined by their overall commitment to strengthening the diversity and influence of citizens' voices and choices in decisions that affect their lives -regardless of the outcome of elections" (Keane, 2011, 216).

A cosmopolitan democracy would need to include numerical minorities' voice. By including this sort of minorities, it would turn out to include also other kind of political and cultural minorities. By the same way, it would also turn out to enhance inclusion of cultural diversity. Institutionally, such an inclusion could be accomplished through an increment of the communicative force of individual votes.

Contemporary cosmopolitan literature does not dispose of a consistent theory of global political representation and/or participation. Though, relevant theoretical inputs should be taken into account, by remaining in coherence with cosmopolitan moral principles. A defining guideline for a satisfactory cosmopolitan construction of global political mechanisms, would need to be composed of a background of communitarian difference-sensitiveness. By consequence, a satisfactory cosmopolitan account would need to embody a meaningful global political representation. Meaningfulness of participation and representation would come out to be at the center of a normative model of cosmopolitan democracy.

Such a meaningful participation needs to be based on top of cultural differences and on top of self-determining peoples. A satisfactory participatory mechanism would need to give to peoples' voice a compulsory force. On the other hand, a satisfactory global representation would need to incorporate a voting mechanism to ensure numerical and cultural minorities' inclusion.

In front of a theoretical vacuum in regard of such challenges, innovations are needed. A cosmopolitan democratic framework would need to combine local participation with global representation. Local

participation needs to be ensured through open input instances, able to incorporate minorities' voice. This layer of political participation would need to have a kind of compulsory force in front of a global representative instance. Such a compulsoriness would make of local institutions authentic *institutions of minority democracy*, which would be inclusive "regardless of the outcome of elections" (Keane, 2011, 216). A plausible institutional strategy to warrant such a compulsoriness would be to give to local panels a monopoly of legislative initiative, in a way that the representative instance would be enabled to decide *only* in regard of propositions coming from local participatory instances.

Global representation, on the other hand, would need to incorporate an electoral mechanism that would enhance the communicative force and meaningfulness of an individual vote. A plausible mechanism to do so, would be to implement a *complete vote scheme* in combination with a national quota mechanism. By giving to an individual the right to vote for national candidates *and* for the composition of the chamber, such an individual vote would gain in communicative force. A detailed description of such a cosmopolitan twofold scheme will be presented in the second part of this thesis.

6

The relevance of the nation state (political concern II)

Even if critical towards the nation state and the interstate system, contemporary cosmopolitan literature would bestow a relevant position to the nation state. Such relevance would not be a consequence of an *a priori* appreciation of the nation state. This classical political instance is considered, instead, as an *instrument*, which is valued to the extent to which it helps to foster cosmopolitan duties. John MacCunn clearly represents this vision:

“This question: -Is the citizen entitled to look to the nation as the instrument through which, *as a matter of settled policy*, his cosmopolitan duties and sympathies are to find enactment? Yet this is the question we ought to put- and to answer in the affirmative” (MacCunn, 1999, 160).

In front of an observable failure of the current interstate system to take care and protect, in an effective way, environmental global commons, a central question arises in front of its very political structure and main constituent body. Roughly, the interstate system is viewed as an articulation of national sovereignties. National sovereignty refers to the fact that a sovereign state is a political unit that has a “supreme authority within a territory” (Philpott, 1999, 570). A problem is identified in the fact that the interstate system is composed by many “equal” sovereignties. Multiple sovereignties produce collective action problems. The absence of a unified sovereignty, in regard of some specific cosmopolitan issues, is seen as a lack that a global democracy would tend to fulfill.

Specifically, what arises a conceptual difficulty about sovereignty is a feature that could be termed *comprehensiveness*. The term *comprehensiveness* is used to mean that a state has a sovereign power, over a portion of territory, in regard of *all issues*. Given that a cosmopolitan democracy would have a political scope over the care of global commons, such a global democracy would need to revisit national sovereignty’s comprehensiveness. The reason is that such a global political unit would need to be embedded of sovereign faculties in regard of matters related to its scope, over the global territory. By consequence, an absolute comprehensiveness’ feature of states’ sovereignty, brings about a concrete contradiction between a cosmopolitan democracy and national sovereign states.

The feature of comprehensiveness has been presented by Caney, as follows:

“One further feature of state sovereignty should also be mentioned, namely what I should term *comprehensiveness*. By this I mean that a political unit is a sovereign state if it has ultimate authority over a territorially defined group of people and it has authority *over all issues* and not simply some... To put the point another way: comprehensiveness requires what might be termed the unity of political functions. That is, in a sovereign state, the state has authority over all political functions and the territorial boundaries for each function maps onto the territorial boundaries for the others” (Caney, 2005, 150).

A consequent principle of non interference in regard of internal matters would mean that cosmopolitan ideals could be further on the sole basis of nation state's arbitrary willing or unwillingness. Charles Beitz observes that, within that framework, states are “no subject to international moral requirements because they represent separate and discrete political orders” (Beitz, 1999, 25). Such a discreteness' conditionality is in a contradiction in front of a cosmopolitan intention to protect universal commons in spite of political boundaries.

More than a theoretical verification of an eventual contradiction between cosmopolitanism and comprehensive national sovereignties, this feature represents difficulties, also seen from an instrumental point of view. National sovereignty's comprehensiveness brings about difficulties for an adoption and implementation of adequate, globally unified, strategies for the care of global commons.

This combined perspective in regard of the difficulties introduced by multiple national sovereignties, leads to argue that the nation state needs to be complemented by supra-national institutions. In any case, in order to further cosmopolitan ideals,

“a state-based order is not effective at securing cosmopolitan ideals and should therefore be supplemented with, or replaced by, global political institutions. In other words, they make the following *empirical* claim: (2) Supra-state political institutions are required to further cosmopolitan ideals... A second consideration in support of supra-state political institutions is that, under a purely statist international system, states do not cooperate to produce public goods like healthy environment” (Caney, 2005, 159, 160).

To appeal for the cession of some sovereign faculties to a cosmopolitan democracy for the care and protection of environmental global commons, would bring about a second conceptual difficulty. Comprehensiveness is a feature that encompasses coercive power. A core question is whether a global cosmopolitan institution has any form of coercive power. Jürgen Habermas (Habermas, 2000) points precisely that a cosmopolitan law needs to be based on any kind of coercion, if it wants to produce effective norms.

Within an open debate, Simon Caney argues in favor of a global institution that would not centralize coercive power:

“the framework being defended is not a global state. It rejects not simply a global system of states but also the utility of relying on sovereign statehood. Rather what is being envisioned is a political order in which the units may lack the properties of sovereign statehood... There may be no one political institution that has final authority... This is

often said to be a problem but, from an instrumental cosmopolitan perspective, it is an advantage since it prevents the centralization of coercive power. It forces people and different institutions to negotiate and cooperate with each other... what is being envisioned is a move away from sovereign statehood” (Caney, 2005, 163).

A deprivation of properties of a statehood sovereignty do not mean that a global institution needs to be completely deprived of any coercive power. What is implicit in Caney’s position, non the less, is a legitimate rejection of a globally centralized coercive *violent* power. In fact, a necessary distinction between cosmopolitan global institutions and any form of globally integrated violent coercive power is frequently introduced. David Held argues:

“Of course, to say this is by no means to confuse such developments with the emergence of an integrated global government. There is a crucial difference between an international society which contains the possibility of political cooperation and order, and a supranational state which has a monopoly or coercive and legislative power” (Held, 2005, 91).

Caney introduces an innovative proposal to move away from a statehood global coercive power. Such a proposal is intended to circumvent a central argument against global political institutions, which has been called the “liberty-based” counterargument (Nardin, 1983). According to such, a global political institution would turn out to be tyrannical because of an extreme centralization of power and an absence of a checks and balances system, due to a lack of international competitiveness. A subsequent conclusion of this counterargument, is that moral cosmopolitan ideals could be better fostered by a society of states. In front of such a subsequent

counterargument, Caney underscores the well known collective action problems of the interstates system, reflected, for example, in the extremely unsatisfactory answer this system has provided to environmental problems:

“The collective action problems involved in getting states to cooperate to protect the environment, for example, are surely one important reason why environmental protection is not attained... A system of democratic states is quite compatible with massive global inequalities (including inequalities of opportunity) and is consistent with a world in which some are consigned to lives of grueling poverty... Some of the most pressing collective action problems arise with global problems such as environmental pollution. Now giving nations statehood or enhanced political autonomy will clearly produce more political players and the more actors there are the more difficult it will be to secure international agreement. Consequently, allowing nations rights of self-government would worsen the prospects of solving some collective action problems” (Caney, 2005, 169, 175, 204).

Such a rejection of a global statehood institution also implies, the other way around, to reject an outright and exclusive system of states. Precisely, what provokes a move away from the states is their incapacity to act together in front of global challenges (like environmental care) that demand globally unified actions. It is frequently adduced that an interstates system is unable to advance cosmopolitan ideals, exactly because the current system of sovereign states is intrinsically anarchic. A point also made by David Held, according to whom:

“Realism posits that the system of sovereign states is inescapably anarchic in character; and that this anarchy forces all states, the inevitable absence of any supreme

arbiter to enforce moral behavior and agreed international codes, to pursue power politics in order to attain their vital interests... In this account, the modern system of nation states is a 'limiting factor' which will always thwart any attempt to conduct international relations in a manner which transcends the politics of sovereign state" (Held, 2005, 74, 75).

Such an anarchy is maybe not provoked by the sovereignty of states as such, but by the plurality of such a sovereignty and the intrinsic lack of global coordination that it produces. Conceptually, national sovereignty supposes that there is not any higher political power. States are equal to each other, because, theoretically, none of them can impose a conduct over another. As long as current interstates institutions are based on the complete sovereignty of nation states, such coordinating institutions would not have the power to create and implement globally unified strategies. A central problem is that the plurality of equal sovereignties produces a discreteness that has turned out to be a limiting factor for globally unified strategies.

Limitations of the interstates system, and the challenges imposed by globalization, can be seen as opportunities to transcend a current confinement of democracy to nation states. Insufficiencies of the nation state, signaled by globalization. Frank Cunningham points at three possible ways to interpret such challenges:

"approaches to international relations theories include (without perfectly matching) three general viewpoints on democracy and globalization, each posing itself a somewhat different problematic: those which see globalization, whatever difficulties it engenders, as also offering exciting *opportunities* to transcend the confinement of democracy to the state; those for which globalization presents problematic *challenges to states*

that need to be met by them in the interest of democracy; and viewpoints which focus on what are seen as grave *challenges to the people posed by globalization*" (Cunningham, 2002, 204).

A way to react to globalization has been to ask from nation states to build an answer from within its own sovereignty. Suchlike reaction has not been effective. We need a creative answer to go beyond national democracies. David Held is indeed an exponent of such an argument. According to him:

"Globalization, a process reaching back to the earliest stages of formation of modern state and economy, continues to shape and reshape politics, economics and social life, albeit unevenly with differential impacts on individual countries. The stretching of social relations across space and time, via a variety of institutional dimensions (technological, organizational, legal and cultural), and their intensification within these institutional domains create new problems and challenges to the power of the state and the interstate system. Against this background, the effectiveness and viability of the sovereign, territorially bounded nation state seems to be in question. How far it is so remains to be explored, especially since the nation state continues to command loyalty, both as an idea and as an institution" (Held, 2005, 98).

An additional argument to plead for the necessity to go abroad nation states, is that that there is absolutely no need to confine democracy to nation-state. Nation-states need to be democratic, but democracy needs to go abroad such a sphere, in order to accomplish human duties. In other terms, if democracy wants to keep a central value within human life, it needs to provide, as a mechanism, a correct answer to compelling global demands. There is a moral need to keep

democracy as being a convenient binding decisions making mechanism. By virtue of this, democracy, and democratic peoples need to push such a beautiful ideal abroad of unfair limitations imposed by political boundaries. For some, such a confinement is both morally and practically unacceptable:

“Territorial boundaries specify the basis on which individuals are included and excluded from participation in the decisions affecting their lives (however limited the participation might be), but the outcomes of these decisions, and of the decisions of those in other political communities and agencies, often stretch beyond national frontiers. The implications of this are troubling, not only for the categories of consent and legitimacy but for all the key ideas of democracy: the nature of a constituency, the meaning of representation, the proper form and scope of political participation, the extent of deliberation, and the relevance of the democratic nation state as the guarantor of the rights, duties and welfare of subjects. The very process of governance seems to be ‘escaping the categories’ of the nation state. Regional and global interconnectedness contests the traditional national resolution of the central questions of democratic theory and practice” (Held, 2007, 292).

Global commons are affected by actions that are undertaken both inside and outside sovereign boundaries. In contrast, destructive actions are not being properly counterattacked by the nation states, nor by the interstates system:

“Environmental problems and challenges are, however, the clearest and starkest examples of the global shift in human organization and activity, creating some of the most fundamental pressures on the efficacy of the nation state and state-centric democratic politics... Problems involving global commons, i.e. fundamental elements of the ecosystem... are, of course, global. But there has

been a striking physical and environmental shift in the circumstances -that is, in the extent and intensity of environmental problems- affecting human affairs in general” (Held, 2007, 302, 303).

A global answer to environmental problems needs to be centered on individuals, rather than on nation states, both because states’ centrality is an obstacle, and because human individuals are the ultimate unit of moral worth and concern. It is in favor of such a unit of moral concern, that cosmopolitanism adopts an instrumental view towards the nation state. Kok-Chor Tan argues:

“The cosmopolitan view in its more basic form, to recall, holds that the individual is the ultimate unit of moral worth, and entitled to equal consideration regardless of contingencies like nationality and citizenship” (Tan, 2006, 35).

To define the individual as the ultimate unit of moral worth, justifies an instrumental vision of the nation state, and a subsequent preference of a global institution that would be based on individuals rather than on top of states. Individuals around the globe ask for answers in front of global environmental challenges. Cosmopolitanism offers an individual-centric global cosmopolitan democracy, rather than an interstate answer.

To say that a non statehood answer to global matters is a moral necessity, does not struggle against the relevance of nation states. Martha Nussbaum shows how the nation state would, in any case, conserve its relevance in front of national concerns, while global matters would be treated away. She says that:

“To give one’s own sphere special care is justifiable in universalists terms, and I think this is its most compelling justification... But my argument does entail the idea that we should not confine our thinking to our own sphere, that in making choices in both political and economic matters we should most seriously consider the right of other human beings to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, and that we should work to acquire the knowledge that will enable us to deliberate well about those things” (Nussbaum, 2002, 13, 14).

To take the individual as the ultimate unit of moral worth produces at least two different kinds of outcomes, in front of the relevance of nation states. On the one hand, it justifies an instrumental view of its pertinence. In other words, such would be a moral argument in favor of non state-centric political institutions. On the other hand, it implies a moral recognition of nation states, given that the state needs to be morally justified in front of “national” individuals, specially because it uses violent coercion. The latter is Kwame Appiah’s point:

“States, on the other hand, matter morally intrinsically. They matter not because people care about them, but because they regulate our lives through forms of coercion that will always require moral justification” (Appiah, 2002, 28).

In front of strictly global challenges, a common structure of political action, different from a simple interstates’ articulation, is needed. Such a structure needs to incorporate a unified sovereign power, which would be sovereign uniquely in regard of the care and protection of environmental global commons. A plausible way to achieve the creation of a limited global sovereignty, would be a voluntary cession, on the part of nation states, of the pertinent features of national sovereignty, to a global one, sovereign uniquely

in regard the care and protection of environmental global commons.

David Held would endorse a voluntary adherence scheme:

“The dangers posed by a threat of ‘new medievalism’ can be addressed if its component parts entrench and enact the rules required for a ‘common structure of political action’. International agencies, organizations, corporations and states could opt to become part of this structure if they chose a democratic political future. I refer to this possibility as the ‘cosmopolitan model of democracy’ or the ‘cosmopolitan model of democratic autonomy’ by which I mean, in the first instance, a system of democratic governance which arises from and is adapted to the diverse conditions and interconnections of different people and nations” (Held, 2005, 140).

David Held argues in favor of a voluntary (rather than compulsory) adherence, because “all groups and associations are assumed to have a capacity for self determination which can be specified by a commitment to the principle of autonomy and specific clusters of rights and obligations” (Held, 2005, 271). In other terms, a voluntary adherence scheme is justified by the cosmopolitan principle of self-determination. At the same time, the argument in favor of a voluntary adherence scheme does not imply that nation states could become units of ultimate moral worth.

As long as individuals hold alone a position of ultimate unite of moral worth, a global democracy would need to establish a direct linkage to people, that would bypass the nation state. For strictly global concerns in regard of global commons, a political integration of individuals would not need to be undertaken through nation states. On the contrary, given that nation states are considered as intrinsically incapables to build global collective strategies, a

cosmopolitan democracy would be logically directly linked to people. Henry Teune is an exponent of such a position:

“The challenge to inclusion is that citizenship today in the global communities of democracies is still primarily exclusively through the channel of a single state...The main solution to the democratic imperative of having a minimal linkage of people to the global political system is to provide organizations that bypass the state” (Teune, 2002, 29).

An intermediate position in front of the state, gives a cosmopolitan role to play to currently existent political institutions, even if acknowledging structural limitations to the interstates system. A position presented by Charles Beitz, according to whom:

“Like any political doctrine that aspires to practical effect, cosmopolitan liberalism is constrained by political realism; this means that it must both recognize the institutional limitations of the states system and take advantage of its institutional capacities” (Beitz, 1999, 519).

Francis Chenval denies that there could be a necessary contradiction between a non state-centric cosmopolitan democracy and the nation state. Even though, a global democracy would seek to go beyond the state, and beyond the subsequent interstates system, in order to promote universal values. To go further than the state would not mean to abandon the state. Chenval considers that the nation state is a kind of father of contemporary democracy. Even if cosmopolitanism tries to take democracy out of the state, to give a role to play to the the nation state inside a cosmopolitan non state-centric framework seems to be adequate. A key point of such an

argument, is that it would be plausible to recognize that the nation state is politically relevant, and to argue, notwithstanding, that there is not a necessary nor indistinguishable linkage between democracy and the nation state. As shown by Francis Chénval:

“Tout d’abord, il faut rappeler que la thèse de la transgressivité cosmopolitique reconnaît l’importance fonctionnelle et normative de l’État-nation comme véhicule de la démocratie. Le cosmopolitisme n’est qu’un principe régulateur de développement politique au-delà de l’État-nation. Pour défendre ce genre de cosmopolitisme "non oedipal" et non patricide, il suffit donc de réfuter les théories qui affirment l’existence d’une unité indissoluble et indifférenciable entre démocratie et État-nation” (Chénval, 2005, 264).

A consistent cosmopolitan argument regarding an articulation of nation states to a global political institution would need to plead for a transfer of some sovereign functions, until now fulfilled by the states, to a supranational instance. In such a way, national sovereignties would not disappear. Instead, only the sovereign functions related to the strict observance of cosmopolitan commons would be ceded to our global unified institution. A position that has been developed by Jürgen Habermas:

“Given all the difficulties of creating a European Union, an agreement for the creation of a worldwide order - especially one that would not simply exhaust itself in creating and legally institutionalizing markets, but would introduce elements of a global political will-formation, and would work toward redressing the undesired social consequences of global commerce - would be much more difficult. As nation states are increasingly overwhelmed by the global economy, one clear alternative emerges, even if somewhat abstracted and viewed, so to speak, from the academic ivory tower: transferring functions that states had previously exercised at the national level onto supranational authorities” (Habermas, 2007, 53).

Habermas introduces a core question, regarding the institutional status of such a non state-centric global democracy, which would give place to coordinated strategies for the care and protection of environmental global commons. Nation states could voluntarily cede their sovereign functions related to the pertinent subject matters to a global democracy. This would mean that nation states would be able to suppress from their sovereign scope the regulation in regard of the concerned global commons. As long as they would cede such sovereign functions to a global instance, such a global instance would turn out to be embedded of a limited sovereignty. Even if limited, such a sovereignty would imply to be a ultimate authority for the respective matters. Contemporary cosmopolitanism rejects a global violent last resort to support global regulations. A plausible alternative to violence, would be moral compulsoriness, undertaken through a widest publicity of the decision making and the policy implementation processes.

An additional argument in favor of such a cession is that the current interstate's articulation, which is based on the full comprehensiveness of national sovereignties, has proven to be ineffective when national states have had "selfish" priorities to circumvent globally accorded obligations. This argument has been presented by Daniele Archibugi:

"For nearly half a century UN actions have been frequently ignored or circumvented by member states. In all conflicts, both great and small, both explicit and latent, the rules dictated by the *raison d'état* have taken precedence over legal principles. Indeed, the actions of the international

institutions have proven effective only in those cases where an accord, implicit or explicit, already existed between the more powerful states. Where such agreement was lacking, the effects have been insignificant” (Archibugi, 1995, 126).

Most of contemporary cosmopolitan authors verify a necessity to overcome both nation states’ limitations and interstates system’s insufficiencies, to foster cosmopolitan ideals. An individual-centric cosmopolitanism would establish a globally unified democracy based on individuals, more than on nation states. A consistent position is to promote coexistence between national a global political institutions, rather than thinking about a substitution.

A global democratic institution could be a non violent global instance, to which existent political units would voluntarily adhere, by ceding pertinent features of national sovereignty. Such a cosmopolitan unified democracy would be in charge of sovereign functions transferred from national states. A non violent last resort could be based on moral compulsoriness, if and only if nation states voluntary assume serious responsibility in front of implementing global policy inside national territories.

A question remains open in regard of the kind of implementation that global policies would have when concerning non-national territories (like international waters, or the air). The occurs in front of non obedient transnational actors, which are legally based in more than one country. In front of non-national territories, a merely global implementation body could do the task, given that such an intervention would not be competing with any military competent force. In front of transnational corporations, unified strategies of

multinational repression would be a plausible way to proceed. The specific question in regard of the kind of sovereignty that such a global democracy would entail, will be addressed at the end of this first part.

7

Global governance (political concern III)

In coherence with an instrumental perspective in regard of the nation state, contemporary cosmopolitan authors would in general adopt a kind of instrumental perspective in front of a global democratic governance. While a necessarily democratic feature is derived from moral cosmopolitan principles, the kind of democratic institutional scheme to be preferred obeys mostly to instrumental considerations. Such a half instrumental, half derived from moral principles institutional perspective, could be consistently considered as *consequentialist*.

An instrumental perspective in front of institutions as the ones we are dealing with here, holds that the value of an institutional scheme is defined by its usefulness, both to further the care of global commons and to realize democratic aspirations at a global level. In such a sense, Simon Caney says:

“The instrumental approach maintains that appropriate political institutions are those that best further cosmopolitan moral ideals... Appropriate political institutions are those that best further cosmopolitan ideals (i.e. the protection of human rights, the securing of a healthy environment, and the observance of cosmopolitan ideals of distributive justice)” (Caney, 2005, 152, 159).

Such a preference is conditioned by a pragmatic recognition of existent national and international institutions. Those forms of political power should be embraced. A central instrumental consideration is that national existent forms of power, if not embraced by a cosmopolitan institutional framework, threaten to produce a chaotic and highly fragmented global order. This position is defended by David Held, according to whom:

"This cosmopolitan polity would be one that in form and substance reflected and embraced the diverse forms of power and authority that operate within and across borders and which, if unchecked, threaten a highly fragmented, neo-medieval order" (Held, 2005, 233).

A possible way to interpret the notion of a “neo-medieval order” is that it would refer to a scenario in which political institutions would be lacking of any form of coordination. In such a sense, an alternative response to a non-coordinated international political order would be to propose a consistent articulation between national, international

and global institutions. A plausible guiding principle to achieve such an articulation could be a principle of subsidiarity. In general, a principle of subsidiarity would hold that a global authority could perform tasks, not effectively performed by local or national instances. This would be coherent with an application of a theory of scales of political participation, as the one commented before. An exposition in favor of a principle of subsidiarity is provided by Phillippe Van Parijs:

“What the principle of subsidiarity says is, roughly, that one should systematically allocate competences to the lowest level of political authority, unless there are strong reasons to do otherwise... The more decentralized the political community in charge of a policy domain, the closer its collective choices can be to the wishes of its current members (both because they can weight more on the choices and because they can better check their implementation) and the easier it is for its current members to move to another political community whose collective choices may better satisfy their wishes” (Van Parijs, 2011, 202).

In general, a global governance could be considered a necessary feature of a consistent cosmopolitan account, because otherwise moral universalistic principles would remain as idle premises, without any kind of efficacy. In other terms, in addition to a horizontal coordination between national states inside interstates institutions, a strictly global *individual-centered* governance is needed in order to circumvent collective action problems which are intrinsic to the states-based international order. Such a widespread position has been presented, for example, by Allen Buchanan, who argues:

“any attempt to frame principles of distributive justice for the global basic structure is an idle exercise because there are no global governance institutions capable of implementing such principles“ (Buchanan, 2000, 713).

New strictly global institutions are needed, and such institutions need to go further than the current interstate system. A reason frequently alleged is that some cosmopolitan affairs, as the care of environmental global commons, overwhelms the mentioned interstates institutions, due to an intrinsic impossibility to effectively coordinate national sovereignties. In this sense, discussing about cosmopolitanism in front of a United Nation’s democratization, Derek Biele, Volker Rittberger and Wolfgang Wagner argue:

"Therefore the question of democratic governance arises at the international level, to which the authoritative allocation of values in many issue areas has already been transferred... However, since interdependence has blurred the distinction between domestic and international politics, politics in the international system cannot be conceived of as an interstate affair only" (Biele, Rittberger & Wagner, 1998, 289, 281).

Different accounts on global governance can be found. A well known account is David Held’s *cosmopolitan model of democracy*. He pleads for a long term maximalist cosmopolitanism. Such a model includes legal, institutional, funding, accountability, and coercive dimensions. Such a long term model is made of six features:

“1. Entrenchment of cosmopolitan democratic law: new Charter of Rights and Obligations locked into different domains of political, social and economic power. 2. Global parliament (with limited revenue-raising capacity) connected to regions, nations and localities. Creation of a public issue Boundary Court. 3. Separation of political and

economic interests; public funding of deliberative assemblies and electoral processes. 4. Interconnected global legal system, embracing elements of criminal and civil law. Establishment of an international Criminal Court. 5. Establishment of the accountability of international and transnational economic agencies to parliaments and assemblies at regional and global levels. 6. Permanent shift of a growing portion of a nation state's coercive capacity to regional and global institutions, with the ultimate aim of demilitarization and the transcendence of the war system" (Held, 2005, 279).

Instead of integral global governance proposals, some authors would emphasize in particular aspects of a global governance. Joseph Stiglitz, for example, put an accent on the centrality of publicity as a necessary feature of a legitimate global democratic governance. Publicity would enhance transparency and meaningful participation:

"Jeremy Bentham based his constitutional system on the motive of 'personal interest corrected by the widest publicity' and took publicity as the principal check against misrule. John Stuart Mill, in his famous essay *On Liberty* (1859), held that subjecting arguments to public scrutiny was unconditionally beneficial and provided the most assured way of sorting out good from bad arguments. In *Considerations on Representative Government* (1861), Mill extended the argument for 'publicity and liberty of discussion' to emphasize the virtues of popular participation... To me, the most compelling argument for openness is the positive Madisonian one: meaningful participation in democratic processes requires informed participants. Secrecy reduces the information available to the citizenship, hobbling their ability to participate meaningfully" (Stiglitz, 2003, 124, 125).

In the same line of argument, some cosmopolitan theorists plead for a democratic education of deficient national institutions, in order to make feasible a cosmopolitan coexistence of global governance and

local power systems. Such a point is made by Frank Cunningham, for whom:

“Cosmopolitan institutions should educate and encourage democratically deficient member states to change their ways, act as mediators and arbitrators in interstate disputes, and provide for institutions through global matters” (Cunningham, 2002, 205).

Kok-Chor Tan argues that “an institutional focus has become all the more urgent in the context of what is normally called globalization” (Tan, 2006, 29). Such an institutional focus would need to be governed by contemporary moral principles of cosmopolitanism, as “the principle of autonomy (that) would be entrenched in diverse sites of power and across diverse spatial domains” (Held, 2006, 29). To jump from moral premises to institutional arrangements has been noted as one central difficulty of a consistent cosmopolitan account. Such a difficulty has been showed by Charles Beitz, according to whom:

“There is no automatic inference from cosmopolitanism about moral justification to cosmopolitanism about institutions. The question is how to account for this practical indeterminacy. No doubt some of it is epistemic, reflecting the defectiveness of our knowledge about the empirical premises required to reach conclusions about how institutions should be arranged from the abstract requirement to include everyone within the scope of moral concern” (Beitz, 2005, 18).

A mere inference from moral principles to institutional schemes could not be a satisfactory account *per se*. The reason is that a morally suitable scheme of global democracy could turn out to be ineffective to further cosmopolitan goals. A plausible way for an instrumental

view of institutions to incorporate normative-moral premises could be a consequentialist approach. According to a consequentialist approach, a good institutional scheme is one that produces good outcomes (or consequences) for the care of global commons, by being, at the same time, morally consistent with cosmopolitan and democratic principles. Thomas Pogge is an exponent of such a consequentialist approach. He argues that a moral selection of global political institutions should be based on an estimation of the best feasible alternatives it would tend to produce. On such basis, a global democratic governance, different from the existent interstates' institutional scheme, could be adopted. Pogge:

“my broadly consequentialist assessment of social institution, which leads us to aim for the feasible global institutional scheme that produces the best pattern of human rights fulfillment, irrespective of the extent to which this pattern is established or engendered. We thus consider the existing global institutional scheme unjust insofar as the pattern that its best feasible alternatives would tend to produce” (Pogge, 1992, 54).

A qualified consequentialist perspective in regard of cosmopolitan institutions could be a consistent viewpoint, which would better off a simple instrumental perspective. According to different authors (Nozick, 1988; Scanlon, 1988; see Sheffler, 1988), consequentialist and deontological normative theories are not necessarily mutually exclusionary. A consistent consequentialist normative perspective would reduce the margin of what could be valued by virtue of its outcomes, to what would be morally acceptable. Instead, an outright instrumental approach to global institutions would allow anti-democratic approaches to global institutions. In fact, references to possible authoritarian attractions among former cosmopolitan

theorists has been made. Ross Posnock points at this possibility by recalling Du Bois:

“In this context one might recall, for instance, the cosmopolitan Du Bois's own attraction to authoritarianism, be it his youthful enthusiasm for Otto von Bismarck and his later regard for Stalin. And some critiques (most recently Adolph Reed) argue that Du Bois grasps modernity as a socialist, collectivist, and managerial project run by an elite intellectual vanguard dedicated to the use of administrative rationality to control the masses” (Posnock, 2000, 813).

Even if theoretically discarded by most of contemporary cosmopolitan authors, some have pointed at the fact that current international institutions would have authoritarian governance traits. As an example, Alexander Cooley shows how the uncontrolled and non democratically elected credit rating agencies do have, in fact, a global influence on the behavior of nation states:

“Although the credit rating agencies themselves often argue that they are merely in the business of information provision, in practice these informational ratings function as exclusive providers of global regulatory licenses (Sinclair, 1994). In fact, the Basel 2 international agreement on bank-capital rules requires that, by January 2007, national bank regulators use these agencies' ratings as a standard measure of a bank port-folio's risk. As a result, credit rating agencies not only impact access to debt markets or actual interest rates, but they affect the actual behavior of states and domestic economic policy-makers” (Cooley, 2003, 678).

Democratic accountability refers to a relationship between public administration and the people, in which such an administration is obliged to inform to the people about its actions and decisions. The

extent to which such a democratic accountability exposes administrators to punishments, exercises a corrective force over public administrators. A consequentialist argument would favor and enhance accountability amongst global institutions. Coinciding with network governance authors, like Woods, who illustrates his own thinking in the following terms:

“Network governance has an important contribution to offer in managing the world economy, bringing as it does, considerable and varied expertise on increasingly complex issues. However, even in seemingly technical areas such as accounting standards, the nature and choice of outcomes are affected by the interests of those who control the process. In essence, network governance proposes substituting expertise for democratic accountability. The problems with this argument have been aired in popular concerns about the lack of accountability of the European Central Bank. These problems magnify when network governance is expanded to encompass wider policies which have the potential to create yet larger groups of winners and losers. This is not simply a normative problem. Strong public reactions against an institution or policy (or simply a lack of ‘buy-in’) can quickly render it powerless” (Woods, 2001, 7).

A cosmopolitan consequentialist approach would discard a radical preference for a global state of states, because of a moral-based rejection of a globally centralized violent power. Even though, such a possibility has also been commented. According to such a vision, the nation state would only be considered as an intermediate stage on the way to a state of states. A state of states’ global governance is necessarily in an ambiguous position in front of a democracy-tyranny dilemma. According to Pauline Kliengeld:

“In his review Fichte regards the league of states as merely an intermediate stage on the way to a state of states (*Volkerstaat*). Just as local alliances for mutual protection preceded the formation of states, he says, the league (*Bund*) can precede the formation of the state of states” (Kleingeld, 1999, 511).

A contemporary majoritarian rejection to any form of state of states is based on, at least, two arguments. First, the one presented in previous chapters, according to which a consistent cosmopolitan account would move away from sovereign statehood. Second, a subsequent argument, made on the basis of a historical verification (see Pogge), according to which there would be possible to undertake a law-governed coexistence without a global violent last resort. Andrew Kuper shows that:

“The traditional Hobbesian claim (which makes its way into much of the later social contract literature) that there must be a final decision mechanism that uniquely resolves any dispute -thereby preventing formal, ongoing, destructive conflict- and this can only be a supreme agency of violent last resort. As Pogge points out, though, the history of the past two hundred years -particularly the success of the division of powers within states- attests to the possibility of law-governed coexistence even when ultimate conflicts between legitimate powers are theoretically possible” (Kuper, 2000, 656).

To discard a state of states’ alternative for a global cosmopolitan governance, is a coherent derivation of cosmopolitan moral principles. Nevertheless, it implies a conceptual difficulty, noted by Habermas when recalling the classical cosmopolitan “perpetual peace” (Habermas, 2003, 164). According to him, such a challenge asks how to define the specific element of a cosmopolitan law, in the absence of a global state. In other terms, his question is to precise

the element that would make of a global law an enforceable set of norms, given the absence of a global state.

An answer to this question will be proposed afterwards (Part I, 9). With more conceptual questions than answers, contemporary cosmopolitan concerns about global institutions remain open. Majoritarian guidelines are to be found in a qualified consequentialist perspective, and in a rejection of a statehood alternative. Available alternative models would offer general assessments about a unified public law, a certain kind of participation of the nation state within a global governance, and publicity and accountability as public control mechanisms. Any consequentialist calculation about which cosmopolitan governance system should be preferred, needs to take into account that such an institutional scheme would need to be democratic. Otherwise, a hardcore justification for a non democratic alternative would be massively requested. A majoritarian preference of a democratic design among contemporary cosmopolitanism, and worldwide society, is virtually out of any discussion.

8

A remind of main objections to cosmopolitanism and its answers

A consistent cosmopolitan account could be based on top of a softened form of universalism. It would be soft to the extent to which it would not pretend to establish an exclusionary dichotomy between locality and universality. Such a kind of soft universalism could be interpreted as an answer to communitarian critiques. I would call this new form of cosmopolitanism a *communitarian cosmopolitanism*, which would tend to find a positive dialectic relationship between local communities and a global democracy.

A deep revaluation of the roles of traditions within a consistent cosmopolitanism would encompass an integration of MacIntyre's arguments about tradition as a virtue (Almond, 1990). A most fundamental critique to cosmopolitanism comes from MacIntyre's conception of a moral narrative unity of human life (MacIntyre 1985). Such a view considers that any conception of the good is a particular condensation of communitarian linkages and "journeys", in which a human life would gain unity with its direct environment and traditions (MacIntyre, 1988) (Mela, 2011). Such a verification represents indeed an unbearable challenge to moral universalism, when universal values are pretendedly deduced from abstract principles. Communitarian cosmopolitanism prefers the venture of a collective *construction* of universal values, in a democratic way. An achieving point of such a cosmopolitan democratic dynamic would be a global moral overlapping consensus.

Contemporary cosmopolitanism faces also other relevant objections, specially at a political level. Given that a political integration is pursued, two possible objections could arise. It has been argued that a cosmopolitan institutional scheme is unrealistic, given that a transformation of the interstates system is impossible. If accepted, this very simple objection would undermine the whole of the cosmopolitan project. Nevertheless, given that it is based on a reductionist and static view of political history, it is easy to discard. Observable lines of moral evolution conduce to a expect transformations of the global system.

A softened version of the former critique is that a *good* institutional scheme of a world magnitude would be simply unachievable. As a consequence, it would be argued that the current system of states is to be preferred, even in order to realize cosmopolitan ideals. A strictly cosmopolitan attempt could bring about a political risk of global tyranny, that humanity would not accept to bear. Such an objection regarding risks of tyranny that a global institution would entail, is directed specially against an hypothetical cosmopolitanism, which would plead in favor of a global state. Such a state would not have a competing institution and could, very seemingly, undermine individual freedom. Contemporary literature, as was shown here, would prefer to move away from sovereign statehood at a global level. Therefore, such a critique loses most of its pertinence.

A well known objection to a unified global institution was raised by John Rawls. His argument is that current international inequalities, which would be hopefully eliminated by a cosmopolitan global institution, are ethically valuable. In such a sense he argues that:

“Basic fairness among peoples is given by their being represented equally in the second original position with its veil of ignorance. Thus the representatives of peoples will want to preserve the independence of their own society and its equality in relation to others. In the working of organizations and loose confederations of peoples, inequalities are designed to serve the many ends that people share. In this case the larger and smaller peoples will be ready to make larger and smaller contributions and to accept proportionately larger and smaller returns. In addition, the parties will formulate guidelines for setting up cooperative organizations, and will agree to standards of fairness for trade as well as to certain provisions for mutual assistance. Should these cooperative organizations have unjustified distributive effects, these

would have to be corrected in the basic structure of the Society of Peoples” (Rawls, 1999, 115).

Rawls considers that wealth transfers amongst peoples would not be possible. In any case, such rawlsian appreciations are not conducing to consider a global institution as unfair *per se*. Rawls would not be against every form of global integrative institution, as long as it would not undermine the self-respect of peoples, and as long as it would not be distributive. Rawls would probably accept one if that was based on the existent nation states. What is to be retained from this famous rawlsian objection, though, is that the feasibility of a cosmopolitan democracy would need to exclude from its scope a *prima facie* distributive agenda. In any case, such a rawlsian point could never be seen as a critique to cosmopolitanism as such.

A consistent cosmopolitan account would integrate nation states and nationalities within a global institutional scheme. Pogge (Pogge, 1992) shows how national political allegiances and loyalties can serve to cosmopolitan values. According to him, in a world where people is highly dispersed, national instances have an important cosmopolitan role to play to channel individual an collective ethical commitments. A connected argument is David Miller’s (Miller, 1997). Miller argues in favor of nationalities, because of reasons that are different from nostalgic claims. He argues that nationalities develop senses of belonging and subsequent obligations towards others (compatriots). Feelings that are inseparable from each state’s political independence. To foster ethical values would need to give weight to special relationships that would motivate people to pursue them. The fact of sharing a same nationality is maybe one of such special relationships, that would be logically consistent with

recognizing universal values. Special relations that could be developed in diverse geographical levels, depending of the kind of community and commonalities that would be at play. Nothing in Miller's argument denies that politically relevant relationships may be developed beyond national frontiers. A politically relevant relation is one that could be a solid basis for a shared participation into a common political venture. The fact of a transcultural concern in regard of environmental global commons could be a solid basis for a politically relevant global relationship.

A radically localist interpretation of national sovereignty, could argue that a cosmopolitan cession of certain features of national sovereignty to a global institution would be unacceptable. Such would be seen as a detriment of nation states, which would violate the principle of autonomy and self-determination of peoples. Jürgen Habermas pleads for a cession of particular sovereign faculties from nation states to a global instance. An argument to endorse his point is that such a cession would regard only specific issues concerning global commons, and that national sovereignties would continue to exist in regard of all of the other matters of the political spectrum.

Another objection against cosmopolitanism is based on the extreme inequalities between richest and poorest peoples, that would render any democratic global participation highly unequal. In other terms, the richest countries would gain much more than the poorest within a cosmopolitan institution. A subsequent objection is that a cosmopolitan instance would prove to be in the service of a new-imperialism, in which the richest would legitimize an over exploitation of raw materials and people out of the poorest countries. For that

reason, some cosmopolitan authors have considered that a necessary correlate of a global democracy is a universal basic income (Pateman, 2006).

An answer to the former critique, could be that a cosmopolitan common framework could seemingly open a gate for an enhanced global allegiance feeling. A cosmopolitan framework would foster a psychological development of feelings of belonging beyond contemporary boundaries. Such a phenomenon should be enriched by a cosmopolitan education. Feelings of support a person has towards compatriots could be generalized towards those “overseas”. Feelings of belonging to a single human community that would bring about more global solidarity and less exploitation and imperialism.

An objection to the former argument is that patriotism embodies some specific feelings that could never be achievable towards foreign people. Symbols sharing and the way people behave, are crucial factors that may be considered. According to such a vision, special obligations towards compatriots could not be expanded towards others. A form of strict chauvinism (or exaggerated patriotism, biased by a belief in the superiority of a nation over the others) could be incompatible with a cosmopolitan perspective. Nevertheless, a consistent cosmopolitanism would never deny that different feelings of attachment may be developed towards people, in different scales of affection. What is important for a cosmopolitan account is that there is, in any case, a scale of community made of the whole of humanity.

A political objection to an individual-centered cosmopolitanism could have a contractarian ground. Given that there is, supposedly, an implicit agreement between people belonging to a same territory to build a state, a cosmopolis would be impossible to reach, if not on behalf of existent national states. It is possible to inverse the procedure. On the basis of a rational ground, existent power units could voluntarily adhere to a global institution created by the people, as a scenario of overlapping consensus building among individuals of the world. Such an agreement would be built in progression, without the need of a violent revolution to install a new world order. In a kantian perspective, from a cosmopolitan point of view, it is possible to argue that a global democracy needs, more than an explicit initial contract, a continuous cooperative obedience and a special commitment towards cosmopolitan commons and institutions.

A central challenge to a cosmopolitan law is to define the practical support of its own normative enforceability. If a principle of voluntary adherence of states to an institution created by the people is a desirable path, the compulsoriness of such norms could not be equally voluntary. For it to be useful, a global institution needs to produce compulsory norms. It also needs to be able to implement it, specially in non-national territories, such as international waters in the ocean, or the air. Another challenge is to define a protocol to confront multinational corporations which could not be willing to accept cosmopolitan norms. The lack of a ready-made answer to these challenges demands from ecocracy to build an adequate alternative.

9

Ecocracy in front of contemporary cosmopolitanism

Ecocracy inherits an evolved and softened contemporary democratic cosmopolitanism. It represents an institutional global scheme that would supersede traditional radical dilemmas. In such a sense, ecocracy incorporates and reconciles local participation and global representation, global institutions and national power units, global and national citizenships, and so on. A global democracy for a global community. A community built on top of global common goods. Ecocracy would be a suitable global democracy for the care and protection of environmental global commons.

A consequentialist perspective prefers a globally unified public law, both because such a mechanism would be coherent with moral principles and because it would produce the better outcomes. Taking into account the same kind of argument, an inclusion of the nation state within a global governance should be accepted as a pertinent and useful measure. *In grosso*, a democratic global non statehood institution, would be the only accepted alternative.

A sovereign state is an institution that has an unlimited sovereignty over a limited territory. A global non statehood institution, inversely, would have a limited sovereignty over an unlimited territory. A key difference between a state and a non statehood global institution is that the latter would not need to monopolize nor administrate violence. A nation state needs to be a violent last resort, because its *rationale* is to resolve *inter partes* conflicts, in a portion of inhabited territory, avoiding the use of violence by particulars. As long as the inhabitable territory of the planet is currently ruled by sovereign states, that kind of function would not be needed to regard a global authority. Deprived of a direct use of violence, nevertheless, ecocracy would not be deprived of an indirect use of violence, through nation states.

Ecocracy's institutional arrangement includes nation states as main implementation bodies, of globally constructed normative consensus. To the extent to which ecocracy would be a non statehood global institution, it would be deprived of a directly violent capacity. An inclusion of the nation state in regard of the enforceability of the global norms turns out to be a necessary feature. A unified global ecocratic public law would be attained through a global constitution,

which would represent a foundational transcultural overlapping consensus. From this major norm, global norms for the care and protection of environmental global commons would be derived. Such norms would be implemented through nation states, or through a subsidiary implementation board, endorsed by the force of nation states.

Contemporary cosmopolitan literature quiet incisively points at the insufficiency of the nation states and the subsequent interstates system to foster cosmopolitan ideals, specially in regard of environmental care concerns. Inclusion of nation states within a cosmopolitan framework should not distract a consistent view from an individual-centered global structure. A consistent cosmopolitan proposal should be based on individuals, in a way that a global democracy would not be a result from interstates' negotiations. Nation states and interstates institutions would adhere to it in a voluntary way, without becoming *member states*, in the classical sense of having a compulsory voice. Such a voluntary adherence would not condition the validity of global norms over all the global territory. Such an adherence would regard the implementation of ecocracy's norms. Given that a voluntary adherence system would be undertaken, ecocracy would need to be provided of a subsidiary implementation body, which would act when unwilling or incapable states would not implement global norms. Even if ecocracy would not be created by nation states, their voluntary majoritarian adherence to it, would turn out to be a necessary condition.

As a result of a global individuals' consensus in regard of the creation of a cosmopolitan democracy for the care of environmental global

commons, nation states would cede some of their sovereign functions to a non violent global instance. Nation states would continue to fulfill all of the other sovereign functions it has traditionally had, specially by giving cultural cohesion to local populations, and by implementing ecocracy's norms. Ecocracy would be a non violent institution, but it would be provided with a coercive power, notwithstanding. First, ecocracy would base its coercion on moral reproach and a wide publicity of the implementation processes. Second, it would rely on a subsidiary implementation body, which would enter to the territory of a reluctant country, endorsed by the force of adherent countries. Without *own* weapons, this subsidiary implementation body would have a borderless competence.

Ecocracy expected to be a good institutional scheme to foster environmental care concerns. As a cosmopolitan scenario, ecocracy would not be the result of an interstates' negotiation process, nor would be oriented by statist proposals or definitions. Global environmental care policies would not be defined by states, even if implemented by them. Ecocracy is, to insist, a individual-centered cosmopolitan institution. States would implement ecocracy's policies, which would be an obligatory consequence of a voluntary cession of some of their sovereign features to ecocracy. A subsidiary implementation board would implement such policies when national power units would not be able nor willing to do so. As long as ecocracy would not supplement but complement nation states, features of cultural cohesion and local symbols sharing would be fulfilled by nation states.

How and to which extent a cosmopolitan institution should grant global political rights, remains as an unresolved question within contemporary cosmopolitan literature. A crucial input may be found in such a theoretical corpus, though. A communitarian difference-sensitive perspective would need to be adopted by a consistent and acceptable cosmopolitan proposal. In other terms, such a guideline could be understood as the need to grant political rights that would not be exclusively attached to an abstract supranational level, but to local infra national levels, connected to global instances. Both democratic participation and representation need to be qualified inside a global democracy by an enhancement of their meaningfulness. Global and local instances need to embody dynamics of democratic inclusion.

A difference sensitive perspective proposes to bestow cosmopolitan political rights to people. Therefore, ecocracy is made of a twofold structure, inside of which the primary unit of political participation and law creation are local citizen panels. Such panels would be locally based and spontaneously created by individual people around the world. An open input dynamic would be created, in a way that every local specific culture would be able to fully develop its own perspective, and to put it into dialogue with other locality specific positions. A first instance of global political rights bestowing would be imposed by ecocracy at a local level, by giving to local *ecopanel/s* a monopoly of the *legislative initiative* regarding the care and protection of environmental global commons. A secondary unit of political inclusion would be global, inside the framework of a global parliament. Any citizen of whatever country or culture (in disregard of the fact of such country's adherence to ecocracy), could choose or

be chosen to integrate a global parliament. An instance that would decide about global laws adoption.

Democracy could be the ground for an enhanced involvement of people in public institutions, because people would have political incentives to participate. An effective participation of citizens inside a global regime could very well produce suitable locally-fitted political outcomes. Lay people's voice could bring about important local features that global policies should take into account. Christiano makes these same points when arguing:

“Since democracy brings a lot of people into the process of decision making, it can take advantage of many sources of information and critical assessment of laws and policies. Democratic decision-making tends to be more informed than other forms about the interests of citizens and the causal mechanisms necessary to advance those interests” (Christiano, 2015).

A meaningful democratic inclusion could also provide a ground for a public justification of global decisions (Cohen, 2002, 21). Democratically built policies would not only be informed, but would also be formally acceptable to any person. Even if conflicts regarding law application may arise, a cosmopolitan democracy based on local participation would bring about a ground for a globally wide acceptability of ecocracy's decisions. Inside the framework of contemporary cosmopolitanism, a meaningful democracy needs to embody the principle of public justification (or acceptability). Inside ecocracy, a global overlapping consensus would be pursued (and re-created). Such a consensus building venture would imply that different conceptions of the good around the world would be

considered as equally reasonable. Public justification is a normative standard for ecocracy, because, as Chistiano says, “one does not genuinely treat others as equals if one insists on imposing principles on them that they cannot reasonably accept” (Christiano, 2015) (see also Christiano, 2004).

Inside a meaningful global democracy, as ecocracy is expected to be, global citizens would define the content of laws, by virtue of the monopoly of legislative initiative granted to *citizen ecopanel*s. Citizen ecopanel is a grass-rooted deliberative instance of legislative initiative. An initiative that would be considered by a global representative parliament, which would be limited to decide over a wide diversity of law proposals coming from downwards. Such a twofold mechanism would create a meaningful linkage between represented and representatives. Along with a voting mechanism which would enhance minorities’ inclusion inside a global parliament, the mentioned twofold arrangement would produce a meaningful representation. Such a twofold proposal will be presented in the second part of this thesis. On the previous grounds, it can be said that democratic normative standards to which ecocracy could adhere are deliberativeness, both at participative and representative levels, and political equality.

A global citizenship could be constructed by virtue of the existence of global commons and of a global democratic culture. A fundamental assumption made in such a sense is that every individual, regardless of his or her cultural or national specificities, is entitled of self-determination, by virtue of a common rational capacity. A crossed and mutual recognition of such a capacity would result on a common

acceptance of the legitimacy of a global institution ultimately ruled by the people of the world.

Common goods could be the ground of a global citizenship. A defining factor of the extent of social belonging feelings is the geographical extent of the commons at play. Whether the commons concerned by a citizenship are circumscribed to a nation or to the globe, is something that would define the scope and range of a shared citizenship.

Ecocracy is an institutional proposal to take care and protect environmental global commons. Such environmental global commons can be considered as the fundamental characters of the atmosphere. Ecocracy is circumscribed to the care and protection of water, air and earth, which are geographically indivisible, and therefore common to the whole of humanity. A feeling of belonging and community would be pertinent towards any individual in the planet, in regard of the care of these three common goods. As a consequence, any individual would accept an equal concern towards water, air and earth to any other person, regardless of his or her culture or nationality. On such a basis, a global citizenship would be entirely coherent with a request of concrete feelings of belonging that would make it acceptable.

Ecocracy embodies a theoretical shift towards a communitarian cosmopolitanism. A major reason for such a communitarian integration inside cosmopolitan perspectives, is that moral values are meant to be adopted inside local cultures. By consequence, cosmopolitan perspectives may be attained by local actors

embedded in local cultures. In no sense, local and cosmopolitan values need to be contradictory. It could happen that contradictions eventually arise between local values and cosmopolitan values, but such would not be irreconcilable thanks to the adaptability of the process of creation of a global overlapping consensus, inside ecocracy. Such an adaptability is based on the existence of local ecopanel, which are a midterm between global and local values. In a hermeneutic dynamic, adaptability would bring both values to evolve. Rational local actors would morally evolve in a dialogue with principles and ideas coming from outside.

Moral norms are necessarily locally adopted and reproduced, in a way that any cosmopolitan transformation of local cultures would only be possible through an internalized dialogue with cosmopolitan values, inside localities. This verification implies that cosmopolitan concerns towards water, air and earth are in an ambiguous relationship in front of local cultures. On the one side, the care and protection of these commons would be accepted *a priori* by any person in the world. On the other side, how to take care of them, and how to get organized to discuss about them inside a community, would be matters of different opinions. In short, a community could prefer a democratic discussion, and another could prefer an age-based criteria, and so on and so forth. A free composition of ecopanel, as the one adopted by ecocracy, could imply that some of such panels could be “non-democratic” inwards, in a sense that it could exclude a majoritarian voting procedure, for example. Such a circumstance would not undermine the democratic character of such a grass-root institution, to the extent to which such an institution would be composed by the people of the world, and that people

would be ruling through it over ecocracy's global democracy. By virtue of global diversity, a communitarian cosmopolitan ecocracy would not impose a criteria of composition of citizen's local panels. As long as those panels would be created spontaneously, any criteria of composition could be acceptable. Spontaneity refers here to the fact that such panels would only be created by the will of people and according to the procedural preferences of those who integrate it. Ecopanel is inclusionary *per se*, to the extent to which any group of at least two persons could create one. It is also important to note that the kind of political regime that would be at play at a national level, would not undermine the validity of the concerned local citizen's panel in front of ecocracy. Obviously, if a country represses the creation of ecopanel, that would be a practical undermining factor. But ecocracy as such would not underestimate the validity of an ecopanel because of the fact of being created inside the territory of a country with a specific (for example, non democratic) political composition.

A cosmopolitan moral prospection of the world could include a cosmopolitan institution which coexists with national ones, in which cosmopolitan values coexist with national ones, in which a cosmopolitan community coexist with local ones, in which global feelings of human belonging coexist with local feelings of affinity. Such a coexistence of local diversities and cosmopolitan communities, would be an arriving point of a process of constant overlapping consensus building between different peoples and cultures of the world.

Ecocracy is a proposal to walk in such a direction through a global discussion on what could be globally consensual regarding the care and protection of environmental global commons. The process to build an ecocracy encompasses a construction of global and local institutions, high levels of cosmopolitan education, and high levels of publicity.

The construction of a cosmopolitan society could likely begin with ecocracy. Such a cosmopolitan strategy represents important advantages. A core reason to choose such a starting point is that ecocracy is a *minimalistic* cosmopolitan democracy. As long as it is minimal, and in regard of most consensual issue, it is likely to be accepted by all. By providing an answer to a most compelling challenge of contemporary world society, ecocracy could be more easily accepted than another cosmopolitan strategy. Even if minimalistic, ecocracy would produce political transformations both in nation states and in individuals' minds, that would open the gate for further transformations. In the first instance, it would enhance a global consciousness in regard of the care and protection of water, air and earth. By consequence, it would enhance a concern about the care of nature. Secondly, it would promote a transformation of nation states and the interstates system in a cosmopolitan direction. This would mean that the nation states would learn how to coexist with a cosmopolitan democracy, and could turn out to be more open to receive ideas and people coming from outside.

Why should the care and protection of environmental global commons be undertaken through a global democracy? Why not, for example, a global technocracy? or a strictly local management?

Answers to these questions need to be priorly considered to undertake conceptual elaborations concerning ecocracy.

The global reach of the action required by environmental challenges related to water, air and earth, is just a logical derivation of the global unity of these three goods, considered altogether. From a geological point of view (see Chesworth, 2008), water, air, and earth are mutually undivided. A way to observe such a geological condition is to consider that the earth, or “vegetable earth”, stores water, supplies it and purifies it, and is also a modifier of the atmosphere and the air (Chesworth, 2008). Another way to conceive such a unity is to consider the cycle of evaporation, condensation, precipitation and runoff of water. Even if it could be possible to separate water from earth or air (and this fact could be debated), in the ecological real world these three elements appear to be, naturally, in an undivided condition. If water is absent from earth, earth suffers. If air is absent from water, water suffers. Between these three goods there is a reciprocal dependence, which makes that any harm produced on any of them implies harms on the others. In a little scale, harms to, for example, water, may be controlled by water, air and earth, in a way that there could result in no harm at all. In contemporary world, unfortunately, harms to water, air and earth are not minor. Huge damages have been produced over each of them, in a magnitude that automatic self defense mechanisms of the planet could not work or worked in an extremely long term, in a way that present and short term future generations of human beings suffer. Damages to water, air, and earth enter into an exponential chain of effects, to an extent to which harms produced over one of them in one corner of the planet, could seemingly affect their quality in another corner of the

world. By consequence, the care of water, air, and earth needs to be global. As long as those commons are mutually undivided, globally unified strategies are needed, even if inside of such unified strategies relevant nuances should be introduced during local applications.

In front of the care of water, air and earth, a communitarian perspective is deeply justified. Local views on what is needed to take care of environmental global commons is fairly valued, because different environmental conditions imply different kinds of protecting actions. Based on the former verification, ecocracy incorporates a communitarian democratic cosmopolitanism.

A communitarian cosmopolitan ecocracy could only be *democratic*. It is logical to conclude that peoples' communitarian participation could be meaningful inside a global scheme, if and only if peoples' voice has a really compulsory force. It could be argued that a global technocracy could impose to itself a duty to listen to communities. Even in the best possible expression of such a global technocracy, the result would be less positive than in a democracy, which would give to such a communitarian voice a legal compulsoriness. A main reason to include a compulsory voice of communities inside a global democracy remains in the political incentives to participate, that would be much more significant within a democratic framework than within a technocratic one.

Apart, some other compelling reasons justify a preference in favor of a democratic mode of global decision-making. Philippe Van Parijs (2015) identifies three strong arguments to justify such a preference. He argues that a democratic procedure entails an *educational force*,

a *civilizing force*, and a *disciplining force*, that could not be socially reached by any other (despotic or technocratic) collective decision-making procedure.

Based on Josiah Ober's (2008) analysis of the relationship that a democratic representation establishes between ruling persons and lay people, Van Parijs concludes that "in a democracy, the need to be elected and re-elected forces political leaders to reach out and listen, to gather valuable but widely scattered knowledge from all those on whose vote they depend: about their situation and their problems, their fears and their hopes" (Van Parijs, 2015). Democracy is provided by an input system to catch information coming from lay people. Such a system could turn out to produce better decisions. In a non democratic decision-making process, the ruling persons could easily turn out to be separated from that sort of popular input, which would push them to dismiss important information. Such an epistemic advantage should not be limited to educational dynamics within elections. It seems necessary to incorporate grass-root participation providing it by a compulsory force. Citizen *ecopanel*s have, within ecocracy, a monopoly of legislative initiative. A global *ecoparliament* considers a refined and manageable amount of information, systematized by a scientific board, to decide about legal initiatives coming from lay people. Grass-root's proposals would be compulsory in front of a global representative *ecoparliament*. Such a grass-root inclusion within the decision-making process could be a way to enhance the epistemic value of democracy to a highest degree.

A second argument to prefer democracy over any other kind of collective decision-making process is also pointed by Van Parijs,

following a Jon Elster's (1986) expression, which is the "civilizing force of hypocrisy". Such a provoking expression refers to a need that electoral candidates and politicians have to make a constant reference to general interests, even if they do not actually believe it. The need of such a hypocrisy is determined by the fact that democracies do intrinsically incorporate a public deliberative dimension, even if limited to the conversation process which comes during campaigns or, eventually, during legal deliberative forums. Van Parijs says that "the need to sound good in the deliberative forum civilizes not only their words (the words of politicians), but also their policies" (Van Parijs, 2015). Such an argument reveals a pragmatic advantage of democratic deliberation. Given a certain degree of publicity intrinsic to any democratic decision-making processes, political decisions need to incorporate qualities that would make laws and policies publicly acceptable. This second argument in favor of democracy underlines a correcting force that publicity has in front of potential political decisions. Such a value of democracy would be enhanced by ecocracy through the implementation of a widest publicity of the decision-making process.

A third argument to favor a preference for democracy is that, given that democracy produces better and more acceptable collective decisions, such decisions could be enforceable through self-infliction. According to Van Parijs, "the third basis for a strong presumption in favor of democracy resides in the *disciplining force of self-infliction*" (Van Parijs, 2015). The extent to which people gets involved with a decision-making process makes possible for a political entity to be effective without requiring violence. In such a sense, Van Parijs argues that "any political entity will work more

efficiently if the enforcement of its decisions does not require an expensive and intrusive repressive apparatus” (Van Parijs, 2015). Following his argument, a deepened social involvement with political decisions would increase the rules’ legitimacy and diminish the need of a violent last resort for its implementation. Such a legitimacy could be made of a combination of an “input legitimacy” (the process to make collective decisions is seen as fair), and an “output legitimacy” (the contents of decisions are seen as fair). In ecocracy, a grass-root political inclusion enhances its “input legitimacy”, and a meaningful representation mechanism enhances its “output legitimacy”. Both dimensions of the acceptability of global rules are straightened by ecocracy’s scope, which is a *per se* legitimate care of environmental global commons.

An additional argument in favor of democracy is that its participatory dynamics would help to “clean” the political process, by “throwing out the rascals” (Van Parijs, 2015; Popper, 2000). Such a cleaning force of democracy could be enhanced by the implementation of democratic accountability mechanisms. Such mechanisms would complement the force of publicity of the decision-making process. Accountability mechanisms subordinate political representatives to the represented people, in a way that the elected could suffer punishment as a consequence of bad political behaviors denounced by any lay person. Even more, such a lay person could ask for any information of the decision making process to see whether or not representatives are doing a good job. Accountability could be interpreted as a mechanism to enhance a cogent subordination of the representatives in front of the represented. Instead of an *strict sense* accountability mechanism, Van Parijs argues in favor of an *ex*

post controlling mechanism, that consists on "the ability to throw out what they (bad politicians) decided through a referendum at the citizens' request" (Van Parijs, 2015). In both alternatives, democracy entails a value, that no other decision-making process has, in the sense that it would incorporate an intrinsic subordination of the representatives in front of the represented. Ecocracy would enhance such value, by introducing an *ex-ante* cogent subordination, through the bestowing of the legislative initiative to the grass-root ecopanel.

These pragmatic considerations to prefer a democratic system, could lead to conclude that for the purpose of an effective care and protection of environmental global commons, democracy is a most adequate option, to the extent to which it would produce the better and more legitimate collective decisions. Such a consideration is complementary to more fundamental reasons, related to moral principles of contemporary cosmopolitanism.

A first moral principle that favors a cosmopolitan democracy, is that the only legitimate ground to achieve unified global policies is a global overlapping consensus building venture. Such a consensus would be constructed as an overlapping of moral coincidence between different conceptions of the good and the justice, where none would resign their own beliefs while establishing moral convergences with other moral conceptions. Such would be a transcultural overlapping consensus. A trans-cultural scenario that would necessarily be democratic, if a politically egalitarian dialogue wants to take place.

Three different moments of such a dialogue can be differentiated inside ecocracy. First, ecocracy's scope is related uniquely to the care and protection of water, air and earth; such a scope incorporates an *implicit and necessary* trans-cultural overlapping consensus, derived from the fact that such are *per se* necessary to any form of good life on Earth. Second, an explicit dialogue would take place during the adoption of a global *ecoconstitution*, from which all the global rules would be derived. Third, ecocracy's global norms come from consensus that would appear among the diversity of law proposals coming from the grass-root's ecopanel. This third dimension of a global overlapping consensus requires a mid-term scientific institutional layer, which would systematize such consensus. Such a systematization would be afterwards considered by the ecoparliament. A global democratic procedure seems the best fitted mechanism to build a global overlapping consensus. From a pragmatic point of view, such democratic procedure would also enhance an "input and output legitimacy" of global decisions.

Ecocracy's global democracy could help to build a cosmopolitan communitarianism. The reason is that a global democracy could help to enhance an inter-local communities-global community dialogue, inside of which both would result culturally better off. Communities would be able to internalize qualified information coming from a hugely diverse outside. Through the ecocratic decision-making process, a global cosmopolis would turn out to be based on enhanced local communitarian moral conceptions and belonging ties.

A qualified global democratic procedure, as the one proposed by ecocracy, would allow to have a global non-statehood institution. A

global institution could only be deprived of a violent last resort (such a deprivation defines its being non-statehood) if their decisions are highly legitimate and accepted. According to Van Parijs' arguments, democratic procedures would be valuable because they would enhance the legitimacy of the norms. Ecocracy would deepen democracy through a primacy of grass-root based institutions (ecopanel), through a highest degree of publicity, through a scope which is limited to the care and protection of environmental global commons, and through global overlapping consensus building as a procedural guideline. A deep democratic legitimacy could deprive ecocracy of a violent last resort, by favor of a strong moral compulsoriness of global norms.

Ecocracy is meant to be a political institution, where political power is defined as the faculty to produce collectively binding decisions. Some authors consider that the binding character of a political decision is ultimately endorsed by a violent last resort, to an extent to which politics and violence can never be separated (see for example Weber, 1978 or Luhmann, 2009). A cosmopolitan political institution, to which nation states would cede a part of their sovereign faculties, would represent a theoretical innovation in front of this classical assumption.

Such a cosmopolitan institution could be considered as a *second order sovereignty*. This expression means, in this context, that a cosmopolitan sovereignty would be both *different* and *complementary* in front of national sovereignties (which could be considered as *first order sovereignties*). Such a kind of second order sovereignty would not compete with first order sovereignties,

because of two reasons. First, because they should have a different thematic scope (even if their geographical scope could be partially superposed). Second, because such a second order sovereignty should be deprived of a direct use of violence. A *second order sovereignty* would not need to repeat all the features of *first order sovereignties*. The reason is that both would have been created to comply different functions, and to answer to different historical needs. Whereas, both national and global sovereignties would need to be well articulated.

National sovereignties (namely, first order ones) were historically born to monopolize the use of violence, to avoid war between private actors. Such a monopole of violence is also a sustenance of the obligatoriness of law (understood as a system of rules to govern human behavior, that could not exist if not enforceable). Moral reproach could work as a partial substitute of the use of physical force to enforce legal rules. National states' adhesion to ecocracy would be necessary, because it would serve as a backrest for ecocracy in cases of conflictual implementation, to oblige opposing actors to comply to ecocratic norms.

As a consequence of an articulation between *first order* and *second order* sovereignties, ecocracy's norms would be based on both a direct use of moral reproach and an indirect use of physical force, through the violence administrated by voluntarily adhering nation states. Nation states would voluntarily adhere to a system of globally obligatory norms.

Such an obligatoriness of ecocratic norms is endorsed by three facts. First, such global norms are necessary for an effective care of water, air, and earth, and are, therefore, valuable for every culture and for every person. Second, such global norms would be created by the people of the world, through an extremely legitimate democratic process of global overlapping consensus building venture. Third, the norms concerning the care and protection of environmental global commons would be a monopoly of ecocracy, given that nation states would have ceded their concerned sovereign functions to it.

Nation states' adhesion would be expressed through national constitutional reforms, which would cede to ecocracy the concerned sovereign functions in regard of the care and protection of environmental global commons. As a democratic political institution, ecocracy would be ruled by the people of the world. Adhesion of nation states would be a necessary feature for ecocracy, but would not be the foundation of its existence. The foundation of its existence would be expressed through the adoption of a global ecoconstitution.

The enforceability of ecocracy's legitimate norms would be made of a combination of a direct use of moral coercion, and an indirect use of violent coercion. In other terms, such an enforceability would be attained through a feasible articulation of first order sovereignties and the second order one. Such an articulation would turn out to be necessary in cases of conflictual implementation of ecocracy's norms. When such conflictual implementations would deal with transnational private actors, the global view of ecocracy would serve to design strategies that would include both global moral reproach and territorial measures of constraint, that would be implemented by

concerned states. Coercive articulation between voluntarily adherent states and the global ecocracy obeys to the principle of a theory of scales, in which the national level of the scale uses violence, whereas global and local levels use moral reproach.

Part II

Ecocracy

Ecocracy is an exercise of normative political philosophy, to derive from deep normative principles and some practical concerns an institutional scheme proposal for the global care and protection of environmental commons. For such a purpose, it is based on top of four methodological motivations. Each of them shows one important aspect of the argument in favor of an Ecocracy. Such motivations could be consistently considered as being methodological, to the extent to which they would define the analytical directions in which the arguments are considered and presented along this second part. Given that this is a thesis on normative political philosophy, the above mentioned four dimensions are coextensive to the four roles granted to political philosophy by John Rawls (Rawls, 2001).

A first methodological guideline is to contribute to build a theoretical agreement between different streams of contemporary political philosophy. Rawls says that “one task of political philosophy -its practical role, let’s say- is to focus on deeply disputed questions and

to see whether, despite appearances, some underlying basis of political and moral agreement can be uncovered” (Rawls, 2001, 2). During at least the last fifty years, a disputed question has been to prefer whether universalism or localism, in terms of political legitimacy and convenience. A dispute between universality and particularity (see Bell, 2013), refers to different approaches to the existence of human goods and values. Goods and values that are *human*, in the sense of being valid for *every* human. Such is the very practical meaning of “universality”.

In the field of the theories of justice, one extreme possibility is to consider justice as a universal truth, and another opposite view is to consider justice as an strictly local contextual issue. A strong point made by communitarian theorists is that justice could make sense for people in the framework of interpretative contexts. Such an attachment to interpretation, makes of any theoretical abstraction of justice an idle exercise.

A plausible way to walk to resolve such a dispute, is to identify global goods, considered as pertinent values in a universal context of interpretation. On such a basis, diverse conceptions of good and justice would be able to enter into a significant dialogue, to build agreed universal consensus. Such a possibility could be accepted by communitarian authors like Charles Taylor, according to whom “we would agree on the norms while disagreeing on why they were the right norms, and we would be content to live in this consensus, undisturbed by the differences of profound underlying belief” (Taylor 1999, 124). A consistent cosmopolitan way to supersede a universality/particularity division could be to build a “communitarian

cosmopolitanism”. Ecocracy advances in such a theoretical direction, while proposing an institutional design inside of which a global democracy could be based on autonomous local communities and specific-culture-located individuals.

A second motivation of this thesis is to serve as a reference point of rational orientation. John Rawls would call this role of political philosophy by the kantian idea of “orientation”. He says that “the idea is that it belongs to reason and reflection (both theoretical and practical) to orient us in the (conceptual) space, say, of all possible ends, individual and associational, political and social. Political philosophy, as a work of reason, does this by specifying principles to identify reasonable and rational ends of those various kinds, and by showing how those ends can cohere within a well-articulated conception of a just and reasonable society” (Rawls, 2001, 3). Such a role of orientation makes of a political philosophical work a contribution to reason, if it provides to it a direction where to advance. Ecocracy opens a debate in regard of a well ordered and deeply elaborated institutional answers to a particularly cogent social and individual end, which is the care of water, air and earth, at a planetary scale. Ecocracy provides a well-articulated institutional scheme proposal, which would reflect and reproduce a just, reasonable and diverse world society.

A third methodological concern of this thesis is to make a reconciliatory-superseding critique. John Rawls would term this role of political philosophy with the hegelian term of “reconciliation”. According to him, “political philosophy may try to calm or frustration and rage against our society and its history by showing us the way in

which its institutions, when properly understood from a philosophical point of view, are rational” (Rawls, 2001, 3). Ecocracy is based on a particular interpretation of contemporary institutional world. Such an interpretation, inherited from contemporary cosmopolitanism, does not stand that current national and interstate institutions are exactly rational. Instead, a methodological assumption of this thesis is that the actual institutional world could acquire a rational prospective. Contemporary cosmopolitanism has quiet incisively insisted on an insufficiency and incapacity of nation states and interstates institutions to take care of environmental global commons, because of an intrinsic discreteness that would impede to undertake needed globally coordinated strategies. Ecocracy would not resign such a critique conception, but it would instead offer an institutional scheme within which national political power could be transformed in a desirable way. Such a kind of critique does not plead for a political destruction of the existent institutional world, but instead for a superseding global democracy. Such a new democracy would embrace and supersede the nation state.

A forth and indeed core methodological motivation of ecocracy is to be a realistic utopia. Normative philosophy can be considered as a reasoned exercise to conceptually plead in favor of what is good. According to Rawls, “we view political philosophy as realistically utopian” (Rawls, 2001, 4). Normative political philosophy should propose societal orderings that could morally better off human social life (greatest examples of such a kind of exercise are John Jacques Rousseau’s or John Stuart Mill’s). This very essential feature of normative political philosophy is, in spite of its importance, rather complex. A perplexity is produced by the apparently contradictory fact

that, on the one hand, none would discuss about a theoretical acceptability of normative political philosophy (which is intrinsically utopian), even if, on the other hand, a utopia would not necessarily be accepted as a consistent normative political philosophy. Contemporary political philosophy asks from a utopia to be *realistically utopian* in order to be theoretically acceptable.

Roughly, the word utopia refers to a desirable future. Normative political philosophy is intrinsically utopian, even if it could be whether transformative or conservative. A conservative normative political philosophy could appeal to moral and ethical principles and prefer not to transform actual societies, but to refine them. Normative political philosophy could also prefer whether transformation either innovation, and would be also utopian. In any case, John Rawls argues that utopian normative philosophy could be accepted in and only if such a utopia was realistic. It is important to note that, as Rawls pleads, how realistic a utopia is, is not a function of a calculation based on empirical factors, since, conceptually, “the problem here is that the limits of the possible are not given by the actual” (Rawls, 2001, 5). According to him, the main question to ask here is: “what would a just democratic society look like *under reasonably favorable but still possible historical conditions, conditions allowed by the laws and tendencies of the social world?*” (Rawls, 2001, 4). In other terms, such a realistic feature of a utopia is composed of considerations about historical and moral feasibility. Historical feasibility refers to the legal, political, economic and social conditions that such a utopia would require to be realized. Moral feasibility refers to the existence of observable lines of moral evolution on top of which such a utopia could rest.

Following a simple etymological analysis, “utopia” means both a no-place and a good-place. A conjunction of both could be simplified by the assertion: “a good future”, if one accepts to consider that a reasonable “no-place” could be the future. Nevertheless, some authors give a pejorative significance to the word utopia. A classical XIXth century debate between proudhonian utopian socialists and marxist scientific socialists would have been a context in which this word gained a negative connotation. Recently, Thomas Nagel reproduces such negative connotation of the word utopia, by arguing that “an ideal, however attractive it may be to contemplate, is utopian if reasonable individuals cannot be motivated to live by it” (Nagel, 1991, 21). In a substantive way, in spite of a terminological dispute, Nagel would not be a “anti-utopian”, to the extent to which he would sympathize with political imagination and ethical invention within political philosophy. He says that “we are then faced with an unsatisfactory situation which calls for the exercise of political, social, and psychological imagination. What generates political theory as a distinct subject is an ethical demand and not just a practical one -and it is the demand for ethical invention” (Nagel, 1991, 32). In the context of this thesis, the word utopian would be freed of any pejorative connotation. Even though, to which extent this utopia could be an acceptable normative excursus needs to be further discussed.

Outside of a discussion about the meaning of the word, Nagel introduces a compelling argument in front of a normative forward-looking political philosophy (utopia). According to him, “justification in political theory must address itself to people twice: first as occupants of the impersonal standpoint and second as occupants of particular

roles within an impersonally acceptable system” (Nagel, 1991, 30). He emphasizes in the fact that an acceptable normative political theory needs to take into account, apart from rational human aspirations, individual motivations bind to what he may call “the stubborn realities of human nature” (Nagel, 1991, 3). In other terms, a normative idea would be unacceptable (or “utopian”, in the sense accorded to the word by Nagel), if it would not be historically feasible (in the sense given to this expression before), morally desirable (in the sense of being theoretically consistent with accepted moral principles), and morally plausible, in the sense that it would need to be compatible with personal “individual choices and efforts and personal attachments” (Nagel, 1991, 120). Historical feasibility and moral desirability complete an “impersonal standpoint”, while moral plausibility represents a “personal standpoint”.

Lets take examples of non reasonable utopias. First, suppose that a utopia is that human beings should fly and live in the trees. Even if extremely desirable, it would not be theoretically acceptable, since it would not be taking into account human physical nature’s constraints. Second, suppose that a utopia is that human beings should be freed of any conflict because we should all share the same moral convictions and behaviors. This one would not be acceptable neither, because it would be both unsustainable from an impersonal standpoint (as long as diversity is rationally preferred to unanimity), and unsustainable from a personal standpoint (as long as individuals have personal motivations to differ with others). A more complex consideration is needed to test a more elaborated utopia: suppose that a utopia is to have an ecocracy, a global democracy for the care and protection of environmental global commons, inside of which the

state would be embraced and superseded. Would this one be an acceptable one?

Rawls would argue that the acceptability of a (realistic) utopia needs to take into account actual tendencies of social life, on top of which it would be based. Such is a requisite to some extent coextensive to what Nagel calls an impersonal standpoint. An impersonal standpoint is made of two different kinds of considerations. First, it needs to take into account moral values. Second, it considers historical variables that would condition the plausibility of such a normative theory. Following Nagel's approach, a personal standpoint needs to be considered also. A personal standpoint made of considerations of personal benefit.

In any case, it would not be consistent to impose to a utopian account a limitation on the basis of certain *static* traits of character that would be called "human nature". The reason is that a normative utopian political philosophy would always be referring to a future, and the mentioned "human nature" is indeed a historical, and variable, configuration of human character. Such a character does evolve. Even if the rhythm of moral evolution is extremely difficult to predict, the very fact of evolution could not be contradicted. If human nature was wrongfully considered as a static feature, such a "nature" would be raised as a definite objection against any form of utopia. Therefore, normative political philosophy would be condemned as such.

If human beings were considered as being exclusively and fatally selfish, any social prospection which would not be strictly limited to

the protection of life and goods of individuals, would be condemned as foolish, and rejected. For any evolutionary view of human condition, it would be necessary to accept that human morality has been changing along history. Many, many examples of moral evolution can be easily found, in the fields of women's rights, children's rights, the care of environment, and a long etcetera. A cogent argument in favor of human social and moral evolution is offered by Steven Pinker, through his book *The Better Angels of Our Nature* (2011). With a basis on statistics, Pinker shows how human society has socially, politically and therefore morally evolved towards an observable reduction of violence. The raise of the nation state, a feminization of social life, education, and also involuntary social features, would have been historically coordinated to produce such an observable line of human moral evolution.

A necessary assumption for any form of utopia is to accept the possibility of human moral evolution. If such an evolution were rejected, any utopia would, regardless of how realistic it could be. Strong theoretical arguments in favor of human moral evolution are available. A good one is based on an anthropological conception of human beings, as being intrinsically open to morality and moral evolution.

Such a line of argument considers that there is an intrinsic rational/linguistic disposition of human beings towards moral transformation. Ernst Tugendhat follows an aristotelian thesis according to which human language is made of a "propositional structure". Such a structure would allow human communication to incorporate a dynamic interaction, based on the assertions "I", "yes" and

“no” (Tugendhat, 1976). Such a feature, essential to any speaking human being, is, according to Tugendhat, the very linguistic essence of human morality. On that ground, he considers morality as a human evolutive feature (Tugendhat, 2001). To the extent to which a propositional structure is a permanent feature of human language, humanity is intrinsically related to predicative moral assertions in an “independent situation” (Tugendhat, 1997), which would allow (and promote) moral transformation and moral evolution.

Linguistic/rational arguments to accept moral evolution could be conceived as being partially complementary to an adaptive view of evolution. A plausible way to reconcile them both is to affirm that a moral adaptive capacity of humanity in front of changing circumstances is possible thanks to a propositional structure of human language. A combination of both theories would deepen an argument in favor of moral evolution as such. The extent to which adaptation is undertaken by rational actors, explains why human beings tend to incorporate what is considered good and reject what is considered bad from traditional morality (say “yes” and “no” to it, respectively), and to invent or incorporate new progressive perspectives to better adapt to new social conditions.

Social changes, defined by moral tendencies, would be gaining space inside human moral configuration. Tendencies that could lead to new institutional forms of adaptation in front of compelling challenges of contemporary world. As long as moral evolution is a *sine qua non* requisite of any utopia, based on the previous arguments, this thesis assumes the fact that human beings do morally evolve.

Moral evolution, assumed as a real historical fact, cannot be reduced to a vacuum, through which the problem of a realistic utopia would be reduced to a simple *petitio principii*. For a utopia to be considered as realistic, the sense of the alleged moral evolution would need to be considered as realistic also. As stated above, Rawls would encourage to answer to the question of a realistic utopia on top of an analysis of the kind of historical requisites and moral tendencies that such a utopia would be based on. A way to answer to Nagel's request about a moral plausibility of a normative political philosophy is to identify observable lines of moral evolution. The extent to which such lines would effectively exist, would make plausible to assume that an institutional proposal could be acceptable.

Ecocracy is based on top of three moral tendencies. First, an ecological tendency, can be observed in a growing concern about the care and protection of water, air, and earth, as environmental essentials of the atmosphere and of human life. Second, a cosmopolitan tendency, can be observed in a growing feeling of cosmopolitan human belonging, and a recognition of humanity as a community, in spite of national boundaries and cultural differences. Third, a post-national tendency, which consists on a less observable acceptance of the cession of some features of nation states' sovereignty to a non statehood global regime. This last moral tendency is actually under permanent dispute.

These three moral tendencies are observable in contemporary social world, albeit unevenly. An ecological moral tendency is almost out of any discussion, for it would be extremely strange that a reasonable

person would be against the care and protection of water, air and earth. A cosmopolitan moral tendency is also observable, even if it can be less consensual. In contemporary world, there are still critiques to cosmopolitanism coming, mostly, from localists perspectives. A consistent cosmopolitanism could deal with such critiques, by incorporating communitarianism and nationalism inside a softened globalism. Even in spite of those critiques, a tendency towards cosmopolitanism is also real. It could be seemingly said that a moral contemporary tendency is to assume an enlarged “we” of humanity. A post-national moral tendency is indeed a more theoretically sophisticated one, and therefore it is less assumed by people in general. A post-national moral tendency can be observed both in the field of theory as in the field of concrete politics, through phenomena like the European Union. A post-national tendency is vividly inside a disputed field. A challenge of this thesis is to show the acceptability of such a tendency, by proposing a consistent institutional global scheme, that would embrace and supersede the nation state. Such a challenge has been already undertaken by relevant authors like Jürgen Habermas. A growing ecological feeling, a growing cosmopolitan feeling and a growing post-national feeling, are moral tendencies on top of which a realistic moral evolution would make of ecocracy a realistic utopia.

The extent to which these three moral tendencies could be considered as realistic, would determine, in part, the extent to which ecocracy would be considered a realistic utopia. If these moral tendencies do exist, a Nagel’s personal standpoint would be partially taken into account: individuals would have personal (moral) motivations to accept an ecocracy. A personal standpoint needs to

consider, also, if people would accept such a normative theory in regard of calculations of their own benefit. Ecocracy is a necessary institution to globally take care of water, air and earth. Any person, rich or poor, would be selfishly interested in the care of these three goods, for their own sake, and for the sake of their heirs. Ecocracy is therefore a normative proposal which should be accepted from a personal standpoint. The extent to which ecocracy would be considered a sustainable proposal from an impersonal standpoint, determines the extent to which ecocracy would be fully accepted as a normative theory. Such an impersonal standpoint is made of the theoretical consistency of the proposal (which will be exposed along this second part), and of a consideration of the empirical conditions for its feasibility (which will be shortly considered at the end of the thesis).

1

Ecocracy's utopia

Ecocracy is a utopia. This is equivalent to say that ecocracy is a good idea for the future. A global democracy for the care and protection of environmental global commons could be put into place, if global politics got open to new institutions as a result of a massif moral acceptance. To consider present and future generations' right to live whatever kind of good life, is a good reason to promote acceptation of environmental global care and protection. As Deborah Lowry says, "scholars of environmental justice, environmental sociology, and related fields should explore possible connections and fruitful extensions to research in... person-environment fit" (Lowry,

2009, 114); as a utopia, ecocracy is a contribution to the field of normative environmental political studies.

Ecocracy is not meant to struggle against national borders, but to overcome its discriminatory features. Indeed, a territorial regime is useful to promote a peaceful coexistence inside national borders, which use to be coextensive to language borders. In fact, as Philippe Van Parijs argues, “a territorial regime will only be able to do what it needs to do for the sake of parity of esteem if it fixes language borders” (Van Parijs, 2011, 138). This is a reason why “sons of the soil”, and other nationalistic claims, are usually accepted. Some privileges use to be associated with national borders; Van Parijs argues that from a territorial regime it would be logical to derive an acceptance of territorially-based privileges. In that sense, “to give a privilege to the ‘sons of the soil’, in the precise sense of those residing in the territory concerned at the time the regime is put into place” (Van Parijs, 2011, 138), would not imply a negative discrimination *per se*. Ecocracy is meant to overcome tacit discriminations suggested by nationhood. Discrimination is a real fact not only when it is explicit, but also when it is suggested through social messages,⁸ like those that are frequently transmitted through national differentiations. Mechanisms of deliberative inclusiveness of ecocracy (ecopanel) are meant to achieve forms of affective and discursive identification larger than nationhood; “identification with an enlarged and possible “we” of humanity” (Mehta, 2000, 623).

⁸ In mass media, for example, “advice about beauty, clothing, styles, cosmetics, diet and exercise... imply that the reader falls short, that she will never be good enough” (McMahon, 1990, 289).

Ecocracy is a global democracy. Given that “it is widely held that democracy can flourish only where certain socio-economic and cultural conditions are satisfied” (Caney, 2005, 41), parametric universalism appears to be a theoretical and political need. Parametric universalism means that universal premises can be realized following different temporal metrics. In terms of politics, a universal democracy can consistently be realized at a global level, whilst non-cosmopolitan regimes subsist at local levels. A global institutional framework is proposed here; a democracy which can coexist with non-cosmopolitan national regimes, as long as they accept people’s democratic participation within ecocracy (even if this participation comes to be denied for national matters). Ecocracy is a proposal to globally protect the environment, in a parametric and democratic way.⁹

Ecocracy is a non-statehood alternative, which is not meant to be a global centralized violent power, in a concurrence in front of national sovereignties (i.e. nation states). The idea of a certain kind of move away from sovereign statehood has been introduced by contemporary cosmopolitan literature. Simon Caney clarifies that, in

⁹ As Bryan Norton would argue, our response to environmental damages needs to be democratic. “Suppose our generation succeeds, against all odds, in instituting strong controls on resource overexploitation, and furthermore institutes successful restoration of existing damage... But suppose also that, in the meantime, democratic institutions are replaced by a centralized, totalitarian government that doles out existing resources mainly to a power elite, while most people live in abject poverty without access to existing resources. Under this supposition, we would have protected, physically, the birthright of future generations -we have maintained options insofar as having options depending on ecophysical resources- and yet most people would not have the power to exercise those options. It would be a sad cynicism to claim, in this situation, that the “opportunities” of this future people have been protected” (Norton, 1999).

general, cosmopolitan authors are be defending the idea of a global state. Given that both a global system of states and to rely on a sovereign statehood would be both considered equally useless, cosmopolitanism should prefer a political order deprived of a “sovereign statehood” (Caney, 2005, 163). Ecocracy is not a multilateral sovereign-state based system. Such is a kind of system that shows paradoxical dynamics,¹⁰ that make it extremely difficult to undertake through them globally unified strategies for the care and protection of environmental global commons.

Ecocracy is based on existing non-interested affect and sympathy relationships between human beings. “Adam Smith ultimately rejected Hume's claim -in the *Enquiry*- that sympathy was grounded in utility... I still affirm -Smith would argue- that it is not the view of this utility or hurtfulness which is either the first principle or source of our approbation or disapprobation (Smith, 1982, 188)” (Forman-Barzilai, 2005, 200). Affect, for Adam Smith, is a human anthropological trait, which is an outcome of social association and connexion, and not only of proximity.¹¹ Even if it is not equally distributed, affect is present in any culture; it makes part of our moral interconnectivity. Affect is the basis on top of which it is possible to build a global

¹⁰ According to Linda Weiss, “states(.) agreeing to a basic set of disciplines governing trade relations, also seek loopholes and escape routes from multilateral discipline (sometimes leading to further multilateral rounds to close the loopholes)” (Weiss, 2005, 724).

¹¹ Affect is also the principle guiding Van Parijs’ call for a global *lingua franca*. According to him, “having a language in common enables all members of the local community to form a common demos, and thereby to satisfy an important precondition for a more effective pursuit of economic solidarity” (2011, 195).

demos, as a collectivity able to give birth to a new planetary way of life, and therefore the basis for ecocracy.

The intensity of our global interactions is increasing.¹² Ecocracy is a move in the direction of the unavoidable circumstance of *globalization*.¹³ If economic globalization has implied environmental destruction, an affect-based political globalization for the protection of environmental global commons is *necessary*; good water, air, and earth are obliged starting points for any prospection of a good life. This universal needs are not ethnocentric, in the sense that they can not be identified with a set of practices and beliefs from a particular culture (see Mehta, 2000, 633). Non-centric politics are deduced from cultural diversity, and are on the basis of ecocracy's multifold institutional design.

Ecocracy is a realistic utopia. John Rawls defines a *realistic utopia* as a morally and conceptually consistent normative theory, based on observable lines of moral evolution. For him, this would be the case of "a world in which great evils have been eliminated and just (or at least) basic institutions established by both liberal and decent peoples" (Rawls, 1999, 126). The institutional design proposed here is meant to be acceptable from any good standing (rational)

¹² This phenomenon is caused by many reasons, one of which is indeed the one presented by Kristy Best, according to whom scene consumption turn out to contract distant interactions: "However, the interface is also embodied, as screens becomes habitual surface areas for daily interaction, or "contractions" (Wise 1997) of perceptions and action toward physical environments" (Best, 2004, 70).

¹³ Pratap Mehta would explain that, in contemporary world, it cannot be said that there are more than very few localities existing outside a deep interaction with the rest of the world (Mehta, 2000, 631).

perspective, and is based on top of three observable moral tendencies: an ecological growing concern, a cosmopolitan growing affinity and post-national growing acceptability.

2

A global ecoconstitution

It is reasonable to assume that future generations would desire to have a good environment. Any basic prospection of a good life need to include good water, good air, and good earth; “the loss of these features would be understood to result in the diminution of the quality of future lives, *regardless of the amount of compensation/wealth that is provided as a substitute for the lost features*. Individuals in the future could, if these features are lost, justifiably blame present people for failing to protect these features, no matter how wealthy they turn out to be” (Norton 1999, 130). How can the present generation grant good environmental commons to future generations?

In the context of this thesis, future generations are those to be born after a decision being made. To be applicable to future groups, and to protect future goods, a present decision needs to be highly legally ensured. Such a high insurance is usually associated to constitutionalization, given that such a legal text is specially difficult to reform. Almost every contemporary country has its own “constitutional” criteria, and it is, in general, difficult to get new ideas into such a “text.”¹⁴

One reason why it is difficult to get innovative modes of environmental protection into liberal constitutions, is that for classical liberal law “all significant moral relations between individuals are the symmetrical ones expressed by contract” (Midgley, 1998, 169).¹⁵ On the contrary, an effective mode of environmental protection needs to be based on an asymmetrical moral interconnection between human and non human beings, including the planet itself inside the range of asymmetry.

¹⁴ Many have noted this difficulty in regard of environmental goods’ protection; “any effort to renovate the institutions of representative, liberal democracy to enable more systematic representation of the neglected environmental constituency” (Eckersley, 2011, 238) seems to be a difficult task.

¹⁵ In the current liberal constitutional model, only “between equal” relations are relevant. Mary Midgley proposes an alternative model, which she calls “organic.” “If, on the other hand,” she says, “we use a biological or “organic” model, we can talk also of a variety of asymmetrical relations found within a whole. Leaves relate not only to other leaves, but to fruit, twigs, branches and the whole tree. People appear not only as individuals, but as members of their groups, families, tribes, species, ecosystems and biosphere, and have moral relations as parts of these wholes” (Midgley, 1998, 169).

A new sort of constitution, able to oblige the world to take the care of environmental global commons, both by virtue of symmetrical (intergenerational) and asymmetrical (ecologic) interconnections, is needed. Such a legal innovation would be called *ecoconstitution*.¹⁶ To be coherent with the global nature of water, air and earth, such a constitution needs to be global. For the purpose of the global care of environmental commons, it is necessary to transfer some constitutional sovereign competences related to such a protection, from nation states to a global instance, namely ecocracy.¹⁷ Nation states would be transferring such sovereign features to a global individual-centric institution.

Ecocracy's *ecoconstitution* is not meant to struggle against national constitutions, since national constitutions are mechanisms for the people to rule over national regimes. A reason for this alleged non contradictoriness is that the global *ecoconstitution* has two differences with respect to the national ones. The first one, is related to the scope: while the global constitution would monopolize the care

¹⁶ An innovation regarding the topic of "constitution" appears to be needed. Some have tried political innovations on this matter. An outstanding example is the one of Dominique Bourg and Kerry Whiteside, who call to: "la refondation de l'édifice constitutionnel au bénéfice d'une bioconstitution, le préfixe *bio* renvoyant à la biosphère et à sa finitude. Cette innovation consiste à fixer des intérêts fondamentaux, des objectifs et des principes intangibles, dans le cadre d'une organisation nouvelle des pouvoirs" (Bourg, & Whiteside, 2010, 89). This "bioconstitution" shall be global, as long as national differentials do not allow to properly implement environmental protection.

¹⁷ Habermas would argue that a consistent cosmopolitan institution would need to be based on this scheme of the cession of sovereign faculties from nation states to a global democracy (Habermas, 2000, 35). The alternative proposed by Habermas is a guideline for ecocracy, in the sense in which it would suggest (*ponendo ponens*) to take out of the state the competences related to the environment.

of water, air, and earth, national ones would monopolize the regulation of all of the other symmetrical relationships, traditionally constitutionalized at a national level. The second difference is that ecocracy's global constitution would not create a violent last resort. In a morally evolved context, the compulsoriness of such an ecoconstitution would not need to be based on a direct use of violence.¹⁸ Such a constitution would not be based on a violent last resort, and would therefore be a legal ground for a non statehood alternative.

As any other constitution, the ecoconstitution will be the legal framework for every ecocracy's further regulations. As any other constitution, this one will be specially difficult to reform; such would be a mean to ensure to future generations that they will dispose of good air, good water and good earth. This ecoconstitution will stand in a highest legal level the warrant of "an adequate bequest package for the future (that) must protect an adequate supply of 'natural capital'" (Norton, 1999, 124). Both symmetrical environmental duties towards present and future generations, and asymmetrical ones towards the planet, would be legally and morally addressed by this kind of global ecoconstitution.

Ecocracy's global constitution would give birth both to ecocracy, and to a global citizenship. Such a citizenship would be referred to the right that every person would have to participate within ecocracy, in its both participatory and representative dynamics, no matter the country on where he or she is residing. Ethically, such a global

¹⁸ In the terms of Andrew Kuper, the global constitution would go further than a traditional view of authority as intrinsically ultimately based on a violent last resort (Kuper, 2000, 656).

ecological citizenship would entail a shift from an exclusively symmetrical rights-and-duties based model, to one where asymmetrical duties should also be considered,¹⁹ in a way that duties towards the planet are common to every person.

Moral and political convictions do evolve along history, and so does law as well. While it was not the case before, today is unacceptable to neglect women's or small children's rights.²⁰ Cosmopolitanism is another example of moral evolution. The rawlsian argument "against those cosmopolitan theories of distributive justice that call for the global redistribution of wealth in order to produce a more equal distribution" (Caney, 2005, 114)²¹, is not a pertinent objection against ecocracy, to the extent to which the ecoconstitution would not include inside its scope any transfer of economic wealth. An important feature of this ecoconstitution is that it would have an *ex-ante* limited scope.

¹⁹ As Manuel Arias-Maldonado notes, "ecological citizenship (would entail) a relationship based on duties more than rights: we human would be obliged to a natural world incapable of answering back" (Arias-Maldonado, 2007, 241).

²⁰ Read, for example, Marie-Anne Warre, when she says that "if any part of our moral code is to remain intact, it seems that infants and small children *must* be protected and cared for" (Warren, 1998, 121).

²¹ "The argument proceeds -Caney continues- by the use of two examples. In the first, there are two peoples, one of which industrializes and the second does not. According to a cosmopolitan approach, argues Rawls, there should be distribution to the non-industrial people. But, argues Rawls, this is unfair: peoples must take responsibility for their choices. In Rawls's second example, there are again two peoples. One of them pursues a sensible population policy and the other eschews such a policy. After time, then, the second has a much greater population and less per person. On a cosmopolitan account, Rawls argues, there should be distribution of resources to it. Again, however, this is unfair: the people chose not to adopt such a policy and is thus accountable for their choices (Rawls, Law of Peoples, 117-18)" (Caney, 2002, 114).

An objection to a global constitution is that constitutionalization is bounded to culture, and that culture is a local phenomenon. An answer to this, is that de-localization of local cultures is already a known fact.²² Another one is that “it would be a mistake, however, to neglect new forms of social connectedness on a global scale, often occasioned by the expansion of the global market, but not limited to its logic” (Kamall Pasha, 2002, 123). A global ecoconstitution would also be bounded to culture, in a dimension that is *transcultural*; environmental care can be expressed in diverse cultural ways: going from the indigenous *cuidar la Madre Tierra* to a more occidental regret of any loss.²³

There is a reciprocal relationship between a global constitution and a democratic global culture. On the basis of Jürgen Habermas’ transnationalism, one can highlight the fact that having a global constitution would strengthen global and local communities’ ties. Boaventura de Sousa Santos could argue that intercultural conversations would lead to common understandings and thus to a common constitution. Such an ecoconstitution would be based on a

²² A good example of cultural de-localization is provided by Aihwa Ong, who refers to “a diasporan-Chinese modernity -in the ‘middling’ sense of pragmatic everyday practices- developed among Chinese emigrant in the colonial worlds of East and Southeast Asia. In city ports and colonial enclaves, Chinese subjects facing political mistreatment and intense competition for survival evolved an instrumentality in norms concerning labor organization, family practice, links between family and the wider economy, and dealing with political authorities. London-trained anthropologist Fei Hsiao-tung was highly critical of the loss of Confucian ethics among this merchant class” (Ong, 1999, 114).

²³ Clark would say that: “though we are bound to regret all our losses, it may be that we must now decide what we can least afford to lose, what we may live well enough without” (Clark, 1983, 183).

minimalistic conception of a global community, according to which there is actually a global community which is *related to* environmental global commons, and *effective in the field* of global democratic ecological law creation. Such a global community would be sharing a minimal democratic culture, consisting on a common recognition of the legitimacy of a political institution ruled under the power of the people. Such a minimalistic perspective about a global community could be the basis to give to an ecoconstitution a limited scope without a violent last resort.

3

A non-statehood alternative

The idea of the nation state has been, at least during the last decades, exposed to a number of reconsiderations. In general, it is considered obsolete for some subject matters, specially for global environmental issues. For many, the state, as we know it today, is a retarded structure in front of supranational dynamics; “critical issues conditioning everyday life for people and their governments in every country are largely produced and shaped by globally interdependent processes that move beyond the realm of ostensibly sovereign state territories... the state can no longer be seen as a pre-given political unit” (Castells, 2008, 82). Nation state appears as an obsolete

structure in front of transnational civil actors,²⁴ as well as, in general, in front of global problematics.²⁵ Specifically, environmental challenges are outside the reach of nation states because they require globally unified strategies.

There have been many strategies to achieve global unification among states. Indeed, the core statehood strategy is represented by the United Nations. Its actions, nevertheless, have been heavily criticized by many cosmopolitan authors.²⁶ In general, the statehood international system is considered to be biased by nations' sovereignty, which entails a chaotic dynamic of concurrence between equal.

²⁴ David Held makes this point when he argues that "there are, of course, new regional and global transnational actors contesting the terms of globalization -not just corporations but new social movements as well. These are the 'new' voices of an emergent 'transnational civil society', heard, for instance, at the Rio Conference on the Environment, the Cairo Conference on Population Control, the Beijing Conference on Women and at the Copenhagen Conference on Climate Change" (Held, 2011, 114).

²⁵ A good example of new global problematics is the creation, on 1998, of the *Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN)*. According to Leslie Pal, "it established a vehicle that could be more efficient and representative than the ad hoc mechanism built in the early years. One problem of democratic legitimacy was ICANN's relationship with the US government (ICANN is incorporated in the United States, and the root is still 'owned' by the United States). This relationship still bothered the European Union and the International Telecommunications Union: a global common property resource was being managed by a hybrid global organization accountable to only one government. In addition there was the balance between commercial and non-commercial interests to consider" (Pal, 2009, 285)

²⁶ Daniele Archibugi is an outstanding example of such a critique (Archibugi, 1995, 126).

Ecocracy appears as being in contrast with national sovereignty. A national sovereignty is supposed to be a potential enemy of any other national sovereignty. Thomas Hobbes said that “in states, and common-wealths not dependent on one another, every Commonwealth (not every man) has an absolute Libertie to doe what it shall judge (that is to say, what that Man, or Assemblie that representh it, shall judge) most conducing to their benefit” (Hobbes, 1968, 266). The concept of sovereignty is based on the right of a group to seek its own benefit, such a group being defined in terms of territory and population. National sovereignty defines the right of a national based group to seek its own interests, in spite of other national sovereignty’s own interests. Since a nation refers to a group which *politically*²⁷ occupies a portion of the global territory, the concept of national sovereignty implies a potential conflict between national states.²⁸

Ecocracy is a non statehood alternative for global unification. Therefore, it is not based on states,²⁹ but on individuals, according to

²⁷ I use the term *politically* to say that a national group is sovereign over one portion of the global territory, even though its population is widespread all over the globe.

²⁸ A good reason to bound sovereignty to nation has been that nation states have had the ability to foster nation’s heritages (Caney, 2005, 178).

²⁹ According to David Held, unions through states can be analyzed on the basis of a kantian distinction; Kant “distinguished between unions based on federal structures and those based on confederal structures. A federal association is based, like that of the American States... on a political constitution and is therefore indissoluble; whereas a confederal structure signifies merely a voluntary gathering of various states which can be dissolved at anytime” (Held, 1995, 423).

an individual-centric cosmopolitanism.³⁰ A global unification through individuals assumes that every person is provided with some rational features making him or her capable of self-determination and autonomy (Held, 2005, 271). Such a non statehood alternative does not exclude states from its arena. On the contrary, in ecocracy the nation states would be the core implementation bodies, because the state “is one that has the capacity to produce definite outcomes... (it) is responsible for monitoring public goals and for trying to make sure they are realized in a visible and legitimate fashion” (Held, 2011, 235). Global unification for the care of environmental commons can be achieved by the union of autonomous individuals around the world. Such an inter-individual global union would be ensured by an ecoconstitution and it would be institutionally traduced into common political participation mechanisms (ecopanel) and a common political representation instance (ecoparliament).

Ecocracy is a global constitutionalized institution which is not composed by states, and which is therefore devoid of any statehood composition (whether federal or confederal). A question arises: what kind of law is there in ecocracy, if there is not a violent (statehood) last resort behind? Kant himself found such a difficulty when talking

³⁰ An individual-centric cosmopolitanism is one that “will keep the well-being of individuals firmly in our sight” (Tan, 2006, 138) The opposite view is the so called “state-centric approach.” Kok-Chor Tan critiques that perspective by saying that “It is due to such a state-centric approach, I would conjecture, that structural adjustment programs of the IMF have failed miserably in terms of human development. IMF structural adjustments aim to bolster a country’s faltering economy, but largely neglect the social and economic costs of these programs to certain groups of *individuals*, penalizing more often than not the most needy individuals (e.g., those who rely on government subsidies for food, fuel, etc.)” (Tan, 2006, 38).

about a *perpetual peace*.³¹ The answer that is proposed here consists on an articulation of a global non violent institution and national violent institutions. In a morally evolved future, humanity as a whole would have an implicit or explicit agreement about the necessity of the global care of environmental global commons. As a result, nation states would cede a part of their political decision-making monopole to the wider globe, with respect of water, air, and earth. An eventual deficit of implementation capacity could arise in the absence of a statehood authority. Such a difficulty would be supplied, precisely, by the enforcement capacity that the ecocracy's implementation bodies (i.e. nation states) do already have.

A global rule of law without a global centralization of violence, based on existent unities of violence administration (nation states), is the answer ecocracy provides. This moral option avoids the risks of a global tyranny, which could be a result of an extreme centralization of power and violence.³² On the contrary, it stimulates global

³¹ In Habermas' terms, a major conceptual challenge would be to define the element that would make of a cosmopolitan law an enforceable one, in the absence of a global state (Habermas, 2003, 164).

³² Linklater alerts on the risks of global centralization of power. For him, "the contention is that (modern societies) appear to be 'more humane'; however 'dangers of callousness' and 'cruelty without passion' have actually increased (Collins 1974: 432ff). A critical development is the bureaucratic division of specialized, seemingly harmless routine tasks that can have devastating cumulative effects but, conveniently from the vantage-point of role occupants, unburden the conscience by diffusing responsibility for violent outcomes. No less important is the phenomena of long-distance harm in which perpetrators do not necessarily encounter adversaries or witness the suffering they inflict. In short, longer social webs have encouraged the dampening of aggressive impulses. One consequence is that those who harm invisible victims through depersonalized violence can be spared the psychological turmoil that often suffers those who personally witness killing and suffering" (Linklater, 2011, 173, 174)

decentralization³³ and enhances political diversity within ecological protection;³⁴ “a splendid range of possibilities is open” (Paehlke, 1989, 252). A non statehood alternative, devoid from a violent last resort, needs to be endorsed by a widest publicity and a subsequent strong moral coercion capacity.

³³ “In their vision of an ideal society environmentalists have at times asserted a preference for geographic decentralization; and some have advanced a vision that can only be called bucolic. Aspects of this vision of the future include, for example, the eco-anarchism of Murray Bookchin, the soft energy path planning of Amory Lovins, E.F. Sumacher’s motto ‘small is beautiful,’ and even the ‘telecommuting society’ of what might be called high-tech environmentalism” (Paehlke, 1989, 245).

³⁴ As Paehlke would also note, “crucial to a recreation of the ideological map is a demonstration that environmental ideas and policies cannot be subsumed easily under one or another of the traditional ideological headings (conservative-right wing and liberal-socialist-left wing). In this regard it is interesting that each major ideological tradition evinced early sensitivity to environmental concerns. Historically, no particular ideology has had a monopoly on environmental thinking” (Paehlke, 1989, 190).

4

Publicity and public deliberation

The kind of enforceability that is needed by global norms regarding environmental global commons, is relative to a degree of mass moral sensitiveness towards nature. A global supra-national coercive regime could be seen as a response to a “structural harm” that has increased within the “the modern states system” (Linklater, 2011, 246). A direct ratio between violent coerciveness and better environmental protection cannot be established. Instead, the kind of coercion that would be necessary is “concerned with the evolution of modern international society and with degrees of ‘moral sensitiveness’” (Linklater, 2011, 246). In the process of moral

evolution, contradictory tendencies may have place.³⁵ In the hypothesis of a morally evolved humanity, a shared understanding of the value of water, air and earth would seemingly be promoted. For such a purpose, a suitable alternative to violence is moral coercion through publicity.

Moral and violent coerciveness are concepts to keep as distinct.³⁶ Publicity is usually considered as a measure to increase moral authoritativeness, and also to promote democratic virtues.³⁷ Nevertheless, many have noted a tendency to secrecy in current international instances, which is in contradiction with the fact that the international arena is one “to which the authoritative allocation of values in many issue areas has already been transferred” (Biene and Wagner, 1998, 289).

Ecocracy aims to establish a democratic scenario where an overlapping consensus amongst cultures would be traduced into institutionally enforceable measures. As a non statehood global institution, ecocracy would be devoid of violent coerciveness. Instead, global enforceability would be partially warranted by the widest publicity of the implementation processes. In a morally

³⁵ As an example of this “enlightenment's scientists and political architects had to share the age with others more bent on controlling than on understanding nature... a rising middle class imbued with the capitalistic ethos on competitiveness, rugged individualism, and economic efficiency” (Fritsch, 1980, 178).

³⁶ Different kinds of legitimacy are associated with such different concepts, according to Max Weber (1978).

³⁷ Stiglitz reminds that Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill and Madison brought cogent arguments in favor of publicity, in order to promote a meaningful democracy.(Stiglitz, 2003).

evolved context, such a publicity would oblige nation states and private actors to act in a proper way. As a positive externality, publicity could enhance global social trust in both local and global institutions.³⁸

Publicity is also a necessary feature of an informed deliberative democracy.³⁹ The widest publicity of the implementation processes, comes along with the publicity of deliberations within the global representative instance (ecoparliament). Both cases of publicity would enhance the quality of public deliberation within the bottom ecopanel.⁴⁰ In some cases, “citizen panels do not make real decisions, they just advise the public officials and the populace” (Schaber & Rippe, 1999, 78). In ecocracy, on the contrary, citizen ecopanel is enabled to exercise the monopoly of

³⁸ “Trust is valuable because public mistrust is harmful for citizens and society in general. Mistrust increases the anxiety experienced by lay people. It may also hinder the work of scientists and public authorities. Thus, since public engagement is presumed to increase trust, it is *prima facie* morally desirable” (Ahteensuu & Siipi, 2009, 135).

³⁹ In general, “the idea of deliberative democracy is that the public deliberation of citizens is at the core of legitimate law -and policy- making... According to the deliberative perspective, the arguments of each party are compared, in consideration of the interests of everyone” (Pellizzoni, 2003, 207).

⁴⁰ A good example of how public deliberation works in regard of environmental issues, even if sometimes extremely technical, is the “Waverly Municipal Council” in Australia. Zwart outlines “the Waverly Municipal Council’s attempts to address stormwater pollution through a citizens’ jury (489)... its members were also asked to ‘seek sustainable (integrated and ongoing) solutions to environmental concerns in the Bronte catchment’ and to address the following questions: Who has an impact on storm water pollution in the Bronte catchment and how? (492)... The citizens’ jury not only produced a clear and agreed understanding on the best way for the council to proceed, but led to recommendations that appeared to favor the maintenance of the natural environment” (Zwart, 2007, 489, 492).

“legislative initiative” (which is the power to propose new laws) regarding environmental global commons. Such a prerogative is an additional argument in favor of the widest publicity; an informed deliberation in the bottom would be needed.

It is reasonable to suppose that moral evolution and publicity could improve and increase lay-people’s involvement in environmental care. A better public knowledge of the issue, would bring an increment of a shared “holistic outlook of ecology and the associated values premium conferred upon the biotic community, its beauty, integrity and stability” (Callicot, 1995, 43). Along the different ways to assume the care of environmental commons in front of humans,⁴¹ public knowledge and moral evolution would get into a virtuous circle

⁴¹ Plumwood shows that there are at least three ways to conceive an indissoluble relationship between human beings and nature: “the indistinguishability account rejects boundaries between self and nature. Human are said to be just one strand in the biotic web, not the source and ground of all value and the discontinuity thesis is, it seems, firmly rejected... But much more is involved here than the rejection of discontinuity, for deep ecology goes on to replace the human-in-environment image by a holistic or gestalt view that ‘dissolves not only the human-in-environment concept, but every compact-thing-in-milieu concept’ -except when taking at a superficial level of communication... It is strongly attracted to a variety of mystical traditions and to the Perennial Philosophy, in which the self is merged with the other -‘the other is none other than yourself’ (159-169)... These points seem to me to apply to caring for other species and for the natural world as much as they do to caring for our own species. But just as dualism is confused with atomism, so holistic self-merger is taken to be the only alternative to egoistic accounts of the self as without essential connection to others or to nature. Fortunately, this is a false choice, as I argue below, non-holistic but relational accounts of the self, as developed in some feminist and social philosophy, enable a rejection of dualism, including human-nature dualism, without denying the independence or distinguishability of the other. To the extent that deep ecology is identified with the indistinguishability thesis, it does not provide an adequate basis for a philosophy of nature” (Plumwood, 1995, 160, 161).

with mass involvement in ecocracy, both at the bottom and at the top of its global structure.

For the sake of the care of environmental global commons, public bottom deliberation on environmental issues is needed. James Lovelock has shown that apart from nature's own controlling measures in regard of water, air, and earth,⁴² there are also some ecological dynamics that are quite sensitive to human intervention.⁴³ Such produces an ecologic problematic which needs to be confronted globally, with a local perspective. This means that global strategies need to be applied according to specific local

⁴² James Lovelock shows it as follows: "It is also interesting to ask why is the oxygen concentration maintained at 21 percent. It is a fact that the energy required for the ignition of organic compounds changes by about 70 percent for each one percent change in oxygen concentration at the atmospheric level. Life at even 25 percent oxygen might be very uncomfortable especially for trees. The removal of oxygen by grass or forest fires may set the upper limit of 21 percent but it seems more likely that oxygen is actively controlled at a safe maximum" (Lovelock, 2012b)

⁴³ An argument in favor of this common sense's assessment can be found in the Gaia theory of the entropic limits of human body: "On the matter of boundaries, it is obvious that a man, as an example of a living entity, takes in free energy in the form of the chemical potential difference between food and oxygen and sustains a low internal entropy through excretion of waste chemicals and heat. To a man, the environment to which entropy is discarded includes the atmosphere and his boundary is therefore his skin. It might seem pointless therefore on Earth to seek the existence of a general living system, Gaia, in terms of entropy reductions within the atmosphere which clearly for some species is a sink for degraded products and energy but this neglects the fact that photosynthetic life uses premium radiation direct from the sun to sustain a high chemical potential gradient within the atmosphere on a planetary scale. For a tree, the boundary within which entropy is reduced is not its surface in contact with the atmosphere but rather the interface between the sun with the atmosphere as an extension of the tree. The tree produces not only food for consumers but also the equally important gas, oxygen which does not accumulate within the tree waiting to be eaten" (Lovelock, 1974, 3)

environmental features.⁴⁴ Bottom ecopanel is needed, also, for a technical sake of precision.⁴⁵

Citizens do already entail initiatives in favor of the environment, in general with a low level of effectiveness. To give to citizens the monopoly of “legislative initiative” would increment their voice’s effectiveness; it could be a shortcut for those who fight against transnational destructive dynamics in microscopical levels.⁴⁶ Ecopanel would not, in any case, annihilate citizenship’s creativity to act outside ecocracy.

A non-statehood obligation for the nation states to follow what has been publicly constructed by global citizens inside ecocracy would be

⁴⁴ A good example of such a diversity is brought by Odum. According to his studies, “survivorship curves are of three general types. A Highly convex curve is characteristic of species such as the Dall sheep, in which the population mortality rate is low until near the end of the life span... Many species of large animals and, of course, man, exhibit this type of survivorship. At the other extreme a highly concave results when mortality is high during the young states. Oysters or other shellfish and oaks trees would be good examples; mortality is extremely high during the free-swimming larval or the acorn-seedling stages, but once an individual is well established on a favorable substrate, life expectancy improves considerably!” (Odum, 1971, 173)

⁴⁵ A possible way to consider the need of diverse grass-root perspectives is Andrew Dobson concern on a plausible distributive justice in front of non human beings, “by far the most normal thing to do, then, is to ‘split nature up’ and to consider the parts on their merit... with the effect that the language of distributive justice is shown to be both applicable and appropriate to some parts of the non-human natural world” (Dobson, 1998, 221).

⁴⁶ To cite only one example amongst others, see what Roberts and Toffolon-Weiss tell: “Although their twisting story seems to have concluded with a long trial against Exxon and an out-of-court settlement with Campbell people of Grand Bois, they have not gotten what they wanted: the closure of the site” (Roberts & Toffolon-Weiss, 2001, 143).

ultimately based on the force that publicity could have. Ecocracy's enforceability is actually based on the force that good reasons and mass moral convictions can have over nation states. Such a *prima facie* moral compulsoriness, would need to be complemented and ultimately endorsed by an indirect use of nation state's violent mechanisms.

5

A multifold democracy

Beside deliberation and participation, a democracy that covers a relatively *large* portion of territory, is obliged to undertake dynamics of political representation. Apart from its pragmatic dimension, political representation and political rights have a linkage to social and political integration.⁴⁷ Social integration (as opposite to social exclusion) is relative to enhance quality of life; a perspective that is meant to be adopted by a state by incorporating representatives'

⁴⁷ According to Dominique Leydet (2006), social integration at a national level is linked to the integrative effects of citizenship, political representation and participation. "The idea is that citizenship as a set of civil, political and social rights and as a political practice can help to generate desirable feelings of identity and belonging" (Leydet, 2006).

demands on social justice through democratic laws.⁴⁸ Political integration is relative to the extent to which an institution takes into account people's voice. That is why a minimal condition to grant a universal form of political integration, inside a representative democracy, is to grant a universal right to vote.

Even if it has been historically associated to a nation state, an exclusive association of social and political integration to it, would be arbitrary. Theoretically, political rights (i.e. representation and participation) can also be granted at a global level. To do so, to imagine a global representation, requires to think in an integral scheme of democratic participation, inside of which representation could be complemented by direct participation. For a global representation and participation to be feasible at a global scale, some innovations are needed.⁴⁹

As an individual-centric regime, ecocracy establishes a direct link between individuals and the global instance, non mediated by the states. Such a democracy requires not only one but a set of institutions to function.⁵⁰ Given that the distance between represented and representatives in the ecocracy is the (geographically) largest possible, some challenges appear. First, it is

⁴⁸ For Van Parijs, the state is a "sheer servant of justice". The relevance of a nation state can be calculated in terms of its utility for the fulfillment of social integrative goals (Van Parijs, 2011b).

⁴⁹ During the first years of the twenty-first century, "many timely and innovative additions to, an revisions of, key ideas of representation have been produced" (Saward, 2010, 19).

⁵⁰ This point is made by Saward, according to whom a direct democracy would need to include both institutions of direct and indirect democracy (Saward, 2010, 162).

necessary to strengthen what Pitkin (1967), Dovi (2006), and many others have called substantive representation,⁵¹ namely the fact that representatives “advance the policy preferences that serve the interests of the represented” (Dovi, 2006). A second requirement is to enhance the communicative power of an individual vote, which would be otherwise extremely irrelevant in a global context. A third requirement is to increment the diversity of the representative chamber to a highest degree. A subsequent necessity is to harmonize such different democratic institutions, in order to avoid an insane competence between “locality specific and larger units of social organization” (Thielbar, 1970, 246)

Ecocracy is a multifold democracy which gives to each layer different faculties and functions. Grass-root institutions (ecopanel), have the function and the exclusive faculty of rising up proposals of legislation (monopoly of legislative initiative). A top-down institution (ecoparliament), has the function of voting the law proposals presented by the ecopanel. Thereby, ecocracy increases and qualifies substantive representation, to a extent that the only proposals that can be considered by the ecoparliament are those that have been presented by lay-individuals in the ecopanel. Simultaneously, it increases incentives for a massif involvement of people in deliberation of political matters. Considerations about a voting procedure that would be consistent with this model, will be presented afterwards (Ch 11). Such a model reduces the

⁵¹ According to Suzanne Dovi, substantive representation refers to “The activity of representatives—that is, the actions taken on the behalf of, in the interest of, as an agent of, and as a substitute for the represented.” (Dovi, 2006).

competence between local and global instances, inasmuch as it gives them different and complementary functions.

Representative claims are not exclusive of democratic regimes.⁵² This is a reason why the multifold structure of ecocracy can be consistently based on parametric universalism. A parametric universalist perspective implies, also, that the conformation of citizen ecopanel could be based on cultural or religious authority, expertise, or election; each ecopanel would define, autonomously, how it will be organized. A way to balance a potential democratic deficit associated to such a diversity, is to universalize the right to create ecopanel.

In ecocracy, political representation is conceived in a way that it avoids a well known “mandatory dilemma”⁵³. Whether or not representatives should have a mandatory relationship with the represented, is in fact a dilemma only pertinent when representatives are in power to present their own law proposals. Here, such a power is exclusively in the hands of lay people in ecopanel. The role of representatives is mandatory *per se*, with the additional benefit that such a mandatoriness does not entail any restriction to the freedom of speech and reasoning of the persons in charge of representation.

⁵² Michael Saward would remind this point (Saward, 2010, 103).

⁵³ What is called the “mandatory dilemma” of representation is well expressed by Alejandro Colàs, when he explains that “even after representation became associated with the equal franchise of (male) adults, there remained some dispute over the nature and extent of the representative's freedom, with some conceptions advocating a mandatory relation between a delegate and the represented body, whilst others defended the autonomy of the representative as someone who is entrusted or authorized to act on behalf of his or her constituency as they see fit” (Colàs, 2003, 100).

Two different criteria are being applied to these two levels of ecocracy. A differential which is justified by a theory of scales (Thielbar, 1970, 249). A theory of scales stands that democratic participation should be modulated in correspondence to the kind of relationship that a common person has with a participatory instance. Such a relationship maybe direct or indirect, depending, primarily, on its geographical reach; the wider the reach of an institution is, the more professional the dedication required is. A theory of scales of participation implies that wide-reach instances may be representative while narrow-reach ones may be participatory. In ecocracy, global-reach ecoparliament is ruled by democratic representation, because this is the best formal way to avoid political exclusions, while local-reach participatory ecopanel can be ruled by any political criteria, even by ones which could entail exclusion. The reason for such differentiation is that there is only one ecoparliament, so political exclusions are not permitted, while there can be as much ecopanel as people want, so political exclusions from each one of them can be permitted.

Ecopanel is *multiple participatory decentralized* instances. Diversity and decentralization are necessary to include, specially, peripheral civil societies,⁵⁴ which have been historically excluded from any kind of participation either at the national and at the global

⁵⁴ Chase-Dunn advocates for the importance of the inclusion of peripheral civil society when he says that “A central question for any strategy of transformation is the question of agency... Where is the most favorable terrain, the weak link, where concentrated action could bear the most fruit?... The agents of (transformation) have been most heavily concentrated in the periphery” (Chase-Dunn, 2002, 55).

levels.⁵⁵ Ecopanelists are those who -as Rousseau would say- write the law.

The ecoparliament is a *unique representative centralized* instance. Following Saward, “this oneness is positive. It provides an answer to a basic political question -who resolves issues when they are contested?” (Saward, 2010, 90). This second layer is important also because it gives unity to the decentralized basis of ecocracy. The ecoparliament is the one that -using the rousseauian distinction once again- approves the law.⁵⁶

Ecocracy universalizes, through ecopanelists, an instance of claim-making. Through that same mechanism, it also enhances the right to exercise control over a global institution that would significantly affect persons’ right to have a healthy environment.⁵⁷ At the same time, it provides a global democratic political framework which, given globalization, is needed to realize participation.

As a midterm between ecopanelists and ecoparliament, a third technical body is needed, in order to reduce the complexity and quantity of proposals that are likely to come up from the basis. Such

⁵⁵ It is clear, as Paul Street shows, that global civil society does not cover the diversity of expressions of world’s civil society. According to Street, “Although there is an empirical category of organizations that claim to form global civil society, global civil society is not a shared reality... However, we need to remain aware that simply because association claims to be a civil society organization, this provides it with no further inherent legitimacy than any other organization or mediating institution” (Street, 2006, 100).

⁵⁶ Here we are inverting the distinction proposed by Rousseau. According to him, the parliament is the one who writes the law and the civil society the one that approves it.

⁵⁷ In the sense emphasized by Caney (Caney, 2005, 159).

a midterm role is played by the ecoboard, which is a *scientific multidisciplinary consensus/dissent building* board. Its function is to synthesize consensus and dissents arising from the bottom-up open input, in a way that ecoparlamentarians would be able to decide between fewer possibilities. Such an ecoboard serves also as an *impartiality filter*, able to warrant that all the different demands coming from the ecopanel are actually integrated within their synthesis. To do so, the ecoboard includes a *citizen's jury*, which is randomly chosen from the ecopanel, in a periodic basis. Such a jury regards scientific experts to see if they are actually taking into account every proposal coming from ecopanel.

6

A global citizenship

A citizen can be conceived as a person who has a legal entitlement to influence political decisions affecting him. Even if democratic power differentials within society are factual realities⁵⁸, any denial of *partial* influence to anyone is unacceptable from a democratic point of view. Ecocracy adopts a qualified minimalistic version of the “all-affected” principle; even if not every decision that affect a person need to be influenced by him or her, at least over those affecting environmental global commons, everyone shall have a right to exercise any degree of influence.

⁵⁸ This point is made by Saward, when he says that “clearly, political power differentials are deeply implicated in the distribution of capacities and resources for claim-making and claim-reception and for responding to claims” (Saward, 2010, 147)

There are some kinds of phenomena affecting environmental global commons that occur beyond national frontiers.⁵⁹ Our daily life is influenced by “alien factors” (Laborde, 2010, 54-55), namely, by power devices that are out of the reach of nation states. If citizenship is constituted by a right to exercise some degree of influence over pertinent decisions, what happens to citizenship when such an influence needs to be exercised at a global scale?

Global citizenship is some times seen as a conceptual non-sense, because there is not a global democratic instance over which people could exercise influence at a global scale. Nevertheless, to abandon an idea of global citizenship would be a conceptual non-sense also; it would annihilate the notion of citizenship in regard of relevant political dynamics that take place in our contemporary globalized world. Such a theoretical dilemma, conduced by the idea of global citizenship, has given the floor to numerous assessments.⁶⁰

Objections to global citizenship have a tendency to claim in favor of a form of political and moral exclusionary relevance of the national sphere. Some partially accept such an assumption, recognizing, as we see in Caney, that “people clearly care about their well-being and quality of life generally” (Caney, 2005, 177), while people’s well-being has a long stand on national factors. While recognizing many forms

⁵⁹ An example of this, is the claim presented by Simon Caney in *Justice Beyond Borders*, where he argues that a cosmopolitan democracy would be needed to give an answer to an unsatisfied right to exercise control over decisions affecting peoples’ rights (Caney, 2005, 159).

⁶⁰ Amartya Sen summarizes some of those (Sen, 2002, 112).

of political and moral relevance of national citizenship, ecocracy proposes a form of global citizenship, compatible with national ones.

Ecocracy is an instance inside of which citizenship is broadened beyond the national sphere; any person becomes able to exercise a relevant influence over some issues for which the pertinent community is the global one. In the terms of Bruce Robbins, ecocracy is a “third option”, which conceives “a non exclusionary relationship between nationality (even if certain privileges are bound to it) and a global citizenship” (Robbins, 1993, 211). Ecocracy’s global citizenship does not dispute *necessarily* with what some authors have called “conational partiality”⁶¹.

Citizenship has been bound to nations both by political and moral reasons. Political arguments plead that politically relevant factors are only national. An easy refutation to such, is that there is an overwhelming evidence of global factors affecting individuals daily life. No one could deny that, from a democratic point of view, people of the world should be entitled to exercise any degree of influence over some of that kind of decisions. Moral arguments are much more subtle: a person is legitimately entitled to influence decisions affecting his or her immediate community circle, more than he or she is in regard of farer social circles, in a cycle of subsequent

⁶¹ Kok-Chor Tan explains that one way to understand the notion of “conational partiality” “is to regard it as an operating norm at the “foundational” or formal level of moral deliberation (Barry, 1992, 194; Beitz, 1999, 208ss). On this view, there is something special about nationality such that in deciding what individuals’ legitimate baseline entitlements and claims are, we do not appeal to the idea of impartial consideration with respect to nationality, but instead allow that some people are entitled to more simply on the basis of our shared national membership.” (Tan, 2002, 454).

subsidiarity between the closest and the most distant circles.⁶² An answer to this argument can be double. In a way, there is no need to reply anything to the idea of subsequent subsidiarity, since it recognizes, implicitly or explicitly, that there is at least one *morally pertinent* community circle which coincides with humanity as a whole.⁶³ What is to contest here, is the implicit idea of an *absolute* priority of the closest communities, since, for some issues, such are not the pertinent ones. For some subject matters, the most pertinent community circle is the global one, as it is the case in regard of the care and protection of environmental global commons.

⁶² This argument does not deny the possibility of an out-comer community flourishing within the rules of a local community circle. According to Joseph Carens, this is the case of the Asian-America within American society. According to him, “one important reason why it seems morally unobjectionable for an Asian-American cultural heritage to increase one’s chances of conventional success is that, as a group, they have not enjoy power and privilege in American society. On the contrary, they have been the targets of racial hostility, and oppression, both overt and covert. No one can suppose that they have rigged the rules of the game in their own favor or that they have tailored the definition of merit to fit their own particular characteristics. So, there is nothing unfair about their success, no violation of the idea of justice as evenhandedness. Indeed, it sounds ironic to say as I did above that it is an advantage to be born an Asian-American. Their success has come in spite of the disadvantages the larger society has imposed upon them. This is why it does not seem problematic” (Carens, 2000, 93).

⁶³ This circle is coextensive to what James Bohman calls “the human political community” (Bohman, 2004, 343).

An angle from which the idea of a global citizenship is some times criticized, is that it would imply an exclusionary dynamic.⁶⁴ Such is an extension of the anti-imperialist critique addressed to universalism. According to that critique, universalism is alleged to be used as a facade to hide the imposition of a country or a group of countries over others, where the dominant country or community identifies itself with universal interests and therefore imposes its particular vision. Such a critique does not constitute any *strong* critique to universalism; it is a *weak* one, that refers only to a particular kind of universalism. It underscores, non the less, a very important issue: it poses the problem of power differentials within universalism, which could imply that all of those not belonging to dominant groups would become suddenly foreigners within the global community. A possible reaction to such a problem could be to “seek to eliminate altogether the inherently aversive structural position of ‘foreignnes’” (Scarry, 2002, 98). In the real world, power differentials can only be defeated by powerful actions. Ecocracy could be an action of the power of change; a direction for a desirable change. An anti-imperialist perspective asserts a critique to universalism from the point of view of a power-relations-real-world. Accepted, such a critique does not

⁶⁴ According to Dominique Leydet, “critiques argued that the model proves exclusionary if one interprets universal citizenship as requiring (a) the transcendence of particular, situated perspectives to achieve a common, general point of view and (b) the formulation of laws and policies that are difference-blind (Young, 1989). The first requirement seems particularly odious once generality is exposed as a myth covering the majority's culture and conventions. The call to transcend particularity too often translates into the imposition of the majority perspective on minorities. The second requirement may produce more inequality rather than less since the purported neutrality of difference-blind institutions often belies an implicit bias towards the needs, interests and identities of the majority group. This bias often creates specific burdens for members of minorities, i.e. more inequality” (Leydet, 2006, 230).

affect the moral validity of an equal global citizenship. On the contrary, a global entitlement to exercise citizenship's rights would be a pertinent mechanism to reduce any "imperialist temptation" of a universalistic claim. Through a global citizenship, the people of the world would be politically equalized, in front of a global democracy.

In a moral argument for a global moral compatibility of humanity, Simon Caney argues that, from a first person perspective, every conviction entails a claim of universal validity (Caney, 2005, 43). Local perspectives are *structurally* compatible with each other, as all as with universal perspectives, since they are altogether based on a claim of universal validity. Moral compatibility between local and global groups is based on the fact that "all persons are similar in morally relevant ways and that persons throughout the world share common morally relevant properties" (Caney, 2005, 57). We all think morally in the same way -would Kant argue- with irreducible differences regarding the content. Humanity is morally compatible *and* diverse. Therefore, a global citizenship has a solid moral basis, that would legitimize a globally shared commitment in regard of environmental global commons.

From a political perspective, global citizenship is not incompatible with national citizenships neither. An absolute compatibility, nevertheless, may be seen as an adaptation process.⁶⁵ By virtue of the principle of parametric universalism, the processes of adaptation

⁶⁵ David Held correctly stands that "the (global democratic public law) lays down a range of criteria which may be deemed to conflict with a country's or community's actual institutions, organizations and practices. It set up, thereby, an agenda for change and a direction for policy to which 'offending' institutions, laws and policies could, in principle, adapt if they are to claim justifiably the mantle of democracy" (Held, 2005, 222).

of local regimes to individual's participation in global stands, may be undertaken without any kind of violent coercion, even if utterly backed and promoted through publicity.

A definite clue in favor of a global citizenship is an extension of parametric universalism. Non-parametric universalism may take us through the misleading idea that local and global belongings are mutually exclusionary. From the perspective of parametric universalism, we, the people, must learn that our duties towards the family, the nation, and the planet are complementary.⁶⁶ Parametric universalism shows that such a complementarity may no be synchronic but diachronic. The processes of realization of national citizenship may have had rhythms and velocities different than those that a global citizenship would. A global ecocratic citizenship is to be simultaneously realized all across diverse regimes and cultures which are differently situated in front of democracy. National partialities are not obliged to disappear, whilst global citizenship may be fully at play, everywhere at the same time.

The complementarity which we are dealing with, implies, quiet obviously, the fact that every person in the world would hold more than one citizenship.⁶⁷ One is to influence national political decisions, and another is to do so in regard of global decisions about the care and protection of environmental global commons. The second one would traduce itself into a right to create and participate in ecopanel

⁶⁶ As Amy Gutmann would argue that this complementary perspective shall be taught to children in schools (Gutmann, 2002, 71).

⁶⁷ David Held notes that "people would come, thus, to enjoy multiple citizenships" (Held, 2005, 140).

and to vote for ecoparlamentarians, in disregard of the country in which a person is located.

Social engagement towards citizenship is a necessary feature for it to work properly. As Charles Taylor notes, “a citizen democracy can only work if most of its members are convinced that their political society is a common venture of considerable moment and believe it to be of such vital importance that they participate in the ways they must to keep it functioning as a democracy. Such a participation requires not only a commitment to the common project, but also a special sense of bonding among the people working together” (Taylor, 2002, 120). A morally evolved future would include a mass political conviction of the universal importance of the care of environmental global commons, and would, therefore, produce a globally widespread commitment towards a global democracy and a global citizenship.

The global citizenship of ecocracy gives a right to every person to participate and be represented in a global scale.⁶⁸ Free movement of

⁶⁸ It would be desirable to adopt a global universal basic income in order to equalize the practical accessibility to ecocracy's democratic instances. This claim is made by Carole Pateman, when she argues that “A basic income is important for feminism and democratization precisely because it is paid not to households but to *individuals as citizens* (115)... While payment of a basic income to a husband for his “contribution” through employment and to his wife for her “contribution” in the home is to recognize that she does indeed make a socially valuable contribution, this does little to calm the fears of some feminists that a basic income will merely reinforce women's lesser standing and the idleness of husbands in the household (116)... let me emphasize that a basic income is not a panacea. In itself, a basic income would not, for instance, provide adequate stock of affordable housing, sufficient good quality education, adequate health-care, an end to racism, or violence-free neighborhoods. Yet if a genuinely democratic society in which freedom of women is as important as that of men remains an aspiration, it is hard to see that there is a substitute for an unconditional basic income” (Pateman, 2006, 115-116).

people across national borders is not conceptually bounded to this kind of global citizenship, and would remain, therefore, a matter to be defined and managed by nation states. The coexistence of global and national citizenships would not imply an immediate transformation of the interstates' dynamics. Global citizenship constitutes, nevertheless, a step forward in the direction of overcoming national boundaries and ultimately the very notion of foreignness.

7

A global governance

There is a vision of global governance which tends to authoritarianism.⁶⁹ Such an undesirable possibility should not make us to renounce to consider the issue in a democratic perspective. Authoritarianism is an unsatisfactory approach since it could respond to questions related to how to implement global decisions, but it would necessarily ignore or avoid questions related to the legitimacy of the decision-making process. A global governance reduced to any kind of unelected ruling elite would only be an ugly metaphor; an

⁶⁹ According to Posnock (2000, 813), this is the case of Du Bois, who would plead for an authoritarian global governance.

undesirable utopia. What is needed by ecocracy is an institutional approach for a non-authoritarian, democratic, cosmopolitanism.

Almost all of the financial global institutions hold any kind of authoritarian power.⁷⁰ They often determine domestic socially relevant game rules without being influenced by any citizen. Paradoxically, more legitimate global institutions, even if not individual-centric, as the UNO, are often completely powerless, even when they aim to promote strictly cosmopolitan interests.⁷¹

Ecocracy looks to integrate global and local powers,⁷² in order to legitimate and empower a global governance. Local, national, and global institutions do partially coexist today, and are partially articulated. In general, the main limitation of the current system of national-global institutions is that it is based on the absolute sovereignty of the nation states, for it would be necessary to introduce some limitations to that sovereignty.⁷³ A full combination of the current international institutions would not provide a satisfying

⁷⁰ See (Cooley, 2003, 678).

⁷¹ The lack of realization of the Millennium Development Goals to date of the year 2015 is an evidence. "In 2000, in a Millennium Declaration signed by 189 countries, the UN General Assembly launched eight Millennium Development Goals with time-bound targets (by 2015) on eradicating extreme poverty and hunger; achieving universal primary education; promoting gender equality; reducing child mortality; improving maternal health; combating HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases; ensuring environmental sustainability; and developing a global partnership for development" (Chan, 2007, 367).

⁷² David Held have proposed the creation of a "Global Parliament connected to regions, nations and localities" (Held, 2005, 279).

⁷³ Frank Cunningham attributes to Archibugi and Held what he calls the "cosmopolitan model" of democracy. Such a model includes some "limitations of the sovereignty of member states" (Cunningham, 2002, 205).

answer to the global governance question, because such a government would practically remain a monopoly of the nation states.

Avant-garde proposals like network governance have arisen.⁷⁴ In regard of a global governance, an actual question is: “new or reformed institutions?” (Woods, 2001, 7). Those who plead for a reform would generally accept the inefficiency and the democratic deficit of current global institutions, both political (as the UNO) and financial (as the IMF).⁷⁵ A plausible institutional framework for a desirable global governance can be based on the creation of new

⁷⁴ A network governance consists in an “open input” decision making process. “In essence, network governance proposes substituting expertise for democratic accountability” (Woods, 2001, 7).

⁷⁵ Jennifer Chan (2007, 364-365) synthesizes a wide range of reform proposals in the following terms: Many “and varied, including:

- (a) creating a peoples' parliamentary assembly, in parallel to the UN General Assembly, so that people can be ultimately directly elected (Childers & Urquhart, 1994; Charter 99, 2000; Held, 2004);
- (b) establishing a UN Economic Security Council to coordinate, if not oversee, the Bretton Woods institutions and the World Trade Organization (Commission on Global Governance, 1995), a proposal that goes far beyond Annan's proposals to hold 'annual dialogue' with the Bretton Woods institutions and the WTO (Annan, 1997, 2002);
- (c) reforming the subscription quota-based voting power structure whereby seven countries have nearly half of the voting power (Singh, 2000; UNDP, 2002) and the selection process for the heads of the IMF and the World Bank, currently controlled by the US and Europe (Singh, 2000; UNDP, 2002);
- (d) setting up an annual Forum of Civil Society (Commission on Global Governance, 1995);
- (e) adopting a new framework on international insolvency based on an ad-hoc court to determine the legitimacy of debts (Jubilee, 2002);
- (f) creating a Financing Facility for Trade-Related Capacity Building to enhance the negotiating capacity of developing countries at the WTO (Oxfam, 2002);
- (g) putting in place a 'Truth Commission' to investigate the actions and impacts of the IMF and the World Bank (Fifty Years is Enough, 2002); and the most basic of all,
- (h) ensuring the right to information (Stiglitz, 2003).”

institutions, with an articulated inclusion of actual ones. In ecocracy, the actual device of policy implementation, which is the nation state, should be included to accomplish the purpose of implementing global norms. Meanwhile, ecopanel and ecoparliament would be in charge of a democratic policy creation on matters related to the care of water, air, and earth. Nation states would implement it, under the vigilance and companionship of the ecocracy's subsidiary implementation board.

How can a global governance deal with the double problem of interstates global concurrency and the non-interference principle? A partial and insufficient answer is provided by the formula of regional blocs. Even if the concurrency between states would be quantitatively reduced by regional unification, it would be qualitatively incremented by the competition between blocs.⁷⁶ A satisfactory answer needs to put such a global governance outside the political concurrency. Such a move away from concurrency could be possible *if and only if* such a global institution is entitled with the full and exclusive political authority over the pertinent global matters. In other terms, ecocracy's authority over the care and protection of environmental global commons would need to draw it out from the state's sovereignty. Ecocracy's global governance would be therefore put outside of an international concurrency between states. The principle of non-interference would also be respected, since the care of water, air, and earth would not be, *stricto sensu*, national matters any more.

⁷⁶ As Margaret Thatcher would note, "a world which formed itself into inward-looking blocs of nations would be taking a sad step backwards" (Thatcher, 1990, 605).

A set of factors compose nation states' sovereignty. A way to see it, is that nation states are provided by a sovereignty composed of five different faculties. A sovereign state (i) has an exclusive jurisdiction over a territory; (ii) is the ultimate authority for the maintenance of security over such; (iii) has the monopoly of the creation of law for it; (iv) produces collectively binding decisions; and (v) administrates public institutions.⁷⁷ The unifications of such sovereign features aims to unify the criteria which would rule the collective behavior of people inside a portion of territory. A cession of sovereign features in regard of the care of water, air, and earth, from every country to a global institution would give place to a coexistence of two sovereignties over the same territory. Such a coexistence could be non-conflictual, if both sovereignties have different thematic scopes. Even more, both sovereignties could be complementary, given that nation states would implement ecocracy's norms into their own territory. A complementarity enforced by the fact that ecocracy's sovereignty would be deprived of a violent apparatus.

The legitimacy of such a global sovereignty in front of national peoples, is a necessary feature for a democratic global governance. Ecocracy would produce global norms which would be a result of a grass-rooted process of global inter-cultural overlapping consensus building.⁷⁸ Given the input/output democratic legitimacy that such a procedure would give to the decision making process, every national

⁷⁷ For similar accounts see Hinsley (1986, 26) and Caney (2005, 149-150).

⁷⁸ Simon Caney explains that an overlapping consensus is one in which different conceptions can come to an agreement on certain values, whilst having different reasons to accept it (Caney, 2005, 29).

people would seemingly consider ecocracy as not producing any “foreign” intervention inside national matters.

An overlapping consensus building venture would be the basis for a democratic global governance and for a future deeper global understanding and integration. To view one’s own moral perspective as participating within a global overlapping consensus, is a way to internalize other’s perspectives into one’s own. The “foreigner” would suddenly be considered as a non stranger. A global overlapping consensus building venture would also be the basis for a morally consistent global community.⁷⁹

A democratic global governance, based on a cession of some features of state’s sovereignty, can be, therefore, a consistent and acceptable consequence of a global overlapping consensus building venture. By enhancing and implementing global common values, ecocracy would reproduce a virtuous circle of better human integration and more effective protection of environmental global commons. To be accepted, such a global governance would need to be based on top of relevant global associative commons. An adequate care and protection of water, air, and earth, is a justification for the cession of the pertinent features of national sovereignties to a global ecocracy.

⁷⁹ An argument to endorse such a presumption is given by Tan, according to whom: “the current failings of globalization are due more to the lack of proper governance of economic integration than to the fact of integration itself. We need to challenge the neoliberal ideology currently guiding the globalization process, an ideology which we have tended to take for granted, and consider possible alternatives. To claim that we have either to accept *neoliberal* globalization or the worse fate of economic isolation, is to present a false dilemma. There is a third option of globalization on different, more egalitarian, terms” (Tan, 2006, 32-33).

8

Water, air and earth

The care and protection of water, air and earth are matters of global governance. This assertion is justified because of (i) the global transcultural pertinence of the commons and (ii) the global scope of the policies that are needed to adequately take care of them.⁸⁰ Ecocracy's cosmopolitanism is based on a transcultural concern for

⁸⁰ This reasons are coextensive with two well known arguments in favor of cosmopolitanism, namely, the arguments of (i) universal form and universal scope of the values (O'Neill, 1999; Caney, 2005, 27), and (ii) the universal acceptability argument, according to which universal values, to be such, are those that "cannot be rejected by any reasonable person" (Barry, 1995; Caney, 2005, 27).

global commons, according to a difference sensitive universalism.⁸¹ A difference sensitive universalism conceptually needs to incorporate two variables. First, the commons at play need to be valid for any person on Earth, in disregard of any kind of differential. Second, the global values that would be associated to those commons need to be achieved through an global overlapping consensus building process. Solely then a global ecocracy would be legitimate. Ecocracy assumes that water, air, and earth are global transcultural commons, that need globally unified actions for an adequate protection.

Global commons are goods that are common to all of humanity. Those are commons that are shared by all individuals in the widest human community. Good air, good water, and good earth are necessary for any form of human life, as well as for other forms of life on Earth. It is the case today, as it will be the case in the future. A good quality of such commons is desirable for any form of good life, as well as for a way of life in balance with nature. Water, air, and earth are relevant to all human beings, regardless of nationalities or cultures.

Good air, good water, and good earth are intergenerational interests.⁸² This is because of five reasons. First, all generations are

⁸¹ As Simon Caney notes, “all cosmopolitan thinkers are universalist. Utilitarian cosmopolitans, for example, aver that the same fundamental principle (to maximize utility) should apply to all sentient beings across the world. Cosmopolitans who embrace the notion of rights will, in a similar vein, maintain that this value should be applied universally to all. Since one fundamental cosmopolitan claim is that the values that apply to some persons should be applied to all, cosmopolitans are, of course, universalist” (Caney, 2005, 29).

⁸² For a complete account on the reasons to consider environmental issues as entailing intergenerational duties, see Mazor (2010).

concerned by them, in the same way that any form of life on Earth is concerned. Second, good air, good water, and good earth are goods that cannot be replaced by other goods (like economic wealth). Third, future generations would not be responsible for the quality of air, water and earth to which they access at birth. Forth, in regard of air, water, and earth, the satisfaction of the present generation does not involve *per se* the satisfaction of future generations. Fifth, elderly and youngest cohorts are specially sensitive to their quality.

Air, water, and earth are global commons that demand global scope policies, since global reach actions are needed to adequately take care of them. Air, water, and earth are widespread all along the globe. The quality of each one of these goods is intrinsically dependent from the quality of each other. The quality each one of them has in a single place, is affected by the quality that any other of them has anywhere. In other terms, these goods are sensitive to harms produced anywhere against anyone of them. By consequence, an adequate care of good air, good water, and good earth needs to be undertaken through globally unified strategies. In order to globally unify the care of water, air and earth, it would be necessary to produce and apply global policies.

In regard of the fact of conferring a central (implicit or explicit) relevance to such global commons, ethical convictions across the globe find themselves in a coincidence. Thanks to this fact, it can be said that a difference sensitive model would not necessarily imply a radical worldwide dissent, taking into account that different comprehensive doctrines can and actually do overlap on certain

issues.⁸³ The commons of ecocracy, namely good air, good water, and good earth, are supposed to be elements of a necessary and implicit global overlapping consensus, because they are a basic and necessary material backgrounds for any person, from any culture, with any ethical conviction, to live any form of good life.⁸⁴

To which extent a global moral concern about good air, good water, and good earth would imply the necessity of an institutionalized action? A first step to answer to this question is to recognize that environmental harms are socially produced, and environmental purity must be therefore socially reestablished. The term “institutional action” is used here to refer to a unified, sustained and authoritative action. The care of good air, good water, and good earth require unified actions in two layers: in one way, they require a unification, because it is not possible to have good air in the absence of good water and good earth, and vice versa. Secondly, they require geographical unification, because these goods are geographically indivisible at a global level.

⁸³ To insist in this very important point, Caney would argue that different comprehensive doctrines can do converge on specific ethical prescriptions (Caney, 2005, 46).

⁸⁴ Such an assumption is compatible with a moral perspective which focus on capabilities, such as Nussbaum's and Sen's. According to Nussbaum, “the capabilities are not understood as instrumental to a life with human dignity: they are understood, instead, as ways of realizing a life with human dignity, in the different areas of life with which human beings typically engage. The guiding idea behind the list is to move through these different areas (life, health, and so on) and to ask, in each of these areas in we live and act, what would be a way of being able to live and act that is minimally compatible with human dignity?” (Nussbaum, 2006, 162).

Deep inequalities between nation states' performances⁸⁵ and interests, within a model of exclusive sovereign states, are clear obstacles for globally unified strategies. The interstate system is not apt to define and undertake globally unified strategies for the care of environmental global commons on their own;⁸⁶ a global supranational instance is needed in order to unify a global intervention.

Such a unified action needs to be sustained over time, because these goods are likely to be adversely affected at any moment, and because, as far as they are intergenerational interests, they imply long-lasting care. It is worthy to note that good air, good water, and good earth are likely to hit to particular or national interests. Therefore, this care would require an authoritative (even if *prima*

⁸⁵ Charles Beitz illustrates this point. "The degree of inequality in life prospects that occurs at the global level is very great, and greater than anything in the domestic political experience of most citizens of the industrial democracies. Just the orders of magnitude are enormous: nominal per capita GNP is about 57 times as great in the 25 countries the World Bank classifies as 'high income' as in the 49 countries it counts as 'low income' -or, to put the same fact another way, 57 times as great for the wealthiest 15 percent of the world's population as for the poorest 55 per cent. Looked at in terms of purchasing power, GNP per capita in the low income countries is roughly 5 per cent of what it is in the US. The average under-5 mortality rate(possibly the best indicator of overall child welfare) in the low-income countries is 20 times what it is in the high-income countries. It is not uncommon in the poor countries to find rates of under-5 malnutrition of 30 per cent to 40 per cent-though it can be as high as 84 per cent (in Bangladesh) or 63 per cent (in India), which together account for about one in six of the world's population" (Beitz, 1999, 516).

⁸⁶ For O'Neill, to reject this point is equivalent to reject a realistic view of the interstate system. That is what she criticizes to Rawls: "the conception of the state that Rawls rejects in *The Law of Peoples* is in my view indeed a pretty unpromising basis for any account of justice beyond boundaries. What he rejects is the realist conception of states as 'anxiously concerned with their power -their capacity (military, economic, diplomatic)- to influence others and always guided by their basic interests' (Rawls, 1999: 28)" (O'Neill, 2000, 50).

facie non violent) supranational action, able to prevail over such interests. In consequence, the care and protection of good air, good water, and good earth require an institutional supranational global action.

Ecocracy's proposal of a global supranational *democratic* institution is a derivation of the cosmopolitan legitimacy and the social need of the take care of these three environmental commons. Needs and desires regarding good air, good water, and good earth are culturally diverse. Scarcity and availability of such is also variable from one place to another. Furthermore, even if every culture needs to have these goods in good quality, their symbolic meaning and functional utility varies by virtue of different conceptions of the good life and different sets of social practices. Because of a difference sensitive concern, and given that all individuals have a right to influence decisions affecting the care of these vital interests, *democracy* is to be preferred over any other sort of global regime for the the care and protection purposes of ecocracy.

A cosmopolitan democracy

Ecocracy is an individual-centric institution, rather than a state-centric one.⁸⁷ Current unions of states, like the United Nations Organization, the European Union, the Organization of American States, and other similar organizations, are state-centric; their political constituency is made of nation states. States are *member-states* inside of those organizations. Nation states do have political rights inside state-centric organizations. The political constituency of an individual-centric global institution is made of individuals. Individual persons, and not nation states, do have political rights inside it. An individual-centric global democracy is a political scenario where individual persons, and not nation states, come out to global agreements.

⁸⁷ Kok-Chor Tan exposes this difference by saying that a cosmopolitan account would adopt an individual focus, which would not see states as the primary subjects of a global democracy. (Tan, 2006, 38).

Even if the concept of democracy was born long time before the notion of nation state, the way we conceive it today establishes a strong link between the two. In many cases we use the term democracy to refer to a procedure that can be pertinently applied to other instances like enterprises, social movements, and other. But when we talk about democracy in a more substantive way, we usually refer to republican democracy, and we therefore talk about a specific political-institutional arrangement of the nation state. The idea of giving a democratic individual-centric order to cosmopolitanism is far from being new. As we will see, when we connect cosmopolitanism to an individual-centric democracy some conceptual precisions are needed.

From a moral cosmopolitan point of view, the concern about institutions is an instrumental one that needs to be difference sensitive. In the context of this thesis, the notion of *difference* is wide; it refers to differences of interests, conceptions and preferences. Such a consequentialist approach demands from political institutions to be coherent with cosmopolitan values (like difference sensitivity), while being effective in the protection of environmental global commons (Caney, 2005, 152). A core moral requirement to ecocracy's global institution is that it must be difference sensitive.

A cosmopolitan consequentialist approach to democracy needs to take into account a *difference sensitive principle*. Those who argue in favor of universal values need to recognize that such values are necessarily the result of a discursive deal between different conceptions of the good life. This point, as Hilary Putnam would say,

starts from the obvious observation that there are many different forms of life that are “good” (Putnam, 2002, 94). Therefore, democracy is a most desired regime for cosmopolitanism, because it allows a global overlapping consensus building venture, which is a fitted mechanism to achieve moral consensus between individuals, in a difference sensitive way.

The democratic arrangement of ecocracy is not identical to the national one. Differences rely precisely on the fact that the distance between representatives and represented is bigger in a global scale than it is in a national scale. A distance that needs to be utterly reduced. The institutional design of ecocracy seeks to make such reduction effective, by incorporating participative, representative, and deliberative claims, coming from different sorts of democratic thinking.

It is possible to see a rising global consensus in favor of democracy, even if not necessarily in favor of a republican form democracy.⁸⁸ If such a rising consensus does exist, it is plausible to assume a minimal global democratic culture, according to which diverse people would accept the legitimacy of a global institution that would be ruled under the power of the people. If this is so, we can expect that, given an enhanced democratic legitimacy of ecocracy’s norms, individuals would have incentives to get politically involved, both in ecopanel and ecoparliament. By virtue of the same argument, it is plausible to

⁸⁸ It is possible to affirm that what has been traditionally seen as the main disagreements in front of democracy are in fact, in most of the cases, discursive misunderstandings. This is Amartya Sen’s opinion (Sen, 2002, 118).

expect that nation states would voluntarily adhere to ecocracy;⁸⁹ nation states would be willing to serve as a channel for ecocracy's policies implementation. Particular nation states would adhere to ecocracy by virtue of the globally accepted and growing realm of ethical concern for the care of environment. Briefly, an ecocratic cosmopolitan democracy would unite the world for the care and protection of environmental global commons.

Such a global political unification oughts to be based on top of the principle of nation's self-determination.⁹⁰ The notion of self-determination is not contradictory with an individual-centric political unification. Even if states will not have political rights in regard of the decision-making processes of ecocracy, such a global democracy would need to be based on a recognition of every nation-state's self-determination. Such a recognition would be effective to the extent to which ecocracy's policies will be strictly limited to the care and protection of environmental global commons.

⁸⁹ The principle of voluntary adherence to cosmopolitan values and instances is largely accepted. For an example of its application, read what Omar Dahbour proposes: "While the idea of an autonomous community, and of a world of such communities, implies significant differences in organization and way of life between communities, the underlying principle that define this autonomy -including those of sustainability and self-sufficiency - are universalist and rooted in an ecological perspective that rejects the disruptive effects of global markets and commodity production. Global justice will result more from adherence to such principles by autonomous communities acting independently than from vain attempts at redistributing resources and incomes globally or at developing global institutions that can coerce states into adherence to supposedly rational ends" (Dahbour, 2005, 223).

⁹⁰ The historical shift that occurred during the twentieth century, after the decolonization process, is presented by Richard Falk when he explains that decolonization brought about a raise of the self-determination discourse (Falk, 2000, 319).

An individual-centric cosmopolitan democracy would produce a desirable reduction of the distance between global policies and lay individuals. By contrast, in state-centric forums, which are not subordinated to citizenship, there is an antidemocratic lack of accountability⁹¹ (Stiglitz, 2003). One virtuous effect of the democratic individual-centric design of ecocracy is that it would reduce such a distance; it would invert the ratio more-far-reaching-instance/less-democratic-participation-and-accountability. On the other hand, such an individual-centric design would also reduce the distance between individuals around the globe. An individual-centric global democracy would contribute to build a global *strong demos* (a strong global community), through a better inter-individual understanding.⁹²

⁹¹ According to Bernhard Wessel, a lack of accountability undermines the very principle of democratic representation (Wessels, 2011, 100).

⁹² A human *strong* community, whether local, national, or global, would always be based on relationships of understanding between individuals. A desirable cosmopolitanism needs to be based on mutual understandings, would the case of "Miriam" suggest. This case is presented by Celena Kush: "The images of colonial other within these early books of Pilgrimage provide a ground for critiqueizing the way cosmopolitanism is achieved. Tellingly the text's narrative of Miriam's social climb follow avenues of colonial penetration into English culture opened by economic and racial others. At the start of *Pointed Roofs*, Miriam is driven by fears that she is a sham, that she can be only an economic cosmopolitan. She feel she is "upstart and alien" as a teacher in an international boarding school in Germany, despite her background as the daughter of a would-be-gentleman (II: 192), and the Victorian parlor of the school fills her with "the sense of the misery of social occasions" (I: 41). Except for a few fleeting moments of success in her teaching, Miriam constantly feels like an impostor among the English daughters of gentlemen who are good at creating "diversions", but who often make Miriam feel like she "could have killed" them for their arrogance (I: 67)" (Kusch, 2007, 48).

Would such an individual-centric cosmopolitan democracy be stable?⁹³ A plausible answer to this question could argue that such a stability depends on the political incentives to participate given to people. Incentives to participate within transcultural diversity that adopt an institutional form through ecopanel. Moral incentives are given by the fact of proximity. Political incentives are offered, because there is a realistic expectation to be taken into account in the content of global norms. Such a real expectation would be warranted by the ecopanel's monopoly of "legislative initiative". A mixture of such incentives, plus a growing realm of ecological concern, would provide to ecocracy a sustained public support to flourish and to be stable over time.

Social incentives to participate are closely linked to proximity ties between persons. This point could suggest a direct ratio more-far-reaching-instance/less-democratic-participation. Nevertheless, it is not true that the proximal communities are exclusionary from the wider ones.⁹⁴ From one level to another, what may vary are the kind of ties that are related to pertinent commonalities. The commons to which ecocracy is related are global ones, and are therefore the

⁹³ As Simon Caney would ask, "we need to know whether cosmopolitan global institutions would be stable. Would they enjoy the public support required for democratic institutions to flourish?" (Caney, 2005, 152).

⁹⁴ This is proved by Kwame Appiah through the story he tells about his father and the kingdom of Asante. He tells that his "father was a Ghanaian patriot. He once published a column in the *Pioneer*, our local newspaper in Kumasi, under the headline "Is Ghana worth dying for?" and it was clear that his answer was yes. But he also loved Asante -the region of Ghana where he and I both grew up - a kingdom absorbed within a British colony, then also a region of a new multiethnic Republic, a kingdom he and his father had also once loved and served. And, like so many African nationalists of his class and generation, he always loved an enchanting abstraction they called "Africa"" (Appiah, 2002, 22).

basis for a global reaching incentive to participate. It is true that physical and cultural proximity and sympathy entails a certain kind of comfort for the participation in public deliberation. This is the reason why the ecopanel must be spontaneously conformed. A consequence of the ecocratic model is that it would enhance global inter-individual and inter-cultural sympathy, by enhancing, simultaneously, local inter-individual and intra-cultural sympathy.

Incentives to participate in the decision making process of ecocracy, from ecopanel to ecoparliament, are coextensive to the level in which a lay-person's voice may be taken into account. Grass-root solutions⁹⁵ are not only desirable because of the locals' knowledge of the factual problems and of the direct consequences of the solutions, but also because this kind of discussions would contribute to create local communities of cosmopolitan interpretation, which would be able to make better and better propositions to the global community.⁹⁶

By virtue of the formerly exposed reasons, ecocracy's global democracy would actually be an *individual-centric global democracy*. Its core political and institutional constituency would be the human

⁹⁵ Authors like Norman Myers and Dorothy Myers argue that global responses to environmental problems are deeply linked to grass-root solutions. The point these authors make is the following: "to this extent, NGOs serve as a paradigm of the "social architecture" that we need if we are to address many of the emergent environmental problems of the future; the mega-problems of supranational order that may prove (in the immediate future at least) to lie beyond the capacities of governments but that may often prove amenable to grass-roots responses" (Myers and Myers, 1983, 26).

⁹⁶ José-Antonio Orosco defines this qualitative enhancement as a result of a hermeneutic openness to others' perspectives (Orosco, 2003, 211).

individual. An institutional derivation of such a principle is the pertinence and necessity of spontaneously created law-making ecopanel, that would reproduce and qualify local-cosmopolitan communities.

Cosmopolitan communities

Political qualifications in regard of a global democracy, require transformations and qualification in regard of communities. An individual-centric cosmopolitanism implies a universal recognition of everyone's individual worth. Primarily, a cosmopolitan mutual recognition implies a moral commitment not to inflict harm to anyone.⁹⁷ This basic form of mutual recognition could be politically

⁹⁷ According to Elaine Scarry, "there exists a *circular relation* between the infliction of pain and the problem of otherness. *The difficulty of imagining others is both the cause of, and the problem displayed by, the action of injuring.* The action of injuring occurs precisely because we have trouble believing in the reality of other persons. At the same time, the injury itself makes visible the fact that we cannot see the reality of other persons. It displays our perceptual disability. For if other persons stood clearly visible to us, the infliction of that injury would be impossible" (Scarry, 2002, 102).

qualified inside ecocracy, through the dialogic building of a community committed with the conformation of a *global demos*.

From a cosmopolitan perspective, to ignore any person's dignity is self-contradictory. In fact, to profess a global community of all of human beings, necessarily implies a recognition of a basic equal worth of every person. A negative outcome of a boundaries-based global system is that it produces stereotypes that make people insensitive towards the suffering and voices of some people. Those stereotypes can be broken through the establishment of direct communication flows with those who are stereotyped.⁹⁸ For this reason, in order to create a global demos, horizontal flows of communication between ecopanelists all around the world need to be activated.

⁹⁸ This is the reason why Elijah Anderson endorses what is called "the cosmopolitan canopy", as the multiplication of intercultural permanent exchange. According to her, "to be sure, people may develop new stereotypes or see fit to hold on to the ones they have previously formed. It is likely that they will opt to hold onto attitudes they are deeply invested in. Yet they will have been exposed to members of a heretofore unknown other (see Blumer, 1958). If nothing more, through constant exposure, such environments can encourage common, everyday taken-for-granted civility toward others who are different from oneself. As canopies proliferate, such neutral territories become an established element of the makeup of the city" (Anderson, 2004).

A higher degree of world population's integration is desirable. Along with already existing processes of interstates' integration,⁹⁹ ecocracy would promote inter-individual transcultural integration, which would foster the creation of a global demos. Such a global inter-individual integration would be based on the mutual recognition of local populations and individuals. Such a stage of recognition would be encouraged through an enhanced flow of communication between local communities. Inside a dynamic of discursive exchange between different local communities in regard of cosmopolitan goods and values, such communities will be transformed into cosmopolitan local communities. Such a discursive inter-individual and transcultural integration would be institutionalized through the ecopanel. A dynamic of discursive exchange through ecopanel would help to strengthen the ties of sympathy among peoples, and would therefore help to re-create a global demos.

⁹⁹ To see a good example of such a tendency one can read Brams, who presents the following dynamic: "While Eastern Europe sends proportionately more diplomats to other regions than other regions send to it, its imports tend to be slightly more cosmopolitan than its exports, though its trade as a whole is the most insular of any region. Asia's trade is far more cosmopolitan than Eastern Europe's, but like Eastern Europe its imports are more cosmopolitan than its exports, and it sends proportionately more diplomats to the rest of the world than the rest of the world sends to it. The situation is reversed for Africa and the Middle East, which both receive a more cosmopolitan distribution of diplomats than they send abroad. The cosmopolitanism indices of the trade imports and exports of these two regions average a very high .96, indicating the very substantial economic dependence of these two regions on the rest of the world (89)... The within-region concentrations of the three different kinds of transaction flows highlight the very substantial influence of geographical proximity on the ecology of international transaction flows (93)... when the boundaries of regions are more explicitly identified, then the implications of trying to change or reinforce policies and goals of nations within these boundaries can be better assessed (94)" (Brams, 1968, 89, 93 and 94).

Through the existence of ecopanel, local communities could be transformed in a cosmopolitan direction. Local communities could produce transformations on others, and vice versa.¹⁰⁰ Cosmopolitan communities would participate into discursive exchange dynamics, while building cosmopolitan democratic global policies.

Ecopanel is not the first nor the only instances to build cosmopolitan communities of individuals. Universities, music clubs¹⁰¹, and many other, do already accomplish such a purpose. Nevertheless, inside the ecopanel's dynamics it would be likely to find a different kind of engagement in regard of the creation of a global demos. One reason is that ecopanel would be stable institutions where proposals about the care of what is globally precious would be permanently discussed. This fact could contribute in a more efficient way to build cosmopolitan communities of individuals, and a global demos.

¹⁰⁰ Sissela Bok's presents the metaphor of concentric circles, as a process of learning which is projected in both ways: "in which direction might children's learning about inner and outer circles and the respective allegiances best develop? Is it better for parents and teachers to begin at the outer edges and move inward, to move back and forth between two, or to begin with the inner circles and move forward?" (Bok, 2002, 42).

¹⁰¹ Elijah Anderson gives a description of the way in which a jazz bar may help to build cosmopolitan communities of individuals: "one might say that places like Zanzibar Blue are a salve for the hustle and bustle of more fraught urban experience. While the jazz club is a special experience, with complete strangers participating in a collective entertainment and artistic production, intimate spaces of a different sort proliferate with the boom of the franchise business. More generally, they include the Starbucks and Mc-Donaldses of the world, places where complete strangers congregate and observe one another but may not feel as connected as people do at a jazz club. Through people watching and eavesdropping in a tight space, they may leave with strong impressions and stories of other people's lives, truncated and fleeting as they may be, which serve to shape their gossip, not simply about individuals but about the groups these strangers seem to represent" (Anderson, 2004, 24).

Cosmopolitan communities are not contradictory with autonomous local communities.¹⁰² There is no logical nor ontological contradiction between local and global communities. In fact, local communities can all be cosmopolitan, even if remaining strictly local in regard of their composition, for example. The extent to which local communities recognize others' voice and get involved with the protection of cosmopolitan global commons, would make of them cosmopolitan communities. Through a global discursive inter-cultural exchange, a global demos is expected to arise.

Different levels of communities (local, national, regional, global) are related with each other, in a certain line of subsidiarity. Ecocracy's institutional model is based on top of a consistent principle of subsidiarity.¹⁰³ Local communities are closely linked to some issues related to the care of environmental commons. At the same time, an adequate care of these global commons needs to incorporate a global view of the issue. Following the principle of subsidiarity, the ecopanel and the ecoparliament would make contributions to the

¹⁰² Omar Dahbour, who advocates for an autonomous-communities based model of global community, asks himself if his own model is an anti-cosmopolitan one, "that is, one opposed not only to greater global integration, but also to any moral equivalence between persons globally? I think this is not a necessary corollary of the autonomous communities model. If moral cosmopolitanism is equivalent to a view of all human beings as having equal dignity and worthiness, this sort of cosmopolitanism is not inconsistent with a particularistic political philosophy - indeed, it is presupposed by it, since the notion of the self-determination of peoples that underlies the ideal of communal autonomy is based on just such a logical outlook" (Dahbour, 2005, 222). In my view, his argument is correct.

¹⁰³ According to Phillipe Van Parijs, the principle of subsidiarity establishes a sequence of allocation of competences, from the lowest level to the highest, ascending only when it is necessary (Van Parijs, 2011, 202).

care of water, air and earth, according to what each of them is more competent to think about. Ecopanel would enter into the chain of global decision-making through specific inputs, which would be integrated inside a global strategy designed by a global ecoparliament. Bottom-up and top-down flows of political communication would enhance a re-creation of cosmopolitan communities and, again, a global demos.

This model is fully compatible with the self-respect of peoples.¹⁰⁴ Ecocracy's cosmopolitanism is based on an hermeneutical enhancement of local communities. By consequence, such model is in contradiction with any kind of deracination of local communities or nations. On the contrary, ecocracy is based on their qualification through an integration of cosmopolitan principles inside their own identity, in a way that the self-respect of each people would be enriched by the self-respect of any other.

Such a local-global compatibility is a result of a combination of the communitarian aspect of ecocracy (ecopanel) and its globalizing aspect (ecoparliament). This twofold cosmopolitanism allows individuals to face the comparative weaknesses of localities in front of the power of global environmental threats,¹⁰⁵ without losing their cultural specificities. In fact, while a global institution is necessary to

¹⁰⁴ Charles Beitz very clearly exposes this John Rawls' principle. According to his view, Rawls' point would introduce a compelling demand to cosmopolitanism, to the extent to which any cosmopolitan value would need to be compatible with the self-respect of people (Beitz, 2000, 675).

¹⁰⁵ Dahbour argues that local communities seek protection in front of aggressive insensitive global impositions (Dahbour, 2005, 204).

protect localities from environmental threats,¹⁰⁶ local ecopanels are fitted mechanisms to protect local communities from an overwhelming globalized and homogenized culture.

A main virtue of such a complementariness is that it would harmonize the top (global) and the bottom (local) of the political spectrum. It would also reduce political competitiveness between liberal and non-liberal societies. As long as ecocracy is based on parametric universalism, a common venture to take care and protect environmental global commons would not push liberal societies to

¹⁰⁶ As John Rawls would insinuate in *The Law of Peoples*, not to adopt a global institution would make of any claim of global justice an idle exercise. The point of Rawls is in fact more aggressive towards global distributive justice. He discards such a possibility because there is not a global institution to implement it. In the words of Allen Buchanan, Rawls “might argue that any attempt to frame principles of distributive justice for the global basic structure is an idle exercise because there are no global governance institutions capable of implementing such principles” (Buchanan 2000, 713). I take here from Rawls’ point what appears to me to be out of dispute: without any global institution, there is no case to propose principles of global justice.

influence non-liberal to become liberal, nor vice versa.¹⁰⁷ Culturally, global diversity would be enriched by the fact that ecocracy would constantly build an inter-cultural global overlapping consensus. Such harmonizations are coherent derivations of the difference sensitive principle of ecocracy's cosmopolitanism.

A global ecocratic *demos* can be conceived as a *global diverse community which is politically committed with the global care of environmental global commons*. This kind of community would be a legitimate pivot for the reproduction of ecocracy as a global

¹⁰⁷ According to John Rawls' mutual respect and toleration principles (in *The Law of Peoples*), are values that all kinds of regimes, whether liberal or not, must accept, to be considered as decent. Rawls is criticized by Simon Caney on this point: "Rawls's answers to the two questions (the subject question and the conduct question) are, however, deeply problematic for two reasons. First, it is questionable whether Rawls's reasoning (that is, the injunction to treat non-liberal peoples with respect) establishes that peoples' foreign policy may never be predicated on a commitment to, say, liberal theories of justice. To see why, we should focus on Rawls's answer to the conduct-question. Rawls's intuition -that liberal peoples should respect decent non-liberal societies- does provide some support for the claim that some types of conduct are inappropriate and disrespectful. What is questionable is that it establishes a complete ban on foreign policy based on liberal values. Quite clearly violence and coercion are ruled out by a commitment to tolerating decent societies but consider other non-violent modes. Consider, for instance, an example prompted by the debates surrounding the enlargement of the European Union. Suppose that a group of liberal peoples form a mutually beneficial economic system. Suppose, further, that they offer membership of this system to decent non-liberal peoples but, because of their commitment to liberal values (like sexual and racial equality), they will admit them only if they adhere to liberal values. According to Rawls, this conduct is unacceptable since it represents an incentive to decent peoples to adopt liberal values. But it is hard to see why this is at all objectionable. It does not have the obnoxious features that would normally make one condemn foreign policy designed to move people toward adopting certain values. It is not coercive; it does not employ propaganda. Decent hierarchical societies are free to reject the offer. The first problem, then, is that the concepts of 'mutual respect' and 'toleration' do not, in themselves, preclude absolutely all conduct attempting to alter the behavior of others" (Caney, 2002, 110).

institution.¹⁰⁸ A virtuous circle would be installed, in which local cosmopolitan communities would reproduce a global demos, within a global cosmopolitan democratic institution where to deal with their specific differences. At this point, it is worthy to note that ecocracy is not exactly a liberal institutional proposal.¹⁰⁹ It is a rather heterodox model which merges individual-centric and difference sensitiveness principles with participative, representative, and deliberative claims, in order to neutralize some of the political effects of economic and cultural global inequalities. Such an equalization could be attained through a law-making process equally accessible to all, which, at the

¹⁰⁸ José Antonio Orosco agrees with this intuition, as long as, according to him, “a global community building venture would gain legitimacy by institutionalizing global norms developed through a global dialogue” (Orosco, 2003, 211).

¹⁰⁹ There are good reasons to prefer a non fully liberal global democracy. Persson and Savulescu give the basis for that point. According to them, liberal democracies “give equal recognition to all citizens only in a rather formal way, by bestowing upon all of them certain basic civil rights and liberties. As we have already indicated, there is room for considerable socio-economic inequality in democracies, and the better off are likely to receive more recognition than the worse off, and their wealth will enable them to make a better use of their rights and liberties. Furthermore, there are political inequalities: those who are elected to offices receive more recognition. This creates a problem because one might doubt that political representatives who are so much more privileged than most of their voters could imaginatively put themselves in the shoes of the latter. For instance, it is hard to imagine that members of the US Congress who earn around 170,000 dollars annually could put themselves in the shoes of the 15 per cent of the US citizens who live in poverty” (Persson and Savulescu, 2012, 93).

same time, would contribute to re-produce a global demos and to democratically qualify global citizenship.¹¹⁰

¹¹⁰ Through a constant global deliberation, ecocracy would render world citizenship more democratically qualified. According to Thomas Christiano, “the virtue effect of deliberation is endorsed by common sense. In a society where public deliberation is the norm, having traits by which one can contribute to public deliberation is highly functional for individuals, or at least for groups. Where one is unable to make a contribution to the public discussion that informs policy making and one has distinctive interests and points of view, those interests and points of view are not likely to be accommodated in the policies that are chosen. At the same time, in a society where public discussion is ignored or suppressed, individuals are not likely to have reasons to discuss their views with others, and they will have less reason to think carefully about many of their views” (Christiano, 1999, 248).

A voting mechanism

A challenge for ecocracy is to propose an electoral design which would not interrupt a moral continuity from a deliberative bottom (ecopanel) to a representative top instance (ecoparliament). Being consistent with moral principles in the background of ecocracy, such a representative instance needs to answer to different challenges. First, it needs to incorporate diversity and inclusion of numerical minorities to a highest degree. Second, it needs to increase the communicative force (or meaningfulness) of each individual's vote. Third, it needs to be coherent with the grass-rooted deliberative system of ecocracy. An analysis on how cosmopolitan principles are

present in the bottom public deliberation, could be an adequate procedure to define a fitted voting mechanism for global representation.

Public deliberation can be interpreted as a political derivation of two core moral cosmopolitan principles; it unifies the principle of equal recognition and the difference sensitive principle. Public deliberation is a way in which mutual respect among citizens manifests itself in the political sphere; it is a basis on top of which a global consensus building can be morally legitimated.¹¹¹ A global deliberative regime would also introduce pressure on the nation states for enhancing political opportunities in local levels,¹¹² and it would enrich a global consensus building venture with the voices of the peoples.¹¹³

¹¹¹ Some say that deliberation has an intrinsic value. According to Thomas Christiano, “there are two ways in which public deliberation is thought to have intrinsic value. First it may have intrinsic value to the extent that participating in discussing matters of great moral importance is an essential or at least irreducible component of the good life. Second, public deliberation may have intrinsic value to the extent that the presence of public deliberation is an expression of a kind of mutual respect among citizens in the society” (Christiano, 1999, 251).

¹¹² Democratic deliberation requires the settlement of a series of public measures to remove “those inequalities, that hinder or erode the establishment of equal participative political opportunities” (Held, 2005, 187).

¹¹³ This would avoid what Bran Hosner notes: “well-meaning NGO’s come to speak for indigenous peoples, denying them a place at the table, ignoring their perspectives, and undermining tribal sovereignty in the name of environmental protection and indigenous right” (Hosner, 2012, 267). Such a democratic deficit would not be present if NGO’s incorporate democratic deliberation in their action. This example shows once again that to build a legitimate global overlapping consensus, democratic deliberation is a necessary feature.

From a difference sensitivity perspective, public deliberation is worthy since it gives the floor to a huge diversity of conceptions of the good life all around the globe to show themselves, to be respected, and to be equally taken into account for the care and protection of our three primary goods. In a context of mutual respect and social promotion of public deliberation, "all citizens, including those who may be disadvantaged, will find greater support in pursuing their life plans whatever they may be" (Thompson, 1999, 117). To develop a feeling of affinity among humans in the widest possible range, could be a simultaneous correlate for the development of massive affinities towards natural environment.¹¹⁴

Mutual recognition is also a basis for a collective conviction about the worth of dutiful efforts beyond frontiers. Efforts that would bring a consciousness and feeling of belonging to "a common life in which all are sharers", which is a feature that "gives this common life the worth which can alone make it an adequate end of dutiful effort" (MacCunn, 1999, 155). Recognition of others, specially from far away beyond frontiers, as equally reasonable -even if culturally different-, is a necessary condition for a recognition of oneself as belonging to a

¹¹⁴ This point is suggested by Robin Doughty. Reviewing *The Biophilipia Hypothesis* by Stephen Kellert, he introduces the central question of the book. In his review we can read that "the basic question for him and other authors is "to what extent can an affinity with life urge moderation in our behavior?" (p.17). By expressing and celebrating our experiences of life in all of its diversity, plenitude, and expansiveness, his Thesis, in the beginning of the book, has the ultimate goal of influencing current policies and practices that many consider to be shredding the biosphere. There is the chance, McVay believes, to practice patience and humility, curiosity and empathy, delight and understanding, before the face of the living world. In a word, there is a possibility for transcendence, opening us to novelty and inspiration along the kind of an evolutionary trajectory envisioned by thinkers like Pierre Theilhard de Chardin" (Doughty, 1996, 783).

global community. To recognize another as equally reasonable is a development of an equal dignity's recognition. Such a kind of qualified mutual recognition is only possible on the basis of discursive direct exchange. Horizontal flows of communication regarding global commons, provided by deliberative ecopanel, are useful to make possible such a kind of recognition.

Besides an intercultural dimension of such a global overlapping consensus, an ideological dimension also appears. People does not only belong to a nation or a culture, but some people also subscribe to a political ideology. The kind of mis-recognition that can be found in this level is different from the one that is usual at the inter-cultural or international levels. In general, there is an "ideological" blockage to accept any idea coming from "another ideology." What is most pertinent for an overlapping consensus building perspective, is not only the existence of ecopanel as deliberative instances as such, but the kind of subject matters which are under their consideration. As long as ecocracy deals with most fundamental environmental issues, there is not any ideology which can claim or pretend to have a monopoly, or even a privileged response.¹¹⁵ A shared sensitivity for environmental issues among major ideologies, could give the floor for an openness to political deliberation, which could eventually break ideological blockages.

¹¹⁵ "In this regard it is interesting that each major ideological tradition evinced early sensitivity to environmental concerns. Historically, no particular ideology has had a monopoly on environmental thinking. Environmental values can point in several political directions, and articulated contemporary environmentalists are found all along the left-right spectrum" (Paehlke, 1989, 190).

National or local communities participating in ecocracy, do not necessarily need to be democratic inbounds. An authentic cosmopolitan democratic community that would be *difference sensitive*, would be compatible with different political conceptions. For sure, non the less, non democratic societies would experience an internal democratic transformation by adhering to ecocracy.¹¹⁶

Democratic deliberation “is an instrument for the making of high quality decisions” (Christiano, 1999, 255). In terms of high quality decisions, it is necessary to recognize that a global deliberation entail a difficulty. Globally widespread public deliberation could produce too many proposals for an ecoparliament to be able to properly adopt high quality decisions. For such a reason, a *scientific board* is needed. It would be deprived of any decision making power, subordinated to the ecoparliament, and would produce, out of such a seemingly huge diversity of propositions, the best possible synthetic alternatives for the ecoparlamentarians to decide.

A global overlapping consensus would only be such if it is worthy to be accepted by all. Such is a primary guiding principle for the

¹¹⁶ This would push the world toward the building of a cosmopolitan democratic community. This point is made by David Held (Held, 1995, 423).

scientific board and for the ecoparliament.¹¹⁷ The main role of ecocracy is to produce enforceable decisions for structuring the global public domain in regard of the care and protection of good air, good water, and good earth. Such a limited scope excludes of ecocracy's competence any decision concerning cultural or moral convictions of peoples or individuals.¹¹⁸ The care of water, air and earth is here considered as an universal common because, to put it in the words of Hannah Arendt, "the earth is the very quintessence of the human condition" (Arendt, 1998, 2).

Global deliberation, as a global discursive interaction, would require a common understanding among people who speak different languages. For some, english holds today a status of a global *lingua*

¹¹⁷ In a kantian way, such a guideline would adopt the shape of a universal principle of justice. According to Onora O'Neill, there are two features this principle needs to have to be considered such: "first, it is concerned only with maxims for outward action, that is with the aspects of action, which could be enforced (so not, for example, with maxims for virtue or with moral worth). Second, it is concerned only with maxims for structuring the domain of external freedom, which is the public domain, and not with maxims regarding every outwards aspect of personal conduct. The Universal Principle of Justice (UPJ) therefore requires the rejection of those basic maxims for structuring the domain of the external use of freedom that could not be adopted by all" (O'Neill, 2000, 57).

¹¹⁸ Kok-Chor Tan would argue, in coincidence with what has been said, that cosmopolitanism "can remain neutral about the separate issues of culture and individual freedom" (Tan, 2002, 444). This is a necessary feature of any acceptable cosmopolitanism, since, as John Rawls argues, "peoples will want to preserve the independence of their own society and its equality in relation to others" (Rawls, 1999, 115).

franca,¹¹⁹ in use in most of the international institutions. Such an argument could lead to adopt english as the official language of ecocracy. But there is a lot of people all around the world who does not understand english at all; without fearing mistake, one can say that at least one half (but it may be much more) of the global population does not speak or understand english. In coherence with our difference sensitive principle, all official documents (excluding the law propositions coming from the ecopanel) shall be traduced, at least, into the five major languages,¹²⁰ in order to make them directly accessible to (almost) all.¹²¹ To translate ecocracy's official documents into these five languages is a democratic task of the scientific board.

¹¹⁹ "Indeed, one can safely conjecture that no other language, in the whole history of mankind, has ever had as many non-native speakers competent in it. Most revealing perhaps: using a not too demanding criterion of competence, it can today be said that, for the first time in history, a language has more people competent in it beyond the borders within which it enjoys official status than it has native speakers. As we also saw above, no other language, whether at European level or worldwide, gives any sign of rivaling English as a universal *lingua franca*, and the snowball effect currently unfolding is such that one can safely predict that no language will ever do" (Van Parijs, 2011, 22).

¹²⁰ According to information provided by *Nationalencyklopedin*, the five major languages in the world are mandarin, spanish, english, arabic, and hindi, all the rest being spoken by less than the 4%.

¹²¹ The translation of all documents to the four major languages is nothing but the concrete development of the liberal egalitarian principle of equal access to resources and goods with which to exercise social and political liberties. In an interpretation of Rawls' conception of justice, Kok-Chor Tan holds that "*egalitarian liberalism* holds that treating persons with equal respect and concern involves going beyond respecting their basic liberties, but includes also ensuring that they have equal access to resources or goods with which to exercise these liberties" (Tan, 2002, 432).

Ecocracy is a global deliberative democracy, both at participative and representative levels. Deliberation is a derivation of core moral principles of cosmopolitanism. Principles that are pertinent for the grass-rooted popular implication with the care of water, air and earth, as well as they are for the highest political representation. An application of the difference sensitive principle to representation could define that the representative instance should be as diverse as possible; according to this principle, a representative instance would be morally better-off if it were diverse. Such a diversity would produce norms that would be meaningful to diverse communities. Along with public deliberation, that produces a meaningful implication of people in ecocracy's politics, political representation needs to be meaningful. Such can be done through the incorporation of a voting mechanism that would incremente the meaningfulness (understood as a strong communicative force) of individual votes.

A necessary condition to have a meaningful representation is to have a meaningful vote, since the vote is the origin of representation. A meaningful representation is one that embodies an increased communicative force of the political message sent by the voter through the vote. A meaningful vote is one that is, first of all, free and effective. A free vote is one which is not forced, in a way that each individual decides how to vote for, without any coercive influence. An effective vote is one which counts for the decision making. Every democratic regime needs to warrant a free vote. To some extent, the system of election which is currently used in contemporary democracies is effective, in the sense that every person has a right to elect a candidate.

In order to increment the communicative force of an individual vote, a *complete vote* design would be better than a *single vote* design.¹²² Contemporary democracies incorporate, in general, a single vote design; one in which a person can vote for only one candidate. Any voter would need to exclude from his political message considerations regarding, for example, in regard of a preferred political composition of a parliament. A complete vote is one in which a person can vote for the whole composition of the representative chamber, in a way that if the chamber is composed by 100 persons, each person can vote once for 100 persons, reasoning the kind of composition he or she would like the chamber to have. The 100 candidates who individually obtain the highest voting will compose the chamber. Within such a procedure, the communicative force (or meaningfulness) of an individual vote would be incremented.

Such an option would give to voters a chance to include into his political message considerations regarding not only one person, but many different persons; not only one candidate from one party, but many from different parties; not only one candidate from one region, but many from different regions. These is a simple and meaningful option. It gives a chance to people to vote for candidates from different parties and minorities, without leaving aside his or hers

¹²² A single vote design would coincide with what the voting theory has called “plurality rule”, according to which “each voter selects one candidate (or none if voters can abstain), and the candidate(s) with the most votes win” (Pacuit, 2012). A complete vote design could be interpreted as a qualified version of an “approval voting” mechanism (Brams and Fishburn 2007 and Brams 2008). According to that method “each voter selects a subset of the candidates (where the empty set means the voter abstains) and the candidate(s) with the most votes wins” (Pacuit, 2012). In a complete vote mechanism, each voters selects a *complete* subset of the candidates.

political preferences. This could allow a more diverse composition of the representative chamber. It would also link representation to grass-root deliberation, since the reasoning on the best composition of the chamber could be considered a common subject matter of political deliberation.

Apart from considerations about an increased meaningfulness of political representation through a complete vote, it is necessary to consider inclusion of numerical minorities inside the representative chamber. Even if a complete vote *could* include numerical minorities, if applied without any forcible measure of inclusion, say a quota mechanism, it *could* also turn out to exclude those minorities.

Taking this fact into account, it is necessary to warrant a world wide national inclusion inside the ecoparliament. An incentive for people to participate in an ecocracy would be to see their nation represented. Given that ecocracy is based on top of a political inclusion of nationalist claims, a measure of national inclusion inside a global representative chamber would be a logical consequence. This is the reason why a complete vote mechanism would need to be enriched by a national quota mechanism, through which every country would have at least one representative inside the global chamber.

A coherent way to unify both concerns (to increase meaningfulness and to include numerical minorities), would be to adopt a twofold voting mechanism. Every global citizen would have a right to vote both for a candidate to represent his or her own country, *and* for a set of 50 candidates of a worldwide jurisdiction. As a consequence, a multiple diversity *per se* warranted by the national quota mechanism,

would be enriched through a meaningful increment of political participation through a complete vote, which would refer to a global jurisdiction. Both national and global candidates would integrate a single chamber of a global ecoparliament.

12

The roles of nation states

A main argument in favor of supra-state political institutions is that, under a statist system, “states do not cooperate to produce public goods like healthy environment” (Caney, 2005, 160).¹²³ Given that nation states are conceptually bounded to national sovereignty, their supranational interaction is limited to negotiate with others what is most beneficial for each. Even if some instances of multilateral negotiation on environmental issues try to overcome such an inherent limitation, environmental global measures use to hit to

¹²³ The same point is largely made by Falk (1995), Goodin (1992), Pogge (1994), and many others.

sovereign states's priorities, and they use to fall in the vacuum because there is not a global power to realize them.

A strategic use of power differentials is a repetitive conduct of nation states. Such a conduct blurs any genuine deliberative feature of the interstates instances.¹²⁴ Power differentials between individuals, even if big in any cases, are tiny if we compare them to states'. Inter-individual deliberation would be much less interfered by power than interstates' is. An individual-centric design, and therefore ecopanel-centric, would give the floor to a more *ideal* political deliberation. Diversity, transparency, and non-exclusive-self-interestedness, which are fundamental for ideal deliberation, are more easily achievable at the level of individuals within a cosmopolitan framework, than at a scale of naturally inwards interested nation states.

At least three arguments are meant to defend a state-centric design. According to Caney, such arguments, in favor of a strictly interstate system and against a *per se* global one, are: "(a) a liberty-based argument to the effect that a global political institution would prove to be tyrannical; (b) arguments to the effect that the advantages claimed for global political institutions can be provided by states; (c) arguments to the effect that one can attain cosmopolitan objectives without global institutions by reforming the internal structure of states" (Caney, 2005, 164). The first one refers to the fact that, even

¹²⁴ This is an interference with ideal deliberation. According to Joshua Cohen, "deliberation is *reasoned* in that the parties to it are required to state their reasons for advancing proposals, supporting them, or critiqueizing them. They give reasons with the expectation that those reasons (and not, for example, their power) will settle the fate of their proposal. In ideal deliberation, as Habermas puts it, 'no force except that of the better argument is exercised'" (Cohen, 1999, 74).

with a democratic spirit, the distance between represented and representative in a global system would be enlarged to such an extent that such an institution would become tyrannical. The legitimate worry this objection entails, requires a kind of global institution able to shorten such a distance to the minimum possible. This point has been made already here; an ecopanel-based design is supposed to accomplish such a requirement. The second objection has also been already responded; there is at least one very important feature of an individual-centric design which cannot be, to the same extent, accomplished by a state-centric one, namely, the building of a genuine political global deliberation. The third objection is answered by a reference to the huge power differentials and natural concurrency between states, which rebounds in the very well known collective action problems of the interstates system.¹²⁵

A decision on whether we should prefer an individual-centric or a state-centric option for ecocracy, should be taken by virtue of which is the morally pertinent instance to claim for good air, good water, and good earth. For such a purpose, we need to deepen into a moral argument. The identification of these three primary goods can be concluded from an hypothetical rational calculation of any conception of the good life in a contextual position. A contextual position is one in which the rational individual knows his own project of good life and also knows the material conditions that would be necessary in order to realize such a project. Two options are possible: either the project explicitly incorporates the three goods, either it does not. In the second case, we argue that in any contextual position, such goods

¹²⁵ This a reason why some may fear, with David Held, the rising of a “highly fragmented, neo-medieval order” (Held, 2005, 233).

are necessarily being considered as primary goods *implicitly*. This means that it is not rationally imaginable, for a human rational actor, to incorporate in his project of good life bad air, bad water, or bad earth. The good quality of these three goods is necessary for the realization of any project of good life. In this lecture we discard all kind of self-destructive projects, given the fact that such projects are merely irrational. A universal coincidence on these three primary goods is what we may call, with Saward, an “hypothetical consent” (Saward, 2010, 97).¹²⁶ In a long-term view, these three primary goods are also interesting for states, if states look for the sake of their own national population. But it is utterly possible that the care for these goods would not be a political priority of a state’s international, nor national, policy. In fact, this is the case for lots of the national states today. A human individual, who is affected by the quality of these three primary goods more than any institution, is much more morally encouraged to take care of them. Therefore, for the care of good air, good water, and good earth, from a moral point of view, we should prefer an individual-centric global institution, rather than a state-centric one.

The fact that the state-centric system is not an adequate one in order to take global care of good water, good air, and good earth, does not mean that nation states do not have a very important role to play

¹²⁶ Michael Saward defines the hypothetical consent as a representative claim, in the following terms: “A representative claim might be based on what people hypothetically would have agreed to in, for example, a state of nature, or an original position... One might read John Rawls’ *Theory of Justice* (1972), for example, as offering a basis upon which a political figure could claim that our deeper, more rational selves would all sign up to a certain, specifiable distribution of “primary goods” such as rights and duties” (Saward, 2010, 97).

inside ecocracy. As matter of fact, the nation states are the main implementing instances of contemporary world policies. Ecocracy would need to include nation states, in the central role of global policy implementation.¹²⁷

The individual-centric design of ecocracy does include nation states for policy implementation. Otherwise, in a strictly individualistic global system, an implementation deficit would seemingly appear, making “the tragedy of the commons... especially hard to avoid” (Persson and Savulescu, 2012, 72). Furthermore, for the sake of good decision-making processes, ecocracy would need nation states to educate and encourage national populations to create ecopanel, and to get engaged with the care of the three primary goods in a cosmopolitan perspective. Nation states could be encouraged to adhere to ecocracy, and to cede the pertinent sovereign features, as an exchange of becoming global environmental policy implementors. Nation states could be able to observe a deep incapacity of the interstates system to answer to such a most compelling challenge.

An intervention of nation states in the promotion of ecopanel is consistent with a conception of ideal deliberation, according to which institutional and material preconditions for deliberative decision-making are central. Nation states should create institutional and material frameworks inside of which proper deliberation could take

¹²⁷ To confer to nation states this function is coherent with national citizenship’s natural expectations in regard of their own state. This is MacCunn’s point (MacCunn, 1999, 160).

place.¹²⁸ An inbounds compromise of nation states towards ecocracy would be traduced into public policies, both in cosmopolitan education¹²⁹, and for democratic deliberation, through the offering of concrete conditions of possibility for the creation of dynamic and autonomous ecopanel. A function that would be complementary to the main policy implementation task.

Indeed, a contextual pre-condition for people's participation in cosmopolitan deliberation is food. This is a most important cosmopolitan intervention to be made by nation states. A zero hunger context is a necessary precondition for a genuinely egalitarian global deliberation, on whatever issue. It exists, furthermore, a conceptual link between a zero hunger context and the care of the three primary goods. As well as good air, good water, and good earth, good food is

¹²⁸ This point is made by Joshua Cohen, according to who "a central aim in the deliberative conception is to specify the institutional preconditions for deliberative decision making. The role of the ideal deliberative procedure is to provide an abstract characterization of the important properties of deliberative institutions. The role of the ideal deliberative procedure is thus different from the role of the social contract. The ideal deliberative procedure provides a model for institutions, a model that they should mirror, so far as possible. It is not a choice situation in which institutional principles are selected. The key point about the institutional reflection is that it should *make deliberation possible*. Institutions in a deliberative democracy do not serve simply to implement the results of deliberation, as though free deliberation could proceed in the absence of appropriate institutions. Neither the commitment to nor the capacity for arriving at deliberative decisions is something that we can simply assume to obtain independent from the proper ordering of institutions. The institutions themselves must provide the framework for the formation of the will; they determine whether there is equality, whether deliberation is free and reasoned, whether there is autonomy, and so on" (Cohen, 1999, 80).

¹²⁹ Cosmopolitan education consists on the awakening of collective consciousness on the fact that we are all sons of Mother Earth, and that we all pertain to the same biological origin, in spite of national or cultural boundaries.

a part of the content of an hypothetical global consensus, since it is a fundamental element of any kind of project of good life.¹³⁰ Nation states need to provide a situation of zero hunger, in order to accomplish its duties towards ecocracy, as well as its more elemental duties towards its own populations.¹³¹

A participation of nation states in ecocracy, creating conditions for people to participate in a genuine global deliberation, may also lead to internal transformations. Transformations that would be democratic, even if not forcibly in a republican nor liberal way. Such would entail substantive transformations of the international context. The setting of a series of conditions for deliberation suppose systemic transformations, in a way that the system of democratic states (would not) be compatible with massive global inequalities (including inequalities of opportunity) and (would not be) consistent with a world in which some are consigned to lives of grueling poverty.¹³²

¹³⁰ Even if some individual may decide not to eat -as some yogi would- this is not a counter-argument for the point being made. In the case of that yogi, good food would be made of just divine energy or planetary prana, which actually does not mean that he or she stops feeding himself.

¹³¹ From a perspective of deliberative democracy, a zero hunger context is one of “the conditions that need to be met by social and political arrangements, within the setting of a modern state, to institutionalize deliberative justification”; it is a condition which needs to be satisfied, in order “to sustain the claim that they establish the conditions for free reasoning among equals” (Cohen, 1999b, 416). In order to create a *global deliberation* context, such a zero hunger situation needs to be global.

¹³² This is a modified version of a quotation of Caney (2005, 169).

13

Ecocracy / states negotiations

The care and protection of water, air and earth through ecocracy would bring, for nation states, a duty of adaptation. Nation states would be facing a new situation, in which they would turn out to share their formerly absolute and fully comprehensive sovereignty with a global institution. Nation states could voluntarily accept such a new situation, by virtue of their moral relationship to national individuals.¹³³

¹³³ On the moral relationship between the state and the individual, one can read Kwame Appiah, according to whom if states matter morally it is because “they regulate individuals’ lives through coercion forms that require moral justification” (Appiah, 2002, 28).

Such an adaptation of nation states to a global and cosmopolitan ecocracy, would transform the international order also, where, currently, the moral discreteness of the interstates system is the core principle.¹³⁴ In the current situation, the world is made of separate political powers, pursuing separate interests, ultimately backed by their own “organization of coercive power” (Held, 2005, 79). In ecocracy, such a moral discreteness of states would need to coexist with a legal global unification in regard of the care and protection of environmental global commons. The interstates system would be forced to adapt itself in order to coexist with a cosmopolitan democracy, and with qualified global¹³⁵ and ecological¹³⁶ communities.

National legal adjustments to global standards are not something new. When a country adopts a Human Rights treatise, it is supposed

¹³⁴ The current “framework of international affairs had a lasting and paradoxical quality rich in implications as increasingly developed and interlinked states system endorsed the right of each state to autonomous and independent action. As one commentator has aptly noted, the upshot of this was that states were ‘no subject to international moral requirements because they represent separate and discrete political orders’ (Beitz, 1979, 25).

¹³⁵ One political consequence would be that, as David Held would say (Held, 2005, 233), a global citizenship could gain a universal status.

¹³⁶ In the ecological perspective, one version of such a global community is called “Gaia”, according to which “if we are “all creatures great and small”, from bacteria to whales, parts of Gaia, then we are all of us potentially important to her well being. We knew in our hearts that the destruction of a whole range of other species was wrong but now we know why. No longer can we merely regret the passing of one of the great whales, or the blue butterfly, nor even the smallpox virus. When we eliminate one of these from Earth, we may have destroyed a part of ourselves, for we also are a part of Gaia” (Lovelock, 2012).

to adapt its local legislation to the new standards. In a less voluntary way, when the World Bank or the IMF make a decision, it also usually affects national legislations, whether it be in taxing, social security, or employment.¹³⁷ Adaptations of national legal systems to international requirements are currently implemented.

More than national legal adjustments, the establishment of an ecocracy would demand a coexistence between two different sovereignties over a same territory. A fact would imply challenges to a traditional conception of sovereignty.¹³⁸ In the framework of ecocracy, the feature of *comprehensiveness* of national sovereignties

¹³⁷ There is an evident democratic deficit in decisions made by the IMF or the World Bank. David Held makes this point when he explains that “as in the IMF, the voting rights of (World) Bank members on policy are distributed largely in relation to their individual financial contributions. Geo-economic strength is integrated into decision-making procedures. Not surprisingly, therefore, the World Bank has become involved in intense disputes about whether its policy reflects sound economic judgement or whether it amounts to a strategy of ‘recolonization’ (see, for example, Tandon, 1994). Those who take the latter position insist that the sovereign rights of countries are violated by World Bank policy directives which undermine the political space for national self-determination. The World Bank, accordingly, is seen to impose its own economic and political standards -the standards, that is, of the North as a whole- on the struggling nations, without regard for a proper consideration of local circumstances and interests (cf. Leftwich, 1993)” (Held, 2005, 111).

¹³⁸ Specifically, such a situation would challenge the feature of *comprehensiveness*, according to which in a same territory only one sovereign power would monopolize all the sovereign features (Caney, 2005, 150).

would be revisited. Such a revisitation is to be interpreted as a part of the process of evolution of democracy.¹³⁹

Ecocracy would monopolize the creation of global norms regarding the care and protection of environmental global commons. Ecocracy would be a sovereign institution in regard of this scope. Its norms would be valid, and would need to be implemented, all across the globe.

In front of nation states, ecocracy would embody a different kind of sovereignty. While nation states do monopolize violence in regard of limited portions of territory, ecocracy is deprived of any violent apparatus. While nation states produce valid laws for a limited portion of territory, ecocracy does the same for all the planet. While nation states would have a valid scope in regard of every subject matter, except from the care and protection of environmental global commons, ecocracy would have a valid scope *only* in regard of such a subject matter.

The fact of being different kinds of sovereignties, opens a conceptual gate to consistently affirm that both (national and global sovereignties) could make part of a same political system. An

¹³⁹ "If the history and practice of democracy have until now been centered on the idea of locality and place (the city-republic, the community, the nation), is it likely that in the future democracy will be centered exclusively on the international or global domain, if it is to be centered anywhere at all? To draw this conclusion is, I think, to misunderstand the nature of contemporary globalization and the argument being developed here. Globalization is, to borrow a phrase, 'a dialectical process': 'local transformation is as much a part of globalization as the lateral extension of social connections across time and space' (Giddens, 1990, p. 64)... In such an order, the principle of autonomy would be entrenched in diverse sites of power and across diverse spatial domains" (Held, 2007, 308).

individual-centric democratic procedure would produce global norms, while such norms would be implemented by nation states. Though, to warrant a strictly global unification of environmental strategies, ecocracy disposes of a subsidiary implementation body, to intervene where non willing nation states are found.

The construction of a global scope limited sovereignty would be seen as something fruitful from the environmental perspectives of nation states and local populations. For local populations, it would be good because they will dispose of (and participate in) a global regime that would adequately take care of environmental global commons. Derivatively, nation states would be integrated into a global institution that would be able to implement (through their own participation) globally unified norms; a purpose for which they are ineffective if considered on their own.

A necessary path to harmonize a cohabitation of different kinds of sovereignties over local territories, could be to use the mechanism of *negotiation*. Regarding implementation processes, bilateral negotiations on particular nuances would be installed between a state and the *subsidiary implementation body* of ecocracy. Global laws about the care and protection of water, air, and earth would be obligatory for all of the territory of the planet.¹⁴⁰ What would be a subject matter of negotiation would only be the extent to which a nation state could implement it on its own, and to which extent it needs help from such a subsidiary implementator.

¹⁴⁰ It would be so, as it is the case in European Union. "European Union's significance reaches further than that of any other kind of international organization by virtue of its right to make laws which can be imposed on member states" (Held, 2005, 111).

There is no reason to assume that there is an enmity between nation states towards progressive ecological regulations.¹⁴¹ The reason why this issue needs to be taken out of its sovereign scope, is that the current interstates system is not able to properly implement globally unified strategies to take care of environmental global commons. A legally and politically competent institution to adopt and implement (even if through negotiation) globally unified strategies, is urgently needed.

Countries would willingly incorporate integrated strategies to take care and protect environmental global commons; “there is a complementarity of needs and interests that makes possible assessing a cooperative venture” (Ypi, 2008, 446). Mutually beneficial cooperation would be installed through an adequate ecocracy/nation states negotiation, regarding nuances of the implementation of cosmopolitan laws and strategies for the care and protection of environmental global commons.

¹⁴¹ A good example of the willingness of the states to take of water, air, and earth is to be found in South Africa. “In South Africa, the Water Act (1998) has been accepted into national planning systems in such a way as to ensure explicitly that an ecological reserve is to be maintained... Another fundamental component of South African Water Law is the commitment to the establishment and maintenance of a basic minimum water allocation to all of the population.” (Wallace, 2003, 2015-2016).

14

Institutional design

The moral and institutional evolution ecocracy would represent, would entail a revaluation of the centrality of the nation state in world politics. Many cosmopolitan theorists would have argued in favor of a global political institution that would supersede a state-based order (Caney, 2005, 159). The global care and protection of water, air and earth create one “of the most fundamental pressures on the efficacy of the nation state and state-centric democratic politics” (Held, 2007,

302).¹⁴² The lack of efficacy of the state-centric system to take care of environmental primary goods is a main reasons to favor the creation of a global institution, competent to produce and implement globally unified strategies for such a purpose.¹⁴³

A strong moral claim of cosmopolitanism is the hope of a global overlapping consensus building venture, which would be plausible inside a framework of opportunities offered by globalization; opportunities to overcome a national confinement of democracy and to undertake global tasks that cannot be managed through nation

¹⁴² David Held would present what he considers to be the main environmental issues by dividing them into three categories. "There are three types of problem at issue:

- a) The first is shared problems involving global commons, i.e. fundamental elements of the ecosystem. The clearest examples of the environmental commons are the atmosphere, the climate system and the oceans and seas; and among the most fundamental challenges here are global warming, ozone depletion and the general pollution of the global commons.
- b) A second category of global environmental problems involved the interlinked challenges of demographic expansion and resource consumption. Examples of great importance under this category include questions of bio-diversity and challenges to the very existence of certain species.
- c) A third category of problems is transboundary pollution such as acid rain or river pollutants. More dramatic examples arise from the siting and operation of nuclear power plants, for instance that at Chernobyl" (Held, 2007, 302-303).

¹⁴³ There are also other reasons to overcome a frontiers based system. One, for example, is for-the-sake-of-science. This reason was presented in the early greek approach to cosmopolitanism. Hugh Harris called such an approach "the scientific (one). Here the love of learning is the determining factor. We read in Herodotus how Solon "traveled through many lands from love of knowledge and a desire to see the world." It was this motive which led Anaximander of Miletus to undertake such a great work in the cause of human solidarity as the drawing of the first map of the world" (Harris, 1997, 4).

states. Global tasks that are simultaneous to internal challenges.¹⁴⁴ Problems which are strictly related to global dynamics, as for example environmental troubles, represent unmanageable difficulties for nation states and for the subsequent interstates system. The nation state and the interstates system are being overwhelmed by troubles that manifest themselves within and outside frontiers, and that require globally unified interventions to be resolved.¹⁴⁵ The goal of ecocracy is to do what appears unfeasible in the framework of a sole state-centric system:¹⁴⁶ to create and implement globally unified policies and strategies, derived from a global overlapping consensus building venture, related to the care and protection of our three primary goods.

Contemporary world is made of differences and diversity. Such is the reason why, instead of an expert global governance, ecocracy opts for a global democracy, able to give to each individual equal say in the collective decision making.¹⁴⁷ The institutional mechanisms through which this kind of difference sensitive perspective is included into ecocracy are the ecopanel. Ecocracy is an ambit for the creation of a common perspective of humanity, enriched by raising perspectives coming from localities. Ecocracy allows, and would

¹⁴⁴ Alonso, for example, presents that kind of internal challenges (Alonso, 2011, 175).

¹⁴⁵ This point is made by David Held. That kind of troubles would make that the process of governance would escape the categories of the nation state (Held, 2007, 292).

¹⁴⁶ In this sense, Omar Dahbour would argue in favor of an application of standards of justice without national restrictions (Dahbour, 2005, 203).

¹⁴⁷ According to Thomas Christiano, "the ultimate public embodiment of equal consideration of interests is an institutions that ensure that each has an equal say in the collective decision making" (Christiano, 1999, 258).

institutionally promote, a better and strengthened flow of communication and discursive interaction between peoples.¹⁴⁸

Ecocracy does not deny the fact that proximity and affections are politically relevant.¹⁴⁹ Such a point leads to recognize the relevance of national belonging feelings, produced both by territorial proximity as well as by cultural and political symbols sharing. Cultural specificities of nation states are features that a global *polis* would not be able to substitute; people would need to dispose of national *polis* in which to find their own political realization.¹⁵⁰ Ecocracy, being a global democracy, would *complement* nation states.

In a cosmopolitan view, the individual is the ultimate unit of moral worth.¹⁵¹ Indeed, each nation is worthy of respect, to a extent to

¹⁴⁸ This is a core aspiration of cosmopolitanism. According to Martha Nussbaum “we should not confine our thinking to our own sphere, that in making choices in both political and economic matters we should most seriously consider the right of other human beings to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, and that we should work to acquire the knowledge that will enable us to deliberate well about those things” (Nussbaum, 2002, 14).

¹⁴⁹ Nussbaum says that “politics, like child care, will be poorly done if each thinks herself equally responsible for all, rather than giving the immediate surroundings special attention and care. To give one’s own sphere special care is justifiable in universalists terms” (Nussbaum, 2002, 13).

¹⁵⁰ An important tradition inaugurated by Aristotle, holds that the participation inside a *polis* is a necessary feature of a good life. According “Aristotle’s dictum, “man is by nature a political animal”, has proven to be far more prescient than the Stoic doctrine (on cosmopolitanism). Aristotle’s polis, to be sure, is not the modern state. But it is a polity. And not a world polity but a specific, historic polity, a government of laws and institutions by means of which -and only by means of which, Aristotle believed- man can consciously try to establish a just regime and pursue the good life” (Himmelfrab, 2002, 74).

¹⁵¹ See (Tan, 2006, 35).

which no state is entitled to interfere inside national affairs of another state. It is not legitimate that a certain group of people, represented by a state, interfere in domestic affairs of a different group of people, represented by another state. What needs to be clarified is that such a respect is in fact a derivation of the individual worth of those who are represented by a state. To say that the interstates system is inapt to properly take care of some key issues,¹⁵² is not equivalent to disregard the state's relevance, but it means that the unlimited sovereign authority of states over their territory hampers the venture of the kind of globally unified strategies that are needed.

From an individual-centric moral perspective, the care of water, air, and earth is extremely important. Not to go too far, a core productive activity of humanity, which is agriculture, is entirely dependent of the quality of these three primary goods.¹⁵³ If morally considered, this goods are elementary for any kind of conception of the good life.

An individual-centric cosmopolitan democratic institution would need to establish a global citizenship. Even if democratic values have

¹⁵² David Held argues that "individual states are no longer the only appropriate political units for either resolving key policy problems or managing a broad range of public functions. Accordingly, states have had to increase the level of their political integration with other states" (Held, 2005, 91).

¹⁵³ The Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs of England (Defra), gives an example of this in his *Code of good agricultural practices for farmers, growers and land managers*. The code says: "338. Consider both soil and weather conditions and the short-term weather forecast. Be prepared to suspend work, including that of contractors, until conditions improve. 339. If you have to travel on wet soils, reduce the loading with low ground pressure set-ups, or set tyre pressures at the lowest that is compatible with the load and tyre type. This is currently a cross compliance requirement (reference 17)" (Defra, 2009)

historically risen within national contexts, participation and deliberation need to be broadened beyond national borders. Global citizenship is conceived by ecocracy as a global right to exercise political participation inside such a global instance, wherever a person may be located. Citizenship's features need to be broadened beyond frontiers in order to give consistency to a global democratic claim. Within ecocracy, such would mean to broaden the right to participate in ecopanel and global elections to a global scale. Ecopanel constitute the basis of the “deep-rooted” structure¹⁵⁴ of ecocracy. A right to participate in ecopanel shall be warranted to any person, anywhere; an appropriate place for a person to get involved with ecocracy is simply the place where such a person lives. Taking for granted that national citizenship is important, a global citizenship

¹⁵⁴ According to David Held, the key feature for a global democracy to be successful is its deep-rooted structure. “Nonetheless, while there may be cosmopolitan elements to existing international law and regulation, these have not, it hardly needs emphasizing, generated a new deep-rooted structure of cosmopolitan regulation and accountability. The principle of egalitarian individualism may be widely recognized, but it scarcely structures much political and economic policy, north or south. The principle of universal recognition informs the notion of human rights and other legal initiatives such as the 'common heritage of humankind' (embedded in the Law of the Sea, 1982), but it is not at the heart of the politics of sovereign states or corporate colossi. The principle of consent might be appealed to in order to justify limits on the actions of particular states and IGOs, but it is, at best, only an incidental part of the institutional dynamic that have created such chronic political problems as the externalities generated by many national economic and energy policies. The principle of inclusiveness and subsidiarity might be invoked to ensure that states, rich or poor, can block direct interference in their sovereign affairs, but it is generally bypassed in a world of overlapping communities of fate in areas as diverse as health, the environment and the global distribution of wealth and income. This should not come as a surprise” (Held, 2003, 475)

would also be. Ecocracy is an urgent need,¹⁵⁵ that would make necessary to establish a global citizenship.

Most of the cyclic changes of nature are not in the hands of humans. Most of them, nevertheless, influence human decisions: from households to bureaucracy. The other way around, human behavior do influence nature's cycles.¹⁵⁶ Most of the life cycles in this planet are based on a dynamic exchange of fluids conducted by water, air and earth. The care of these primary goods seeks to ensure what is essentially required for any healthy reproductive life. An ecological perspective¹⁵⁷ tries to incorporate into human action an awareness of the fact that the human community can alter those harmonic cycles, and that it has, therefore, a duty to take care of them and to restore

¹⁵⁵ "The hitch is that when our detrimental effect upon the climate and the environment of the planet becomes undeniable, it might be impossible for us to reverse the process of degradation... When there is no longer any uncertainty to be exploited, it might be too late to reverse the decline effectively" (Persson and Savalescu, 2012, 81).

¹⁵⁶ There are scientific verifications of the harmful effects that proxy and far away overseas interventions (like nuclear proofs in south pacific) can produce over the qualities of earth, air, and water everywhere, and, by consequence, even in the very composition of our human bones. "Strontium is a good example of previously almost unknown element that must now receive special attention, because radioactive strontium appears to be particularly dangerous to man and other vertebrates... As a result of nuclear weapons tests and production of waste materials from experimental and industrial uses of atomic energy, radioactive strontium is becoming widespread in the biosphere. This strontium is new material added to the biosphere since it is the result of the fission of uranium... Tiny amounts of radio-strontium have now followed calcium from soil and water into vegetation, animals, human food, and human bones" (Odum, 1971, 101).

¹⁵⁷ In his *Basic ecology*, Ralph Morris Buchsbaum presents the basis of an ecological perspective on the following assertion: "plants and animals do not live in the vacuum. They stand or walk upon the earth, drift or swim in the water, or float or fly in the air" (Buchsbaum, 1957, 21).

them where they have been damaged.¹⁵⁸ On the basis of individual worthiness, ecocracy is a way to open democracy to incorporate an ecological perspective.


Henceforth, no lexicographic nor any other kind of priority can be set between individual's worth and environmental commons' worth. Only inside the framework of a good environment, individuality can effectively flourish. The other way around, only inside a framework of individual freedom, nature is a good that can be fully enjoyed by individuals. The moral equivalence of these values can be considered as a post-liberal conception of morality, as long as liberalism has been traditionally exclusively centered in the individual.

Ecocracy pushes democracy beyond national spheres, in a dynamic of global unification -sensitive to local differences- able both to avoid global tyranny and to take care of environmental global commons. Such a global democracy would produce global norms. It would also create a global community and a global demos, as long as it would be a scenario for a global overlapping consensus building venture among cultures, and an institution to (re)produce global social trust. Intentions that are to be reached through global citizenship's deliberation, participation and representation.

¹⁵⁸ The relationship between humans and nature is diverse. Some would use the expression: "the struggle of man against nature." In the terms of Holmes Rolston, this can be explained because "in earlier eras human needed an exodus out of nature into culture" (Rolston, 1988, 339). Away from any consideration of the moral validity of such a conviction, today our view is different. Now we "want to be liberated out of egoism, into a transcending overview that sees Earth as a blessed land exuberant with life, a land field with integrity, beauty, dynamic achievement, and storied history" (Rolston, 1988, 339).

On the basis of the previous parameters and considerations, and as a derivation from a normative view of what might be a global democracy, this thesis proposes the following multifold institutional arrangement for ecocracy:

(see design in next page)



A look to this design would help to understand the kind of multifold institution which is being proposed here. A starting point of a global political dynamic is global citizenship. Individuals around the world would have the right to spontaneously create ecopanel, and to elect a global ecoparliament. Ecopanel are free speaking institutions, horizontal towards all of their kind. Regardless of specific political foundations, ecopanel would provide to the ecoparliament the law proposals to take care and protect environmental global commons. Such proposals would be filtered by a scientific board, which would reduce the complexity of the multiple proposals into short and manageable consensus-based law proposals. Proposals to be considered and decided by ecoparlamentarians, who would produce globally unified strategies. Resultant global norms would be compulsory for all of the planet, and would be implemented by nation states and by a subsidiary implementation board. If in a case a state is not able to properly implement global norms, such a subsidiary implementation board would intervene to properly do it The extent to which such an intervention could go, would be decided by the concerned states and ecocracy through negotiation. Such a multifold design could serve as a scenario of global overlapping consensus building venture, and to properly take care and protect environmental global commons.

The care of environmental global commons is not identical to its allocation.¹⁵⁹ Care and allocation could even be in a contradiction. A plausible public policy for the care of water, could impose an economic charge over its consumption, making this common scarce for poorer people. Social justice maybe a desirable consequence of a moral evolution bounded to cosmopolitan individual interconnection. The scope of ecocracy would need to be limited to the care and protection of water, air, and earth, and would need to exclude *prima facie* considerations regarding its appropriation. Even though, the use of the three primary goods, wether private or public, would need to be limited by ecological concerns.

Ecocracy is meant to be a political institution, to the extent to which it is meant to produce collectively binding decisions. The obligatory character of ecocratic norms, nevertheless, would not be endorsed by a global violent last resort. Ecocracy is, to be more precise, a *second order sovereignty*, that does not need to monopolize any violence, to the extent to which it is based on national *first order sovereignties* for global norms' implementation. Nation states are included inside ecocracy as the main implementation instances. Ecocracy would dispose of a direct use of a publicity-based moral

¹⁵⁹ Allocation can be set to many different mechanisms. According to Weinberg, "institutional parameters including the level of the initial water allocation may have an important role in the response to, and on the effects of, water markets. At opposite ends of a spectrum are farmers that purchase water and those that sell their entire allotment. If the initial allotment is less than the optimal input use level ($A_i < x_f$), the ability to purchase water on the market offers a welfare improving opportunity to the farmer. The quantity purchased will equal the difference between the initial allotment and optimal use level (equation (2d)). Alternatively, the entire allotment will be sold if the water market price exceeds the productive value of the water for all values of x_i , i.e. $x_i = 0$ when $p_f X < Vx$ " (Weinberg, 1993, 280).

reproach, as a medium of moral coercion, and of an indirect use of violence, as a mechanism of physical coercion, to endorse global compulsory norms.

Conclusion

Ecocracy is a realistic utopia. It is realistic if one considers its moral plausibility. As a moral prospection, it is based on three observable moral tendencies, which are (i) a growing concern for nature and for the care and protection of water, air, and earth (namely, an ecological tendency); (ii) a wider feeling of belonging to a global human community (namely, a cosmopolitan tendency), and (iii) a more and more accepted (even if also contested) cession of features from national sovereignties to supranational instances (namely, a post-national tendency). Ecocracy is also realistic if one considers its historical feasibility. Without an ambition of making an exhaustive feasibility test of ecocracy, which would entail *per se* a complete social engineering dissertation, some considerations about legal, economic, political and social requisites for ecocracy will be shortly presented.

From a legal point of view, ecocracy is independent from nation states, to the extent to which it is an individual-centric global institution, rather than a states-centric one. In such a sense, what would give birth to ecocracy would not be the will of nation states, but the will of individuals around the globe. Never the less, ecocracy would require a cession of some features of current national sovereignty, in regard of the care of water, air, and earth. Such sovereignty features would need to be ceded through national constitutional reforms. In constitutional democracies, to reform a constitution is the most legally demanding procedure. It requires biggest political majorities, whether inside national senates, constitutional assemblies or citizen's referendums.

A constitutional reform is a mechanism that reflects a social consensus in regard of a new topic. Every constitutional democracy considers the possibility of being reformed through demanding procedures. Formally, a cession of national sovereignty features to an ecocracy would be legally feasible. If it is true that most of contemporary national regimes are democratic, it is necessary to accept that nation states could cede such sovereign features to ecocracy, if national majorities ask them to. If national regimes are democratic only by fake, such a situation could bring morally evolved populations to turn down their respective national regimes. As long as law is dependent from social dynamics, the feasibility of getting such national majorities to favor ecocracy will be considered below, in regard of the social feasibility.

Economic conditions for the feasibility of an ecocracy are of various kinds. A simple aspect of economic considerations, is the kind of funding that ecocracy would need to work. To the extent to which it would not be a state-centric institution, any sort of compulsory contribution asked to nation states would not seem logical. It makes sense to expect non compulsory private contributions, whether from private fortunes or from particular lay individuals around the globe. Also, nation states could make economic contributions.

Another aspect to consider in regard of the economic feasibility of ecocracy, is a possible clash between global norms and multinational corporations that would be damaging such goods through their economic production. In general, multinational, or national, environmentally damaging corporations allege that such injuries to environmental global commons are nothing but negative externalities. If such a discourse is rightful, global and national corporations would not reject *per se* global regulations for the care and protection of environmental global commons. While not being in conflict with ecocratic norms as a matter of principle, a strict priority of economic profit could bring some corporations to disregard the care of environment, and even to dismiss ecocratic norms. For such a reason, ecocracy would need to be able to impose its norms over such a kind of transnational actors. As a global sovereignty based on national sovereignties, ecocracy could design globally integrated strategies to oblige such a kind of multinational corporations to cooperate, by activating national repression apparatus.

A third consideration in regard of the economic feasibility of ecocracy is related to its scope. It is important to note that ecocracy would

have jurisdiction to produce and implement norms for the *care and protection* of environmental global commons, and not for its allocation. Ecocracy does not deal with the (fair or unfair) property of water, air, and earth. It deals only with its protection. In other terms, ecocracy protects our three goods from any form of violence against them (pollution), and not from any form of appropriation of them. Even if ecocracy's scope does not include property rights over environmental global commons, such rights would be affected, to the extent to which an obligation to take care of them would impose limitations to its exercise. *De facto*, an ecological *function* would be imposed over property rights concerning water, air and earth.

Political considerations in regard of the feasibility of an ecocracy have to do with the plausibility of a multi-layer democratic global governance. Such a multi-layer governance is made of local ecopanels, a global ecoparliament and national states. The first ones represent the communitarian aspect of ecocracy's cosmopolitanism. Those panels would be spontaneously created. As long as it is supposed that proximity ties are a strongest incentive for popular participation, such is a plausible institution. A global parliament is not any political novelty at all. Non the less, for it to be considered a plausible institution, it would need not to be too big. A chamber made of thousands of people would not seem plausible. That is the reason why such a parliament would be elected through a voting mechanism composed by a complete vote and a national quota mechanism. Through such a twofold voting mechanism, every citizen would increment the meaningfulness of his or her political message, while incorporating diversity; facts that could incentive people to vote.

The way in which grass-root (ecopanel) and top-down (ecoparliament) institutions would be articulated with nation states, will be a consequence of the partial cession of sovereignty features that was discussed in regard of the legal feasibility. Nation states would have an incentive to cede some of these sovereign functions, related only to the care and protection of environmental global commons, to a global ecocracy, in an observation of the well known collective action problems that faces the interstates system, in contrast with the necessity of globally unified strategies in such a field. For the sake of a most needed ecological protection, morally evolved politicians could agree to cede such sovereign functions to ecocracy.

Considerations regarding the social feasibility of ecocracy are based on top of an observation of the mentioned three lines of moral evolution. As long as a process of moral evolution would not necessarily occur following spontaneous historical tendencies, considerations in regard of the mechanisms to promote such a moral evolution are pertinent. A moral affinity towards ecocracy could be produced, and re-produced, through, first of all, cosmopolitan education. Many schools around the globe do already include a cosmopolitan chair. Many cosmopolitan authors argue in favor of a worldwide cosmopolitan education in schools. Such a mechanism, in spite of its relevance, would not be directly handled by ecocracy. Instead, ecocracy would produce, and re-produce, moral cosmopolitan, ecological and post-national senses through a widest publicity of agreed moral principles, and of the decision making and policy implementing processes. Publicity would be used by ecocracy

as an alternative for morally compulsory -whereas non violence-based- ecological regulations.

An intercultural global overlapping consensus is possible. Every moral conception of life is, by definition, a conception of what is good or worthy to make in life. Discarding irrational self-destructive “moral” perspectives, all of those conceptions would agree in the fact that good air, good water and good earth are necessary to develop any project of good life. Given that a basic (and implicit) overlapping consensus does already exist, all of the different moral conceptions across the world would come to global overlapping consensus, in regard of the care of these three goods. The only concrete obstacle for such a purpose is the absence of a institutional scenario where to build it seriously. Ecocracy provides such a scenario.

People of the world will get involved with ecocracy. As a consequence of the former argument, it can be said that every person has moral incentives to participate in the definition of global policies regarding this three valued commons. Such an assertion is endorsed by three considerations. First, the privileged channel to get involved with ecocracy are ecopanel. These mechanisms are based in proximity ties. Such a kind of ties are proved to be a strongest incentive to participate. Second, ecopanel have the monopoly of the legislative initiative. This would make significant the fact of participating. Third, through ecocracy, effective globally unified strategies for the care and protection of water, air, and earth will be created.

Ecocracy's norms will be obligatory and enforceable. The obligatoriness of ecocracy's norms is derived from their democratic legitimacy. Their enforceability, instead, is based on a cession of sovereign features from nation states to ecocracy. Such a cession would be the foundation of a legal obligation of adherent states in front of the implementation of ecocracy's norms and strategies. States would also endorse the application of ecocracy's norms in front of particular actors. If private actors are transnational, ecocracy would incorporate joint ventures of all of the concerned nation states.

On the basis of a legal cession of sovereign features from nation states to ecocracy, such a collaboration would not be voluntary, but legally obligatory. A problem is whether or not such a cession would be plausible. Given that it is legally feasible, the question is if national politicians would allow such a cession to be made. A concrete answer is not straightforward to be given. But such a phenomenon is possible. The only requirement is political will. As a matter of political will, both of lay people and of politicians, ecocracy is fully plausible, feasible and viable.

If these considerations are accepted, it would be reasonable to accept ecocracy as a realistic utopia. Such an assumption would be consistent, to the extent to which ecocracy offers a theoretically satisfactory cosmopolitan institutional scheme to take care and protect environmental global commons. If such is the case, ecocracy could be considered an acceptable reference point for future developments of normative political philosophy and social research.

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