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Moral economies of Euroscepticism: A qualitative diachronic study ¹

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Introduction

The logic behind a recent strain of Euroscepticism advocated by Brexiteers presents an empirical puzzle: *how can voters from different economic positions publicly demand compliance with rules for fair market competition (Schmidt & Thatcher, 2014)—a key principle of neoliberal ideology—yet use nationalism to socially delegitimize the EU—whose market competition policy became increasingly neoliberal (Buch-Hansen & Wigger, 2010)?* This puzzle is especially relevant given the power of nationalist and neoliberal rhetoric to mobilize popular opposition to the EU leading up to Brexit (Andreouli & Nicholson, 2018). We dub this form of Euroscepticism ‘nationalist neo-liberal Euroscepticism’ (NNLE) and investigate it empirically.

Research on Brexit builds on the Euroscepticism literature that traditionally measures opposition to the EU as an attitude at the individual level (for a summary see Hobolt and de Vries 2016; also Hobolt and Wratil 2015; de Vries 2018). For instance, Hobolt found that support for Brexit “was particularly common among less-educated, poorer and older voters, and those who expressed concerns about immigration and multi-culturalism (2016, p. 1259), while others found that ethnic, economic, and regional differences structured attitudinal support for the EU (e.g. Bonikowski 2017; Flemmen and Savage 2017; Gidron and Hall 2017; Laurence et al. 2019)(Carreras, Carreras, and Bowler 2019).

However, both the Euroscepticism literature and these recent works investigate Euroscepticism from the perspective of individual citizens’ privately held attitudes or voting behavior rather than by empirically analyzing the socially acceptable forms of Euroscepticism citizens encounter, use, and respond to in everyday life. In this article, we investigate socially acceptable—and thus normative—Euroscepticism. Responding to the aforementioned empirical puzzle, we analyze normative ‘*nationalist neo-liberal Euroscepticism*’ (NNLE). To do so, we must shift our focus from individual British citizens’ surveyed pre-Brexit attitudes to social norms that are shared across economic divisions. In our analysis, we investigate this Euroscepticism as it manifests in a ‘moral economy’—or popular consensus about moral principles of economic exchange that forms a normative basis of economic action, attitudes, and legitimacy (Thompson 1971; Mau 2003; Svallfors 2006; Sachweh 2012; Koos and Sachweh 2017; Taylor-Gooby et al. 2018).

To conduct this analysis, we respond to an important gap in the contemporary literature concerning moral economy in terms of the evolution of normatively based popular outrage against market action. This type of analysis was central to foundational work on moral economy—which stressed the temporal element of moral economies as normative (see, Scott, 1977; Thompson, 1971). Returning to this diachronic comparative approach to moral economy, we study ‘nationalist neo-liberal Euroscepticism’ longitudinally as a form of normative market outrage as it developed over time.

Our investigation into whether the Euroscepticism of UK citizens can be explained because of the EU’s infringement of the nationalist and neoliberal norms at the basis of British citizens’ moral economy proceeds in three steps. *First*, using semi-structured interview data collected right after Brexit (2016 Qualitative Election Study of Britain) we identify popular outrage against the EU as nationalist neo-liberal Euroscepticism by analyzing how Brexit supporters and opponents socially legitimated their vote. *Second*, relying on focus group data that predates Brexit by a decade (2005-6 CITAE) we show how the delegitimation of the EU in 2016 can be traced back to shared

popular norms regarding EU market action that constitute a moral economy of nationalist neoliberal Euroscepticism. *Third*, based on our analysis of Celine Belot's semi-structured interview data (1995-6) collected just after the Maastricht Treaty, we identify the beginning stages of this normative anti-EU popular outrage. This final step does not find evidence of a nationalist neo-liberal moral economy, but instead finds what appears to be building blocks of such a moral economy.

This three-step analysis then sets the stage for an investigation into this nationalist neo-liberal moral economy as 'normative policy feedback' (Rothstein 1998; Svallfors 2006; Koos and Sachweh 2017)—a perspective that sees moral economy as structured by institutionalized norms of economic exchange. Future work can then investigate this moral economy as a form of policy feedback in order to supplement work on Euroscepticism as structured by socio-economic or ethnic divisions. This paper falls into six sections dealing with the theoretical framework on moral economies, nationalism and neo-liberalism, methodology and data, the three-step analysis and discussion and conclusions.

Moral economies of nationalist neo-liberal Euroscepticism

Moral Economy

Turning to the moral economy literature enables to study economic Eurosceptic beliefs as normative rather than attitudinal. For E.P. Thompson (1971), 18th century English riots over bread shortages due to popular outrage over the British allowing merchants to sell flour above normative prices established a 'moral economy' because it demonstrated the popular consensus of a universal right to subsistence. Currently, moral economy is used by scholars to denote market action that is embedded in shared principles for evaluating and legitimating market action and policy. These shared principles are then used as legitimations to evaluate "*the just distribution of resources and social exchange*" (Mau, 2007). Thus, a moral economy is a consensus of principles—that can be understood as "norms"—which are used by actors to legitimate economic action and policy (Thompson 1971; Mau 2003; Svallfors 2006; Western and Rosenfeld 2011; Kissane 2012; Sachweh 2012; Vila-Henninger 2019). Such a consensus develops over time, shapes market action, and provides further evidence against a purely rational choice perspective (Arnold 2001; Mau 2003; Svallfors 2006; Western and Rosen 2011; Sachweh 2012; Gangl and Ziefle 2015; Vila-Henninger 2017, 2019; VanHeuvelen 2018).

It is important to note a key element of establishing a moral economy is evidence of a "*popular consensus*." Moral Economy scholars operationalize consensus by looking for the use of a market principle among citizens across a key social and economic division (Kissane, 2012; Sachweh, 2012; Svallfors, 2006; Western & Rosenfeld, 2011; Gabel & Palmer, 1995; Vila-Henninger 2017, 2019). In response to our research puzzle, a nationalist interpretation of a neo-liberal principle used by British citizens across different economic positions would then provide evidence of the presence of a moral economy

In our analysis, we define a consensus as the use of fairness criteria across occupation levels. Thus, we are interested in a consensus across indicators of utility—or among the losers and winners of globalization, or as in the case of Brexit, the winners and losers of European integration (see Crafts, 2016; Hobolt, 2016). Moreover, recent findings seem to indicate that – apart for UKIP – the distribution of remain and leave voters did not coincide with the traditional division in partisanship between the Conservative and Labour electorate (Alabrese, Becker, Fetzer, & Novy, 2019; Clarke, Goodwin, & Whiteley, 2017; Vasilopoulou, 2016). As such, the moral economy

framework and its emphasis on widely shared beliefs to explain collective reactions to societal changes offers a promising avenue to better understand how many British citizens, notwithstanding their differences, form a Eurosceptic consensus². To investigate a normative nationalist neo-liberal Euroscepticism (NNLE) as a moral economy, we provide an overview of British nationalism and neo-liberalism.

Nationalism

Much work has been done on Euroscepticism but the debate remains inconclusive regarding its base in either utilitarian reasoning, group allegiances (e.g. national identities), or a combination of both (for a summary see Hobolt and de Vries 2016). The emphasis on national identity as a driver for EU support is part of a line of literature that emphasizes the role of the exclusivity of national identity in generating opposition to EU membership (Carey, 2002; Hooghe & Marks, 2005, 2009; McLaren, 2006).³

When looking into the specificity of Euroscepticism in the UK, literature suggests that *‘at the root of British Euroscepticism lies a long-established tradition of contrasting the British Own with the European Other’* (Spiering, 2015, p. 17). More precisely, Vines argues that because of the central values of *‘parliamentary sovereignty and British independence’* (Vines, 2015, p. 368) British national identity is considered incompatible with the EU. However, as Gifford notes, *‘Europe was re-imagined by Eurosceptic forces as the ‘other’ of British political identity and interests’* (Gifford, 2017, p. 7). The antagonistic relationship between ‘Europe’ and ‘Britain’ but also the mutual dependency of both terms to become meaningful is also confirmed empirically. For instance, in ‘Framing Europe’, Diez Medrano found *‘that the greater sensitivity of the British toward the EU’s potential threat to national identity and culture results from the fact that the British have generally felt less part of Europe’* (Diez Medrano, 2003 p 234). In the CITAE project, the frame of ‘otherness’ was also very present in 2005-2006 (Duchesne et alii, 2013). In the focus groups, the participants in the British groups appear to be more preoccupied with the question on national sovereignty and the loss of national identity than their counterparts in Belgium and France (Van Ingelgom, 2014: 144-148). In line with previous studies (Belot, 2000; Cinnirella, 1997; Diez Medrano, 2003), these results thus systematically emphasize the importance of nationalist beliefs in explaining the positions of British citizens concerning European integration.

² We will discuss our operationalization of consensus given our use of data below

³ There is an interesting ongoing discussion regarding British Euroscepticism and its relation to either nationalism, populism, or both (Gifford, 2014, 2015, 2017; Tournier-Sol & Gifford, 2015; Wellings, 2010, 2012; Wellings & Baxendale, 2015). The debate is largely due to how nationalism and populism are conceptualized. With nationalism traditionally been theorized as revolving around the issues *identity* and *sovereignty*, while populism is seen as constructed around a central antagonism between ‘the people’ and an ‘elite’ *‘in order to subsume and subvert underlying differences [among the people]’* as such, it *‘constitutes and combines identities rather than signifying a meaningful collective identity with shared interests’* (Gifford, 2015, p. 363). In a forthcoming study we address this issue in detail and argue for the benefits of conceptualising nationalism’s ‘populist dimension’ by referring to Laclau’s theory of populism of which a key element is how populism constitutes an attempt to construct ‘the people’ as a category with supposedly similar or ‘equivalent’ demands due to its meaning being largely derived from the antagonism with the elite (Critchley & Marchart, 2004; Laclau, 1996, 2005). However, this paper focusses on Euroscepticism, which implies either an opposition to the European Union or a preference of the *national* over the European level of governance. Therefore, we decided nationalism would be better adapted to describe this study’s research object.

On a more general level, there seems to be a consensus among Europeanists on the continuing importance of nations, nation-states, or simply put national(ist) frames, for the way citizens speak and think of the European Union (Díez Medrano, 2003; Duchesne, 2013, p. 3,30-31, 58-59). This is important to keep in mind as many of the citizens we quote in the analytical section, do not speak explicitly of the European Union but rather make references to ‘other European actors’ (e.g. Germans, the French government, Spain). Based on our knowledge and analysis of the full transcripts, however, it is clear that respondents are actually referring to the EU as a whole but do so by using other European actors (e.g. nations or states) as a *pars pro toto* for the EU.

Neoliberalism

Given increasing neo-liberalization of EU economic states and member states’ welfare provisions (Taylor-Gooby et al. 2018, 2019), it is also important to look at sources of popular neo-liberal beliefs. Therefore we look at neo-liberal ideology. A key distinction here has been made by critics (e.g. Venugopal 2015), who have noted that ‘neo-liberalism’ is often conflated with economic ‘liberalism’—the belief in self-regulating markets. Rather, drawing upon the academic roots of the concept of ‘neo-liberalism’, we see that this concept is distinct from economic liberalism and uses a distinct conception of ‘fairness’. ‘Neo-liberalism’, as conceived by Louis Rougier and developed in the 1938 *Colloque Walter Lippmann*, is a project that aims to ‘save’ capitalism by reacting to the failures of economic liberalism. Responding to the financial crises of the 1930s, which neo-liberal thinkers attributed to laissez-faire capitalism, the *Colloque Walter Lippmann* sought to re-establish capitalism by promoting a state that would actively re-regulate the market in order to preserve and promote market competition. From this perspective, market competition was socially constructed and—though central to the success of society—needed to be carefully protected and promoted by the state (Rougier 1938; Amable 2011).

Promoting the moral agenda of Social Darwinism, this neo-liberal project asserted that individual competition was central for the benefit of both individuals and society (Rougier 1938; Amable 2011). In order for such competition to exist, responsibility for market action must be placed on individuals, who then have the onus to develop themselves as suitable for market competition (*entrepreneur de soi*: Foucault 2004; Dardot and Laval 2009). In order to foster and sustain individual competition, the state must promote the fairness of such competition. Fair market competition was the foundation for Social Darwinist market order—as well as market morality—to the extent that it allowed for optimal individual competition and thereby the success of the fittest individuals. State regulation or interference was then primarily justified to the extent that it sought to re-establish the fairness of individual market competition (Rougier 1938; Foucault 2004; Dardot and Laval 2009; Amable 2011, 2014, for a summary see Amable 2011: 5-11, esp. 5 and 10). The central feature to neoliberal market fairness, then, is an ‘ethic of self-reliance’ (Wacquant 2009; Amable 2011) in which the state ensures conditions for fair competition, but it is ultimately the individual’s responsibility to follow these market rules and maximize the outcomes of his or her competition with others.⁴ Important empirical work has been done linking such neo-liberal ideology to British citizens’ (de)legitimations of UK welfare state priorities leading up to Brexit (Taylor-Gooby et al. 2018, 2019).

⁴ For a discussion of the implementation of this ideology as policy, see Harvey (2005).

Nationalist Neo-Liberal Euroscepticism

Recent work finds that a Nationalist Neo-Liberal Euroscepticism existed among some UK citizens in the mid-2000s (Vila-Henninger, Caprioli, and Van Ingelgom Manuscript). The NNLE consists of the following logic: First, British respondents defined fair market competition relative to the interests of the UK or a subset of British citizens. This means that respondents used the wellbeing of the UK, or a subset of its citizens, to define the rules for fair market competition—which is inherently nationalist. The key element here is the using fair market competition to evaluate market action is a pillar of neo-liberal ideology. Thus, we argue that this application of fair market competition is an example of nationalist neo-liberalism. Next, British participants delegitimated a European Union linked actor as unfair for not following the aforementioned nationalist market rules—thereby defining that actor as a member of an out-group. This means that not following British nationalist market rules separated some group, nation, or other actor that had a connection to the European Union from the UK or a subset of British citizens. Applying the moral economy framework then, Nationalist Neo-Liberalism would then be a market principle. Its use to delegitimize the EU across economic divisions would then constitute a moral economy and NNLE as normative.

A Diachronic Research Design: Reanalysing Qualitative Data

To proceed, we investigate whether NNLE was present around the time of Brexit. We then analyse whether it constitutes a moral economy—which would establish NNLE as normative. Finally, we trace NNLE back to its popular origins. To perform our analysis we mobilize a reanalysis of qualitative data. This section presents our method, data and coding strategy.

Reanalysis

This paper relies on secondary analysis understood as ‘*a research strategy which makes use of pre-existing quantitative or pre-existing qualitative research data for the purposes of investigating new questions or verifying previous studies*’ (Heaton, 2004, p. 16). While secondary analysis of quantitative data is a well-established practice, data sharing amongst qualitative researchers is far less common. Nevertheless, secondary analysis of qualitative data has developed since the development of pioneering qualitative archives like Qualidata in Britain (Bishop & Neale, 2010; Corti, 2005; Corti, Witzel, & Bishop, 2005; Fielding, 2004). It has generated a heated debate related to the epistemology of qualitative research (Hammersley, 1997, 2010; Natasha S. Mauthner, Parry, & Backett-Milburn, 1998; Savage, 2005). Some researchers continue to oppose archiving and secondary analysis of qualitative surveys (Mauthner & Parry, 2009, 2013)⁵, but a consensus regarding the potential of qualitative data secondary analysis – especially as allowing for qualitative longitudinal research – has been reached. Furthermore, its feasibility and prospects have been demonstrated through a series of persuasive publications (e.g. Hodson, 2001; Holland & Edwards, 2014; Savage, 2011).

Data

In the past thirty years, many qualitative studies were conducted in one or several European countries that pertain to topics and issues of interest for this research. In particular, comparative

⁵ Even though mandatory policies are implemented, such as the archiving obligation attached to ESRC grants since 2010, or the 2015 statement of political science journals (JETS) regarding transparency and open access to datasets <http://www.dartstatement.org/#!/blank/c22sl>.

qualitative data has been extensively produced over the past decades for diverse scientific purposes, including the large number of surveys funded by the EC⁶. Due to the process of qualitative research, data – in particular interview data – is generally richer than what is needed in a specific project. Qualitative scholars know from experience that only parts of the data are thoroughly analyzed and included in subsequent publications. These rich qualitative data are at the center of our analysis when reanalyzing the focus group data generated by the CITAE project (Duchesne et al. 2013). Therefore, this paper inscribes itself in the recent qualitative turn in European studies (e.g. Belot 2000; Bruter 2005; Diez Medrano 2003; Duchesne et al. 2013; Favell 2008; Gaxie, Hubé, de Lassale, and Rowell 2011; Meinhof 2004; White 2011; Van Ingelgom 2014).

In what follows, we conduct our analysis over three phases. First, we identify a public pro-market liberalization form of Euroscepticism as it existed prior to Brexit. For this analysis we use semi-structured interview data collected right after Brexit (2016 Qualitative Election Study of Britain 2016). Second, we trace this back to a moral economy. Analysis in this step uses focus group data from around ten years before Brexit (2005-6 CITAE). Third, we identify the beginning stages of this moral economy. This final step establishes does not find evidence of this moral economy twenty years before Brexit, but does find evidence of what appears to be an early form of this public Eurosceptic moral economy. For this final phase, we use Celine Belot's semi-structured interview data (1995-6).

The Qualitative Election Study of Britain's (QESB) 'EU Referendum 2016 Interviews Dataset' consists out of 15 individual semi-structured telephone interviews with panelists of the broader QESB project (Carvalho, Winters, and Oliver, 2019). The goal of the 'EU Referendum interviews' was to *'understand how the campaign and results of the UK's referendum on membership of the European Union, held in June 2016, affected how people thought about and understood of UK politics'* (QESB, 2019). Each interviewee was asked to elaborate on: the leave campaign, the remain campaign, the day of the referendum, subsequent political change, and their views on the (political) future. As all interviews are freely available for research purposes, we consider them fit for our purpose of secondary analysis, i.e. to answer a different research question than the primary researchers⁷.

The CITAE data set is based on data gathered from focus groups, conducted in Oxford in the period January to June 2006 (Duchesne and alii, 2013). It is based on eight collective discussions (focus groups) involving 4 to 6 participants selected as socially close but politically diverse. In sum, these focus groups were conducted with British citizens from different socio-economic contexts (working class, white collars, managers and activists). Each focus group discussion lasted about three hours, and was organized around five questions only – in order to leave enough room for participants to lead the discussion in the directions that would interest them most. The five questions tried to cover different aspects of European integration: identity, institutions, benefit and membership, as well as political sophistication⁸.

⁶ Between 2005 and 2011, no less than 20 projects were funded by the EC on topics related to European identity, for more than 44 million €. They all generated qualitative comparative data.

⁷ For all information regarding the participants see annex or the QESB website, <https://qesb.info/>

⁸ The questions posed were as follows: 1. What does it mean to be European? 2. How should we distribute the power in Europe? with suggestions, in order to structure the discussion, and requests to discuss what would be desirable or undesirable about power resting with the Nations, with Experts, with MPs or with the Market (i.e. left to market forces). Then there was a PAUSE for refreshments. 3. Who profits from Europe? This question was posed to sub-groups, and their written responses were then discussed by the whole group; 4. For or against Turkey's entry into the European Union? This discussion was preceded by a yes or no vote by each participant individually. 5. For or against Turkey's entry into the European Union? This time participants were asked to answer this question from the point of view of

Finally, Celine Belot' dataset gathers around 40 non-directive (semi-structured) face-to-face interviews realized at Durham (Tyne and Wear) and Guildford (Surrey) between 2 May 1995 and 22 June 1995. These interviews were realized in the framework of a comparative research with France. She interviewed young people between 15 and 30 years old and the sample was diversified according to age (3 classes), gender and education criteria. The interviews begun by a biographical question 'Before talking about Europe, I would like to ask some general and personal questions to know you a little bit better. Can you talk to me at first about your education and your experience of work and unemployment if you had had these experiences'. Then, the interviews continued on Europe in a non-directive approach⁹.

Coding

We coded our transcripts of qualitative collective interviews (CITAE) and individual semi-structured interviews (Belot, QESB) using ATLAS.ti, a Qualitative Data Analysis Software (QDAS). Building on a previous analysis with the CITAE data, our coding was deductive. We used deductive codes from a team codebook to code passages within each transcription. To operationalize NNLE beliefs, we used the 'Query Tool' from ATLAS.ti by employing the 'AND' function to combine deductive codes.

Our operationalization for NNLE beliefs is the same as in our previous analysis with CITAE data:

First, British respondents defined fair market competition relative to the interests of the UK or a subset of British citizens. This means that respondents used the wellbeing of the UK, or a subset of its citizens, to define the rules for fair market competition—which is inherently nationalist ([Sub-Formula 1] Codes: Neo-Liberal Fair Market Competition AND Political Community AND National Level AND In-Group/Out-Group). Next, British participants delegitimated a European Union linked actor as unfair for not following the aforementioned nationalist market rules—thereby defining that actor as a member of an out-group This means that not following British nationalist market rules separated some group, nation, or other actor that had a connection to the European Union from the UK or a subset of British citizens. ([Sub-Formula 2] Codes: Neo-Liberal Fair Market Competition AND Unfairness AND In-Group/Out-Group AND EU/European Level).

Using the AND function with the ATLAS.ti Query Tool, we combined these two subsets of codes to create the following formula for operationalizing British neo-liberal nationalist beliefs:

Query Tool Formula: British Neo-Liberal Nationalist Market Principle = Neo-Liberal Fair Market Competition AND Political Community AND National Level AND In-Group/Out-Group AND Unfairness AND EU/European Level

political parties from the country in question – list of parties was suggested by the moderator. This question both cooled any conflict as answering it was a cooperative enterprise; and also serves as a kind of test of political knowledge.

⁹ Celine Belot mobilized an interview guide and some supports. The topics were going from the personal experience of the interviewee in other countries, the meaning of Europe, and the principal problems that they faced currently to the role of France in Europe. 5 vignettes were also mobilized through the interviews. The details can be found in the methodological appendix of her PhD (Belot, 2000: 63-71).

It is important to note that we only considered a ‘case’ of ‘NNLE beliefs’ as occurring when both sub-formulas appeared in a single passage of text. Thus, if all of the codes occurred but each sub-formula did not, we did not consider this a case of ‘nationalist neo-liberal Eurosceptism beliefs.’ Similarly, we considered passages as ‘cases’ rather than entire interviews. This means that both sub-formulas had to be used together in a passage. As nationalist neo-liberal Eurosceptism beliefs are beliefs in terms of which legitimacy is justified, it was necessary to restrict the operationalization of these beliefs to individual passages within transcriptions. Part of our ‘nationalist neo-liberal Eurosceptism beliefs’ formula is a delegitimation in terms of ‘fairness.’ Thus, we included a fairness delegitimation in our nationalist neo-liberal Eurosceptism beliefs formula. For this reason, we are analyzing specific instances in which a delegitimation of ‘unfairness’ is justified in terms of nationalist neo-liberal Eurosceptism beliefs.

We used the coding from our first paper for the CITAE data. We then coded both the Belot data and the QESB data using codes from our team codebook (see coding appendix). These codes included—but were not limited to—the codes that made up our nationalist neo-liberal Eurosceptism formula. Using the AND function in ATLAS.ti’s Query Tool, we identified cases that matched our nationalist neo-liberal Eurosceptism formula that we developed with the CITAE data (British Neo-Liberal Nationalist Market Principle = Neo-Liberal Fair Market Competition AND Political Community AND National Level AND In-Group/Out-Group AND Unfairness AND EU/European Level).

This allowed us to engage in a second round of analysis, in which we distinguished between cases of NNLE beliefs and ‘false positives.’ In our analysis, a ‘false positive’ was passage of a semi-structured interview that was coded for all of the nationalist neo-liberal Eurosceptism codes but did not constitute a case of NNLE beliefs (as described in our ‘Operationalization’ section for the CITAE data). This is because in ATLAS.ti, the AND function consolidates different formulas with overlapping codes into a single formula. The result was that there were some passages in which all codes were present, but the two sub-formulas were not completely present (**Sub-Formula 1: Neo-Liberal Fair Market Competition AND Political Community AND National Level AND In-Group/Out-Group; Sub-Formula 2: Neo-Liberal Fair Market Competition AND Unfairness AND In-Group/Out-Group AND EU/European Level**).¹⁰

We then proceeded by analysing how false positives did not fit the NNLE formula, as well as cases in which the nationalist neo-liberal Eurosceptism beliefs did occur. By using this approach, we were able to establish that there were no cases of nationalist neo-liberal Eurosceptism beliefs in the Belot data. Instead, across multiple passages we found Sub-Formula 1 and 2. Given the timing of these data (mid-1990s) relative to the CITAE data (mid-2000s), we interpreted this to mean that there were the ‘origins’ of nationalist neo-liberal Eurosceptism beliefs in the Belot data. Similarly, in the 2016 QESB data, we found a false positive of nationalist neo-liberal Eurosceptism

¹⁰ Methodologically, our choice for the AND operator is informed by its restrictiveness compared to for instance the OR operator. If we would have used the OR rather than the AND condition which requires all codes to be simultaneously present for a coded fragment to be selected the number of retrieved coded fragments would be much higher (ATLAS.ti 8 Manual, p162). Moreover, in line with our theorization of Euroscepticism in relation to the neoliberal and nationalist beliefs of British citizens both nationalist and neoliberal normative criteria should be simultaneously present in order to characterize these beliefs as a moral economy. Finally, by relying on the restrictive AND function we also wished to yield strong evidence for the existence of a neoliberal nationalist moral economy. Alternatively, analyses relying on the same formula but using the OR operator would be suited to investigate other configurations of Eurosceptic beliefs having a neoliberal or nationalist component. However, these type of – possibly more nuanced – analyses fall beyond the scope of the present paper.

beliefs for a ‘Remainer,’ as well as a case of nationalist neo-liberal Euroscepticism beliefs for a ‘Leaver.’

Comparative Diachronic Qualitative Reanalysis

Phase 1: Nationalist Neo-Liberal Moral Economy as Norm of Euroscepticism circa Brexit

For the first analytical phase, we investigated Euroscepticism among Leavers around the time of Brexit. For this analysis we use semi-structured telephone interviews conducted as part of the 2016 Qualitative Election Study of Britain (QESB). This allowed us to identify NNLE beliefs used in Leaver legitimations of their Brexit votes to leave the EU.

The key finding in this section is that there is evidence of ‘Leaver’ vote legitimization post-Brexit. We only used the semi-structured interviews from the 2016 QESB in our analysis as the post- and pre-electoral FG’s conducted by QESB focussed too much on electoral evaluations and motives to yield relevant findings for the research question guiding our secondary analysis. There were limitations in terms of the number of respondents, as there were a total of 15 QESB post-Brexit semi-structured interview—and only three of which were with ‘Leavers.’ This means that there were two analytical tasks. The first was to establish that there was no evidence of NNLE beliefs used to legitimate ‘Remain’ votes. Such use of these beliefs would indicate that these NNLE beliefs justified legitimations of the EU, which would run counter to our observations in the 2006 CITAE data and would undermine our claim that NNLE is indeed a form of Euroscepticism.

Subsequently, with an N of three ‘Leavers’, we investigated whether these NNLE beliefs were in fact used by Brexit voters to justify their legitimations of their ‘Leave’ votes. Of these three, we found one respondent who justified her vote to leave the EU using the NNLE beliefs. It is important to note here that this is qualitative research and as such we are not attempting to generalize to a population. For this reason, sample size is not relevant as long as we reach saturation. One could argue that such a small N does not allow us to reach saturation; however, we contend that we indeed reached—or approached—saturation by using longitudinal qualitative analysis. Thus, in future analyses with larger samples of ‘Leave’ voters, we would expect to see these NNLE beliefs employed in ways that were analogous to those we observed in the CITAE data. Thus, while these data do not allow us to study NNLE beliefs as a moral economy among Brexit voters, they do allow us to establish the use of these NNLE beliefs among Brexit ‘Leave’ voters. As such, there is evidence of these NNLE beliefs as reaffirming Euroscepticism among British voters.

NNLE Formula Positive Match: Taylor, Leaver #3

I: So you voted to Leave the EU, can you tell me [...] the reasons why you decided to vote to Leave the EU?

Taylor: So it was sovereignty a lot for me. I don’t want to be ruled by a separate parliament other than Britain, and neither do I want to have to accept laws that aren’t made in Britain.

I: [...] Were there any other issues that stood out in terms of why you decided to vote that way?

Taylor: [...] Right, yes I mean the other thing was controlling our borders and I want to stress on this one, because people that talk about controlling borders and immigration are always cast as racist. [...] I was brought up in London, in South London, so I was used to different ethnic groups from when I went to primary school. It was nothing new for me. I’ve never had a problem with it, I’m not against people from other countries but, for me, it was

a numbers game. You cannot have, I don't think, 350,000 people year on year arriving in this country without it causing a problem. So it was numbers, and I think the idea that we might go into a points system seems to me pretty sensible. [...] I mean, there's huge pressure now on school places, and housing. This is never talked about. It's part of the problem, I think, that we have on our housing shortage, because when people come to Britain, where do they live? They're not living underground, they're not living in some cocoon somewhere, they've got to live in houses, accommodation, whatever, and I think this has created the situation we've got now. And where it builds resentment is when you have the indigenous population that's been born here that's got no chance whatsoever of either buying a house or getting an affordable rented house because it's all supply and demand, isn't it?

I: Absolutely.

Taylor: I mean when, I think before, you had possibly the high numbers we've got now, if people were looking to buy a house it was within limits, they could do, and also renting, because the landlords and people looking for accommodation was about the same, it was okay. But now we know it's completely off the limit and off the scale for a lot of people. So, yes, it was to do with immigration, but not to do with the fact that people of different cultures live in this country and I think I need to stress that. It's numbers.

Here we see the classic example of immigrants who were able to come to the UK because of EU regulations creating unfair market competition. Taylor's application of the NNLE beliefs apply to Brexit, but the formula is the same as in the CITAE data: the rules for fair competition in the housing market are defined by the respondent as they relate to a balance of 'supply and demand' that is favorable for 'the indigenous population that's been born here.' A group of EU-linked actors then act unfairly by disrupting the balance of fair market competition, in this case immigrants entering the country *because* of the EU. This then reinforces their status as an out-group relative to the 'indigenous' British.

The key here is that the respondent stresses that 'it was to do with immigration, but not to do with the fact that people of different cultures live in this country—and I think I need to stress that. It's numbers.' The in-group/out-group distinction was not cultural for the respondent, but was instead the 'numbers'—which referred to the perceived influx of immigrants into the British housing market. Notice that the 'numbers' are a problem precisely because of the market interests of the 'indigenous [British] population.' Rules for fair market competition are defined by the interests of these 'indigenous' British, who then suffer due to EU-linked immigration. The respondent then delegitimizes EU-linked immigration—and by extension the EU—as unfair by describing these immigrants as building 'resentment' because 'you have the indigenous population that's been born here that's got no chance whatsoever of either buying a house or getting an affordable rented house.' Thus, British nationalist market privilege determines the rules for fair market competition and the subsequent fairness and legitimacy of market outcomes.

Complicating previous work on 'Leaver' attitudes, we do not find clear evidence that ethnicity is a key dividing line for Brexit 'Leavers' (Bonikowski 2017; Flemmen and Savage 2017; Laurence et al. 2019). Instead, for the QESB semi-structured interview data with 'Leavers,' British nationalism is the foundation for rules of fair market competition. It is then through recourse to fair market competition that is based on nationalist market privilege, rather than an appeal to ethnic boundaries. This does not mean that ethnic bias is not driving these delegitimizations; however, it does mean that socially acceptable Brexit Euroscepticism is more complex than ethnic divisions. Future qualitative work can then investigate whether, with a larger sample size of Brexit voters, there is evidence of an intersection of ethnic boundaries and NNLE beliefs.

On the other hand, Taylor's statements can be considered neoliberal as his problem definition and proposed solutions for the perceived shortcomings of the British housing and schooling situation purely in market terms. According to neoliberal ideology, market outcomes are fair and just if they result from fair market competition on the market. Rather than direct state intervention in the market, e.g. increased public investment for social housing or schools, the neoliberal state should ensure the fairness of market competition in order for outcomes to be just. In this case, according to Taylor "it's all supply and demand", in the sense that for him the UK's EU membership would have caused a disturbance in the priori presumably fair national market competition by allowing in to many immigrants, thus increasing demand on the market. In his eyes, this led market competition to be unfair and thus the outcomes to be illegitimate. Interestingly, though, the solution he proposes is both nationalist and neoliberal, first it is neoliberal as he does not argue for direct state spending but rather for the state to restore fairness on the market, e.g. rebalancing supply and demand. The solution to reinstate a level playing field then, would be to reclaim the UK's supposedly lost sovereignty and control of its borders. Ironically, it can be noted how this, nonetheless constitutes a direct intervention in the market by limiting demand, however, it is legitimate according to the nationalist criterion, while direct market intervention by increasing supply would be illegitimate to the neoliberal criterion. In this sense, Taylor's discourse offers evidence for a nationalist neoliberal economy of Euroscepticism.

NNLE Formula False Positive: Jeremy, Remainer #7

'Jeremy: I think, as much as I wasn't 100% sure until maybe a week or so beforehand, I was fairly early on quite confident that I was going to vote to Remain, partially because I always felt that the conversation that's arisen over the last few years hasn't been a very enlightened conversation in approach to the EU, it's a very negative campaign and it's unfortunately been very driven from a right-wing perspective and from the side of anti-immigration and anti-internationalism as a point. So very early on I just very, very keenly felt that I couldn't agree with that, that I think that, as much as I still support an independent Scotland, I still think that, as a nation, we should be working with other countries and we should be outward looking and we should be a welcoming country. There were a few things that came up during the campaign such as the Common Agricultural Policy, which was something I wasn't particularly aware of beforehand and it showed that there were some structural issues and some bureaucratic issues with the EU as a concept. But it was nowhere near strong enough to push me over from my Remain vote.

I: What was it about those issues that made you think twice or at least gave you pause?

Jeremy: I knew beforehand that the CAP payments were quite strongly in favour of farmers in the country, I knew because that issue had come up during the Scottish independence debate but just the idea of how arbitrary some of the decisions are within the EU system and how much certain industries are disproportionately supported and propped up, possibly at the expense of other areas, which I felt was a bit negative. Effectively there's farmers being paid to keep fields fallow, or they're being paid not to produce a certain foodstuff, which I thought was not very progressive and not very democratic.'

Here, the respondent references the UK's political community or nation by framing his legitimization with respect to his vote decision. However, in the respondent's formulation of EU market rules as unfair is not defined relative to British interests, but instead relative to all farmers in general. Thus, the EU's CAP was unfair because it paid farmers to *'keep fields fallow...which I thought was not*

very progressive and not very democratic.’ Notice that the respondent refers to ‘farmers’ instead of specifically discussing British farmers. The respondent does, however, specify that he is discussing rules of fair market competition by mentioning that due to EU policy ‘certain industries are disproportionately supported and propped up, possibly at the expense of other areas.’ As discussed in the ‘coding’ section, this case then constitutes a ‘false positive’. Thus, based on the QESB data, there is no evidence of NNLE used by Remainers to delegitimize the EU or EU-linked actors.¹¹

Phase 2 results: Nationalist Neoliberal Moral Economy in the UK in 2006

This second phases examines whether the results discussed above can be traced to a norm of NNLE. To establish NNLE as a norm, we look for evidence of its existence as a moral economy. We operationalize this moral economy as a consensus across economic positions—and in our case across occupation (see table below). For this we turn to the 2006 CITAE focus group data and our previous research regarding the British respondents views on EU legitimacy (Vila-Henninger, Van Ingelgom, and Caprioli, in progress). Concretely, we examined the ‘discourses of (de) legitimization’ (Van Ingelgom, 2014, p. 108) that spanned economic divisions among respondents. In what follows, we discuss a selection of quotes from different occupational groups (activists, working class, managers) where respondents used the neo-liberal principle of fair market competition to define UK identity, define other nations as outsiders, and the EU as illegitimate. This series of cases used the UK’s adherence to the EU’s market rules to define fair market competition in contrast to others who do not respect these rules and therefore portrayed as unfairly competing and hindering a level playing field.

Table 1. *Presence of Nationalist Neoliberal normative beliefs in order to establish a moral economy of Euroscepticism by Focus Group Set Composed of UK Citizens from 2005-6*

CITAE Focus Group Set	Collective Beliefs Used in Delegitimation: Neoliberal and National Political Community Intersection		Scope of Justificatory Beliefs	EU Delegitimation (Fairness)	Area of EU Legitimacy (Economic Sector/Issue)
	Market Rules: Defined Relative to Interests of UK or Subset of	Outgroup Identity: Actor Does Not Follow British Nationalist	Scope of Market Rules (UK, EU, Global)	Unfair Behavior of EU-Linked Market Actor	

¹¹ Here, an important side note is how different forms of nationalism, i.e. how the national community’s identity and interests are defined, leads to diverging views of said institutions legitimacy as they constitute different beliefs for assessing political legitimacy. This difference, here in Jeremy’s case between Scottish versus British nationalism, sheds light on the specificity of NNLE for the UK as a case. An avenue for future research could then be to study how nationalist and neoliberal beliefs’ impact on Euroscepticism or EU legitimacy is or is not mediated by how both beliefs are embedded in different (sub)national contexts.

	British Citizens (Present vs. Absent)	Market Rules (Present vs. Absent)			
Activist 1 Set	Present	Present	EU	Present	EU Regulations
Activist 2 Set	Present	Present	UK	Present	Agriculture/EU Environmental Regulations
White Collar 1 Set	Present	Present	UK, Global	Present	Labor Market, Trade
White Collar 2 Set	Present	Present	UK	Present	Fishing
Manager 1 Set	Present	Present	EU	Present	Fishing, EU Subsidies
Manager 2 Set	Present	Present	Global	Present	Trade
Working Class 1 Set	Present	Present	UK	Present	Agriculture
Working Class 2 Set	Present	Present	EU	Present	Construction, Manufacturing

To begin, we see the foundations of this Euroscepticism based on a nationalist neo-liberal moral economy for EU market rules in the reasoning of Bethany, who participated in the Activist 1 set. Bethany explains that:

The point I was trying to make by saying you're British (towards Charles or James) was that you were talking about English and to me I'm British and the British Isles encompasses all of us and I understand what you (towards Allison) say that we are privileged and we've had our bad times in the British Isles and our good times and we've worked our way through to get fairly average sort of living that is not perfect by any ... means there is lots of things that need doing in Britain ... I have to say that when we were asked whether wanted to go into Europe my husband was all for it and I was against it because I always think small is beautiful. I thought it was going to be very difficult to get all the states to agree to things and what I find is now I mean we're in and I'm all for it because you can't do anything about that. Now we're all meshed together. I suppose it's working alright. The one thing I object to is that we hopefully do try to not break the rules and yet and ... lots of other countries just go ahead.

Here the implication seems to be that even if imperfect, market competition at the national UK level is considered as fair, and thus its outcomes legitimate. Along the same nationalist logic, she identifies the UK as a law abiding nation in opposition to the 'other countries' who break the rules

and the EU which is implied as illegitimate since it can neither enforce a convergence of interests among different nations with their own identity, neither can it ensure the fairness of market competition by forcing its member states to live by the same rules as the UK. In this sense, the EU fails to enforce compliance to the neoliberal norm of fair market competition in that it fails to ensure a level playing field or equal opportunities to the different member states since those who play by the rules do so at a certain cost, while those who do not only benefit by avoiding the cost of rule compliance, the EU also lets them get away with it.

Again, we see this same logic echoed in the Working Class 1 focus group. The EU is seen by respondents as illegitimate due to its ineffective—and thus unfair—enforcement of its own rules. Once again, participants' delegitimizations were founded on their belief that the UK is a lawful nation that lives by EU's rules, while other member nations do not follow these same rules.

As Bridget states

'well I still feel British but I know that that we are European and I think eventually we've got to get our heads round it and, it'll probably, we're going to have to just accept it whether we want to or not ... and I think we do accept a lot of it and I think we accept a lot of the good of it but we're not prepared to accept any of the : taking our identity away for example the language and the and the our money ...'

Bridget explains that *'there's a lot of rule and regulations that we [in] Britain are adhering to that a lot of European countries are not and it's making life quite difficult.'* The respondent uses her own personal experience to prove this point. *'My husband's in the building trade and rules and regulations [are] making it practically impossible for him...[because] he's got his own business, and to employ his men...he's got to abide by so many rules. Yet when he's worked in Germany they're very relaxed [as well as] in France and in Spain.'* Bridget seems to be a little at odds with all of these regulations, explaining that *'as a nation...I think we've gone a little over the top...and I think we should just sort of calm down a little bit.'* Notice, though, that even in her disagreement she reaffirms this dichotomy between the UK as a follower of EU rules versus other member nations, which disregard these rules. This dichotomy then delegitimizes the EU due to its inefficacy. Furthermore, for Bridget the UK has the agency to decide if it wants to follow or not follow EU rules without there being any perceived consequences from the EU. The UK then is perceived as voluntary and unnecessarily following rules given that other member nations are pursuing their own interests with no consequence from the EU. The key here is that even though the respondent disagrees, she establishes the UK as taking the moral high ground and not acting as economically shrewd as other member nations who disregard the common marketplace's rules for their own interests. This clashes with the neoliberal moral norm that these rules are there to ensure the fairness of the market competition and thus the legitimacy the competitions' outcomes.

Establishment of a Moral Economy in 2006 UK

We found that a nationalist interpretation of the neo-liberal principle of fair market competition was a key element that spanned all occupational divisions in the CITAE data. There was a clear discourse on defining British identity in terms of adherence to neo-liberal rules of fair market competition. In the examples cited above, we saw respondents justify beliefs about the EU's illegitimacy, as well as non-British EU member nations, by characterizing these entities according to their disregard for neo-liberal fair market competition.

In particular, we see the emergence of a nationalistic neo-liberal moral economy based on the use of common fairness criteria for market competition across occupation levels and which serves to legitimize certain Eurosceptic perspectives. This moral economy is composed of two different ideational elements, nationalism and neoliberalism. The primary nationalist criterion was the definition of being 'British' as following rules in contrast to the European 'others'. The primary neoliberal criterion was the emphasis on the need to follow rules in order to establish a level playing field, fair market competition, and thus legitimate market outcomes.

Although, the precise conceptualization of 'fair market competition' differed across respondents, we found they all shared a common line of reasoning. This consisted of defining the UK as following rules for fair market competition, defining European nations as not following those rules and thus as 'others' with distinct identities, interests and privileges; and as such providing the foundation for Eurosceptic beliefs that portray the EU as unfair and illegitimate because of its inability to ensure fair market competition and because of its threat to British identity and (economic) sovereignty. As we found this line of reasoning and those fairness criteria being used across all different occupational groups – thus suggesting a consensus- based on our operationalization of a moral economy, we argue that we found evidence of a neoliberal nationalist moral economy among British citizens in 2006. The finding of this moral economy then helps to supplement our understanding of how during the Brexit vote a British voting bloc of the winners of EU market insertion might have emerged. Regardless, it provides evidence of a nationalistic neo-liberal consensus of European illegitimacy that demonstrates the intersection of neo-liberal frames on fair market competition and British frames of nationalism in UK citizens' moral economies. Hence, our findings demonstrate that the social construction of EU membership legitimacy ten years prior to Brexit was—at least for some citizens—rooted in normative neo-liberal moral criteria.

Moreover, the nationalist neoliberal moral economy of Euroscepticism we found, can be conceived as related to the emergence of 'neoliberal communitarian citizenship' in the UK, which recasts the ethical foundation of the nation on economic morality to 'delineate 'communities of value' populated by 'good citizens' (McGhee, Moreh, & Vlachantoni, 2018, p. 3).' The implication is that by influencing how the British nation or political community, citizens' moral economy is intrinsically related to their assessment of the EU's and the UK's political legitimacy. This connection between political legitimacy and moral economies is noted by Arnold (2001, p 90) too when he states that ' legitimacy is recognition by a community that a given state of affairs conforms to known and accepted rules and principles. Well-known and long accepted rules and principles are the ground [...] for consensus and collective action'. In the case of Brexit, this is echoed by McGhee et al. who state 'that the political renegotiation of the terms of Britain's EU membership can be interpreted as the culmination of decades-long processes effecting a restructuring of the ethical foundations of Britain's 'community of value' (2018, p. 4)'.

This cross-occupational consensus can then be seen as a manifestation of a British moral economy of Euroscepticism. This moral economy hinged on legitimations of judgements of market fairness. Fairness judgments, however, were found to be biased by nationalist ideas regarding the national identity and interest of the UK in contrast to those of others. In particular, we saw the denunciation of the EU and other member states, as special interest groups—usually in the form of the pursuit of non-UK national interests— who were often characterized as violating a neoliberal sense of fair market competition due to advancing the interests of an outsider-group over everyone else—therefore violating the notion of a level playing field.

Phase 3: Evidence on the origins of a national neo-liberal moral economy from the UK in the mid-1990s

Finally, the third phase of our analysis utilizes Celine Belot's semi-structured interview data (1995-6) collected just after the Maastricht Treaty. We use these data to investigate whether the NNLE moral economy that we established in the CITAE data (mid-2000s) stems back further in time. In this sense we return to classic works on moral economy that emphasized how the particularities of the shared moral beliefs on legitimate market actions are most visible when new economic developments seemingly came into conflict with the pre-existing consensus on the moral economy, thus causing popular outrage (Scott, 1977; Thompson, 1971). Therefore, in what follows we analyzed data preceding the consensus or moral economy we described in the previous section. This allows us to study 'nationalist neo-liberal Euroscepticism' as a form of normative market outrage longitudinally and understand the development of the moral economy at its base over time. Thus, we seek to identify the beginning stages of NNLE as normative anti-EU popular outrage.

Table 2. *Selected fragments that matched the Neo-Liberal Nationalist coding formula for British Youth in the mid-1990s (Belot) to illustrate NNLE origins and false positive.*

Belot Data Participant Name	Normative Neoliberal and Community	Market and National Intersection	Principles: Political	EU Delegitimation	Area of EU Legitimacy (Economic Sector/Issue)
	Market Rules: Defined Relative to Interests of UK or Subset of British Citizens (Present vs. Absent)	Outgroup Identity: Actor Does Not Follow British Nationalist Market Rules (Present vs. Absent)		Unfair Economic Behavior of EU-Linked Market Actor	
Debbie	Absent	Absent		NA	Immigration
David	Present	Present		Present	Car manufacturing

We did not find a moral economy in the Belot data. However, we found what we argue is its popular origins. At different points in the semi-structured interview, David B uses different elements of NNLE but does not use them in conjunction to delegitimize the EU. Thus, we argue that David's case provides evidence of the popular origins of NNLE in the mid-1990s.

NNLE Formula False Positive: David (NNLE Origins)

David: we are lucky that Henry Ford was an Essex boy, he came from Essex in London, so that why we have to have him in Essex you see. But I don't mind being patriotic say in English football team or something like this, that's always a bit of fun, but I hate Nationalism...

[...]

David: I think if you... I mean look at the, the, take companies like Citroen they've been very heavily subsidized by the French government, who have big shares in it... And they

obviously want erm... they want Citroen to do well and so when you go to France, they are all buying Peugeots, Citroens, Renaults, I mean if you go anywhere else in Europe they don't, they buy German cars or whatever. That doesn't make the company fit and healthy, it gives it a false sense of security and I think that you should have a free market for everybody. It makes them stronger. I mean what is one of the strongest motor companies in the world? Ford. They do get concessions, tax concessions and things like this if they are going to build their plant in England...but they are not bailed out to the extent that certain countries' cars are. Like I say Volkswagen and with Citroen

David's quote illustrates how the double standard regarding national interests and identity as determinant of politics and economy, in conjuncture with neoliberal morality, leads to an inconsistent and contradictory narrative. First, David discusses Henry Ford as a UK national and thus positively Ford on the basis of his supposed compliance to neoliberal ideals on market conditions. Second, others (the French) are negatively defined as not complying to these rules—even if the in-group can actually not be credibly defined as passing the same evaluative criterion for fair market competition used to designate the French as negative out-group. Hence, here we see the genesis of the CITAE logic. David's take on UK nationalism remains unclear and contradictory in terms of following market rules. Nevertheless the quote stood out because on the one hand, David explicitly opposes nationalism as a political logic while declaring himself pro-free market policies that are used to legitimate Ford (who the respondent claims is British) and degitamate car manufacturers from other EU member nations.

NNLE Formula False Positive: Debbie

Next, we use the case of Debbie to illustrate the type of false positives we discovered with our ATLAS.ti NNLE Query Tool formula.

Debbie: 'It depends if for instance if we all became one it would mean that I could go to Germany, get a job as easily as a German person could..... I don't know if that would work... I mean it's nice to think that you can say 'Right I'm going to go to France and work for a year', you know, it'd be, it'd be a nice idea but there's gonna be so many people that don't want to become one... and if for instance... someone was to come in from Germany and take away an English's person job, even though we're all one, if that person doesn't agree with everyone being one, they're gonna feel bitter towards the German person for taking their job away because they'll still think of themselves as being England, and not European. They'll still think the old way, and they'll still think 'I don't think we should be Europe, we should be England still.' I'd be a nice idea if, if it worked I think that it would cause problems...

Notice that here the respondent is delegitimizing the EU, but rather speculates about what might be perceived as future unfair competition within the UK as a result of EU integration. The respondent seems to define British political community not according to rule compliance, but instead as nativist. As such, there is no delegitimation about the fairness of the EU, but instead speculation about what could be others' future judgments of unfair market competition. Note the respondent is discussing the future of EU market regulation. We can then see the origins of the moral economy in David's quote which is then distinct from other logics with the same beliefs that are not used to delegitimize the EU.

To summarize, all of these Belot respondents identified by this operationalization are discussing possible future outcomes of EU integration. Thus, it appears as if there is no norm of the illegitimacy of EU market regulation among these respondents in the mid-1990s. Rather, these respondents used political classification systems that appear to be influenced minimally, and potentially not at all, by EU economic policy. Furthermore, respondents project that neoliberal norm of fair market competition as characterizing future interactions or just beginning to characterize interactions. Thus, this neoliberal norm appears to characterize respondents' understanding of the future.

Conclusion and Discussion

Work on citizens' Eurosceptic attitudes does not address a key empirical puzzle of Euroscepticism that was prominent in the popular rhetoric surrounding Brexit. This puzzle concerns a seemingly contradictory combination of nationalism and neo-liberalism as a basis for the popular illegitimacy of the EU. However, as we have shown in our analysis, not only was this nationalist neo-liberal Euroscepticism relevant among Brexit voters, but it also constituted a moral economy ten years before Brexit. Our empirical response to this puzzle begins to address two gaps in the Brexit literature: the existence of nationalist neo-liberal Euroscepticism as a form of popular Euroscepticism and Euroscepticism as normative.

To address the first gap, we investigated support by individuals in a social context of the 'Leave' vote using nationalist neo-liberal Euroscepticism. We established this by finding evidence of the use of nationalist neo-liberal Euroscepticism among 'Leave' voters to legitimate their Brexit vote in semi-structured interviews collected for 2016 post-Brexit QESB.

The subsequent component of our analysis was to establish nationalist neo-liberal Euroscepticism as normative. Since Brexit can be considered both an economic and political referendum, its popular legitimacy too is economic and political. Economic legitimacy as a popular consensus is understood through the prism of 'moral economy'. A 'moral economy' is defined as popular norms, or consensus, concerning principles of market behavior that are then used to evaluate and (de)legitimate economic action. In our case, we investigated whether there was evidence of a popular consensus of nationalist neo-liberal Euroscepticism used by citizens to delegitimize market action. In order to extend our analysis of nationalist neo-liberal Euroscepticism as normative, we carried out a longitudinal analysis that traced nationalist neo-liberal Euroscepticism back to a moral economy in the UK in 2006.

We operationalized Brexit voters' individual support and legitimation of the Brexit 'leave' in their QESB semi-structured interview. We found that nationalist neo-liberal Euroscepticism was in fact used among 'Leave' voters to legitimate their vote to exit the EU. Next, we established the endorsement of nationalist neo-liberal Euroscepticism by finding evidence of its existence in the UK in 2006 as a moral economy. The key here is that as a moral economy, nationalist neo-liberal Euroscepticism is a popular consensus—and thus a form of endorsement of nationalist neo-liberal Euroscepticism. Our argument then draws upon our study's longitudinal analysis, which establishes the temporal precedence relative to Brexit.

Thus, given the use of nationalist neo-liberal Euroscepticism among Brexit voters to legitimate the 'Leave' vote, paired with our evidence suggesting how British citizens shared a nationalist neo-liberal Eurosceptic moral economy in the UK 10 years before Brexit, we argue that our article presents an empirical case for the possible impact of nationalist neo-liberal Euroscepticism on the Brexit voters' public acceptance of Brexit. Future research can then extend our analysis by providing further evidence of a possible causal link, as well as investigating other potential links

between nationalist neo-liberal Euroscepticism and individual-level Brexit outcomes—such as voting behavior. The next step, which would contribute to the social psychological literature and moral economy literature, would be to investigate if the endorsement of NNLE found in 2006 can be linked to the support of the Brexit outcome among British voters—thus demonstrating the effects of the nationalist neo-liberal Euroscepticism moral economy on Brexit voters.

Another important finding relates to moral economy as ‘normative policy feedback.’ We found evidence of the genesis of nationalist neo-liberal Euroscepticism beliefs shortly after the Maastricht Treaty. However, as we could not find evidence of an nationalist neo-liberal Euroscepticism moral economy in the mid-1990s UK semi-structured interview. The next step in this analysis, which would address an important gap in the moral economy literature, is to understand the nationalist neo-liberal Euroscepticism moral economy relative to specific changes in public policy.

These results and the longitudinal analysis that they require reaffirms the potential of qualitative data secondary analysis – especially as allowing for qualitative longitudinal research. Building on this important literature on secondary analysis, this paper demonstrates its feasibility for longitudinal analysis and prospects for future research.

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Appendices

1. QESB interviewees information.

(source: <https://wintersresearch.files.wordpress.com/2019/03/eu-ref-dataset-v.1.0-read-me.docx>)

2016 Alias	Sex	Special Category	Age group	Supporter	Party	Strength	Constituency	2016 vote	2015 vote preference	2014 Indy Ref vote	2010 Vote preference	Date of interview
Walt	M	Y	57-64	Y	Labour	2	Dundee West	Leave	Y, and party	No	NA	4 Jul. 2016
Carter	M	Retired	65-72	Y	Tory	5	Colchester	Leave	Y, and party	NA	NA	21 Jul. 2016
Taylor	F	Retired	57-64	Y	UKIP	4	Colchester	Leave	Y, and party	NA	NA	15 Jul. 2016
Fiona	F	N	42-49	Y	SNP	6	Dundee East	Remain	Y, and party	Yes	NA	4 Jul. 2016
Natasha	F	N	34-41	N	NA	NA	Cardiff West	Remain	Y, not which party	NA	NA	4 Jul. 2016
Charles	M	SAH parent	34-41	N	NA	NA	Edgbaston	Remain	Y, and party	NA	NA	1 Jul. 2016
Clare	F	Retired	72+	Y	SNP	6	Dundee East	Remain	Y, and party	Yes	NA	29 Jul. 2016
Damian	M	N	49-56	N	NA	NA	Cardiff Central	Remain	Y, not which party	NA	NA	21 Jul. 2016
Olivia	F	Retired	57-64	Y	Lib Dem	1	Cardiff Central	Remain	Y, not which party	NA	NA	28 Jul. 2016
Jeremy	M	Y	26-33	Y	Green	5	Dundee West	Remain	Y, not which party	Yes	NA	28 Jul. 2016
Whitney	F	N	34-41	Y	Labour	4	Selly Oak	Remain	Y, not which party	NA	NA	5 Aug. 2016
Vince	M	Student	18-25	N	NA	NA	Selly Oak	Remain	Y, not which party	NA	NA	29 Jul. 2016
Cathy	F	N	42-48	Y	Tory	3	Harwich and North Essex	Remain	Y, not which party	NA	Y, not which party	28 Jul. 2016
Erica	F	N	26-33	Y	Labour	3	Cardiff North	Remain	Y, not which party	NA	NA	29 Jul. 2016
Finn	M	N	42-48	N	NA	NA	Glasgow South	Remain	Y, and party	Yes	NA	28 Jul. 2016

2. Celine Belot's participants information (taken from: Belot, C. (2000). *L'Europe en citoyenneté: jeunes français et britanniques dans le processus de légitimation de l'Union européenne*. Grenoble 2.)

Liste des entretiens réalisés :

Entretiens pilotes :

0. Julie - 23 ans - professeur de musique (stagiaire) - Leeds

1. Colin - 20 ans - étudiant en sciences naturelles, président d'une association d'étudiants qui organise des débats politiques - Ecosse

2. Tracey - 26 ans - aucun diplôme - employée (ménage et cuisine) dans un établissement scolaire - Durham

3. Mary - 20 ans - étudiante en langues - sud de l'Angleterre.

Entretiens (ceux analysés de façon exhaustive dans l'enquête sont en caractères gras)

4. William - 21 ans - étudiant en science politique - Londres.

5. Jennifer - 30 ans - ancienne ouvrière, en formation dans l'hôtellerie - Durham

6. Jonathan - 17 ans - élève en section générale (option sciences sociales) Durham

7. Andrew - 22 ans - étudiant en formation technique 'commerce et finances' – Leeds

8. Entretien non conservé car avec étudiante Polonaise

9. Abigail - 18 ans - élève en section générale (options sciences naturelles) - Durham

10. Stéphanie - 19 ans - élève en formation professionnelle (commerce) - Guildford

11. Benjamin - 19 ans - élève en formation technique (aérospatiale) - Guildford

12. David B. - 29 ans - ancien restaurateur, en formation de mécanicien - Guildford

13. Gary - 19 ans - élève en formation dans l'hôtellerie - Guildford

14. Heather - 18 ans - élève en formation technique (tourisme) - Guildford

15. Debbie - 23 ans - employée dans divers secteurs (dentiste, grands magasins), en formation de design - Guildford

16. Chris - 21 ans - étudiant en formation technologique (informatique) - York

17. Peter - 24 ans - employé au bureau des inscription d'un établissement scolaire - Guildford.

18. Alison - 23 ans - aide-comptable - Kent.

19. Kate - 17 ans - élève en section générale - Guildford

20. Entretien non conservé par suite de problèmes techniques

21. Tina - 27 ans - secrétaire dans un établissement scolaire - Guildford

22. Richard - 27 ans - technicien (ingénierie) - Guildford

23. Henry - 17 ans - élève en section générale (public school) – Guildford

24. Entretien non conservé par suite de problèmes techniques

25. Clare - 19 ans - élève en formation technique (design) - Durham

26. Jonathan P. - 27 ans - professeur d'éducation religieuse (stagiaire) - marié - Durham

27. Christine - 30 ans - au chômage, en formation professionnelle (administration) - divorcée, mère d'une petite fille - Durham

28. Steven - 18 ans - en apprentissage (mécanique automobile) - Durham

29. Heather B. - 21 ans - étudiante en Mathématiques - Londres

30. Alison B. - 21 ans - en apprentissage (infirmière - secteur dentaire) - Durham

31. Helen - 18 ans - étudiante en Anglais - Glasgow

32. Alison G. - 25 ans - cadre stagiaire dans un établissement bancaire - Durham
 33. Philip - 19 ans - élève en formation technique (commerce) – Durham -70
 34. Jill - 19 ans - élève en formation technique - Durham
 35. Rosalyn - 30 ans - en formation professionnelle (hôtellerie) - divorcée, mère de deux adolescents - Durham
 36. David H. - 28 ans - en formation technique (hôtellerie) - marié, père d'un jeune garçon - Durham
 37. Nicholas - 29 ans - Ingénieur - Durham
 38. Alexander - 29 ans - docteur en sciences physiques, au chômage - Durham
 39. Kieron - 22 ans - étudiant en musicologie - Durham
 40. Fiona - 29 ans - professeur d'anglais (stagiaire) - mariée, mère de 3 enfants - Durham

Appendix 3 CITAE FG participants

(Nick)name	Sex	Age	Education	Profession	Left right	Vote	Referendum	EU belonging	Identity	Origin
OXF Working Class 1										
Mina	F	48	A-Level, AS-Level	Private care assistant	7	Labour	DK	NGNB	World	Black Asian
Robert	M	32	GCSE or O'Level	Tankdriver (disabled)	7	NV	Y	G	NE	White
Ron	M	31	VCE, AVCE, NVQ L3	Technician (car industry)	5,5	Labour	DK	NGNB	N	Black Asian
Mary	F	54	GCSE or O'Level	School cleaner	7	Ind.	Y	NGNB	N	White
Brenda	F	37	GCSE or O'Level	Post person and receptionist	DK	NV	N	NGNB	N	White
OXF Working Class 2										
Vicas	M	29	VCE, AVCE, NVQ L3	Forklift driver	DK	NA	DK	NGNB	N	Black Asian
Esther	F	32	GCSE or O'Level	kitchen assist, catering, cleaning (unemployed)	3,5	NV	DK	NGNB	N	White
Ruth	F	48	GCSE or O'Level	Care assistant, office worker (unemployed)	8	Cons.	DK	NGNB	N	White
Bridget	F	52	GCSE or O'Level	Receptionist (unemployed)	9,5	NV	DK	NGNB	N	White

Anthony	M	53	GCSE or O'Level	Working man (early retired)	5,5	LibDem	DK	G	NE	White
OXF White Collars 1										
Nina	F	31	Foundation d°, NVQ L4	Care support worker	3	Labour	Y	G	EN	White
Pat	F	37	A-Level, AS-Level	Admin/secrarial work	4,5	Labour	DK	G	N	Black
Mel	F	51	A-Level, AS-Level	Receptionist (part time)	5,5	DK	DK	G	NE	White
Kenneth	M	51	A-Level, AS-Level	Office support worker	5,5	LibDem	Y	G	NE	White
Mike	M	45	A-Level, AS-Level	Office manager	6	NV	N	B	NE	White
Kamal	M	24	BA, BSc, degree	Team leader in catering business	5	Ind	N	G	N	Black Asian
OXF White Collars 2										
Stephanie	F	33	VCE, AVCE, NVQ level 3 ...	IT trainer	5	Cons	N	G	N	White
Kylie	F	33	BA, BSc, degree	Office worker (unemployed)	2	Ind	DK	NGNB	N	White
Lily	F	37	BA, BSc, degree	Homemaker (former HR manager)	5	Labour	Y	G	NE	White
George	M	22	BA, BSc, degree	Temp, office worker	3	LibDem	Y	G	EN	White
Emily	F	82	VCE, AVCE, NVQ L3 ...	Clerical work (retired)	1	Labour	DK	G	NE	White
Jeremy	M	67	Foundation d°, NVQ L4	Director in engineering sector (retired)	5,5	LibDem	DK	G	N	White
OXF Managers 1										
Sundai	M	36	BA, BSc degree	Store manager	7	Labour	Y	G	NE	Black
Alexander	M	39	A-Level, AS-Level	Bank manager	8	Cons	N	NGNB	N	White
Derek	M	37	PhD or Dphil	Lecturer and researcher	3	Cons	DK	NGNB	NE	White
Ian	M	38	BA, BSc degree	Salesman	7	Cons	N	NGNB	N	White
Bansuri	F	42	VCE, AVCE, NVQ L3	Personal development trainer	5,5	NV	N	NGNB	N	Black Asian
OXF Managers 2										
Sanjay	M	24	BA, BSc, degree	Accountant	6	LibDem	DK	NGNB	N	Black Asian
Joe	M	27	BA, BSc, degree	Fundraising	3	Labour	DK	G	N	White

Alya	F	23	BA, BSc, degree	Office manager	3,5	NV	Nul	G	N	NA
William	M	67	Master degrees	IT consultant (retired)	3	Labour	Y	G	NE	White
Rebecca	F	52	BA, BSc, degree	School teacher (unemployed)	6,5	LibDem	DK	NGNB	N	White
Rachel	F	28	BA, BSc, degree	Human resources manager	5	NV	Y	G	EN	White
OXF Activists 1										
Bethany	F	79	Foundation d°, NVQ L4	Councillor	5	Labour	Y	NGNB	NE	White
Allison	F	57	Primary school	Housewife and volunteer	4	LibDem	Y	G	NE	White
Charles	M	71	A-Level, AS-Level	District councillor (ex IT consultant and finance advisor)	6	Cons	Y	B	N	White
Annabel	F	26	BA, BSc, degree	Campaign manager	3,5	Labour	Y	NA	NA	White
James	M	61	Master degrees	Company director	8	Cons	N	B	Other	White
Lewis	M	70	PhD or Dphil	County councillor (ex health advocacy)	1	Green	N	DK	World	White
OXF Activists 2										
Kevin	M	20	A-Level, AS-Level	Student	3	Labour	Y	G	NE	White
Ben	M	19	A-Level, AS-Level	Student	5,5	Cons	N	B	N	White
Tim	M	23	BA, BSc, degree	Production editor	4	LibDem	Y	G	NE	White
Nick	M	21	A-Level, AS-Level	Student	6	Cons	N	G	NE	White

Appendix 4 Neoliberalism and Nationalism Coding Scheme

Fair Market Competition	Definition: Evaluations of the fairness of any aspect of market competition. Keywords: Actors as needing to ‘act correctly,’ ‘fairly,’ or ‘follow the rules’ established for a market. ‘Equal opportunities.’ ‘Level playing field.’ Example in the CITAE data: <i>Rebecca = of course in our papers we always hear you know oh about the Spanish fishing treaties [and the Spanish] kind of stealing stuff in our waters and putting up an English flag and that sort of thing. You tend to hear negative things.</i> Code Type:
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	Deductive Deductive Code Source: Foucault 2004; Amable 2011.
Political Community	Definition: How individuals define: a) themselves and/or others as political subjects or members of politically significant social, cultural, economic, and other groups. b) When they define, describe or reason about such group boundaries Keywords: I am 'x'; I feel as a 'x' , I consider myself a 'x.' Example in the CITAE data: William (to Sanjay) = <i>is it fair to ask you if you were educated in England, born in England always lived in England</i> Sanjay = <i>oh yeah, I've been born into it brought up here...I do consider myself British first.</i> Code Type: Deductive Deductive Code Source: (Easton, 1965, 1975; Norris, 1999, 2011; Torcal & Moncagatta, 2011)
Regime Institutions	Definition: Political institutions Keywords: 'Government,' 'parliament,' 'the legal system,' 'political parties.' Example in the CITAE data: Alya = <i>There are more women there are more men in the House of Commons called John than there are women and that's on a British level</i> Code Type: Deductive Deductive Code Source: (Easton, 1965, 1975; Norris, 1999, 2011; Torcal & Moncagatta, 2011)
National Level	Definition: National level politics or economics Keywords: UK, British, National Examples: Jeremy = <i>they're economic migrants really</i> Emily = <i>yes, they're free to come here, they hope they'll have a better life</i> Code Type: Deductive Deductive Code Source:
EU/European Level	Definition: EU level politics or economics; European integration Keywords: EU, Europe Example in the CITAE data: Joe = <i>yeah, I mean definite smaller benefits are people who travel by airline. When their flights are cancelled or there's a rumor [that] what's going to be enacted in the next few days [that] when you got to Europe you will be able to use your mobile phone without roaming charges.</i>

	Code Type: Deductive Deductive Code Source:
In-Group/Out-Group	Definition: All references to either self-definitions, group belongings or definitions of non-specified others. Keywords: 'Us' vs. 'Them' Example in the CITAE data: <i>Rebecca = European countries twist bend the laws very much to suit their favour...we tend to follow things laws strictly, to the letter, very religiously...whereas the others have a much more flexible interpretation on lots of things</i> Code Type: Deductive Deductive Code Source: (Easton, 1965, 1975; Laclau, 1996, 2003, 2005; Mudde, 2007; Norris, 1999, 2011; Torcal & Moncagatta, 2011)
Fairness	Definition: Participant judges/evaluates something/someone as begin fair. We coded the discourse/keywords expressing the judgment/evaluation. Keywords: 'Equal,' 'just,' 'level playing field,' 'balanced,' 'everyone has the right,' 'follow the law.' Example in the CITAE data: <i>Rebecca = and isn't there an equal distribution of money</i> Code Type: Deductive Deductive Code Source: Thompson 1971; Haidt 2012
Unfairness	Definition: Participant judges/evaluates something/someone as begin unfair. We coded the discourse/keywords expressing the judgment/evaluation. Keywords: 'Unfair,' 'twist/bend,' 'don't get the same deal,' 'steal,' 'too powerful,' 'taken advantage of,' 'the wrong way.' Example in the CITAE data: <i>Ben = But I think that surely it gives them that an idea where people want their powers to lie and where their decisions should be made. I mean, what is the point in having this sort of supranational organization?</i> Code Type: Deductive Deductive Code Source: Thompson 1971; Haidt 2012
Scope of Market Rules: UK	Definition: The UK's economy is the marketplace in which EU action is judged by respondents. Keywords: UK, British Example in the CITAE data: <i>Ben = you don't need these sort of crippling regulations which are sort of destroying the British economy.</i>

	Code Type: Inductive Deductive Code Source: NA
Scope of Market Rules: EU	Definition: The EU's economy is the marketplace in which EU action is judged by respondents. Keywords: EU, Europe Example in the CITAE data: <i>James = the British people have been consistently misled by politicians over the eventual aim of Europe...[The] European Union is now expanding in a totally uncontrollable way. What I voted to go into was an economic entity not a political entity.</i> Code Type: Inductive Deductive Code Source: NA
Scope of Market Rules: Global	Definition: The global economy is the marketplace in which EU action is judged by respondents. Keywords: Global, the World Example in the CITAE data: <i>Emily = we're in it to prosper and blow the others...you're talking about Africa and countries that are dying for want of a fair trade policy</i> Code Type: Inductive Deductive Code Source: NA