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When sub-state communities demand and obtain autonomy

A comparative analysis of sub-state mobilisation and restructuring in Belgium, Spain and the United Kingdom

Christoph Niessen

PhD thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor in Political and Social Sciences

Jury

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Academic year 2020-2021

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Preface and acknowledgements

When my great-grandfather was born in 1897, it had been about 80 years that the region where I grew up, Eupen–Malmedy–Sankt-Vith, belonged to Prussia and later the German Empire. Previously, it had been part of several medieval duchies and principalities in what is today the Belgian, Dutch, German and Luxemburgish border region, with a short period of French rule.

When my grandfather was born in 1929, it had been about 10 years that the region was incorporated into Belgium as a reparation for the First World War. At that time, deep societal cleavages split those who had come to terms with Belgium as new state and those who wanted the region to return to Germany. Such a return was briefly realised during the Second World War but repealed thereafter.

When my father was born in 1962, Belgium had just enacted a linguistic partition of the country into four areas with enhanced administrative facilities: a Dutch-speaking area, a French-speaking area, a bilingual area in Brussels and a German-speaking area. While the social life in the latter had been depoliticised since the end of the war due to shame for the German past, political parties had by then taken enough self-confidence again to start discussing the region's autonomy situation. Following the federalisation demands of the Flemish and Walloon movements, they would soon claim to be recognised on equal footing as own entity in a multinational Belgian federation.

When I was born in 1993, it had been 20 years that the German-speaking Community obtained an own elected council, 10 years that the latter disposed of legislative powers, 2 years that the German text of the Belgian Constitution acquired legal force and 5 months that Belgium was officially a federal state. While this met most of the requests issued over time by German-speaking parties, they still demand to receive all political competences that other federal entities have obtained.

Now that I write these lines in 2021, Belgian parties on both sides of the linguistic border argue that the distribution of competences in the federal state has become so heterogeneous that it hinders political action on all federal levels. While some argue in favour of simplification by recentralising competences, others want to achieve this through further decentralisation.

This short political history of the region in which I grew up and still spend a lot of my time illustrates how profoundly the political authorities exercised on a territory can change over a few generations. It also shows that the vertical reorganisation of political power across different territorial units comes with political competition through the interplay of political demands and political responses, that can occur both in large and small political communities. At the same time, it makes one wonder about the precise determinants of this autonomy mobilisation and conferral: How come that greater self-determination is demanded within certain sub-state communities? How come that state elites sometimes accept these demands but sometimes not? Equally, how do autonomy demands and refusal or acceptances mutually influence each other and evolve? Their importance for public policy, social cohesion and

democracy, my personal fascination for where political power is located, and my personal background as German-speaking Belgian – whatever this means – brought me to dedicate the present dissertation to these questions.

Throughout my work on this dissertation, I have accumulated numerous debts, many of which words do not suffice to acknowledge. First of all, I would like to express my deep gratitude towards my supervisors Jérémy Dodeigne (Université de Namur) and Min Reuchamps (Université catholique de Louvain) for having guided me through the PhD with incredible availability, kindness and attention in multiple regards. I would also like thank Frédéric Bouhon (Université de Liège) and Nicola McEwen (University of Edinburgh) for all their invaluable comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of the thesis as members of the doctoral committee. Special thanks go to Sandra León (Universidad Carlos III, Madrid) and Arjan Schakel (Universitetet i Bergen) for having accepted to examine my PhD and to join the jury. Their numerous and detailed comments during the private defence have greatly contributed to the improvement of this revised manuscript. Last but not least, I would like to thank Nathalie Burnay (Université de Namur and Université catholique de Louvain) for having accepted to chair the jury.

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Louvain-la-Neuve, Namur and Bütgenbach
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Introduction

Chapter 1. Introduction

Throughout the last century, many countries around the world have delegated decision-making powers from the state to sub-state entities (Hooghe & Marks, 2016). In some of them, the distribution of political competences among levels of government has led to significant political conflict between state and sub-state actors – mostly when sub-state entities nourished own political identities and aimed to take over many (if not all) functions of government. The autonomy movements in Catalonia, Flanders, Scotland are some prominent cases in this respect. However, there are also smaller and less mediatised sub-state entities in which substantive demands for greater self-rule have been issued in the past, like Asturias in Spain, the German-speaking Community in Belgium or Cornwall in the United Kingdom, to only cite a few.

When considering that in such cases, the conferral of sub-state autonomy can both accommodate autonomy demands and incite news ones, whereas the non-conferral of autonomy can equally either silence autonomy demands or exacerbate them, states are faced with a paradox (Erk & Anderson, 2009). In light of the great variation of sub-state autonomy demands and statutes in the past, we are left wondering (i) when the autonomy demands of such sub-state entities arise and when they evolve, and (ii) when autonomy statutes are granted to them and when they evolve.

These questions are at the centre of the present dissertation that aims at providing a systematic research of the conditions under which both mobilisation in favour of sub-state autonomy and institutional restructuring to confer it occur. In this introductory chapter, I start by problematising the research and by outlining the puzzle it aims to address. I go on by presenting how the dissertation proceeds to offer an answer to the research question. I conclude with a summary of the main theoretical, methodological and empirical arguments that will be made throughout the thesis.

1. The puzzle

In the course of history, political sovereignty, or what Keating (2001, 2012) tried to disentangle as the multi-faceted exercise of political authority over a population and a territory, has been understood and organised in very different ways by very different societies. While ancient societies were above all organised on a tribal basis with or without rulers, antique and medieval societies started to concentrate political power – either in the form of very small city states, or in the form of very large empires that federated smaller heterogeneous political entities (Van Creveld, 1999). Both city states and empires started to concentrate political power in an organised and sometimes hierarchical manner, but they did not require all legislative authority to be central, nor did they require political identities to be

singular and exclusive (Spruyt, 1996). It was only with the modern nation-state, which further concentrated political, economic and bureaucratic power (Tilly, 1992), that political sovereignty was envisaged as to be exercised (i) on one defined territory (ii) by one central legislative authority (iii) for a population subscribing to one national political identity (Mann, 1993; Chernilo, 2008).

While the modern nation-state has been seen in Western Europe from the mid-17th to the mid-20th century as the most suitable territorial unit for both the exercise of political sovereignty and political identification, other territorial units – above and below – increasingly appear to be of similar importance for many people's national identification and aspire taking part in the exercise of sovereignty (Colomer, 2007). *Above*, states agreed to delegate political competences to international organisations like the European Union and although some modernist scholars predicted national identities to decline in light of the globalisation process (Hobsbawm, 1992, p. 191), it seems today that national and supra-national identities are rather cumulative (Duchesne & Frognier, 2008, p. 162; Westle & Segatti, 2016). *Below*, sub-national identities appear to be of growing importance for people – usually as a complement but sometimes even as opposed to state-wide national identities (Miller, 2000, pp. 127-131), and many states entrust sub-state entities with increasing political competences (Hooghe, Marks, & Schakel, 2010).

The situation of political competences below the state level, called henceforth 'decentralisation'[1], has followed different trajectories and rationales, and has taken very different degrees and types in the past. When looking at the trajectories of decentralisation, one can see that it either comes with a *centripetal* or a *centrifugal* state-building (Bryce, 1901; as cited by Burgess, 2006, pp. 17-18). This means respectively that sub-state entities either enjoy particular political competences because they already detained them when they came together to form a state, or that they were granted them following a departing tendency from the state. Equally, two different rationales of decentralisation have been observed in the past (Hooghe & Marks, 2016). On the one hand, decentralisation followed a *sociological* rationale when states delegated power to accommodate the sovereignty claims of territories or communities with distinct political identities. On the other hand, decentralisation followed a *functional* rationale when states aimed at providing public goods at the most efficient level of governance from an organisational perspective – regardless of sociological sub-state distinctiveness. While both rationales can exist independently from each other, they are often combined to some extent – with one of the two prevailing. Finally, the decentralisation of political competences has not only followed different trajectories and rationales but has also taken very different degrees and types (Dardanelli, 2019). Indeed, while decentralisation was limited to administrative competences in some cases, it went as far as to confer full legislative powers for numerous policy domains in others.

[1] By doing so, I follow the Anglo-Saxon scholarly tradition. One should note, however, that in the French (and especially legal) tradition, 'décentralisation' is often used to refer to the competences of municipal entities or to the functioning of local democracy in general (e.g. Balzacq et al., 2014, pp. 118-120; Behrendt & Bouhon, 2014, pp. 385-388).

Depending on how far decentralisation goes, which trajectory it took and which of the two aforementioned rationales is prevalent, state structures with eight different patterns of decentralisation can be identified. They are summarised in Table 1. On the one hand, we have countries whose decentralisation has followed rather functional rationales. Among them, there are states like the Netherlands or the United States of America that were formed centripetally through the coming-together of sub-state entities. While the Dutch provinces did so by keeping only administrative powers on the sub-state level, the American states entered a federal union and preserved significant legislative autonomy. In cases like France or Brazil, in turn, the decentralisation of political power can be conceived as centrifugal insofar as it was posterior to the state creation, even if it was introduced top-down rather than following sub-state mobilisation. While in metropolitan France, the regional decentralisation never exceeded administrative powers, legislative competences were delegated to the Brazilian states after the creation of the federation. On the other hand, there were countries whose decentralisation has followed sociological rationales. In countries like Italy or Switzerland, for example, the decentralisation was grounded in the coming-together nature of the state creation. While this led the Swiss cantons to preserve important legislative powers, the so-called 'ordinary' regions in Italy were only entrusted with administrative powers. In countries like the United Kingdom or Belgium, in turn, sub-state entities have obtained decentralisation following centrifugal pressures to the state. This decentralisation was administrative in Wales until 2011 (when it also obtained legislative competences), while it was legislative in Belgium.

One should note that these are ideal-types and that hybrid situations as well as evolutions are possible. In the same state, some sub-state entities can indeed be based on a functional decentralisation rationale, while others are based on a sociological one. In France, for example, alongside the mainly functional regionalisation, there has also been sub-state mobilisation along sociological lines in Corsica and Brittany in favour greater autonomy (that was not followed by the state). Similarly, the autonomy of some entities within a state might have centripetal origins, like the 'ordinary' Italian regions, while others have succeeded in centrifugal mobilisation, like the 'autonomous' Italian regions. Finally, in the same state, there can be entities with administrative and legislative competences, like in the United Kingdom until 2011 when Scotland had primary law-making powers while Wales had only secondary ones.

Table 1. Decentralisation patterns by rationale, trajectory and type

		Rationale and trajectory			
		Functional		Sociological	
		Centripetal	Centrifugal	Centripetal	Centrifugal
Type	Administrative decentralisation	1 e.g. Netherlands Since 1839	3 e.g. France Since 1956	5 e.g. Italy (ordin. regions) Since 1948	7 e.g. Wales 1999-2011
	Legislative decentralisation	2 e.g. USA Since 1776	4 e.g. Brazil Since 1889	6 e.g. Switzerland Since 1848	8 e.g. Belgium Since 1970

The objective of this typology is to identify different patterns of decentralisation and to show that they are be subject to different political dynamics. Decentralisation that has its

origins in a centripetal state-building is usually less contended because it is seen by both state and sub-state actors as granted and as the constitutional basis of the newly created state (Bryce, 1901; as cited by Burgess, 2006, p. 18). This does not mean, however, that there cannot be transition to centrifugal dynamics when additional autonomy demands come up in some sub-state entities, as exemplified above with the Italian case. Similarly, functional decentralisation, tends to be subject to less salient political dynamics because it is envisioned as a mean for efficient multi-level organisation rather than for recognising distinct political communities. When it incites further decentralisation, it is rather for logics of scale than of identity (Hooghe & Marks, 2016, pp. 1-4). The most salient political dynamics can be found among cases of sociological decentralisation with a centrifugal trajectory. It is there, indeed, where sub-state entities nourish own political identities that complement or compete with that of the state and ask for taking part in or even take over the exercise of sovereignty with a departing tendency from the state because they consider themselves as different political communities with the right to (co-)decide (Keating, 1996, 2001; Coakley, 2012).

In their aspiration to take over (parts of) the exercise of political power, two types of moments have been particularly contested by state and sub-state actors in such cases of centrifugal sociological decentralisation: (i) the shift from administrative to legislative autonomy, and (ii) the subsequent extension of competences over different policy fields. In Belgium, for example, the federalisation of the country with legislative powers for sub-state entities in 1970 and each extension of their competences have all been moments of major political turmoil (Deschouwer, 2012). In the United Kingdom, the 'devolution' of legislative powers to Scotland and Wales was heavily contested until the 1990s, just as was the extension of their statutes once in place (R. Deacon, 2012). In Spain, it was only after important regional mobilisation in the 1970s and 1980s that 'autonomous' statutes with legislative powers were envisioned for communities other than Catalonia, the Basque Country or Galicia and two competence extensions have thereafter equally fuelled political discussions (Magone, 2008). In centralised cases like metropolitan France, in turn, demands for regional legislative autonomy have been repeatedly rejected until today – even when faced with violent upheavals like in Corsica, whose assembly's acts still need national parliamentary assent to acquire legal force (Kernalegenn & Pasquier, 2018).

This heavy political competition comes with the fact that most state actors are reluctant to give away more than administrative powers from the state to the sub-state level, but even when they are willing to decentralise legislative autonomy or extend it, states face what has been called the 'paradox of autonomy' (L. M. Anderson, 2004), the 'dilemma of recognition' (De Zwart, 2005) or, more commonly, the 'paradox of federalism' (Erk & Anderson, 2009). While one might think that responding to sub-state demands by granting legislative autonomy should accommodate them, it has been shown that the decentralisation in some policy areas can also incite further demands in other areas and that the conferred legislative autonomy provides sub-state entities with the necessary political space and resources to intensify the political competition. Conversely, not granting legislative autonomy can prevent these spaces and resources to be provided and try to silence autonomy demands by ignoring

them, but it can also frustrate sub-state demand and exacerbate the political tensions. Ultimately, when having to respond to sub-state autonomy demands, the state is thus in the dilemma that both the conferral and non-conferral can paradoxically accommodate and/or exacerbate the demands.

In the past, very different sub-state autonomy demands and state responses to them have been formulated. While some sub-state entities demanded own political competences with legislative powers and obtained them after long periods of sub-state mobilisation (e.g. Flanders in Belgium, the Basque Country and Catalonia in Spain, Scotland and Wales in the United Kingdom) or following the mobilisation of other entities (e.g. the so-called 'non-historic' autonomous communities in Spain or the German-speaking Community in Belgium), others demanded own sub-state autonomy but did not obtain it (e.g. Cornwall in the United Kingdom or Corsica in France). Furthermore, autonomy demands have subsequently evolved in some sub-state entities but not in others and, equally, additional competences were conferred to some of them but not to others.

When thinking about the paradox of federalism, this variation is puzzling. More specifically, we are left wondering about two sets of pairwise questions, summarised in Table 2. First, one wonders about the starting point of the phenomenon, which is the initial sub-state challenge to the state: (1a) when do legislative autonomy demands come up? Secondly, one wonders when states give in to these demands, while facing the dilemma that the decentralisation of legislative powers can have both accommodating and exacerbating consequences: (2a) when do states accept to confer legislative autonomy? Thirdly, one wonders about the evolution of autonomy demands, namely when they get appeased or exacerbated and if this happens in the presence or absence of conferred legislative autonomy: (1b) when do legislative autonomy demands evolve, i.e. increase, decrease or disappear? Finally, one wonders when states amend autonomy statutes, while still facing the paradox: (2b) when do states reform autonomy statutes, i.e. increase, decrease or withdraw them?

Table 2. The paradox of federalism and the questions derived on this basis

Paradox	
Confer legislative autonomy →	Accommodate/Silence sub-state demands
No confer legislative autonomy →	Exacerbate sub-state demand
Questions derived	
2a) When do states confer legislative autonomy?	1a) When do legislative autonomy demand come up?
2b) When do states reform autonomy statutes, i.e. increase, decrease or withdraw them?	1b) When do legislative autonomy demands evolve, i.e. increase, decrease or disappear?

These questions have furthermore important implications for politics and society beyond the paradox of federalism. Different degrees of sub-state autonomy allow indeed for different degrees of regional public policy, which – together with own institutions – contribute to the development of own political spaces and identities on the sub-state level (Keating & McEwen, 2005). These spaces alter not only the social and political conception of

the state but also the relations between the state and its sub-state entities, and even between sub-state entities themselves (Erk & Swenden, 2010b). Ultimately, one touches upon the question of self-determination and the appropriate balance between socio-political unity and diversity (Burgess & Gagnon, 2010).

Given the political relevance and maturity of the question, a vast body of existing literature has been established on the topic. Five major theoretical strands can be distinguished: sociological theories emphasising the importance of group identities, grievances and statewide nationalisms (e.g. Livingston, 1952; Lipset & Rokkan, 1967; Gurr, 1993; Erk, 2008); economic theories being concerned with the relative distribution of wealth across sub-state entities (e.g. Keating & Loughlin, 1997; Dalle Mulle, 2017); institutionalist theories explaining how institutionalised political spaces influence state and sub-state actors' perceptions and decisions (e.g. Hall & Taylor, 1996); functionalist theories pointing to the potential for political and institutional spillover (e.g. Haas, 1958; Hombrado, 2011); and rational-choice theories emphasising the mechanisms through which interests-based calculations shape the behaviour of state and sub-state elites (e.g. Riker, 1964, 1969; Türsan, 1998; Alonso, 2012).

Numerous studies that are reviewed in greater detail in chapter 2 have tested these theories and found confirmatory evidence for all of them in different cases and with varying approaches. Although they offer valuable insights into the political dynamics of centrifugal sociological decentralisation, two shortcomings should be noted. While the first is methodological, the second is theoretical.

First, no unified framework has yet been developed to assess the extent of autonomy demands and statutes jointly. Yet, a directly comparable assessment of both would be necessary to directly compare the evolution of autonomy demands and statutes over time – in order to see how they mutually influence each other. In addition to enabling within-case comparisons of autonomy demands and statutes, a unified framework would allow for cross-case comparisons and, thereby, for the assessment of mutual influence and spillovers. Both are important for a systematic analysis of when autonomy demands and statues come up and evolve.

Secondly, there is until now little comparative theoretical dialogue between studies. Most of them have indeed been elaborated based on in-depth studies of few cases with various explanatory factors (e.g. Parks & Elcock, 2000; Fitjar, 2009; Dodeigne, Gramme, Reuchamps, & Sinardet, 2016), through large-n comparative accounts with a limited number of determinants (e.g. Toubeau & Wagner, 2015; Zuber & Szöcsik, 2015; Röth & Kaiser, 2019) or through meta-analyses comparing the findings of different studies for different cases (De Winter, 1998a; Müller-Rommel, 1998; Gomez, De Winter, & Lynch, 2006; Mazzoleni & Müller, 2016). Those who carry out a cross-theoretical comparison for a substantive amount of cases identify mainly the individual importance of factors from different theoretical strands (Hooghe & Marks, 2016; Massetti & Schakel, 2016).

However, in addition to knowing that sociological differences, the economy, institutions, spillovers and interests can matter, one would like to know to which extent and how they

interact, prove relevant in different cases and at different stages of the decentralisation process. For that to know, though, we need a systematic comparative theoretical assessment. Only through this, we get a better understanding of how factors are not only individually important but play out differently in different cases and in different combinations at different stages of the process, which provides an enhanced understanding of when autonomy demands and statutes arise and evolve.

The objective of the present dissertation is to take up on this and to broaden the scope of the existing literature by systematically comparing the presence or absence of factors from each aforementioned theoretical strand to the extent of autonomy demands and conferral over time in typical cases of centrifugal sociological decentralisation. Thereby, the aim is not to prove existing theories right or wrong in particular cases. Rather, I want to show (i) at which moments of the demand and conferral processes and (ii) in which combination, factors from different theoretical strands interact and appear to be important from a cross-case perspective. In doing so, I adopt a constellational approach of causality with a theory-building ambition. It follows that the research is not a normative but an empirical one. I do indeed not want to argue why some sub-state entities should mobilise and/or receive autonomy. Instead, I want to uncover in a more precise manner when some entities do mobilise and/or receive autonomy at different points in time.

2. The plan

To address this research problem, the remainder of the dissertation proceeds in three parts. A first part is dedicated to the theoretical and methodological framework of the research and comprises three chapters. Chapter 2 will develop on the already mentioned dynamics of sub-state mobilisation and restructuring in order to specify how autonomy demands and statutes are understood. After a review of existing scholarship on the evolution of autonomy demands and statutes, the contribution of the present study is specified. I proceed by defining how the research conceives sub-state entities, from then on called 'sub-state communities', and justifies the selection of three countries under study – Belgium, Spain and the United Kingdom – all being typical cases of sociological decentralisation with a centrifugal trajectory. It concludes with the selection of 31 sub-state entities to be studied within these three countries. Chapter 3 is dedicated to the measurement of sub-state autonomy in the cases under study. After a review of existing indicators, an own indicator is developed based on the needs of the present research. It is also situated and critically discussed vis-à-vis existing ones. Chapter 4, finally, presents the rationale of the Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) that is used to systematically compare in the presence or absence of which factors autonomy demands and statutes arise and evolve. After the selection and operationalisation of the factors under study, a variant that renders the method suitable for longitudinal analyses is developed.

In the second part of the dissertation, the results of the analyses are presented in four chapters. Chapter 5 starts with a historical overview on the sub-state autonomy history in

Belgium, Spain and the United Kingdom. It goes on by presenting the evolution of sub-state autonomy demands and statutes in each of the three studied countries using the scale I developed. On this basis, different overall patterns of sub-state autonomy demands and conferral are derived. The three following chapters detail the results of the QCA and show when autonomy demands by regionalist parties arise and evolve (chapter 6), when the autonomy demands of traditional parties arise and evolve (chapter 7) and when the autonomy statutes of sub-state entities are put into place and evolve (chapter 8).

The third part of the dissertation discusses these results in two chapters. Chapter 9 looks back at them and compares which theoretical strands have proven important at different moments of the demand and conferral process. On this basis, two 'waves' of centrifugal sociological decentralisation are identified as an overarching tendency and pattern of the studied phenomenon. After examining what this tells us about the accommodation and exacerbation of sub-state autonomy demands through the paradox of federalism, I look at the recent political dynamics in the three countries to formulate a few expectations about future evolutions and a possible third wave. In the concluding chapter 10, I summarise the main lessons of the dissertation, discuss its limitations and propose a few avenues for further research on this basis.

3. The arguments

Throughout the dissertation, nine major arguments are made. Three of them are theoretical and concern the way the study has been conceptualised. Two of them are methodological and concern the way the analysis has been conceived. Four of them are empirical and concern the interpretation of the results.

The theoretical arguments of the thesis assert that:

- Because sub-state mobilisation and restructuring are the driving forces behind the political dynamics of centrifugal sociological decentralisation, and because they mutually influence each other substantively, a research trying to comprehensively tap into the determinants of these dynamics needs to study sub-state mobilisation and restructuring jointly.
- Since both regionalist and traditional parties are core actors of the autonomist mobilisation in sub-state entities, and since they politically compete and influence each other's position on the autonomy question, both need to be considered jointly in a comprehensive analysis of sub-state mobilisation.
- To account for the important qualitative difference between administrative and legislative autonomy, and to account for the distribution of competences between the state and sub-state levels in a fine-grained manner, sub-state autonomy needs to be measured in kind, in degree and by competences and the same time.

The methodological arguments of the thesis maintain that:

- In a longitudinal QCA, conditions need to be disaggregated temporarily with change-based intervals (CBIs), i.e. each time when cases' membership in either a condition or the outcome under study change, because it prevents contradictory condition realities from falling within a single interval, because it avoids empirical redundancies over several intervals and because it is the most accurate way to reflect the moment in which empirical realities change.
- The artificial contradictions that can arise from change-based case disaggregation should be resolved with a flexible lag condition (FLC) that consists in capturing each change in either the combination of conditions or the outcome under study, because it resolves both contradictions coming with identical combinations of conditions that are separated by an unnecessary condition for sufficiency and contradictions coming with the fact that a combination of conditions might need time to translate into the outcome.

The empirical arguments of thesis contend that:

- The rise and increase of autonomy demands and statutes were driven in the cases under study by a combination of sociological (and economic) and rational-choice factors for strongly distinctive and aggrieved sub-state communities, and by a combination of sociological, functionalist, institutionalist and rational-choice factors for sub-state communities with weaker distinctiveness and grievances, to which the demands and statutes of the former have spilled over.
- The temporal sequencing of these developments allows to interpret the dynamics of centrifugal sociological decentralisation through two 'waves', the first of which comes with autonomy demands and statutes in sub-state communities with strong sociological distinctiveness that, in turn, incite a second wave among sub-state communities with weaker (yet present) forms of distinctiveness, as well as their own extension.
- The findings of the research confirm that the paradox of federalism needs to be acknowledged to a large extent as a political dilemma that cannot be fully resolved, because both the conferral and non-conferral of sub-state autonomy lead to an increase of autonomy demands; but that the non-conferral of sub-state autonomy can be expected to lead to a greater exacerbation of autonomy demands in large and strongly distinctive and aggrieved sub-state communities, while the non-conferral of autonomy in smaller or less distinctive and aggrieved sub-state communities appeared to lead to the persistence of the autonomy demands, which conferrals accommodated after gradual increases.
- Based on the longer-term perspective of the analyses and the recent evolutions in the cases under study, there are four evolutions that seem plausible as a continuation of the first two waves of centrifugal sociological decentralisation: partial de-federalisation – which would lead to a halt of current decentralisation dynamics at some point for some sub-state communities; quasi confederalisation – which would push current decentralisation dynamics to the end in other sub-state communities; independence – which would lead to the accession to independence for some sub-state communities; and differentiated de- and

re-federalisation – which would constitute a reform model where competences can be de- and recentralised depending on the preferences of state and sub-state actors at different moments in time.

With these lessons, I hope to contribute to a better understanding of sub-state autonomy mobilisation and restructuring in countries where these dynamics are most salient, namely those witnessing centrifugal sociological decentralisation. More concretely, knowing which combinations of conditions lead to the rise and evolution of sub-state autonomy demands and statutes, how this evolution can be interpreted, what are the consequences for the accommodation and exacerbation of political dynamics on the sub-state level and what future evolutions can be expected, are lessons that should inform academics studying, decision-makers governing and citizens living in multi-level states.

Part I.
Theoretical and methodological framework

Chapter 2.
Sub-state communities and the dynamics of sub-state mobilisation and restructuring

To study the determinants of centrifugal sociological decentralisation as outlined in the previous chapter, four points must be specified: (i) How do sub-state mobilisation and restructuring relate to each other and what are in fact autonomy demands and autonomy statutes? (ii) What knowledge does already exist on the evolution of autonomy demands and statutes and how does the present study contribute to it? (iii) What are sub-state entities and how to define them? (iv) And which sub-state entities are studied in the present research? This chapter aims at clarifying these points and dedicates a section to each of them.

1. The dynamics of sub-state mobilisation and restructuring – between autonomy demands and statutes

Centrifugal sociological decentralisation comes with the interplay of two dynamics that mutually influence each other: sub-state mobilisation, i.e. demands from a sub-state entity addressed to the central state asking for more political autonomy; and sub-state restructuring, i.e. state responses that reshuffle the territorial organisation of the state by creating new sub-state entities and/or by conferring specific political competences and prerogatives to them.

In the past, 'political autonomy' has been associated with different objects – from the recognition of the entity, its delimitation, habits, language and symbols, to special assistance, guaranteed representation and self-government rights (Levy, 2000, p. 25). Etymologically, 'autonomy' qualifies the possibility for someone or something to live according to his/her/its own rules (in classical Greek, 'auto' means 'self'; 'nomos' means 'rule' or 'law', see Oxford English Dictionary, 2018), which can indeed refer to a broad range of prerogatives. In this research, however, I focus on three aspects of autonomy that appeared most salient in cases of centrifugal sociological decentralisation: group rights, self-rule and shared rule.

Self-rule consists in the capacity of a political community to take decisions for itself by itself. It is the core-business of political autonomy in that it enables decisions and regional public policy to be enacted on the sub-state level (Dardanelli, 2019). Its political saliency comes with the distribution of competences between state and sub-state levels and with the political competition resulting from sub-state actors' demands to the state for competences over additional areas of government.

Shared rule, in turn, consists in the capacity of a political community to participate in the making of decisions that concern the entire state and, consequently, all of its political communities. While some see it as the counter-part of self-rule in that it complements the decision-making power of sub-state entities (Hooghe et al., 2016), others argued that shared rule should be treated separately because it relies on the notion of *influence* rather than on that of *autonomy* (Dardanelli, 2019). I side with the former because participating in decisions that affect the state as a whole, and by consequence the political community itself, is not only a question of influencing state decisions but also contributes *in fine* to a sub-state entity's capacity to live according to its own rules. Shared rule has proven politically salient when sub-state actors aimed at being included in central state decisions and at ensuring that their voice has as much weight as that of other sub-state entities.

Group rights, finally, consist in the capacity of a political community to preserve its culture and use its language in the main state institutions (e.g. administration, education, judiciary) – provided that these are features that distinguish the community from the rest of a states' society. Cultural and linguistic diversity has indeed not concerned all political communities in cases of centrifugal sociological decentralisation. But those for which it does, have often seen salient demands for such prerogatives come up prior to demands for self- and share rule (Gevers, Willemsen, & Witte, 1998). Rather than focussing on decisions taken by sub-state entities, group rights focus on their recognition as political community in its own right and on the integration of their particularities into state institutions.

These three aspects of autonomy, whose dimensions and measurement will be further specified in chapter 3, have been the object of significant sub-state mobilisation and restructuring, both of which relate to each other in multiple ways. Usually, mobilisation precedes restructuring – at least in one sub-state entity of the state. After a demand has been issued, the state decides to which extent it reacts and accepts it. In this case, state and sub-state institutions are restructured. As pointed out earlier, both accepting and refusing sub-state demands can paradoxically lead to the accommodation and/or exacerbation of autonomy demands (Hechter, 2000; De Zwart, 2005; Erk & Anderson, 2009; L. M. Anderson, 2010). In the latter case, it is the restructuring (or its absence) that precedes the mobilisation. This can happen when (i) only a part (or none) of the autonomy demand is met or (ii) when the conferred competences incite the sub-state entity for demanding more. It is also possible that (iii) the conferred autonomous institutions and/or competences provide the sub-state entity with the necessary political space and resources to structure its organisation and issue more substantive demands. Finally, (iv) sub-state entities can also receive competences they did not demand for reasons of symmetry – be it policy symmetry or institutional symmetry across different sub-state entities deemed necessary by the state.

The ambiguous consequences of sub-state restructuring on sub-state mobilisation led to a heavy debate between so-called 'consociationalists' around Arend Lijphart (2004) and so-called 'centripetalists' around Donald Horowitz (1993). The former argue that sub-state autonomy demands should be met with segmental autonomy to appease them (e.g. McCulloch, 2013; L. Anderson, 2014). The latter, however, contend that institutional

recognition of sub-state entities freezes societal cleavages along ethnic lines and will therefore exacerbate autonomy demands. Instead, they suggest that power-sharing institutions who incentivise cross-ethnic support (through vote-pooling for example) will more effectively appease sub-state autonomy demands (e.g. Reilly, 2001; Roeder, 2009). In light of the contradictory empirical evidence that is found in support of both schools, there have been recent efforts to explore the conditions under which consociationalist and centripetalist institutions can be combined (Reilly, 2012; Bogaards, 2019).

Considering that sub-state mobilisation and restructuring are the driving forces behind the political dynamics of centrifugal sociological decentralisation and that they mutually influence each other in an important manner, a first theoretical argument of this thesis is that a research trying to fully tap into the determinants of these dynamics needs to study sub-state mobilisation and restructuring jointly.

a) Sub-state mobilisation – what are autonomy demands and which ones are considered here

Sub-state mobilisation, or the demand of sub-state autonomy, has both a quite heterogeneous agency and content. There are indeed various actors that can demand more political autonomy for a community and/or territory (the relation between communities and territories will be explored in greater detail in the next section). It usually starts with regional elites that use the entities' language, history, geography or economy to make the case in favour of a regional political distinctiveness that deserves own political rights (Keating, 1996; Türsan, 1998). Depending on how broadly these ideas are shared by the regional society and how open the political space is, a regionalist movement can organise in the form of civil society groups (Hroch, 2000; S. L. Greer, 2012) – up until the creation of own political parties (De Winter & Türsan, 1998). Several regionalist parties exist in one entity when the movement is significant and/or divided by another political cleavage or claim (Müller-Rommel, 1998). In addition to this diversity, the agency of sub-state entities is further complexified by the fact that, even within individual organisations or parties, members can have diverse opinions and preferences (Dodeigne, Niessen, Reuchamps, & Sinardet, 2020).

In the present research, I approach sub-state entities' autonomy demands by taking into consideration the position of political parties within the entity and I do so for three main reasons. First, because despite the heterogeneous preferences of their members, parties have official positions that are recognised both by their members and other political actors they interact with. Secondly, because they compete in elections and can make a certain claim of representativeness for the public opinion in their sub-state entity – depending on their electoral result. Thirdly, because they are the ones that negotiate with state officials about questions of autonomy and are hence the main actors on the demand-side of the demand-conferral interplay.

Among the political parties under consideration, I distinguish between regionalist and traditional political parties. By regionalist parties, I refer to political organisations competing in regional or national elections whose foundational issue is the defence of a particular

territory or community's political interest and/or autonomy (Urwin, 1983; Newman, 1997; Müller-Rommel, 1998; Strmiska, 2003; Dandoy, 2010). These are the parties whose *raison d'être* and core business is sub-state autonomy, and that the literature traditionally pictures as reference for the autonomy demands in sub-state entities (Hepburn, 2009; Elias & Tronconi, 2011; Massetti & Schakel, 2016, 2017). By traditional parties, I refer to political organisations which compete in regional or national elections on the original political cleavages, i.e. the economic or philosophical one (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967; Katz & Mair, 1994; Bartolini & Mair, 2007), and which are usually those detaining power in government. One should note that I do thus not relate the term 'traditional' to their age but to them being in power and following one of the traditionally main liberal, socialist or centrist positions. The reason for looking at traditional parties is that, even if they are usually seen as the competitors and those threatened by regionalist parties, some traditional parties take-up the autonomist question because of this very threat or as a political strategy and become defenders of more moderate forms of sub-state autonomy (O'Neill, 2003). By doing so, the autonomist traditional party becomes a driver of autonomy when it participates in government (Toubeau, 2018). The salience of this stance is further increased when another traditional party positions itself strategically against the autonomist question and the most autonomous traditional party (Mitchell, 1998; Toubeau, 2011; León, 2017).

Since both regionalist and traditional parties are core actors of the autonomist mobilisation in sub-state entities, and since they politically compete and influence each other's position on the autonomy question, a second theoretical argument of this thesis is that both need to be considered jointly in a comprehensive analysis of sub-state mobilisation.

Recent research has moved in this direction, most notably by integrating traditional parties in datasets on party positions on sub-state autonomy (see for example the Chapel Hill expert survey (Bakker et al., 2015) or the ethnopolitics and party competition (EPAC) dataset (Szöcsik & Zuber, 2015; Zuber & Szöcsik, 2019), where both regionalist and traditional party positions on territorial autonomy are measured with 0-10 scales). However, empirical analyses and joint considerations remain scarce. I would like to take-up on this and study under which conditions both regionalist and traditional party demands in favour of autonomy arise and evolve.

In a sub-state entity, the autonomy question can be driven by different regionalist and traditional parties. There can indeed be several regionalist parties that compete on the autonomy question and that differ regarding the radicalness of their autonomy demands or regarding their position on traditional political (left-right) cleavages. In turn, there can also be several traditional parties that take up the autonomy question – be it for strategic or ideological reasons. With such a high number of actors, it becomes not only difficult to operationalise the sub-state autonomy demands within a sub-state entity, but it is also is very time consuming to assess all of their positions in a precise manner. However, since such precision is important to allow for a direct comparison between degrees of demanded and obtained autonomy, I decided to focus only on one regionalist and one traditional party at a given point in time in each studied sub-state entity. While this reduces the depth with which

the party system of a sub-state entity is assessed, there is one type of regionalist and one type of traditional parties that stand out and that can be considered most relevant for a sub-state entity's autonomy mobilisation.

For regionalist parties, a discriminating criterion is the popular support they gain during elections. When different regionalist parties compete, the share of votes they obtain can indeed indicate which one has the largest support in the population and hence formulates the autonomy demand that can be deemed most representative for regionalist voters within a sub-state entity.[2] In my analysis, I therefore approach the regionalist party demand within a sub-state entity by taking into consideration the official position of the regionalist party that has obtained the largest share of votes in regional and national elections. In the Basque Country, for example, this leads me to consider the highly autonomist PNV as regionalist party of reference, rather than the radical independentist EH Bildu. However, in order to do justice to the effects that regionalist inter-party competition can have, the analyses will account for the presence of other regionalist competitors (see chapter 4, though with a less fine-grained account of their position for the reasons of feasibility as explained above).

For traditional parties, in turn, a discriminating criterion is the extent of the autonomy demand itself. While several traditional parties can have a positive attitude towards the autonomy question, there is indeed one that pushes most for it and also strategically portrays itself as the main non-regionalist party defending the autonomy cause in a sub-state community. Examples for this would be the CVP/CD&V in Flanders, the PSOE in Catalonia or the Labour party in Scotland (since the 1970s). In my analysis, I therefore approach the traditional party demand within a sub-state entity by taking into consideration the official position of the traditional party with the highest autonomy demand.[3] One should note that this traditional party demand is not to be confounded with the government's position. The latter will be accounted for by the degree of autonomy that has been granted to sub-state entities. Instead, by traditional party demand, I refer to the autonomy demand that is issued by the most autonomist traditional party and that thereby pushes the autonomy cause within a sub-state entity – to some extent as counterpart to the regionalist party demand.

[2] One might want to counter-argue that a regionalist party can get a higher amount of votes than another because of its position on a political issue that is not related to the autonomy question. In this case, the regionalist party with the highest amount of votes is not most representative of the regionalist voters within a sub-state entity. In my case studies, I paid attention to this issue and I encountered one case in which this argument could indeed be made. In Flanders, where the *Vlaams Blok* and its successor, the *Vlaams Belang*, competed with the *Volksunie* and its successor, the *Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie*, there were periods where the former got more votes than the later because of its radical right programme rather than because of its stance on the autonomy question (Van Haute & Pilet, 2006, p. 311; Deschouwer, 2009b, p. 560; Dandoy, 2010, p. 198). In these cases, I therefore decided to consider the position of the *Volksunie* and of the *Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie* as main regionalist party demand in the sub-state entity.

[3] If the position of the regional branch of the traditional party differs from that of the national party instances, I take the position of the regional branch because it is most representative for the traditional party's position in the sub-state entity.

Since my analysis is longitudinal and since both the popular support for regionalist parties and the autonomy positions of traditional parties can evolve over time, it is possible that different regionalist and traditional parties are considered issuing the relevant regionalist and traditional party demands at different points in time for the same sub-state entity. Equally, when two traditional parties issue the same autonomy demand, this same position is taken into consideration and attributed to both parties. As mentioned above, this focus on only one main regionalist and one main traditional party demand has the shortcoming of not accounting for the entire party system and its demands within a sub-state entity. In addition to the aforementioned reasons of feasibility, however, it also comes with the advantage of identifying two main kinds of demands that, although they are identified based on specific party positions, can be envisioned on a broader level of generality as the main macro-political autonomy demands within a sub-state entity.

b) Sub-state restructuring – what are autonomy statutes and which ones are considered here

Sub-state restructuring, or the institution of sub-state autonomy, comes with two main objects. The first consists in the institution (and delimitation) of a sub-state entity, while the second consists in the definition (and evolution) of its prerogatives. As Toubeau and Massetti (2013) explain, these two establish a special relationship between levels of government with three characteristics. First, the relationship is *continuous* insofar as both the demand and conferral of autonomy can vary and prerogatives can be both de- and re-centralised. Secondly, it is *asynchronous* insofar as the continuous process is neither linear nor does it evolve in regular intervals. Instead, evolutions appear at moments of critical political junctures. Thirdly, it is *open-ended* insofar as there is no predefined outcome and evolutions in different directions can occur at different moments.

The content of sub-state restructuring is just as heterogeneous as that of sub-state autonomy mobilisation (and analogous to it), but its form is much more structured because it comes with the adoption of legal documents that comprise all the prerogatives that are conferred to the entity. In the present research, I will hence also focus on the legal prerogatives conferred to sub-state entities in order to assess the extent of the autonomy statute that was conferred to them. One caveat to this structuredness that should be kept in mind is the difference between *legal* and *effective* prerogatives. Being legally entitled to exercise certain policy competences does indeed not guarantee that an entity can effectively do so when the exercise of one competence depends for example on that of other competences or requires coordination with other entities (Yang, Rounsevell, & Haggett, 2015).

When considering the extent of autonomy statutes, I have made the case in the introduction that two moments are particularly relevant. First, there is the shift from administrative to legislative autonomy. While the former entitles sub-state entities to administer itself the policies whose content has been determined on the state level, the latter entitles them to determine the content of their policies themselves. This distinction constitutes a critical in-kind difference of autonomy statutes whose content varies otherwise

in degree within these two categories. In many countries that witnessed centrifugal pressures for sociological decentralisation, like Belgium, Spain, Italy or the United Kingdom, the shift from administrative to legislative autonomy has been of particular saliency and it was only after intense political pressures and lengthy negotiations between state and sub-state actors that the latter agreed to decentralise legislative autonomy (Swenden, 2006). In some countries, like France, this is still a contentious issue and sub-state autonomy has remained on an administrative level (Kernalegenn & Pasquier, 2018). Legislative autonomy allows sub-state entities indeed to develop much more advanced territorial policies that can shape specific sub-state interests and institutions (Keating & McEwen, 2005). Secondly, there is the extension of competences over different policy fields and, more specifically, the distribution of competences between state and sub-state entities that is of critical importance and can lead to considerable tensions between both levels (Toubeau & Wagner, 2015).

Based on these considerations, a third theoretical argument of this thesis (that will be further developed in chapter 3) is that, if one wants to account for the critical political moments that are the shift from administrative to legislative autonomy as well as the extension of competences over policy fields, autonomy needs to be assessed *in kind*, *in degree* and *by competences* at the same time. Following the two previous arguments, this assessment needs to be made for (i) autonomy statutes, for (ii) autonomy demands by regionalist parties and for (iii) autonomy demands by traditional parties.

c) Critical moments in the evolution of sub-state mobilisation and restructuring

It has been shown above that the evolution of both sub-state autonomy demands and statutes is continuous, asynchronous and open-ended. However, I also made the case for why autonomy should be seen as varying in kind, in degree and by competences. More specifically, I have shown that there are two critical evolutions in the dynamics of centrifugal sociological decentralisation: the shift from administrative to legislative autonomy, and the extension of competences over policy fields. When thinking about these longitudinally, and when linking them back to the paradox of federalism that has been presented in the introduction as the puzzle of the research, there are four critical moments of change that deserve to be analysed separately, and to be analysed for both autonomy demands and statutes.[4]

The first critical moment comes with the shift from administrative to legislative autonomy. When autonomy demands change from administrative to legislative autonomy, it is usually the moment where a regionalist party comes up (because they often immediately start to demand legislative autonomy) or where a traditional party starts to become autonomist. For autonomy statues, it is usually the moment where own institutions are either conferred or significantly strengthened. I will refer to it as the 'arise' of autonomy demands or statutes.

[4] While the term 'critical moment' might lead some to think of that of 'critical juncture', one should note that the latter is usually associated with much more singular moments and therefore frequently subject to in-depth historical analyses (Capoccia, 2015).

The second critical moment comes with the enlargement of legislative autonomy. For autonomy demands, it is the moment where regionalist and/or traditional parties increase their demands and claim further competences. For autonomy statutes, it is the moment where they are reformed and where further competences are conferred. I will refer to it as the 'increase' of autonomy demands or statutes.

The third critical moment is the opposite of the second one and comes with the reduction of legislative autonomy. For autonomy demands, it would consist in regionalist or traditional parties decreasing their demands and claiming less competences. For autonomy statutes, it would consist in a recentralisation of previously decentralised competences. I will refer to it as the 'decrease' of autonomy demands or statutes.

Finally, the fourth critical moment is the opposite of the first and comes with the shift of legislative to administrative autonomy. For autonomy demands, it consists in the disappearance of a regionalist party (because they usually to not claim less than legislative autonomy) or of the autonomist stance of a traditional one. For autonomy statutes, it consists in the removal or significant weakening of legislative institutions. I will refer to this moment as the 'disappearance' of autonomy demand or statutes.

While these four moments have been presented here jointly for autonomy demands and statutes for reasons of symmetry, one should note that they can sequence very differently: with the rise of autonomy demands preceding the rise of autonomy statutes often in at least one sub-state entity of the state – with or without demand increases before the first conferral and with possible spillovers to other sub-state entities; the conferral, in turn, can be followed by one, several or no demand increases before a statute increase, decrease or disappearing. Equally, after having disappeared, autonomy demand and statutes can arise and evolve again.

In the analyses that follow and whose method is described in greater detail in chapter 4, each of these four moments will be considered distinctively for both autonomy demands and autonomy statutes in order to see what is specific for each of them. However, to do justice to my first theoretical argument, i.e. that autonomy demands and statutes need to be studied jointly, the extent of existing autonomy statutes will be integrated as conditions in the analyses of autonomy demands; and the extent of autonomy demands will be integrated as conditions in the analyses of autonomy statutes. While this joint consideration is static for each of the analyses, chapter 9 will bring all results together and, doing so, also provides a joint account of the dynamic evolution of autonomy demands and statutes.

Finally, one may wonder about the increase or decrease of administrative autonomy without shift to legislative autonomy and why it is not among the critical moments I identified as deserving separate analysis. In cases of centrifugal sociological decentralisation, there have indeed been important instances of increased administrative decentralisation, like the partition of ministries for both language communities in Belgium in the 1960s, like the instalment of the Mancomunitat in Catalonia in 1913, or like the instalment of the Scottish and Welsh offices in 1885 and 1964 in the United Kingdom. Since these are rather singular moments in many cases of centrifugal sociological decentralisation, however, and since they have not appeared as being a particular trigger for the paradox of federalism presented earlier

as puzzle of the research, I decided not to focus on them in the analyses. The data I collected and present in chapter 3, however are comprehensive and detailed enough for increases and decreases of administrative autonomy to be identified and could serve as basis for a separate inquiry.

2. Existing theories and knowledge on sub-state mobilisation and restructuring

The evolution of sub-state autonomy demands and statutes has attracted significant scholarly attention in the past because the two phenomena have been of political relevance in different parts of the world for several decennia already. Five major theoretical strands can be distinguished and are reviewed in this section: sociological theories, economic theories, institutionalist theories, functionalist theories and rational-choice theories. Factors explaining the variation of both autonomy demands and statutes can be found in each of these theoretical strands and will be presented accordingly. While some of them are relevant for both autonomy demands and statutes, others relate specifically to one of the two.

a) Sociological theories

The baseline of sociological theories of sub-state mobilisation and restructuring is that groups of people that see themselves as belonging to a political community that differs from what is defined by the state as the main national society will mobilise to obtain political recognition of their difference. That difference can be based on language, history, geography, religion or traditions, and it can be fostered by grievance experiences. The sociological definition of the national society is important insofar as its degree of inclusiveness influences the extent to which sub-state communities see themselves as different, and the extent to which state institutions feel able to accommodate autonomy claims without compromising the state position.

In his pioneering *Note on the Nature of Federalism*, William Livingston (1952) set the grounds for a sociological theory of sub-state mobilisation and restructuring when arguing that:

> "Every society, every nation if you will, is more or less closely integrated in accordance with its own peculiar historical, cultural, economic, political and other determinants. Each is composed of elements that feel themselves to be different from the other elements in varying degrees and that demand in varying degrees a means of self-expression. These diversities may turn on all sorts of questions – economic, religious, racial, historical; any of these can produce in a certain group within the population a demand for such self-expression" (p. 85).

With a similar argumentation when developing their theory of *Party Systems and Voter Alignments*, Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan (1967) attributed the development of a centre-periphery cleavage in societies to the presence of minority languages, distinct institutional histories and geographical (and political) distance from the centre. Numerous authors have followed this line of argumentation (e.g. Stein, 1968; Rokkan & Urwin, 1982;

Smiley, 1983; Schnapper, 1994; Seiler, 1994; Keating, 1996), the most recent and comprehensive of which is probably Jan Erk. In his aim of *Explaining Federalism*, Erk (2008) departs from Eckstein (1961) and Gellner's (1983) earlier work on state-society congruence and argues that:

> "When confronted with an ethno-linguistic structure that does not match the political one, the political structure gradually changes in the direction of congruence; not automatically, but through the influence of public policy concerns pursued by political actors. (…) Thus, if the "nation" is smaller than the unit defined by the political institutions, there will be devolutionary pressures on the unitary institutions. (…) On the other hand, when the "nation" is bigger than the unit marked off by political institutions, the tendency will be towards centralisation" (pp. 9-10).

Concerning the development of autonomy demands, abundant empirical research has followed to test the importance of sociological factors and received confirmatory evidence. One can distinguish between group-level studies which operationalised sociological differences based on the presence of a distinctive language, institutional history or geography among certain populations (Gourevitch, 1979; Hearl, Budge, & Pearson, 1996; De Winter, 1998a; Parks & Elcock, 2000; Fearon & Van Houten, 2002; Sorens, 2005; Gomez et al., 2006; Fitjar, 2009; Chernyha & Burg, 2012; Massetti & Schakel, 2016), and individual-level studies that tried to approximate differences with citizens' (Hamann, 1999; Bond & Rosie, 2010; Sinardet, De Winter, Dodeigne, & Reuchamps, 2017) or members of parliament's (MPs) subjective political identity (Dodeigne et al., 2016; León, 2017).

Delving further into the importance of sociological differences for autonomy demands, Ted Gurr (1993) showed in his longitudinal and cross-sectional work on *Why Minorities Rebel* that peripheral identities are enforced and autonomy demands are exacerbated when members of sub-state communities affirm to have political, economic or social grievances. His evidence received further support by theoretical and meta-analytical scholarship (Erk & Anderson, 2009; Mazzoleni & Müller, 2016).

Concerning the conferral of autonomy statutes, in turn, slightly less comparative empirical evidence exists but influential theoretical work and case-studies have shown that the degree of dominance of state nationalisms also matters. Either because it influences decision makers' conception of how power should be divided vertically in the state (Resnick, 1990; Lecours & Nootens, 2007; McEwen & Lecours, 2008), or because it conditions their ideological ability to accept autonomy demands in the presence of regionalist threats (Toubeau, 2018; Cetrà & Harvey, 2019).

b) Economic theories

Economic theories of sub-state mobilisation and restructuring, together with sociological theories, are often qualified as 'structuralist theories' in that they use macro-social factors like group identities or economic disparities to explain pressures for and the occurrence of institutional change (Erk & Koning, 2010). The baseline of economic theories is that

differences in the relative distribution of wealth across regions in a country can also create or foster feelings of differentness and/or contribute to group-based grievances or greed.

Several of the aforementioned scholars working on the theorisation of sociological factors also took into consideration economic disparities as source for regional mobilisation (e.g. Livingston, 1952; Lipset & Rokkan, 1967; Seiler, 1994). Among them are Rokkan and Urwin (1982) who explain in their influential work on *Centres and Peripheries in Western Europe* that:

> "Historically, we can distinguish two major sources of territorial strain: cultural distances, whether linguistic, religious or, in a diffuse sense, 'ethnic' between core areas and 'less privileged' peripheries; and economic conflicts between regional centres competing for the control of trade and productive resources. Some possible indicators, for example, of cultural distance would be the grammatical structure of the languages, the ease or difficulty of communication, the costs of both elite and mass integration across cultural communities. Similarly, the centralisation of economic transactions can to some extent be gauged by indicators of the rank size structure of the city networks" (p. 4).

> "While economic variations might continue to exist, with the complete supremacy of territorial space, political centralisation and cultural standardisation would be assured: without the existence of an identity other than with the state, there would be no distinctive peripheries" (p. 9).

We thus see that economic differences are above all envisioned as working alongside sociological differences, albeit not without them. Michael Keating and John Loughlin (1997), who truly spelled out the ins and outs of the *Political Economy of Regionalism*, go in a similar direction when explaining how sociologically distinct regions have not only been influenced by economic disparities but even tried to explicitly develop own economic spaces:

> "Culturally distinct regions have in recent years been attempting to develop a model of regional economic development where their cultural distinctiveness is regarded as giving them a comparative advantage over their competitors. Movements of cultural defence thus link up with ideas of endogenous development theory, as this model attempts to preserve features such as the regional language and culture while at the same time providing both sufficient employment for young people and a rich cultural life for the inhabitants of the region and those whom it hopes to persuade to invest in the region" (p. 3).

Comparative empirical research has found that relative regional differences in wealth can indeed fuel demands for economic and political self-governance (Gourevitch, 1979; Hearl et al., 1996; Newman, 1997; De Winter, 1998a; Parks & Elcock, 2000; Fearon & Van Houten, 2002; Sorens, 2005; Gomez et al., 2006; Fitjar, 2009). Case-study evidence shows that this mechanism works in two directions. On the one hand, regions that are comparatively richer than others may want a greater say in what is done with 'their' money or not have to pay for other regions (Dalle Mulle, 2017). On the other hand, regions that are comparatively poorer than others may want greater economic self-governance to design themselves the best possible ways for catching up (Smyth, 1980; Joris, 1998).

c) Institutionalist theories

Traditionally, institutionalist theories of multi-level governance and federalism have studied the functioning and interaction of state and sub-state institutions with a legalistic or

philosophical perspective. From Carl Friedrich's (1962) *Federal Constitutional Theory* over the works of Wheare (1963), Tarlton (1965), the early Watts (1966), Sawer (1976), Vile (1977) and King (1982) to Daniel Elazar's (1987) *Exploring Federalism* (see Burgess (2006) for a comprehensive review), these scholars have been concerned with theorising the origins, nature and functioning of federal or quasi-federal states. At that time, many prominent federal states were mono-national and attracted less attention to question of social diversity, like later federations would soon do. By the mid of the 1980s, neo-institutionalist theories took over and studied how multi-level institutions, once in place, shape the behaviour of actors through different mechanisms (Erk & Swenden, 2010a). Three schools of thought can be distinguished, as theorised by Hall and Taylor (1996):

> "Sociological institutionalists emphasize the highly-interactive and mutually-constitutive character of the relationship between institutions and individual action. When they act as a social convention specifies, individuals simultaneously constitute themselves as social actors, in the sense of engaging in socially meaningful acts, and reinforce the convention to which they are adhering" (p. 948).

> "Rational-choice institutionalists (…) posit that the relevant actors have a fixed set of preferences or tastes (usually conforming to more precise conditions such as the transitivity principle), behave entirely instrumentally so as to maximize the attainment of these preferences, and do so in a highly strategic manner that presumes extensive calculation" (pp. 944-945).

> "[For historical institutionalists,] not only do institutions provide strategically-useful information, they also affect the very identities, self-images and preferences of the actors. These two approaches also supply different explanations for why the regularized patterns of behaviour that we associate with institutions display continuity over time" (p. 939).

Sociological institutionalism thus attributes actors' behaviour to the roles, identities and experiences that specific sets of institutions have created, while rational-choice institutionalists look for the interests that are shaped by particular institutions as explanations for actors' behaviour. Historical institutionalism, finally, looks at how existing institutional arrangements and path dependencies condition actors' choices.

Drawing on these theoretical considerations, empirical research has found different institutional factors to impact party positions on sub-state autonomy and elite dispositions to confer it. It has been shown, for example, that proportional electoral systems (and the multi-party systems that come with them) facilitate the entrance of regionalist parties into parliament and, thereby, the political debate of autonomy demands (De Winter, 1998a; Müller-Rommel, 1998; Sorens, 2005). Demands of regionalist parties have been found to be more radical in majoritarian electoral systems though – most probably because a harsh party competition obliges parties to distinguish themselves more from others (Massetti & Schakel, 2016). Government participation, in turn, has proven to be a moderating factor for autonomy demands because regionalist parties need to make concessions in some policy areas for others to be acceptable by the coalition partners (Deschouwer, 2009b; Massetti & Schakel, 2016). Equally, it was noted that once in place, autonomous institutions tend to get accepted rapidly by all political parties (Mazzoleni & Müller, 2016). From the question of the creation of sub-state institutions, the debate moves on to that of how much competences should be (de)centralised. Within political parties, MPs' positions on more or less (de)centralisation

have been shown to be related both to their current mandate – regional MPs being more autonomist than national MPs (Pilet, Tronconi, Onate, & Verzichelli, 2014; León, 2017), and to their overall career pattern – MPs being influenced not only where they serve currently but also where they have served most of their career (Dodeigne, 2018; Dodeigne et al., 2020).

Finally, it was found that sub-state institutions perpetuate themselves by fostering distinct political identities (J. Nagel, 1994) and by providing the sub-state community with the necessary political capabilities to defend its positions (Roeder, 2009). In this line, the way citizens (can) think about the (multi-level) state was seen to be impacted by path dependencies (Reuchamps, Boerjan, Niessen, & Randour, 2020) and by the institutional arrangement they grew up in – leading to gradual support for sub-state institutions and autonomy (Dupuy, Verhaegen, & Van Ingelgom, 2020). Eventually, it was shown that regionalist parties whose main autonomy demand is met can decline when they are no longer perceived as politically distinctive enough (Deschouwer, 2009b).

In addition to this political science scholarship, historical work has shown how democratisation and the extension of voting rights were preconditions for peripheral autonomy demands to be both permitted and translated into regionalist political parties (Magone, 2008; Mabille, 2011). This reading has received further confirming evidence by Gurr (1993) who found that minority mobilisation is more frequent in democratic than in autocratic regimes, by Shair-Rosenfield et al. (2021) who show that linguistically diverse regions only have a higher likelihood of claiming sub-state autonomy when they live in a democratic state, and by Hooghe and Marks (2016) who found that decentralisation of political authority is also more likely in democracies than in dictatorships.

d) Functionalist theories

Functionalism, after being an influential theory for the study of social structures in the first half of the 20th century (Parsons, 1937), was repopularised as 'neo-functionalism' by scholars explaining the integration process of the European Union with spillover effects where the transfer of competences from member states to the European Union in one policy area incited transfers in others (Haas, 1958). In studies on sub-state autonomy, functionalism has mostly been used to refer to the idea that political competences should not be decentralised on communitarian lines but rather be situated on the political level where they can be exercised most efficiently from a scale-benefits perspective (Alesina & Spolaore, 1997). Recently, the term 'post-functionalism' has been coined by Hooghe and Marks (2016) to label their theory arguing that decentralisation should be understood as being the consequence of both 'community and scale', i.e. that:

> "Our premise is that the structure of governance expresses the bonds of human sociality as well as the functional pressures of scale. Citizens care – passionately – about who exercises authority over them. A post-functionalist theory stresses that governance cannot be explained by its utility or purpose, but must engage the feelings that people have about the communities in which they live" (p. 17).

When taking considerations of scale, symmetry and spillover effects as the most importance aspects of an otherwise heterogeneous theory, different existing studies have tested functionalist theories. On the one hand, supporting evidence for the spillover of regional demands from one region to another was found (De Winter, 1998a). On the other hand, it has been shown that asymmetrical forms of decentralisation where some regions receive more autonomy than others create incentives in the latter regions to demand an equal consideration and additional autonomy (Giordano & Roller, 2004; Hombrado, 2011; Niessen, 2020).

e) Rational-choice theories

The baseline of rational-choice theories of sub-state mobilisation and restructuring is that both state and sub-state actors' behaviour will be determined by whatever maximises their political interest. The most famous precursor to today's empirical work on this strand is certainly William Riker (1964) who, in his seminal work on *Federalism: Origin, Operation and Significance*, states that:

> "I interpreted federalism as a bargain between prospective national leaders and officials of constituent governments for the purpose of aggregating territory, the better to lay taxes and raise armies" (p. 11).

In his book review on *Six Books in Search of a Subject or Does Federalism Exist and Does it Matter*, Riker (1969) even goes as far as to argue that:

> "Federalism qua federalism is significant at the beginning of a central government as a way to bring in regional governments with the promise of autonomy. Once the central government is actually in operation, however, what maintains or destroys local autonomy is not the more or less superficial feature of federalism but the more profound characteristics of the political culture" (p. 142).
>
> "No matter how useful the fiction of federalism is in creating new government, one should not overlook the fact that it is a fiction. In the study of federal governments, therefore, it is always appropriate to go behind the fiction to study the real forces in a political system" (p. 146).

Preparing the ground for the rising scholarship on the origins, nature and demands of regionalist parties, Huri Türsan (1998) followed a similar (albeit slightly less radical) line of reflection when presenting *Ethnoregionalist Parties as 'Ethnic Entrepreneurs'* (a term she borrowed from Tilly (1991), my emphasis) and explaining that:

> "Cleavages do not by themselves explain variations in the translation of cleavages on the site of party competition. As several cleavages can coexist, the activities of agents are crucial in the way they are perceived and are rendered salient. We argue that the variations in single cases are also determined by parties as entrepreneurs" (p. 14).

The most comprehensive existing account of statewide and peripheral party strategies on the decentralisation question has probably been provided by Sonja Alonso (2012) in her work on *Challenging the State: Devolution and the Battle for Partisan Credibility*. Based on a socio-historical analysis of party positions in Belgium, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom, she argues that:

> "Electoral competition between state and peripheral parties pushes some state parties to prefer devolution at some particular point in time. Devolution is an electoral strategy adopted in order to make it more difficult in the long term for peripheral parties to increase their electoral support by claiming the monopoly of representation of the peripheral territory and the people in it. (…) devolution is not a decision to protect the state from the secessionist treat. It is, instead, a decision by state parties to protect their needed electoral majorities" (pp. 1-2).

Significant empirical research has been carried out as of today to test various rational-choice hypotheses explaining sub-state mobilisation and restructuring. Concerning the evolution of autonomy demands, it was shown that regionalist party demands are higher in the presence of another competing regionalist party – leading to mutual competition for being the most advanced autonomy defender (De Winter, 1998a; Massetti & Schakel, 2016). The conferral and increase of autonomy statutes, in turn, was found to follow electoral threats by regionalist parties (Mazzoleni & Müller, 2016; Toubeau, 2018), especially when the constituency is important for the national governing party (Alonso, 2012). Similarly, governments proved more likely to decentralise to regions where they had been electorally strong in the past – either as an electoral strategy in the hope of being rewarded for this in regional elections (O'Neill, 2003; Hopkin, 2009; Elias & Tronconi, 2011) and national elections (Meguid, 2005, 2008), or as a strategy for providing power to the political level where they expect to be in charge themselves (Swenden & Maddens, 2009). The latter mechanism has been theorised by Röth and Kaiser (2019) as 'authority insulation', stressing however that governing parties are not only more likely to decentralise to sub-state entities where they are electorally strong themselves, but also to those that are electoral strongholds of parties that share the same left-right stance than them. They furthermore find that the number of demanding parties on the sub-state level increases governments' likelihood to decentralise, while secessionist claims and a larger number of parties in the national government reduce the likelihood. The number of entities in a country, in turn, makes no difference according to them – a factor that had received confirmatory evidence in the past however (Walter, 2006). Finally, another set of contradictory evidence has been found for whether the internal division of claims within sub-state entities increases (Cunningham, 2011) or reduces (Niessen, 2020) the likelihood for autonomy conferral. One should note though that the former study is concerned with separatist claims, while the latter concerns autonomist ones.

f) Comparative consideration and contribution of the present research

The preceding review of the existing literature shows that an impressive amount of empirical research has been carried out and provided different explanations for why the autonomy demands and statutes of sub-state entities arose and evolved. Sociological and economic theories have been concerned with what can be regarded as the 'raw material' for sub-state distinctiveness: own languages, institutional history and geography, which can be reinforced with economic disparities when laying the ground for sub-state mobilisation. Rational-choice theories have shown that this mobilisation does not come out of nowhere but is activated by

political agency responding to various individual or collective interests. Similarly, political interests and strategies have been shown to be important for state actors' decision to confer sub-state institutions or not. Once in place, institutionalist and functionalist theories have shown how institutions shape existing identities and set different rules for interest-calculi, leading to evolving sub-state mobilisation. Furthermore, they showed how spillovers effects can lead other sub-state entities to demand equal recognition – be it for the creation of own autonomous institutions or their extension.

While it relies on a significant amount of cases, time-periods and theoretical perspectives, two shortcomings should be noted among existing scholarship. On the one hand, there is no research providing a joint account of the evolution of autonomy demands and autonomy statutes. On the other hand, mixed-theoretical approaches exist but few cover more than two theories. The former probably comes with the fact that, hitherto, there has been no comparative analytical framework for the joint study of autonomy demands and statutes. The latter, in turn, can rather be attributed to the significant empirical work that is required for carrying out a systematic cross-theoretical comparison. Four exceptions should nevertheless be noted.

First, there are cross-theoretical assessments in the form of meta-analyses (De Winter, 1998a; Müller-Rommel, 1998; Gomez et al., 2006; Mazzoleni & Müller, 2016). They offer valuable comparative considerations, although they discuss the findings of other studies rather than testing several theories for the same set of cases.

Secondly, there is the research by Massetti and Schakel (2016) who analyse the demands of 78 regionalist parties in eleven Western European countries between 1944 and 2010. While providing important evidence on the significance of sociological, institutionalist and rational-choice factors for changes in party positions according to four different types of autonomy demands (protectionist, federalist, ambiguous and separatist), their findings incite knowing more about the actual interaction between the factors that are found to be significant and for a more fine-grained assessment of party positions.

Thirdly, in her analysis of the competition between statewide and peripheral parties on the decentralisation question in Belgium, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom, Alonso (2012) provides a detailed account of the strategic interests of both actors demanding autonomy and those granting it. Furthermore, she does so by differentiating between party strategies before and after the enactment of autonomy statutes. Her account, however, focuses primarily on the rational choices of parties and the electoral geography that constraints them, without explicit account for how these play out in different sociological, economic or functionalist environments.[5]

Fourthly, the most comprehensive existing assessment of autonomy statutes is the research by Hooghe and Marks (2016) who study the evolution of regional authority of 231 regional tiers of government in 81 countries worldwide between 1950 and 2010. They discuss the relevance of sociological, functionalist and institutionalist factors for the creation and

[5] On the latter point, see also Dardanelli (2014).

evolution of sub-state institutions. While shaping a new post-functionalist theory of governance, one would like to know more about their dialogue with rational-choice factors, about the interaction of factors altogether and about their results when using an indicator of sub-state autonomy that does not only make in-degree but also in-kind distinctions.

In the present research, I would like to take-up on the preceding observations and carry out a research in which the evolution of autonomy demands and statutes is analysed by taking into account at which moments of the demand and conferral processes and in which combination, factors from different theoretical strands interact and appear to be important from a cross-theoretical and cross-case perspective. The objective of this endeavour is twofold.

First, it seeks to complement the existing knowledge that sociological and economic differences, institutions, spillovers and interests can all matter to some extent in some cases, by showing more precisely (i) in which combination, (ii) in which cases and at (iii) which stages of the decentralisation process they matter. Only through this, we get a better understanding of how factors are not only individually important in certain cases but play out differently in different combinations, in different cases and at different stages of the demand and conferral process. The aim is not to prove existing theories right or wrong in particular cases but to examine when, where and in which combination they are important.

Secondly, through the joint study of autonomy demands and statutes, it seeks to tap into the influences that both can have on each other within and across cases. The autonomy demands and statutes do indeed not only influence each other in one sub-state community but can also have spillovers to others. Ultimately, the aim is to disentangle the interplay of autonomy demands and autonomy statutes in order to obtain a refined assessment of how they play out in the paradox of federalism that has been presented previously as the starting puzzle of the research.

g) Theoretical approach and expectations

While one could think that this cross-theoretical examination is a form of theory-testing, I conceive the aim of the research rather as one of theory-building. In the absence of pre-existing cross-theoretical examinations, learning when and how factors from different theoretical strands interact allows us indeed to build a new cross-theoretical understanding. It follows that the research adopts a constellational approach of causality, i.e. looks for the interactive effects of factors rather than for their individual relevance, and that it is empirical rather than normative. Despite that there are no existing cross-theoretical accounts of when autonomy demands and statutes arise and evolve, the lessons of the existing literature still provides us with several points that allow to formulate cross-theoretical expectations. I distinguish four in particular.

First, it was shown that sociological distinctiveness and grievances constitute the raw material that motivates and enables sub-state actors to demand autonomy. Similarly, economic disparities were found able to further reinforce perceptions of distinctiveness and

shape different regional interests. Such interests were shown to influence the strategies of both sub-state actors demanding and state actors conferring autonomy. I would hence expect a combination of sociological, economic and rational-choice factors to be at the origin of the first autonomy demands that come up within one or several sub-state entities of a country, and of the first statutes that are conferred to them.

Secondly, the degree of autonomy that has been demanded or granted in one sub-state community was shown capable to spillover to other sub-state entities within the country. In order to do so, regional political actors need to take up on these. I would hence expect a combination of functionalist, institutionalist and rational-choice factors to be at the origin of the autonomy demands and statutes that come up subsequently in one or several sub-state entities of a country. In addition, I would expect the ease and speed with which these spillovers take place to depend on the sociological and economic distinctiveness of a sub-state community, since the case for deserving own regional institutions needs to be made by sub-state actors.

Thirdly, the conferral of own institutions and competences was shown to have the potential for creating further autonomy demands. These demands need again to be mobilised by sub-state actors who defend them along lines of sociological or economic distinctiveness. I would hence expect a combination of sociological, economic, institutionalist and rational-choice factors to be at the origin of the evolution of autonomy demands and statutes in sub-state entities that demanded and obtained autonomy in the first place.

Fourthly, spillover effects of autonomy demands and statutes were also shown to have the potential for creating further demands and statutes in sub-state entities whose dynamics followed that of others. I would hence expect a combination of sociological, economic, functionalist, institutionalist and rational-choice factors to be at the origin of evolving autonomy demands and statutes in such communities.

3. Sub-state communities and how to identify them

Until now, I have been mostly referring to the cases of interest as 'sub-state entities' – leaving open how precisely I conceive them. The remainder of this study needs a more precise handling of this question, both for delimitating the object of the research and for selecting the cases under study.

a) The nexus of institutions, population and territory

The exercise of political sovereignty in the traditional Weberian sense is constituted by three elements: (i) the monopoly of government, (ii) of (and by) a human community, (iii) in a specified geographical area (Weber, 1992 [1919], p. 6). This holds true regardless of the state level since in a setting of multi-level governance, different kinds of political competences can

be exercised for different groups of people in different geographical areas.[6] In this 'nexus' of institutions, population and territory (Malloy, 2015, pp. 2-6), there are three different ways to conceive a sub-state entity depending on which of the three elements is seen as predominant. With each come different epistemological and methodological consequences.

First, one can conceive sub-state entities as political institutions applicable to the people living in a certain territory. They are then above all approached as legal entities – having either a functional or sociological background depending on the rationale of their institution. In this case, the focus lies only on sub-state entities who have received autonomous institutions, which can make sense for a study concerned with these, but less so for a counterfactual one that is also interested in negative cases.

Secondly, one can conceive sub-state entities as territories with or without special institutions applicable to the people living there. They are then predominantly approached as geographical units, leaving open their sociological and institutional background. This can be interesting if this kind of variability is of interest for the study. However, it becomes difficult to identify territories independently of populational or institutional characteristics – rendering an objective operationalisation very difficult.

Thirdly, one can conceive sub-state entities as populations with or without special institutions living on a certain territory. They are then above all approached as social groups identified based on special characteristics. This has the advantage of leaving the room open for institutional variation, while at the same time using objective criteria for the identification. The definition of the objective characteristics that serve as basis for the identification comes with two main difficulties though. First, as Zuber (2013) argues, assuming that groups with a distinctive language, habits or history also have a special political identity is problematic insofar as it essentialises social groups that have been shown to be socially constructed (B. Anderson, 1983). Secondly, assuming that groups where a special political identity has been manifested also have a coherent special political behaviour is equally problematic, as Zuber (2013) further explains, because group agency is heterogeneous (Brubaker, 2002; 2004; see also my development about sub-state mobilisation in the previous section).

b) A naturalised constructivist approach of sub-state communities

In order to do justice to both the group-driven dynamic of the phenomenon I study and the valid constructivist warning against essentialism and groupism, I follow a 'naturalised constructivist approach' to define my cases of interest, as proposed by Zuber (2013). It follows the constructivist tradition in that it conceives social groups as being formed by social practice and cognition rather than being intrinsic quasi-natural categories. However, to overcome the problems that traditional constructivism has to explain why social categories are stable throughout time despite being constructed and why they cannot be easily

[6] One might argue that in settings of non-territorial autonomy, only the monopoly of government of (and by) a human community are required. However, as Palermo (2015, p. 14) nicely points out: "non-territorial (personal or cultural) forms of autonomy (…) also have a territorial scope of application, and are often established only as a secondary alternative when territorial arrangements are not available".

reconstructed by ethnic entrepreneurs to serve their purpose, it acknowledges ethnic categories as 'naturalised'. This means that human cognition is considered to have a strong predisposition to form ethnic categories for a simplified and self-securing understanding of an otherwise complex social reality. Or as Zuber (2013, p. 204) puts it: "reliance on ethnic (as opposed to other) categories for social classification under conditions of insecurity can be thought of stemming from an innate cognitive predisposition to think in ethnic terms. By contrast, the tangible attributes associated with an ethnic category are seen as socially constructed in nature".

From this, it follows that I consider social groups as a meaningful category of analysis because they appear to be an important political frame of reference for the agents of both sub-state mobilisation and restructuring. At the same time, I acknowledge the constructed nature of social groups and I define them based on a manifest group-based political behaviour or institution. By manifest group-based political behaviour, I refer to the presence of autonomy demands by a regionalist and/or traditional party for a specific community. By group-based political institutions, I refer to the presence of autonomous institutions. Doing so, I do not assume that all the inhabitants of the territory for which the autonomy is claimed or to which it is conferred subscribe to the asserted political identity or autonomy claim. Yet, I consider inhabitants of territories for which special demands and statutes are made as meaningful categories of analysis.

This approach allows me to select sub-state entities with variable autonomy demands and statutes. They can indeed have demanded and received autonomy, demanded but not received autonomy, and not demanded but received autonomy. When studying cases cross-temporarily, one even has historical instances where cases did at some stage neither demand nor obtain autonomy.

In the existing literature, various names have been given to sub-state entities depending on how they have been conceived and approached. Studies with a sociological approach have been talking about "stateless nations" (e.g. K. J. Nagel, 2004; Nimni, 2010; Friend, 2012) or "minority nations" (e.g. Keating & McGarry, 2001; Requejo, 2010; Reuchamps, 2015) when referring to large entities in search of sub-state autonomy if not independence. When trying to further stress the territoriality of the groups under study, scholars have been referring to "territorial minorities" (e.g. M. Anderson, 1978; McEwen & Lecours, 2008) or "territorial communities" (e.g. Pasquier, 2005; Jeffery, 2008; Toubeau & Massetti, 2013) – sometimes but not always in opposition to non-territorial forms of autonomy (e.g. Malloy & Palermo, 2015). When referring to smaller groups with a variety of cultural and political demands, the term "national minority" has been popularised (most notable by Kymlicka (1995, pp. 10-11) who distinguished these historical minorities from more recent 'ethnic' minorities). Studies with a functional approach, in turn, have mostly used jurisdiction-based names (e.g. Hooghe et al., 2016).

In the present research, I go with the term of 'sub-state community' to emphasise the sociological approach of my research, while specifying its situation below (and delimitation from) the state level. I do not integrate the term 'nation' because I am interested in

communities with diverse demands – not only those claiming to be a nation. I do not integrate the term 'minority' because I am also interested in communities where people have a distinctive political identity from the state despite being a majority in that state (e.g. Flanders or England). Based on the conceptualisation that precedes, I define sub-state communities as 'social groups for which autonomous institutions have been demanded or to which autonomous institutions have been conferred on a specific territory'.

The term and definition seem appropriate to me for two reasons. First, because they do justice to the main features the concept aims to capture: the idea of a political community below the state level whose existence comes either with its institutional statute or with special political claims that have been issued on its behalf by important political actors. Secondly, because they are in line with the naturalised constructivist approach described above. A caveat that deserves mentioning, however, is that the term does not make explicit reference to the territoriality of sub-state communities. This was sought insofar as I did not want to define sub-state entities based on their territoriality and leave the label open enough as to also apply to political communities who do either not have a fixed territory or who live in contested political spaces (e.g. Brussels or Northern Ireland). Yet, territoriality remains an important political and symbolic aspect of sub-communities because it delineates the spatial scope on which they live and to which their institutions apply. This even holds for non-territorial autonomy that, despite its group-based definition and applicability, also has a territorial scope (Palermo, 2015, p. 14).

4. Studying sub-state autonomy dynamics in Western Europe

Sub-state mobilisation and restructuring have taken place in many states around the world. While the ideal of the modern nation-state is often considered as having been inaugurated by the Treaties of Westphalia, signed in 1648, and as having been consolidated by the Congress of Vienna, concluded in 1815 (Tilly, 1975; Farr, 2005), it was later exported around the world (Habermas, 1996; Wimmer & Feinstein, 2010) and faced challenges from below in different regions and contexts (Salat, Constantin, Osipov, & Székely, 2014; Bieber, 2018). In the present research, I will focus on the region of the world where the ideal of the modern nation-state came up, has been consolidated for many years and was yet considerably challenged throughout the last century by sub-state mobilisation: Western Europe. This choice comes on the one hand with the suitability of the region as a promising ground of study since both nation-state building and sub-state mobilisation and restructuring have matured there. On the other hand, it constitutes a more or less politically coherent and geographically proximate cross-national context I was familiar with.

a) Studying centrifugal sociological decentralisation in Belgium, Spain and the United Kingdom

To serve the theory-building ambition of the research, the case selection aimed for 'typical cases' of sociological centrifugal decentralisation. In the absence of existing scholarship on the cross-theoretical and cross-case relevance of factors from different theoretical strands, it is indeed such typical cases that one starts researching to develop knowledge on the core-cases of the phenomenon of interest, before moving to less typical cases and check until where the findings hold. At the same time, among the typical cases under study, one seeks a certain degree of diversity with regard to contextual factors that seem relevant for the phenomenon under study (Gerring, 2006).

In the last century, five states in Western Europe have primarily undergone a centrifugal sociological decentralisation of their state structure: Belgium, France, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom. While Belgium went as far as to formally consecrate its state structure as 'federal', France, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom are often described as 'regionalised' states (Burgess, 2017; Dardanelli, 2019). These terms do not directly express a country's degree of decentralisation but rather depict how states envision the nature of their state structure – even if the two can be related. While regionalised states tend to consider themselves as central states with regions disposing of more or less important degrees of decentralisation, federal states consider themselves as composed of different entities with significant autonomy. The conferral is usually co-determined by the constituent unites and their federal unity amid autonomy is often constitutionally recognised (Swenden, 2006; Watts, 2008). Since states can fulfil some of these characteristics but not others and are therefore more or less federalised, drawing a clear line between the two can still be difficult. Spain, for example, is described by some as a 'quasi-federal' state (Moreno, 1997, p. 65), while others show that this qualification is contested (Sala, 2014). The United Kingdom, in turn, has been described by some as a 'union state' (Rokkan & Urwin, 1982; Mitchell, 2006), which could lead one to think that it unites different entities with separate legislative authority. One should note, however, that it is a sociological term referring to the state formation rather than a legal qualification. While the Westminster parliament can 'devolve' competences to sub-state entities, it preserves the power to withdraw them by virtue of parliamentary sovereignty (Jeffery & Wincott, 2006).[7]

In addition to this varying terminology concerning their state structures, the five states have conferred different degrees of decentralisation to sub-state entities at different points in time. In metropolitan France, contrary to the four other countries, the degree of decentralisation never exceeded an administrative nature (Pasquier, 2012). Even in Corsica, where the most advanced autonomy arrangement has been enacted, regional assembly acts

[7] For a critical discussion of this terminology, describing the United Kingdom as 'state of unions' instead of a 'union state' (because of the asymmetries of the devolution arrangements), see Mitchell (2006).

need national parliamentary assent to acquire legal force (Roux, 2018). In Belgium and the United Kingdom, in turn, a considerable amount of legislative competences has been transferred to different sub-state entities with some degree of asymmetry between them (R. Deacon, 2012; Deschouwer, 2012).[8] Italy and Spain, finally, are situated in between France on the one hand and Belgium and the United Kingdom on the other, with a lesser but still substantive amount of legislative competences being transferred (Moreno, 2013; Palermo & Wilson, 2014).

When one looks at the asymmetries between degrees of decentralisation of different sub-state communities within a state, one can see that Italy is the most asymmetrical of the five states because only five out of the 20 regions detain legislative autonomy and do so even with different competences. In the United Kingdom, asymmetries come both with the fact that Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland obtained different degrees of legislative autonomy and with the fact that there has been no devolution to England, nor within England. In Belgium, all sub-state entities have obtained legislative autonomy but they work in a complicated two-level system with region and communities forming two tiers of sub-state entities with different legislative competences. Spain, in turn, has witnessed tendencies towards more symmetry among the autonomous community arrangements in the 1990s and has currently the most symmetrical situation of the four states. All of its autonomous communities detain indeed rather similar legislative powers, with higher fiscal competences in the Basque Country and Navarre, and with some entities having an on civil code.

In the case of Spain and the United Kingdom, two different periods of decentralisation can furthermore be distinguished. In Spain, sub-state autonomy arrangements were enacted both during the Second Republic, from 1932 to 1936, and after the transition to democracy, from 1979 until today. In the United Kingdom, devolution was granted from 1921-1972 to Northern Ireland, and from 1998-today to Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales. A particularity of the United Kingdom is the so-called 'reserved matters scheme' of its devolution arrangements (applicable to Wales since 2017 only). It means that all competences not explicitly reserved to the state are considered devolved, which is opposite to the logic applicable in the other states.

Seeking a certain degree of variation among these cases with regard to their decentralisation degree, symmetry and rationale, I selected three countries to be included in the present research. I excluded France for having too little institutional variation with administrative autonomy statutes only. I selected Belgium for its federal state structure and the United Kingdom for its devolution arrangements with reserved matters schemes. Between Italy and Spain, both being regionalised states, I choose Spain in order to have a country with more symmetry compared to the former two, and potentially interesting dynamics to observe in this respect. While centrifugal sociological decentralisation is the main rationale in the three cases under study – in line with the starting point of the research – Spain

[8] When speaking of asymmetrical decentralisation, Belgium is particular insofar as there are not only competence asymmetries between sub-state entities but also two different layers of sub-state entities, the so-called 'communities' and 'regions' (see below).

and the United Kingdom have certain entities where decentralisation followed a functional logic (see below), which further contributes to the diversity of the case selection. The decentralisation characteristics of the three selected countries are summarised in Table 3.

Table 3. Decentralisation characteristics of the three countries under study

	Belgium	Spain		United Kingdom	
Period under study	1830-2020	1868-2020		1801-2020	
Legislative decentralisation	1971-2020	1932-1936	1979-2020	1921-1972	1998-2020
Trajectory	Centrifugal	Centrifugal	Centrifugal	Centrifugal	Centrifugal
Rationale	Sociol.	Sociol.	Sociol./Funct.	Sociol.	Sociol./Funct.
State structure	Federal	Regional	Regional	Regional	Regional
Degree of symmetry	Asymmetr.	Asymmetr.	Symmetr.	Asymmetr.	Asymmetr.

While the main reason for this selection was the cases' typicalness for the phenomenon of interest, centrifugal sociological decentralisation, and a certain cross-case variability based on relevant characteristics, one might contend that the cases have been selected on the dependent variable insofar as the three countries have all decentralised legislative autonomy. One should note however, that the unit of the analyses will be sub-state communities that are assessed longitudinally and that there will be two kind of negative cases. On the one hand, there will be sub-state communities in the analysis without either autonomy demands and autonomy statutes. On the other hand, even the sub-state communities in which there have been both autonomy demands and statutes are assessed longitudinally so that there are periods of observation without autonomy demands and statutes, which allows a counterfactual assessment of the phenomenon.

b) Selection of sub-state communities under study

Within each of the three countries, I identified the sub-state communities to be studied based on the conceptualisation elaborated in section 2: 'social groups for which autonomous institutions have been demanded or to which autonomous institutions have been conferred on a specific territory'. To operationalise this definition, I used two temporal and four conceptual minimal criteria.

Concerning temporality, I studied the selected cases over time, starting with the modern period of states' history. In the Belgian case, I took 1830 as starting date, i.e. the year when the country became independent from the Netherlands (Mabille, 2011). In the Spanish case, I took 1868 as starting date, i.e. the year when the country knew its first transition to democracy leading up to the First Spanish Republic (Magone, 2008). In the case of the United Kingdom, I took 1801 as starting date, i.e. the year when Ireland joined the Union of England, Wales and Scotland (Welsh, 2003). Sub-state communities were thus (i) considered respectively from these dates onwards, provided that they already belonged to the state at that time. Otherwise, (ii) I start my observation with the beginning of that belonging. I ended my observation in 2020.

Going back in time as far has two main advantages and one caveat. First, it allows to set the phenomenon under study in a much broader perspective and to show that sub-state

mobilisation and restructuring are not just something that occurred in the late twentieth century but that also in the nineteen and early twentieth century, there have been demands for sub-state autonomy and states that conferred it. Secondly, it allows for a counterfactual assessment of case realities before autonomy demands came up in sub-state communities and before autonomy was conferred. The objective is to truly compare the before and after of these demands and statutes, i.e. what changes were critical for these processes to start and to evolve.

As a caveat, it should be signalled that this long period covers very different political contexts that one needs to be aware of in the comparison. For example, the conception of the state and its functions, the time it takes for popular demands to translate into political parties or the dynamics of inter-party competition itself differed across time. In the analyses that follow, particular attention will be paid to such contextual differences and the results will be interpreted accordingly in the case-based discussions of the analyses.

Concerning conceptual criteria, I needed to set thresholds from which on I considered a sub-state community to have demanded or received autonomy. For an autonomy demand, I considered it to be sufficiently expressed when either (i) a traditional party had formally demanded legislative autonomy at some point in time or (ii) when a regionalist party had done so and received at least 5% of votes (in the community) or a seat in sub-state or state elections. The reason for the latter threshold was to ensure that only regionalist parties with sufficient political relevance were retained. I decided to put the threshold at 5% because it corresponds to a common electoral threshold applicable in most parts of the countries under study.[9] For an autonomy statute, (iii) I considered it to be received when a sub-state community had obtained legislative decentralisation at some point in time. Finally, (iv) I decided to exclude sub-state communities that were linked to the state by colonial heritage because I considered the instalment of their autonomy arrangements to come with very different political dynamics from those under study in the present research.

These criteria allowed me to selected 31 sub-state communities to be studied in the three countries. They are listed in Table 4.[10] Five of my selection choices, however, deserve a special explanation.

First, I had two instances where the same territory was claimed by two communities – in Brussels and Northern Ireland. Considering that my focus of analysis is social groups, I decided to consider each of the two cases twice. I.e. Brussels (Flemish), Brussels (Francophone), Northern Ireland (Nationalists) and Northern Ireland (Unionists). Furthermore, these two set of cases come with the peculiarity that the demand of one of the two communities inhabiting them were not directed primarily towards autonomy. In the case

[9] In Belgium, the electoral threshold is fixed at 5%. In Spain, the electoral threshold varies and is fixed at 3% on national elections and on either 3% or 5% for community elections (depending on the autonomous community). In the United Kingdom, general elections do not have an electoral threshold because they follow the first-past-the-post system. In Scottish and Welsh elections, the electoral threshold is fixed at 5%.

[10] In addition to these 31 cases, ten others were under consideration for being included. They are listed in Appendix 1 with an explanation for the exclusion.

Table 4. Selected sub-state communities under study

Country	Sub-state community	Studied period	Abbreviation
Belgium	Brussels (Flemish)	1830-2020	BFl
	Brussels (Francophone)	1830-2020	BFr
	Flanders	1830-2020	Fla
	German-speaking Community	1925-1940, 1946-2020	GsC
	Wallonia	1830-2020	Wln
Spain	Andalusia	1868-2020	And
	Aragon	1868-2020	Ara
	Asturias	1868-2020	Ast
	Balearic islands	1868-2020	BIs
	Basque country	1868-2020	Bsq
	Canary islands	1868-2020	CIs
	Cantabria	1868-2020	Can
	Castile and Léon	1868-2020	CyL
	Castile-la Mancha	1868-2020	ClM
	Catalonia	1868-2020	Cat
	Extremadura	1868-2020	Ext
	Galicia	1868-2020	Gal
	La Rioja	1868-2020	Rio
	Léon	1868-2020	Leo
	Madrid	1868-2020	Mad
	Murcia	1868-2020	Mur
	Navarre	1868-2020	Nav
	Valencia	1868-2020	Val
United Kingdom	Cornwall	1801-2020	Cor
	England	1801-2020	Eng
	London	1801-2020	Lon
	Northern Ireland (Nationalists)	1921-2020	NIN
	Northern Ireland (Unionists)	1801-2020	NIU
	Scotland	1801-2020	Sco
	Ireland	1801-1921	Ire
	Wales	1801-2020	Wls

of Northern Ireland, the power-sharing agreement is indeed rather seen a lesser evil to Unionists whose primary interest is to preserve the territory to remain part of the United Kingdom. In the case of Brussels, Flemish nationalists argue that it should be considered as a Flemish city and part of Flanders rather than as an own sub-state entity. Given that they are subject to sub-state autonomy statutes that have been enacted for their territories in a power-sharing form, however, I decided to keep the cases in the analysis and to nuance the results accordingly when necessary.

Secondly, in Castile and León in Spain, I had a partially overlapping territorial claim with the autonomous community of Castile and León having obtained their own legislative institutions, while a Leonese regionalist party claimed an own community for the three provinces forming the historic Leonese kingdom (León, Zamora and Salamanca). I thus decided to consider both separately, i.e. Castile and León as one case and León itself (comprising the three provinces) as one case.

Thirdly, in the United Kingdom I came across the particularity of the Greater London Authority that, although it has a long history of own legal frameworks (the County of London (1888-1964) and the County of Greater London (1965-1985)), never obtained (nor demanded) legislative institutions. Yet its statute was considered in the UK as a form of devolution – more limited but analogous to the arrangements in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. I thus decided to exceptionally also include this case.

Fourthly, I had two cases that did not belong to the state for the full period under observation. On the one hand, Ireland became independent from the United Kingdom in 1921. I thus included it in my observation from 1801 to 1921 only. This led me to consider Northern Irish Nationalists as an own sub-state community only from 1921 onwards, while I considered Northern Irish Unionists as an own sub-state community since 1801. On the other hand, the German-speaking Community of Belgium only joined the country formally in 1925 and it was annexed by Germany during the Second World War from 1941 to 1945. I thus considered the case as a Belgian sub-state community from 1925 to 1940 and from 1946 until today.

Finally, I encountered the problem of the complex Belgian state architecture with two levels of federal sub-state entities. At the beginning of the Belgian federalisation process, it was decided to install three sub-state entities in charge of cultural and so-called 'personalised matters' (mostly related to social and health policy) in response to Flemish demands for cultural autonomy: the Dutch, French and German Culture Communities.[11] In parallel, one decided to install three sub-state entities in charge of economic and so-called 'territorialised matters' (related to landscape, environment or agriculture policy, for example) in response to Walloon demands for economic autonomy: the Flemish, Walloon and Brussels-Capital Regions. The reason for this two-level setting came with the special bilingual situation of Brussels. When the community institutions were created, it was decided that in the absence of clear geo-linguistic lines in the capital and not to create further 'sub-nationalities', Francophone institutions in Brussels would be governed jointly with those of the French Community, while Dutch-speaking institutions would be governed jointly with those of the Flemish Community. When the regional institutions were created, it was decided that Brussels should become an own region for its special capital situation.

To disentangle this complex socio-institutional situation in order to identify the sub-state communities that should be included in my analysis, I decided to consider the populations to whom a uniform set of sub-state laws applied and for whom specific autonomy claims had been made as distinct political communities. In the case of Brussels, I considered the Flemish and French-speaking populations as distinct political communities because they are governed by the institutions of the Brussels-Capital Region on the one hand, and respectively by those of the Flemish and French Communities on the other. The existence of strong Brussels federations within both Flemish and Francophone parties points to the presence of different political dynamics and further contributes to this choice (although one should note that Flemish nationalist and christian-democratic parties consider Brussels as a Flemish city and its Dutch-speaking inhabitants as part of the Flemish Community to whom the same rules should apply). As a consequence, I decided to treat Flanders and Wallonia as political communities without separate account for the Flemish and French Communities.

[11] In 1980, the name of the Dutch Culture Community was changed to 'Flemish Community' and that of the French Culture Community to 'French Community'. In 1983, the name of the German Culture Community was changed to 'German-speaking Community'.

In the case of Flanders, this appears less problematic because the regional and community institutions have been merged both *de facto* and *de jure*, with a slight distinction remaining for the community's affairs in Brussels.[12] In the case of Wallonia and the French Community, however, regional and community institutions have been kept separate (even if executives have sometimes been partially overlapping) and there remain advocates of the French Community to be treated as a separate political entity (Rocour, 2013). One possibility would thus have been to include both the French Community and the Walloon Region as separate sub-state communities. However, considering that French-speakers in Brussels and Wallonia are subject to different sub-state institutions, and that a decreasing part of the Walloon population subscribes to the French Community as a distinct political identity (Sinardet, De Winter, Dodeigne, Niessen, & Reuchamps, 2020), I decided not to treat the latter as a separate sub-state community. If I had done so, I would furthermore have encountered problems during the comparison of autonomy levels across sub-state communities. The French Community and Wallonia would have individually received less competences than Flanders, although a French-speaking Walloon is *de facto* subject to the same degree of decentralisation.

One should note, furthermore, that although it legally belongs to the Walloon Region, I considered the German-speaking Community as a separate sub-state community because it obtained own legislative institutions for community matters and because a vast majority of its population considers it as a distinct political identity (Güllner, 2018).[13]

In the remainder of the study, I thus speak of Wallonia as of a sub-state community that comprises the French-speaking population of the Walloon Region for whom both regional and community competences are exercised – acknowledging that the later are exercised by two different set of institutions and that some elites and citizens see all French-speakers in Belgium (both those in Wallonia and in Brussels) as belonging to a distinct political community.

5. Conclusion on the conceptual strategy of the research

In this chapter, I have presented the conceptual strategy of the research. I did so by exploring the dynamics of political mobilisation and restructuring on the sub-state level, by reviewing existing knowledge on their evolution and how I aim to contribute to it, by explaining how political entities below the state can be understood and by specifying which ones I study in the present research.

In my exploration of sub-state mobilisation and restructuring, I showed that sub-state mobilisation relies on a complex group agency in which very different political actors – from intellectuals to social movements to political parties – can address autonomy demands to the

[12] In the Flemish parliament, regional matters are only voted by MPs elected in Flanders, while for community matters, MPs elected in both Flanders and Brussels vote.

[13] During the different reforms of the Belgian state, the Walloon Region has transferred the exercise of some regional competences for the German-speaking language area to the German-speaking Community.

state. Sub-state restructuring, in turn, was shown to consist in the legal prerogatives conferred to sub-state entities in a dynamic and non-linear way, as well as without predefined ultimate outcome. The object of sub-state mobilisation and restructuring, political autonomy, was presented as being understood in this research as a combination of self-rule, shared rule and group rights.

The objective of this exploration was to make the case for the three main theoretical arguments of this thesis. First, that sub-state mobilisation and sub-state restructuring should be studied jointly because they mutually influence each other. Once autonomy demands have been issued in a sub-state community, state decisions to accept them can indeed both accommodate existing demands and incite further ones – in that sub-state community or within other ones in the state. Secondly, that in light of the complex agency of sub-state mobilisation, autonomy demands should be studied by taking into consideration both the demands of regionalist and traditional political parties. While the focus on parties allows to look at political actors that have official positions, can make certain claims of representativeness and are those that negotiate with state elites about the conferral of autonomy, the joint consideration of regionalist and traditional political parties is important because they mutually influence each other and can both play an important role in the issuing of autonomy demands for a sub-state community. Thirdly, that sub-state autonomy needs to be assessed *in kind*, *in degree* and *by competences* because in sub-state communities' extent of autonomy demands and statutes, very different political dynamics come with administrative and legislative autonomy on the one hand, and with the extension of existing competences on the other. On the basis of this conceptualisation, four critical moments for the evolution of autonomy demands and statutes have been identified: their rise, their increase, their decrease and their disappearing, each of which will be studied separately in the analyses that follow.

The review of the existing literature on sub-state mobilisation and restructuring articulated the lessons of five main theoretical strands: sociological, economic, institutionalist, functionalist and rational-choice theories. Despite all the merits pointed out, two shortcomings were noted. On the one hand, there is no research providing a joint account of the evolution of autonomy demands and autonomy statutes. On the other hand, mixed-theoretical approaches exist but few cover more than two theories. The present research aims to take up on this by studying (i) in which combination, (ii) in which cases and at (iii) which stages of the decentralisation process factors from different theoretical strands matter. By doing so, it aims to provide a joint study of autonomy demands and statutes and to disentangle how their mutual influences play out in the paradox of federalism that has been presented previously as the starting puzzle of the research.

In my explanation of how entities on the sub-state level can be understood, I showed that one will navigate somewhere between their populational, territorial and institutional nature, depending on the objective of the study. For the present research, I chose to conceive what I called 'sub-state communities' as social groups in order to emphasise their communitarian dynamic and leave open their institutional statute because the latter is part

of what the research aims to explain. To overcome the risk of essentialising political communities that have shown to be constructed, I follow a naturalised constructivist approach. While considering that sub-state communities are meaningful categories of analysis because they constitute an important frame of reference for the actors of sub-state mobilisation and restructuring, I acknowledge the constructed nature of their social group and identify them based on a manifest group-based political behaviour or institutions: having demanded (through significant regionalist or traditional parties) or obtained sub-state autonomy. I decided to study sub-state communities in Western Europe because it forms a more or less coherent cross-national political context where sub-state mobilisation and restructuring have matured. More specifically, I decided to study sub-state entities in Belgium, Spain and the United Kingdom because despite being all typical cases of centrifugal sociological decentralisation, they present interesting varieties of autonomy demands and statutes.

While these considerations detailed most of the conceptual strategy of the research, it remains to be explained how the extent of autonomy demands of regionalist and traditional parties, as well as of the autonomy statutes conferred to these sub-state communities, will be assessed concretely. This is the objective of the next chapter.

Chapter 3. Measuring sub-state autonomy in kind, in degree and by competences

To specify how sub-state autonomy is understood, and how the extent of autonomy demands and statutes will be assessed in the present research for the cases under study, I will proceed in three steps in this chapter. I first review existing indicators of sub-state autonomy statutes and demands. After highlighting their main strengths and limitations, I explain why I need another one for the present research. Secondly, I present the indicator I created: the *Sub-state Autonomy Scale* (SAS). I do so by explaining how it has been conceived and how data on it have been collected. I illustrate its use and usefulness by applying it to several cases and comparing it to existing indicators to further discuss its main advantages and limitations.

1. Existing indicators of sub-state autonomy

In recent years, there has been an increasing interest in measuring sub-state autonomy statutes and demands, which comes with two developments. On the one hand, the last fifty years have witnessed an increasing demand and conferral of political autonomy below the state level, which was followed by an equally increasing scholarly interest in understanding the determinants and consequences of the visibly varying types and degrees of demanded and enacted political decentralisation (Keating, 2008). On the other hand, political science has become increasingly comparative[14] and experienced a revived interest for institutions and (regional) party politics since the 2000s (Hepburn, 2009; Erk & Swenden, 2010a).

Taken together, both developments led to the creation of about 25 indicators of decentralisation that were as diverse in scope and conception as to inspire Harguindéguy, Cole, and Pasquier (2021) for a comprehensive review. More recently and less numerous, scholars interested in party politics started to create indicators that assess the type and extent of autonomy demands of national or regional(ist) parties. In this section, I review these indicators – by retaining those that (i) measure regional autonomy (i.e. not local), (ii) go beyond mapping types of state structures (i.e. assess the associated degree of autonomy) and (iii) are generalist in their set-up (i.e. encompass more than one policy field).[15] I do so in order to situate the Sub-state Autonomy Scale vis-à-vis their main strengths and limitations. Table 5 serves as synthetic support.

[14] Some would even go as far as to say 'increasingly variable-oriented' (or what epistemologists call "nomothetic" (Connolly, 2017, p. 5)), but I do not have the empirical evidence to confirm or infirm this claim.

[15] Recently, Cole, Harguindéguy, Pasquier, Stafford, and De Visscher (2018) have developed a framework for capturing what they call "Territorial Political Capacity". It relies on a joint consideration of institutional resources, regional party and leadership capacities and territorial praxis. Given that is scope lies beyond that of sub-state autonomy, I did not take into consideration for the present review.

Table 5. Existing indicators of sub-state autonomy statutes and demands

Name	Authors	Unit of analysis	Observation	Indicator	Included cases	Time period
Indices evaluating regional autonomy statutes						
Institutional Autonomy Index	Lane and Ersson (1999[1987])	Countries	Degree of decentralised autonomy	10-point index	18 European countries	1945-1999 (punctual)
Federalism and Decentralisation Index	Lijphart (2012)	Countries	Degree of federalism and decentralisation	5-point index	36 countries worldwide	1945-2010 (evolution-based)
Unitarism-Federalism Scale	Keman (2000)	Countries	State structure and decentralisation degree	Continuous (-1,23–1,72)	18 European and OECD countries	2000 (punctual)
Decision-making Decentralisation Index	Treisman (2002)	Countries	Degree of decentralised authority	3-point index	133 countries worldwide	Mid-1990s (punctual)
Institutional Decentralisation Index	Arzaghi and Henderson (2005)	Countries	Degree of decision- and fiscal decentralisation	0-4 index	48 countries worldwide	1960-1995 (quinquennial)
Political Decentralisat-ion Index	Brancati (2006)	Countries	Degree of decentralised competences	5-point index	30 countries worldwide	1985-2000 (annual)
Decentralisation Index	AER and BAK (2009)	Regions	Degree of decision- and financial decentralisation	0-100 index	29 European countries (234 regions)	2009 (punctual)
Party Government Index	Woldendorp, Keman, and Budge (2013)	Countries	Degree of independence of decision-making	8-point index	37 European and OECD countries	1945-1998 (punctual)
Regional Authority Index	Hooghe et al. (2016)	Regional tiers of government with an average population ≥ 150 000	Degree of self- and of shared rule	30-point index	81 countries worldwide (231 regional tiers)	1950-2010 (annual)
Autonomy Index	Dardanelli (2019)	Countries – with regional specifi-cations in case of asymmetries	Decentralisation degree of unitary and federal states	14-point index	15 European countries (22 regional tier types)	1950-2015 (quinquennial)
Indices evaluating regional autonomy demands						
Chapel Hill Expert Survey	Bakker et al. (2015)	Political parties on the national level	Degree of regional and local decentralisation	11-point scale	14-31 Europ. countries (143-268 parties)	1999-2014 (quin-punctual)
Regionalist Party Ideology Scale	Massetti and Schakel (2016)	Regionalist parties	Regionalist ideology type	4-point index	11 OECD countries (78 parties)	1944-2010 (each election)
Ethnopolitics and Party Competition Scales	Szöcsik and Zuber (2015, 2019)	Political parties represented in parliament	Degree of terr. autonomy and ethnonationalism	11-point scale	22 European countries (210/222 parties)	2011-2017 (bi-punctual)

Source: compiled based on Schakel (2008), Dardanelli (2019), Harguindéguy et al. (2021) and own research for autonomy statutes, compiled based on own research for autonomy demands.

a) Indicators measuring autonomy statutes

Concerning autonomy statutes, there are to my knowledge as of today ten indicators that measure the type or degree of regional autonomy with a generalist approach:[16]

- The *Institutional Autonomy Index* by Lane and Ersson (1999[1987]) is a 10-point index that measures the degree of regional institutional independence within a country based on four dimensions (federalism, special territorial autonomy, functional autonomy, local government discretion).
- The *Federalism and Decentralisation Index* by Lijphart (2012) is a 5-point index that assesses a country's degree of decentralisation based on five categories (unitary and centralised, unitary and decentralised, semi-federal, federal and centralised, federal and decentralised).
- The *Unitarism-Federalism Scale* by Keman (2000) is a continuous scale that assesses the degree to which different features of unitarism/federalism are present in a country (autonomy, balance, sovereignty, barriers). The final score is obtained based on a factor analysis of the scores for each feature.
- The *Decision-making Decentralisation Index* that Treisman (2002) elaborated for one of his conceptions of decentralisation is an index with three degrees of subnational authority within a country (weak autonomy, residual authority, subnational veto).
- The *Institutional Decentralisation Index* by Arzaghi and Henderson (2005) is an 0-4 index that measures the degree of fiscal, political, and administrative responsibilities of regional governments within a country by taking the average of six indicators that range from 0 to 4 (official federal structure, regional executive election, local executive election, central government veto, regional revenue raising authority, revenue sharing).
- The *Political Decentralisation Index* by Brancati (2006) is a 5-point index that measures the degree of regional authority within a country based on five dimensions (elected regional legislature, tax authority, education authority, public order authority, constitutional veto).
- The *Decentralisation Index* by Basel Economics and the Assembly of European Regions (2009) is a 0-100 index that measures the degree of power of regional tiers of government within a country based on aggregating scores of five dimensions (administrative, functional, political, vertical and financial decentralisation).
- The *Party Government Index* by Woldendorp et al. (2013) is a 8-point index that measures the degree of independence of policy-making by non-central government units based on four dimensions (fiscal centralisation, regional autonomy, centralisation, local government autonomy).

[16] I based my review on Schakel (2008), Dardanelli (2019) and Harguindéguy et al. (2021). If the authors of an index/scale did not assign an explicit label, I assigned one myself for the purpose of this review. This was the case for Keman (2000) and Dardanelli (2019), although I had an exchange with the latter on the label he preferred. For Treisman (2002), I borrowed the label from Harguindéguy et al. (2021).

- The *Regional Authority Index* by Hooghe et al. (2016) is a 30-point index that measures the degree of regional authority based on five self-rule dimensions (institutional depth, policy scope, fiscal autonomy, borrowing autonomy, representation) and five shared rule dimensions (law making, executive control, fiscal control, borrowing control, constitutional reform).
- The *Autonomy Index* by Dardanelli (2019) is a 14-point index that measures the degree of decentralisation of a state based on sub-state entities' degree of institutional autonomy, policy autonomy and fiscal autonomy, while securing a qualitative difference between unitary and federal states on the point-8 anchor.

When comparing these indicators, several lessons can be drawn. The Institutional Autonomy Index, the Federalism and Decentralisation Index, the Decision-making Decentralisation Index, the Institutional Decentralisation Index, the Political Decentralisation Index, the Decentralisation Index, the Party Government Index and the Regional Authority Index are in-degree measurements. The Unitarism-Federalism Scale and the Autonomy Index, in turn, allow to assess sub-state autonomy both in degree and in kind. Among these two groups of indicators, the Autonomy Index (AI) and the Regional Authority Index (RAI) stand out for four reasons. First, because they are the ones that provide the most fine-grained evaluation of sub-state autonomy on respectively 30-point and 14-point indices. Secondly, because they are the only indicators that account for varying degrees of competences. On the RAI, this counts for 4 out of 30 points on the index and being competent in some parts of a policy domain suffices for qualifying as being competent in the domain. On the AI, this counts for 3,5 out of 14 points on the index and a distinction is made between competences that are exercised concurrently (i.e. by both the state and sub-state levels) and exclusively (i.e. by the sub-state level only). Thirdly, because they do not only measure sub-state autonomy on the country level but also for regional tiers of government, insofar as the RAI is concerned, and by accounting for regional asymmetry, insofar as the AI is concerned. Finally, both have undergone sophisticated validity checks. For the RAI, these relied on content-validation through expert discussions and on cross-validation through comparisons with existing indicators. The AI, in turn, relied on content-validation through detailed justifications for all coding decisions, but not on cross-validation because Dardanelli (2019) did not deem comparisons with existing indicators appropriate since his indicator relied on a different concept. In terms of coverage, one should note the RAI is available for 81 countries from 1950-2010 on a yearly basis, while the AI is available for 15 countries from 1950-2015 on a quinquennial basis.

b) Indicators measuring autonomy demands

Concerning autonomy demands, there are to my knowledge as of today three indicators assessing the type or degree of autonomy demanded by national or regional political parties:

- In the *Chapel Hill Expert Survey* by Bakker et al. (2015), one question measures political parties' degree of support for decentralisation on a 11-point scale.
- The *Regionalist Party Ideology Scale* by Massetti and Schakel (2016) is a 4-point scale that classifies regionalist political parties based on four types of regionalist ideologies (protectionist, federalist, ambiguous, separatist).
- The *Ethnopolitics and Party competition Scales* by Szöcsik and Zuber (2015, 2019) are 11-point scales that measure political parties' support for territorial autonomy and for ethnofederalism.

When comparing these indicators, another set of lessons can be drawn. All indicators are party-level studies, which is probably the most suitable approach given the heterogeneous agency of sub-state communities and valid constructivist warnings against 'groupism' (Brubaker, 2004). While the *Chapel Hill Expert Survey* (CHES) question and the *Ethnopolitics and Party Competition Scales* (EPAC) measure demands in degree, the *Regionalist Party Ideology Scale* (RPIS) relies on a typology with in-kind distinctions. The former seems very useful when comparing party positions relatively on a decentralisation-recentralisation continuum – especially when both regionalist and traditional party demands are concerned. The CHES data are available for 14 countries in 1999, 2002 and 2006; for 24 countries in 2010 and 2014; and for 31 countries in 2019. The EPAC data, in turn, are available for 22 countries in 2011 and 2017. When it comes to the typology of the RPIS, it seems most useful for absolute comparisons of regionalist party positions. Its data are furthermore available from 1940-2010 and cover 11 countries.

c) Why another indicator for measuring autonomy statutes and demands

The need for another indicator of sub-state autonomy demands and statutes comes with two main properties that existing indicators, despite their increasing quality and the merits pointed out above, do not fully capture. The first relates to the fact that existing indicators do not capture all important instances of change in autonomy reforms and autonomy demands. The second comes with the need for a unified framework to assess autonomy demands and statutes jointly.

Regarding the first property, I have argued in the two previous chapters that in the political dynamics of centrifugal sociological decentralisation, two types of moments have been particularly contested between state and sub-state actors: (i) the shift from administrative to legislative autonomy, and (ii) the subsequent extension of competences over different policy fields. In Belgium, for example, federalism and the legislative competences that came with it, have been the 'f-word' of politics from their first mentioning in the 1900s until after the first state reforms in the 1970s and 1980s. Since then, the country has seen five more heavily debated state reforms with incremental competence enlargements in less than 45 years (Deschouwer, 2012). 'Devolution' of legislative powers in the United Kingdom was equally contested from the 1920s onwards until the 1990s – even within Scotland or Wales. After their statutes had been in place, they were extended twice for both

of them following regionalist pressures (R. Deacon, 2012). In Spain, it was only after important regional mobilisation in the 1970s and 1980s that 'autonomous' statutes with legislative powers were envisioned for communities other than Catalonia, the Basque Country or Galicia. Once again, two competence extensions have fuelled political discussions – not to mention the political tensions coming with the differences in fiscal competences between Catalonia on the one hand and the Basque country and Navarre on the other (Magone, 2008). In centralised cases like metropolitan France, in turn, demands for regional legislative autonomy have been repeatedly rejected until today – even when faced with violent upheavals like in Corsica, whose assembly's acts still need national parliamentary assent to acquire legal force (Kernalegenn & Pasquier, 2018).

One could go on with this illustration but the two points I want to make should become clear. First, decentralising administrative competences and decentralising legislative competences are very different things. With legislative institutions come different territorial policies that can shape different territorial interests and identities – up to a point where their conferral might both accommodate and exacerbate territorial divisions (Erk & Anderson, 2009). Secondly, once legislative institutions are in place, the distribution of competences between the state and sub-state levels is of critical importance and can lead to considerable tensions between both levels (Toubeau & Wagner, 2015).

The two existing indicators of sub-state autonomy *statutes* that stand out in the preceding review are the Regional Authority Index (RAI) by Hooghe et al. (2016) and the Autonomy Index (AI) by Dardanelli (2019). Yet even these most advanced indicators do not fully allow to capture the political dynamics described above. While the RAI struggles to differentiate administrative from legislative autonomy, both the RAI and the AI do not capture all autonomy increases for the following reasons.

While the RAI provides an impressively detailed additive account of a region's degree of decentralisation on a 30-point index, it does not specify their relative position vis-à-vis a qualitative anchor that would allow to distinguish between administrative and legislative powers. All self-rule components (institutional depth, policy scope, fiscal autonomy, borrowing autonomy and representation) are indeed added-up irrespective of regions' legislative capacity (Hooghe et al., 2016, p. 106).[17] This leads, for example, to entities with administrative competences like the French regions (1986-2010) to score 10 on the self-rule tier, while entities with legislative competences like the Flemish or Walloon Regions (1980-1988) in Belgium score respectively 7 and 6 on the self-rule tier. The French score is larger because of the fiscal and borrowing autonomy of the regions, which were at that time absent in Belgium. Yet the Belgian regions enjoyed legislative competences in different policy fields. Now, one may just want to operationalise things differently based on the RAI's policy scope dimension that distinguishes between "very week authoritative competences" (0) and "authoritative competences" in several extending policy sectors (1-3) (p. 28). By 'authoritative', the authors mean "having the capacity to develop binding rules through

[17] I talk about the self-rule components here because it is among them that one would expect to find the difference between administrative and legislative powers. The share-rule components are, of course, also additive.

legislation or executive orders" (p. 67). However, this does visibly not capture the difference between administrative and legislative competences because the French regions (1986-2010) obtain the same score (2) as Flanders (1980-1988), while Wallonia (1980-1988) even gets a smaller one (1).

When we look at the way the RAI captures competences enlargements, we see that the policy scope dimension distinguishes between economic policy, cultural–educational policy, welfare policy and special competences like residual powers, police, own institutional set-up and local government. Score 1 is given for 'authoritative' competences in one of the above. Score 2 is given for two of the above. Score 3 is given for special competences and two others of the above. Score 4 is given when, in addition, there are competences over immigration, citizenship and right of domicile. While this covers an impressive amount of competences, one should note that having some competences in one of these domains qualifies for being considered competent in it. In other words, there is no account for how much decentralisation in each domain occurred. For instance, this leads to entities like the Spanish autonomous communities (1982-2010) to score 3 on the policy scope dimension, although most of their competences are only partial. Furthermore, the 1992 extension remains unnoticed because there were pre-existing competences in the extended fields (education and health care, see Machado, 1992). An entity like Scotland (1999-2010), in turn, similarly scores 3 on the policy scope dimension, although its devolved policy areas were much more comprehensive than the Spanish ones (Cairney, 2011).

The AI, in turn, varies a little less than the RAI (14 points [with 7 additional half-points]) but is conceived in such a way that the point-8 anchor distinguishes between administrative and legislative autonomy statutes. In addition, in its assessment of policy autonomy (0-7 points), it accounts for whether sub-state entities have concurrent or exclusive competences in one or at least two "key areas of government" (economic policy, cultural-educational policy, welfare state policy) (Dardanelli, 2019, p. 280; 285). Concurrent primary law-making powers are worth 3,5 points when extending to one area. They are worth 4 when extending to two. Exclusive primary law-making powers are worth 5 points when extending to one area. They are worth 6 when extending to two. The score is further increased by half a point when sub-state entities have control over either civil and criminal law, police, judiciary or local government, or when they have a veto on central government decisions affecting the entity. It is decreased by half a point when the central government detains a veto on sub-state decisions. While this constitutes a considerable advancement towards a more accurate assessment of the extent of competences held by sub-state entities, extensions are not captured if a sub-state entity already possesses competences in two of the three areas. For example, the Spanish autonomous communities score 4,5 on the policy autonomy dimension from 1985-2015 – without increase between 1990 and 1995 due the 1992 reform mentioned above. In Belgium, the federal entities score 6,5 on the policy autonomy dimension from 2010 to 2015 – without increase due to the sixth reform of the state in 2014 which has conferred further competences in the social security sector for example. Two more caveats deserve mentioning. One the one hand, codings are expressed in quinquennial intervals, which makes

it more difficult to account for their precise historical occurrence. On the other hand, given that areas are frequently subject to shared competences (few competences are exercised truly exclusively), the comparison of state and sub-state competences in a particular policy field needs to be further refined.

As for indicators of sub-state autonomy *demands*, although significant progress has been made in recent years, existing measurements are less sophisticated than those for autonomy *statutes*. While one indicator comprises four in-kind differentiations (the *Regionalist Party Ideology Scale*), two provide relative in-degree differentiations (the *Chapel Hill Expert Survey* question and the *Ethnopolitics and Party Competition Scales*), but none combines both in kind and in-degree differentiations or explicitly looks for particular policy fields.

Regarding the second property, one should note that there is hitherto no decentralisation indicator with data available for both autonomy demands and statutes. Yet, I have shown in the two previous chapters that decentralisation reforms have often been enacted following political pressures by regionalist parties – especially in large sub-state entities with distinct political identities like Catalonia, Flanders or Scotland (Hepburn, 2009; Toubeau, 2018). In turn, as illustrated by the paradox of federalism, the decentralisation statutes (that may have been extended to other entities in the same country following demand spillovers) have the potential for creating new demands (Erk & Anderson, 2009). To truly disentangle the interplay of autonomy demands and autonomy statutes, and to obtain a refined assessment of how they play out in the paradox of federalism that has been the starting puzzle of this research, one needs a unified framework allowing to evaluate both autonomy demands and autonomy states with the same indicator. One may argue that, in this case, it suffices to use the RAI or the AI to code the autonomy demands issues by regionalist or traditional parties. However, in light of the shortcoming pointed out regarding the first property, a refined framework and indicator is necessary.

I created the Sub-state Autonomy Scale to have an indicator that allows for a fine-grained evaluation of sub-state autonomy demands *and* statutes *in kind* (depending on whether competences are administrative or legislative in nature), *in degree* (depending on how much each dimension is present) *and by competence* (disaggregating multiple policy fields and assessing the relative share of state and sub-state competences) at the same time.[18] The scale consists in a 0-1 range that relies on three dimensions of autonomy (group rights, self-rule and shared rule) which, in addition to usefulness with regard to the two aforementioned properties, is suitable for analyses with various methods – from regressions

[18] The 'in kind' and 'in degree' language I use here has been inspired by the literature on set-theory (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012), and is furthermore the one used by Dardanelli (2019). Scholars familiar with regional autonomy might also speak of 'type', 'depth' and 'scope' when referring to 'in kind', 'in degree' and 'by competences'. Since the former three are however sometimes confused by non-specialists, I prefer the more generic set-theoretic language and the explicit reference to competences.

to fuzzy-set analyses and qualitative comparisons. In parallel to the scale, I created a database with data on sub-state autonomy statutes and demands for sub-state communities in Belgium, Spain and the United Kingdom for the periods of observation specified in chapter 2.[19]

Now, not to be misunderstood, I do not claim that existing indicators of autonomy demands and statutes are flawed or henceforth useless – on the contrary. What I argue is that some research problems – especially those involving political dynamics that are influenced by (i) the qualitative distinction between administrative and legislative autonomy, (ii) by competence distributions and extensions and (iii) by the interplay of autonomy demands and statutes – can be resolved more meaningfully with an alternative indicator like the SAS. I further illustrate this point in the third section of this chapter with a direct comparison of the three indicators used on different cases.

2. The Sub-state Autonomy Scale

In order to explain the conception and data collection of the Sub-state Autonomy Scale, I proceed in four steps. I (i) define the concept of sub-state autonomy, (ii) detail and operationalise its dimensions and (iii) explain how the operationalised dimensions have been conceived as a scale. I go on by (iv) specifying what information was used to make the measurements and how data have been collected.[20]

a) Definition of the concept and its dimensions

The SAS aims to capture what prerogatives sub-state entities demand and obtain to become more 'autonomous'. In chapter 2, I have shown that 'autonomy', i.e. the 'prerogatives allowing a political community below the state level to live according to its own rules', can refer to a broad range of rights – from the recognition of the entity, its delimitation, habits, language and symbols, to special assistance, guaranteed representation and self-government rights (Levy, 2000, p. 25).

I have also made the case, however, for why I focus on the three aspects of autonomy that appeared most salient in cases of centrifugal sociological decentralisation: group rights, self-rule and shared rule. Group rights allow a community to preserve its culture and use its language in the main state institutions (e.g. administration, education, judiciary) – provided that these are features that distinguish it from the rest of a states' society. Shared rule prerogatives allow a community to co-determine decisions on the state level that will affect the society as a whole and, thereby, also the community itself. Self-rule prerogatives, finally, allow a community to determine decisions that will only govern the community itself. While the three types of prerogatives all concern decisions that are taken for a community to

[19] In the United Kingdom, I started the data collection in 1707 (with Scotland joining the Union) although the analysis only starts in 1801 for the reasons pointed out in chapter 2.

[20] For a comprehensive explanation on how to conceive a transparent, valid and reliable indicator, see Hooghe et al. (2016, pp. 6-14) who base their proceeding on Adcock and Collier (2001).

become more autonomous, the actor who takes the decisions is different. Group rights rely on decisions taken outside the community by the state. Shared rule relies on decisions that are taken jointly by the community and the rest of the state. Self-rule, in turn, relies on decisions that are solely taken by the community.

Depending on how broad the notion of autonomy is conceived, the types of prerogatives that are associated with it will differ. In a narrow approach of autonomy, like the one Dardanelli (2019) uses for his *Autonomy Index*, one will only include self-rule because it is the only type of prerogatives that allow a community to take decisions for itself solely. Or as he puts it: "self-rule rests on the underlying notion of autonomy whereas shared rule rests on that of influence" (p. 275). In a broader approach, one will recognise that joint decisions to allow a community to (co-)determine the rules according to which it lives. This is what Hooghe et al. (2016) do when using the concept of 'regional authority' to encompass both self-rule and shared rule because they contribute to "the capacity to make legitimate and binding decisions for a collectivity" (p. 16). For the SAS, I adopt an even broader approach by considering that decisions that are taken outside the community can also contribute to rendering it more autonomous when they allow the community to use state institutions while preserving its own language and culture. The fact that these have often been salient demands in regionalist movements alongside self-rule and shared rule claims underlines the connection of the three in a broader conception of autonomy (Gevers et al., 1998). While I therefore conceive autonomy as comprising self-rule, shared rule and group rights as its core dimensions, I recognise that the three types of prerogatives weight differently in the extent to which they render a political community autonomous: with self-rule prevailing over shared rule, which in turn prevails over group rights. This will be reflected in the scale.

b) Specification and operationalisation of the dimensions

The three dimensions developed above can be divided into different sub-dimensions that I use to construct the scale. While the division was originally developed based on theoretical considerations inspired by the works of Keating (1992), Loughlin (2000), Brunner and Küpper (2002), Tkacik (2008), Hooghe et al. (2016) and Dardanelli (2019), it has later been refined based on the empirical reality of cases that I studied. The former theoretical work aimed at achieving an indicator with a high level of meaningfulness through context and time. The latter empirical considerations aimed at enriching this meaningfulness by ensuring its applicability to political realities. Although the amount of countries in this research is limited, this does not mean that the SAS can only be applied to them. While it needs to be acknowledged that additional country studies could potentially lead to further refinements of the scale, the universe of sub-state communities under study was sufficiently large to ensure a broad applicability *a priori*.

The first dimension, group rights, can be operationalised based on different prerogatives with gradually increasing importance. Being recognised by the state (in law or political practice) as a relevant political group (and not only as an administrative territorial

division) is one thing. Being allowed to use a regional language in primary education, secondary education, administrations, the judiciary and support for cultural distinctiveness is another. When 1-3 of the former prerogatives are involved, I consider cultural and linguistic facilities to be partial. When 4-5 are involved, I consider cultural and linguistic facilities to be advanced. For sub-state communities without particular linguistic or cultural dynamics, this dimension is only of limited relevance and not taken into consideration. But this is not a problem for the scale because the prerogatives of the other dimensions can be situated independently of it (see below).

The second dimension, shared rule, can involve co-decision power in different state institutions. I take into consideration the two most important ones by assessing sub-state communities' influence in the state parliament and the state executive. In order to do so, I account for whether they are only represented in the legislature and executive or if they can also veto decisions taken by them.

Finally, the third dimension, self-rule, involves a variety of sub-dimensions. Since it is not only the core dimension of sub-state autonomy but also the one that captures the difference between administrative and legislative powers, as well as the one that accounts for competence enlargements, I dedicate the most fine-grained operationalisation to it. The depth of self-rule is determined by both the capacities of institutions and the policy scope that falls under their competences. For the capacities of institutions, one can rely on the aforementioned distinction between 'administrative' and 'legal' self-rule.

Administrative self-rule allows a sub-state community to implement specific policies for their group without giving them the possibility to determine the content of these policies. Three types can be distinguished. (i) Executive administration allows for the simple execution of policies, as determined by superior institutions (e.g. having a specific ministry for the implementation of a policy, like the split French-speaking and Flemish ministries for culture and education in the 1960s in Belgium). (ii) Advisory administration allows for voicing the sub-state community's concerns on policies at statewide institutions through an own representative body (e.g. an advisory body, like the Council for Wales and Monmouthshire from 1949-1964). (iii) Discretionary administration allows for the execution of policies as determined by the institutions of the sub-state community itself (e.g. having a regional council and executive determining the policy implementation, like the Provincial Councils in Spain). These three types of administrative self-rule are of gradually increasing importance. While an executive administration allows a community to do itself what others want, an advisory administration allows in addition to say what it wants. Discretionary administration, finally, allows a community to implement policies the way it wants. The importance of the three also increases with the number of policies that fall under their control, and with the legitimacy of their institutions. While executive administration relies only on an own ministry, advisory and discretionary self-rule can come with an elected assembly that deepens the popular ownership (and thereby the 'auto' side of the autonomy). Discretionary administration can furthermore rely on an own executive for the implementation of the policies based on the decisions of an own assembly.

Legislative self-rule, in turn, allows a sub-state community to adopt itself the rules that determine the content of specific policies for their group. The scope of legislative capacities increases with four features. (i) As before, the legitimacy of the institutions, i.e. having an elected assembly and an own executive, deepens the popular ownership and thereby the 'auto'-side of the legislative autonomy. (ii) The number of policy fields that fall under the competence of these institutions increases their room of manoeuvre. Thereby, the relative importance of state and sub-state competences is important. Drawing on the existing works cited above and trying both to be as exhaustive as possible and to form uniform categories of public policy, I chose to distinguish between seven policy fields: culture, education, social and sanitary affairs, territorial affairs, economy, social security, citizenship and immigration; and five special areas of government: local government, police, defence, penal and civil law, judicial system (see Appendix 2 for their detailed content). (iii) The extent to which a sub-state community can collect money through fiscal and borrowing autonomy determines how independent from state resources a sub-state community is when carrying out its policies. (iv) Finally, the scope of legislative institutions depends on how independent the statute itself is, i.e. whether the rules of functioning (constitutive autonomy) can be amended, whether sub-state laws are subject to central government veto, whether the statute is constitutionally guaranteed and whether international relations can be conducted in the competence areas.

c) Conception of the scale

Based on this conceptualisation, the SAS was conceived as a 0-1 range by following three principles (see Table 6 for the precise composition). First, based on the hierarchy of the three dimensions set-out above, 0-9% of the score was attributed to group rights prerogatives, 0-16% of the score was attributed to shared rule prerogatives, and 0-84% was attributed to self-rule prerogatives. The sum of the three does not equal 100 because self-rule and shared rule prerogatives can be assessed independently of group rights prerogatives in sub-state communities without cultural or linguistic distinctiveness. For the latter, the scale starts then immediately at administrative self-rule, with the same scores as for the other cases. Within legislative self-rule, in turn, the largest share of the score is attributed to controlled policy fields and special areas of government (59%) because they determine most importantly the depth of the conferred self-rule. Having own institutions, fiscal and borrowing autonomy and statutory autonomy count each for 12-18% of the score share. While all these differences were aimed at to respect the conceptual hierarchy and their relative importance, the precise shares were derived based on the equal weights that had been given to all sub-dimensions.

Among policy fields and special areas of government, themselves, I did indeed not introduce specific weight-differences to remain value-free in this respect. However, one should note that certain policy competences might be deemed more important or providing more autonomy than others in certain contexts. Their relative importance can furthermore vary across countries and throughout time. Should such differences be relevant for a specific

research, specific weights can be attributed since the data have been coded separately for each sub-dimension and policy, and are presented as such in the database.

Secondly, the scale relies on an additive in-degree measurement within fixed scores defined by qualitative anchors on the self-rule dimension. On the 0-1 range, the main anchor distinguishes between administrative and legislative self-rule and is set at 0,50. The other anchors rely on the sub-dimensions of administrative self-rule and are set at 0,12, 0,16 and 0,22. To respect the 0,50 anchor, shared rule prerogatives are added either to administrative or to legislative self-rule prerogatives in such a way that the total score never exceeds 0,50 with administrative self-rule, and never exceeds 1,00 with legislative self-rule.

Thirdly, in-degree scores are assigned based on the simple presence or absence of the prerogatives to which they refer, with two exceptions. (i) For the scores of policy fields and the special areas of government, the assessment of communities' competences is made relative to those of the state. This means that: if a community has exclusive competence in a domain, it receives the full score related to that domain, if a community has more competences than the state, it receives 75% of the score, if the competences of a community are about equal to those of the state, it receives 50% of the score, if a community has less competences than the state, it receives 25% of the score, and if a community has no competence, it receives 0% of the score. (ii) For fiscal and borrowing autonomy, I follow the well-thought conceptualisation of the RAI (while subjecting it to the qualitative anchors set-out above). Concerning fiscal autonomy, 25% of the score is attributed if the community can set the rate of minor taxes, 50% of the score is attributed if it can set the base and rate of minor taxes, 75% is attributed if it can set the rate of one major tax (personal income, corporate, value added or sales) and the full score is attributed if the community can set the rate and base of one major tax. Concerning borrowing autonomy, 33% of the score is attributed if the community can borrow after prior authorisation of the state, 67% of the score is attributed if it can borrow without prior authorisation but within certain rules and the full score is attributed if the community can borrow without centrally imposed restrictions. Notice that fiscal and borrowing autonomy are considered for administrative and legislative self-rule because both can entail them. I considered fiscal and borrowing powers as administrative when they consist in administrative acts in application of state laws. I considered them as legislative when they are exercised through own sub-state laws. Finally, in the particular case of a demand for independence (i.e. not sub-state but state autonomy), the score 'Ind.' was assigned.

In sum, this operationalisation allows to measure autonomy demands and statutes by – at the same time – distinguishing administrative from legislative self-rule with a fixed anchor, by assessing the three dimensions of autonomy in degree, and by differentiating in a fine-grained manner which extent of competences have been conferred or demanded and when this extent of competences extended. In Table 6, hereunder, the cumulative score follows the scale.

Table 6. Conception of the Sub-state Autonomy Scale (SAS)

Dimension		Content	Fixed anchor	Prerogative score	Cumulative score
I. Group rights		Absent	0,00	+ 0,00	0,00
		Recognition of group/entity particularism		+ 0,03	0,03
		Partial ling./cult. facilities		+ 0,03	0,06
		Advanced ling./cult. facilities		+ 0,03	0,09
II.a Administrative Self-rule	a.1 Executive	Own administration for 1 policy sector	0,12	+ 0,00	0,12
		Own administration for ≥ 2 policy sectors		+ 0,02	0,14
	a.2 Advisory	Advisory competences in 1 policy sector	0,16	+ 0,00	0,16
		Advisory competences in ≥ 2 policy sectors		+ 0,02	0,18
		Directly elected assembly		+ 0,02	0,20
	a.3 Discretionary	Discretionary administration of 1 policy sector	0,22	+ 0,00	0,22
		Discretionary administration ≥ 2 policy sectors		+ 0,02	0,24
		Fiscal autonomy (adm.)		+ 0,02	0,26
		Borrowing autonomy (adm.)		+ 0,02	0,28
		Directly elected assembly		+ 0,02	0,30
		Own executive		+ 0,02	0,32
III. Shared rule (i)	State parliament	Guaranteed representation		+ 0,04	0,36
		Veto power		+ 0,04	0,40
	State government	Guaranteed representation		+ 0,04	0,44
		Veto power		+ 0,04	0,48
Self-rule anchor					0,50
II.b Legislative Self-rule	Institutional statute	Directly elected assembly	0,52	+ 0,00	0,52
		Own executive		+ 0,02	0,54
	Policy scope	Cultural matters		+ 0,00-0,02	0,56
		Educational matters		+ 0,00-0,02	0,58
		Social and sanitary matters		+ 0,00-0,02	0,60
		Territorial matters		+ 0,00-0,02	0,62
		Economic matters		+ 0,00-0,02	0,64
		Social security matters		+ 0,00-0,02	0,66
		Citizenship and immigration matters		+ 0,00-0,02	0,68
	Special competences	Organisation and oversight of local govern,		+ 0,00-0,02	0,70
		Police & defence		+ 0,00-0,02	0,72
		Judicial system & general penal and civil law		+ 0,00-0,02	0,74
	Financial autonomy	Fiscal autonomy (leg.)		+ 0,00-0,02	0,76
		Borrowing autonomy (leg.)		+ 0,00-0,02	0,78
	Statutory autonomy	Constitutive autonomy		+ 0,02	0,80
		International relations in competence areas		+ 0,02	0,82
		No government veto & guaranteed statute		+ 0,02	0,84
III. Shared rule (ii)	State parliament	Guaranteed representation		+ 0,04	0,88
		Veto power		+ 0,04	0,92
	State government	Guaranteed representation		+ 0,04	0,96
		Veto power		+ 0,04	1,00

For real case evaluations, it is obtained based on the second conception principle in the following way. If a sub-state autonomy demand or statute includes:

- legislative self-rule, it scores: 0,52 + its scores on this dimension.
  + its scores on the self-rule dimension.
  = 0,52 (min.) – 1,00 (max.).
- discretionary administrative self-rule, it scores: 0,22 + its scores on this dimension.
  + its scores on the self-rule dimension.
  = 0,22 (min.) – 0,48 (max.).
- advisory administrative self-rule, it scores: 0,16 + its scores on this dimension.
  + its scores on the self-rule dimension.
  = 0,16 (min.) – 0,36 (max.).

- executive administrative self-rule, it scores: 0,12 + its scores on this dimension.
  + its scores on the self-rule dimension.
  = 0,12 (min.) – 0,30 (max.).
- no self-rule, it scores: 0,00 + its scores on the group rights dimension.
  + its scores on the self-rule dimension
  = 0,00 (min.) – 0,25 (max.).

d) Data collection and database

Following the conception of the Sub-state Autonomy Scale, I created a database with information on the sub-state autonomy statutes and demands of the 31 sub-state communities under study in Belgium, Spain and the United Kingdom. As set out in the previous chapter, by 'autonomy statutes', I refer to the legal prerogatives that were effectively obtained by a sub-state community; by 'autonomy demands', in turn, I refer to both the official position of the traditional (i.e. centrist, liberal or socialist) party with the highest autonomy demand, and to the official position of the regionalist party with the highest electoral support.

By official position, I refer to the position that can be considered the dominant view within a political party. It does not have to be formally adopted by the party board, nor to be included in the party manifesto, but it should be the view that the majority of party officials (i.e. MPs, ministers or chairs) defend publicly during the period of observation. The reason for this choice is that party positions often come up, adapt and exert political pressures much before they are formally adopted or translated into manifestos. When shared by a large part of party officials, they can indeed already be considered approved implicitly. It is also possible that a party does not talk during all periods about certain policy competences, although it follows from previous actions that they support their decentralisation. In many manifestos, furthermore, the general party position on autonomy is included but not always all detailed demands regarding specific competences. The present approach has the advantage of assessing party positions in greater detail – both regarding their extent and the moment they come up. However, it comes with the difficulty that such an assessment is more complicated to objectify. To achieve an as large as possible objectivation, I complemented my own assessment with expert checks in the following manner.

To collect the necessary information for attributing SAS scores to the statutes and demands of all sub-state communities under study, I relied on two types of sources. First, I read secondary literature by political scientists, sociologists, historians and legal scholars and assigned scores provisionally on this basis. I disaggregated cases temporarily each time there was a change in the traditional party demand, in the regionalist party demand or in the autonomy statute of a community. Ranges were expressed annually (e.g. Flanders 1 (1830-1890), Flanders 2 (1891-1916), etc.), which led to a total amount of 372 longitudinal observations for the 31 sub-state communities under study. Secondly, for all cases where I still had hesitations on the scoring, I conducted expert interviews to obtain the necessary

information for assigning the scores.[21] For each country study, I started by interviewing legal scholars in order to confirm my coding for the autonomy statutes of all communities in the country (see Appendix 2 for the overview sheet I provided to them). I then proceeded with interviewing political scientists and historians on the regionalist and traditional party demands for specific communities. Since the extent of autonomy statutes had already been confirmed, autonomy demands could usually be situated vis-à-vis them. In case of doubts on scores, additional experts were consulted until I had sufficient information to for the assignment. In total, 47 interviews have been carried out (see Appendix 3 for the full list). At the end of the process, I compiled a database with the detailed scores of all scale components for each case so that the aggregated score can be verified and adapted for specific research purposes. The total database that comprises 49 848 scores (134 SAS scores for regionalist party demands, traditional party demands and autonomy statutes, multiplied by the 372 observations) will be made publicly and can be found in Appendix 4, 5, 6 and 7.

One may wonder why such a degree of precision and such a high number of scores was required to evaluate the social reality I am to capture: the rise, increase, decrease and disappearing of autonomy demands and statutes. While one should note that only 9506 scores out of the 49 848 were non-repetitive, i.e. comprised a change vis-à-vis the previous period, the amount of scores to be assigned remains substantive. However, such a precision is required if one wants to capture all instances in which autonomy demands and statutes changed. For example, if one does not account for all the different dimensions of legislative self-rule or for the relative share of competences between states and sub-state entities, demand changes and statute reforms remain unnoticed although they have had important influences on the political dynamics in multi-level states. I will illustrate this by comparing the RAI, the AI and the SAS on concrete examples in the following section.

Altogether, the process of data collection was guided by the four main criteria that Harguindéguy et al. (2021) also used for their review of existing decentralisation indices. First, data were meant to be publicly *available*. Secondly, *transparency* about the scale conception, the data collection and the score attribution was aimed at. Thirdly, three types of *validity* checks were carried out (Adcock & Collier, 2001): (i) conceptual validity – through the critical exchange with other scholars, (ii) content validity – through a comprehensive verification of the information used for coding through expert interviews, and (iii) (dis)convergent validity – by comparing the scale to existing indicators and discussing their differences (see next section). Finally, *reliability* was aimed at in the form of 'snowball-checks' where unconfirmed information was (re)submitted to experts until confirmation could be given.

[21] While interviews were usually conducted face-to-face (in person or via video-conference), some interviewees preferred to answer my questions on a written basis.

3. Illustration of the Sub-state Autonomy Scale and comparison to existing indicators

The objective of this third section is to illustrate the usefulness of the Sub-state Autonomy Scale (SAS) vis-à-vis the two main properties that justified its creation: (i) the need for an indicator that assesses autonomy in kind, in degree and by competences, and (ii) the need for a unified framework when studying autonomy demands and statutes. Put differently, I want to show that the scale lives up to the expectations raised in the first section and that it is a trustworthy tool of analysis. While doing so, I will compare the SAS to existing indicators to point out its comparative advantages.

a) Assess autonomy in kind, in degree and by competences

Assessing sub-state autonomy in kind, in degree and by competences is important to capture the political dynamics that come with (i) the shift from administrative to legislative autonomy, and (ii) the extension of competences or institutional strength. An indicator accounting for these needs hence:

- to have a fixed anchor discriminating administrative from legislative prerogatives.
- to capture all extensions of competences.

I use three examples drawn respectively from the Belgian, Spanish and United Kingdom cases to show that the SAS is able to do these differentiations and I compare its ability to that of the two existing indicators of sub-state autonomy statutes that stood out in the preceding review: the Autonomy Index (AI) and the Regional Authority Index (RAI). For the latter, I look at the self-rule dimension because it is the one that should capture the two aforementioned dynamics. After considering the indicators' evolutive assessment of the three cases, I also say a word about how their absolute levels compare. I then turn to points on which the RAI and the AI can be considered superior to the SAS.

First, I would like to start my illustration with the case of Flanders, which has been the arche-type of a sub-state community whose long autonomy mobilisation was followed by the decentralisation of legislative powers and incremental competence extensions. The important autonomy changes that one would want to see captured are (i) the extension of basic linguistic rights to an own executive administration in 1964, (ii) the conferral of legislative institutions with a first set of competences in cultural matters during first state reform in 1970 and (iii) the subsequent competence extensions during the second (1980), third (1989), fourth (1993), fifth (2001) and sixth (2014) state reforms.

As shown in Table 7, all these changes are captured by the SAS that accounts for the shift from administrative to legislative autonomy in 1971 with the score passing from below to above 0,50, as well as for the extensions of both administrative and legislative autonomy with extending scores. The self-rule dimension of the RAI and the AI, in turn, account for some of these changes but not for all. The 1990 competence extension remains unnoticed by the AI because there had been some decentralisation already in the extended fields (educational and social and sanitary matters). The 2014 competence extension remains unnoticed by both the

AI and the RAI because Flanders was already competent in more than two important areas of government they account for. While the shift from administrative to legislative autonomy is the starting point for the RAI measurement and captured by the AI with a score increase, both fail to distinguish it from entities with administrative powers. For the RAI where administrative entities can score higher (e.g. the French regions scoring 10 from 1986-2010), this is due to the absence of a fixed anchor distinguishing between administrative and legislative powers. For the AI, this is most probably due to a coding mistake because it comprises such a fixed anchor (8) and it works in most other cases (see below). As for the linguistic partition of the national ministries for culture and education in 1964 that conferred an executive administrative autonomy to the two main linguistic communities, it remains unnoticed by the AI although it foresees a score for administrations with executive responsibilities. There are no indications on this in the Online Appendix to Dardanelli (2019).

Table 7. AI, RAI (self-rule) and SAS scores for Flanders

Autonomy change	1950-1963 Linguistic rights	1964 Administrative partition	1971 Legislative autonomy	1981 Competence extension	1990 Competence extension	1994 Competence extension	2002 Competence extension	2014 Competence extension
RAI (self-rule)	NA	NA	4	7	11	13	14	14
AI	3,5	3,5	6,5	8	8	11	11,5	11,5
SAS	0,170	0,220	0,705	0,770	0,802	0,857	0,890	0,905

Secondly, I pursue my illustration with the case of Scotland that has, similarly to the Flemish one, obtained legislative autonomy after a long political mobilisation but with much less incremental competence increases. Instead, it received a higher degree of autonomy at the beginning but obtained lesser and less far-reaching subsequent extensions than Flanders. The autonomy changes one would like to see captured are (i) the shift from the administrative Scottish Office to the legislative Scottish Parliament in 1998, as well as (ii) the competence extensions of the 2012 and 2016 Scotland Acts.

As shown in Table 8, the SAS is again able to capture all these changes, both with regard to the qualitative turnover point discriminating administrative from legislative autonomy and with regard to its subsequent extensions. The RAI and AI, in turn, also register a considerable increase in 1998 that, for the AI, correctly crosses the legislative anchor this time. They fail, however, to account for the following competence extensions (knowing the AI observations stop in 2015). This is once again due to the fact that important political competences had been conferred in more than two policy fields previously. The problem of not registering any competence extension is more pronounced than in Flanders, though, due to the fact that higher levels of sub-state autonomy had been immediately conferred in 1998.

Table 8. AI, RAI (self-rule) and SAS scores for Scotland

Autonomy change	1950-1997 Admin. autonomy (Scottish Office)	1995 Unitary local authorities	1998 Devolution statute	2012 Competence extension	2016 Competence extension
RAI (self-rule)	1	1	14	14	14
AI	6,5	3,5	11,5	11,5	NA
SAS	0,320	0,320	0,740	0,752	0,782

Finally, I would like to close the illustration with the case of Aragon in Spain, which is a nice instance of what Spaniards have called the 'non-historic' autonomous communities and, more specifically, one that needed to take the so-called 'slow route' of autonomy in order to acquire the same competences than the so-called 'historic' and 'fast track' autonomous communities (a detailed historical overview on the Spanish autonomy history will follow in chapter 5). It is thus more representative of cases whose autonomy enlargements followed that of other larger or more politically mobilised communities. In addition, it is representative of the Spanish cases in which despite having decentralised competences in a policy field, the state detains important prerogatives of framework legislation. The autonomy changes one would like to see captured here are (i) the shift from a recognised political community without own institutions to an autonomous community with legislative competences in 1982, and (ii) two competence extensions in 1992 and 1997.

As shown in Table 9, the SAS is once again able to capture these changes, accounting with its 0,5 anchor for the shift from administrative to legislative autonomy and for the extensions thereafter. The RAI and the AI also capture the instalment of the autonomous community institutions in 1982 with significant score increases – and a correct surpassing of the legislative autonomy anchor for the AI. While they do not capture the 1992 extension, they capture the 1997 one. This might at first be surprising because one would expect earlier extension with lower levels of autonomy to be more easily identifiable. However, it comes with the fact that the 1992 reform extended educational and social and sanitary competences for which competences pre-existed, while the 1997 reform extended taxation powers that is accounted for separately by both the RAI and the AI.


Table 9. AI, RAI (self-rule) and SAS scores for Aragon

Autonomy change	1950-1976 Francoist dictatorship	1976-1981 Democratic transition	1982-1991 Autonomous community	1992-1996 Competence extension	1997-2018 Competence extension
RAI (self-rule)	NA	NA	13	13	14
AI	4	7	9,5	9,5	10
SAS	0,000	0,070	0,667	0,682	0,687

Before I draw conclusions on this discussion of the relative score changes over time, the absolute scores that the three indicators give to these cases also deserve some consideration. More specifically, if we look at the scores in the previous tables and the graphical summary in Figure 1, three issues appear.

First, the autonomy statute of Aragon is rated as high by the RAI as those obtained by Flanders and Scotland. This is problematic insofar as, despite having some competences in various policy fields such as culture, education, social and sanitary, territorial and economic matters, most of these fields have only been decentralised very partially. Furthermore, the Spanish state detains important framework legislation prerogatives in most of them, which further reduces the effective capacity of autonomous communities to legislate on them (Spanish Constitution, 1978, art. 149 §3). The statute would thus need to be rated much lower than the Flemish and Scottish cases whose competences in these areas are much deeper.

Figure 1. Comparison of the AI, RAI (self-rule) and SAS scores for Flanders, Scotland and Aragon



Secondly, the autonomy statute of Scotland is rated comparatively very high by the AI, equalling that of Flanders. This comes with the fact that both have important competences in fields such as culture, education, social and sanitary, as well as territorial matters and fiscal autonomy. However, Flanders also detains competences in economic matters, international relations and has higher educational and borrowing autonomy, while Scotland only detains more policing and judicial autonomy. Compared directly, one would thus expect the former to be more autonomous than the latter.

Thirdly, when comparing the current scores of the three cases to the maximal possible score on the AI (14) and the RAI self-rule dimension (18), one would expect that there is still some room for evolution in their competence scope. However, on the very policy scope dimension, Flanders and Scotland score 6,5/7 on the AI (one half-point remaining) and 3/4 on the RAI (one full point remaining), while Aragon scores 4,5/7 on the AI (one full and one half-point remaining) and also 3/4 on the RAI (one full point remaining). There is thus not much room left for future evolutions. On the SAS policy scope and special areas of government, in turn, Flanders and Scotland score 0,11/0,20 (17 quarter points remaining),[22] while Aragon scores 0,07/0,20 (26 quarter points remaining).

Taken together, the comparisons in this sub-section all show one and the same thing: that considering policy competences further than two important areas of government, and that assessing state and sub-state competences relatively to each other is not only important to trace competence extensions over time, but also to correctly assess sub-state communities' absolute levels of autonomy to ensure direct comparability.

From the two points I tried to make in this sub-section, i.e. that the SAS is able to assess sub-state autonomy in kind, in degree and by competences and that this leads to both better relative and absolute measurements of sub-state autonomy than those of existing indicators, one might want to conclude that the SAS is superior to the AI and RAI and should therefore be preferred over them from now on. However, one should note that the assessment in this

[22] While at first glance, this might look contrary to my previous point, the score of Flanders does not exceed the Scottish one here because the former's higher international relations competences and borrowing autonomy fall under 'financial and statutory autonomy' rather than under 'policy scope' and 'special areas of government'.

section was made vis-à-vis the properties that are important for the present research: capturing shifts from administrative to legislative autonomy and capturing extensions of legislative autonomy. It is thus only vis-à-vis these two properties that the SAS has been proven superior. When it comes to assessing degrees and evolutions of fiscal autonomy, for example, the AI can be expected to be more fine-grained that the SAS given its higher number of categories available on this sub-dimension. The same is true for assessing degrees and evolutions of shared rule for which the RAI disposes of a much more fine-grained framework. If one of these two elements is central to a research problem, the choice should fall on these indicators rather than on the SAS. One should furthermore keep in mind that, although some country extensions are envisioned for the SAS, the AI and the RAI will probably remain available for a wider range of cases. They can thus still be preferable for reasons of data availability, although the caveats highlighted in this sub-section should then be kept in mind.

b) Provide a unified framework for the study of autonomy demands and statutes

The second property justifying the creation of the Sub-state Autonomy Scale was the need for a unified framework when assessing autonomy demands and statutes. This was shown important to disentangle the mutual influences that autonomy demands and statutes can have on each other. An indicator able to account for these would thus need to:


- complement the assessment of sub-state communities' autonomy statutes with the tracing of autonomy demands issued by political parties within the communities over time.
- code demands and statutes on similar dimensions so that not only levels of demands and statutes cannot only be compared relatively to each other but also competence-wise.

I use again three examples drawn respectively from the Belgian, Spanish and United Kingdom cases to show that the SAS is able to do these differentiations. While I stick to the Flemish and Scottish cases, I substitute that of Aragon by Catalonia because it has known a greater variation of autonomy demands that is more interesting to discuss. As pointed out in the first section, existing indicators like the *Regionalist Party Ideology Scale* (Massetti & Schakel, 2016) provide in-kind measurements with four main categories (protectionist, federalist, ambiguous, separatist), while the *Chapel Hill Expert Survey* by (Bakker et al., 2015) and the *Ethnopolitics and Party competition Scales* by (Szöcsik & Zuber, 2015, 2019) situate party position on decentralisation and territorial autonomy on 0-10 scales. These indicators are hence capable to provide insights on the evolution and raw levels of parties' autonomy demands. However, in the absence of fixed anchors (to the *status quo*, for example), these indicators cannot be compared directly to assessments of communities' autonomy statutes. In the absence of such a direct comparability, I limit my illustration here to the Sub-state Autonomy Scale.

The three cases on which I would like to illustrate the utility of the SAS are that of Flanders, Catalonia and Scotland. All are typical cases in which autonomy statutes have been conferred after autonomy demands had been issued by both regionalist and traditional parties and in which both demands and statutes have evolved subsequently. The graphical

representation in Figure 2, read jointly with Appendix 4, shows nicely how autonomy demands and statutes have evolved in the three cases.

Figure 2. SAS scores for autonomy demands and statutes of three cases in Belgium, Spain and the UK



In Flanders, for example, we see the regionalist party demands of the *Frontpartij* (1919-1935) coming up in the inter-bellum and radicalising up until the independence demands of the *Vlaams Nationaal Verbond* (1936-1945). The regionalist party demands drop after 1945 after the radical parts of the Flemish movement lost credibility due to their collaboration during the Second World War. They come up again in 1954 with the federalist demands of the *Volksunie* that increase in 1977 in reaction to the first state reform and in 1985 in reaction to the second state reform. From 2002 onwards, the *Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie* is considered as its successor with a further radicalised demand. The centrist-catholic CVP (CD&V since 2001) is identified as the traditional party with the largest autonomy demand. It favours legislative autonomy for the first time in 1964 and increases its demand after the first (in 1977), second (1985), third (1992), fourth (1999) and fifth (2007) state reforms.

In Catalonia, we see that the first regionalist party demands come already up in 1907 with the *Lliga Regionalista* adopting a federalist position. After the dictatorship by Primo de Rivera (1923-1930), it is the *Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya* that defends an independentist position from 1931-1936. After the Francoist dictatorship (1936-1975), the regionalist party with the highest electoral support is first *Convergència i Unió* with a federalist position. After its dissolution, it is succeeded by *Junts pel Sí* (2015-2016) and *Junts per Catalunya* (2017-2020) as largest regionalist parties that took an independentist position. The regional branches of the *Socialist Party* are identified as the traditional parties with the largest autonomy demand that already support the conferral of legislative autonomy during the second republic (PRIzq, 1931-1936). They also do so after the Francoist dictatorship (PSOE, 1976-2020) with a demand increase following the 1997 statute reform and further autonomy demands since 2010.

In Scotland, finally, the first position in favour of legislative autonomy is taken by a traditional party. Following the 'Home Rule all round' policy adopted under prime-minister

Gladstone in response to the Irish autonomy movement, the *Liberal Party* supported Scottish devolution since 1885. It was jointed in the mid-1970s by the Labour party who increased its demand once in 2007 and once in 2014 – mostly following the pressures by the regionalist *Scottish National Party*. The latter had been demanding Scottish independence since its foundation in 1934.

This illustration shows that SAS data are able to trace in the autonomy demands that have been issued over time in sub-state communities by the regionalist party with the largest popular support and by the traditional party with the largest autonomy demand, as conceptualised previously. While the present comparison only showed the evolution of absolute demand levels, the precise scores in Appendix 5, Appendix 6 and Appendix 7 also provide their detailed composition for all the competences that are also coded for the sub-state communities' autonomy statutes. This allows for a direct comparison between the parties' demands and the obtained prerogatives. Taken together, the SAS is thus able to provide a unified framework allowing to study autonomy demands and statutes jointly.

4. Conclusion on an alternative indicator for measuring sub-state autonomy demands and statutes

In this chapter, I have developed what I called the Sub-state Autonomy Scale (SAS), an indicator for measuring sub-state autonomy demands and statutes that comprises two main analytical properties. First, it allows for a fine-grained evaluation of sub-state autonomy in kind (depending on whether competences are administrative or legislative in nature), in degree (depending on how much each dimension is present) and by competences (as a function of the extent of comprised policy domains) at the same time. Secondly, it provides data for both the autonomy demands and statutes of sub-state communities. While the former property aims at capturing two political dynamics that are of critical importance for the study of sub-state mobilisation and restructuring – the shift from administrative to legislative autonomy and the extension of policy competences, the latter provides the necessary methodological framework to disentangle the mutual influences of sub-state autonomy demands and statutes that are at the origin of the paradox of federalism. The illustrations in this chapter have proven that the SAS and the related data collection are perfectly capable to fulfil these analytical objectives, and that they do so better than existing indicators of both sub-state autonomy demands and statutes.

Beyond its usefulness in the present research, the SAS can be considered suitable for any decentralisation research looking into political dynamics that are influenced by (i) the qualitative distinction between administrative and legislative autonomy, (ii) by competence distributions and extensions and (iii) by the interplay of autonomy demands and statutes. For research looking into the evolution of fiscal autonomy or shared rule, the *Autonomy Index* (AI) and the *Regional Authority Index* (RAI) have respectively been shown to be more fine-grained. They are furthermore available for a larger number of cases than the SAS and may therefore still serve as main alternatives for cross-sectional reasons.

Chapter 4. How to systematically compare when sub-state autonomy demands and statutes arise and evolve

The last chapter of the first part of this dissertation is dedicated to detailing the methodological strategy of the research. To this end, a first section reminds the analytical needs of the research and explains why they are best met by carrying out a case-informed Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA). Secondly, I select and operationalise the factors included in the analyses. Thirdly, I explain the two main analytical tools that are used in QCA: analyses of necessity and analyses of sufficiency. In my description, I draw on the works of Rihoux and Ragin (2009) as well as on that of Schneider and Wagemann (2012) who are the leading generalist references in the field. Since QCA is usually used with static cases, I elaborate in a fourth sub-section on how I adapted the method to be suitable for longitudinal analyses.

1. Systematic cross-case comparison through Qualitative Comparative Analysis

As explained throughout the preceding chapters, the objective of the research is to investigate in typical cases of centrifugal sociological decentralisation under which conditions the demands of sub-state communities arise and evolve, and under which states accept to confer it. More specifically, rather than to look for the importance of individual factors, the aim is to show in which combination factors from different theoretical strands interact and appear to be important from a cross-case perspective. Three methodological requirements follow from this objective. First, the analysis needs to allow for a constellational inquiry of the studied factors' importance. Secondly, it needs to be case informed, i.e. make explicit based on which cases conclusions about factors' combinations are drawn. Thirdly, such conclusions need to rely on more than a single case. To achieve this, I opt for a Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) during which I iterate between the combinations of conditions that appear to be associated with an outcome and the cases based on which the association is observed.

QCA systematically compares in the presence or absence of which conditions an outcome is present or absent. It does so by looking at the values different cases take for certain conditions and outcomes, and then compares how frequently (combinations of) conditions and outcomes occur together. To be more precise, QCA conceives cases, conditions and outcomes in terms of 'set-relations'. Three elements need to be understood in this respect. First, when a condition (e.g. sociological distinctiveness) is present in a case (e.g. Flanders 2014-2020), the case is considered to be a member of the set of cases in which this condition is present. With multiple conditions (e.g. sociological distinctiveness and economic distinctiveness), set-properties are expressed in an interactive way. Flanders 2014-2020 is,

for example, member of the set of sociologically and economically distinctive cases. Secondly, cases have a similar set-relation with the outcome under study (e.g. autonomy increase). Flanders 2014-2020 is, for example, member of the set of cases in which autonomy increased. Thirdly, in a QCA, it is cases' set-memberships in conditions and outcomes that is compared as to determine in the presence or absence of which conditions and outcome is present or absent. Relations between conditions and outcomes are then expressed in terms of necessity and sufficiency. For example, if an outcome Y happens to always occur in the presence of condition X_1, one will consider X_1 to be 'necessary' for outcome Y to occur. In turn, when conditions X_1 and X_2 happen to always lead to outcome Y, X_1 and X_2 will be considered 'sufficient' for outcome Y to occur. The concepts of necessity and sufficiency are further detailed in the sub-sections below.

QCA has three epistemological characteristics. First, it has an 'equifinal' view of causality in that it understands outcomes as being (potentially) produced by multiple conditions. Put differently, it accepts different explanations for the occurrence of an outcome and sees them as equally valid. Secondly, it has an asymmetrical view of causality in that it does not presuppose that when conditions explain the occurrence of an outcome, their negation will also explain the absence of an outcome. Consequently, the presence and absence of an outcome need to be analysed separately. Thirdly, it has a constellational view of causality in that it explicitly looks for the combinations of conditions under which an outcome (or its absence) occur. By doing so, combinations are either linked by logical conjunctions (AND statements, noted ' * ' hereunder) or logical disjunctions (OR statements, noted ' + ' hereunder).

QCA is particularly suitable for the present study because my research looks for the different combinations of conditions under which autonomy demands and statutes arise and evolve. This is perfectly in line with the constellational and equifinal properties of QCA that allow to assess the importance of different theories, in different combinations at different moments of the demand and conferral process. Regression analyses, for example, could have tested the absolute importance of individual conditions – with some interactions being examined when strong theoretical expectations pre-exist. But since measuring and interpreting interactions for more than three or four variables becomes very difficult, they would have been incapable of delving in an in-depth and systematic manner into the combinations of conditions under which autonomy demands and statutes arise and evolve. Process-tracing analyses (PTA), in turn, would have been suitable for looking into such combinations. But the required precision of the method would have made it difficult to examine empirical evidence for all the conditions under study for an as large number of cases. More importantly, PTA would not have allowed the counter-factual considerations that comes with QCA's minimisation process. Based on Boolean logics, QCA retains indeed only combinations of conditions in which all conditions are necessary for the combination to prove sufficient for the outcome to occur (see below). QCA is situated on the middle-ground in between regression and process-tracing approaches in that it allows to systematically study the combinations of a substantive number of conditions for a large number of cases. While it

is case-driven enough to prevent the omission of relevant conditions, it is outcome-driven enough to retain only those combination(s) of conditions that prove effectively relevant for explaining the outcome.

2. Conditions under study in the present research and operationalisation

In the following sub-sections, I detail the factors taken into consideration for the study of autonomy demands and autonomy statutes. Since the objective of the research is to make a systematic comparative assessment of factors from different theoretical strands, those selected respond directly to the literature review in chapter 2. Given the relevance of the five strands for explaining both the evolution of autonomy demands and statutes, factors from each of them will be included in both of their analyses. Across specific analyses, some structuralist and contextual factors will always be included, while other more specific ones will vary based on their relevance for the outcome under study – in line with the preceding review. After justifying the selection of factors vis-à-vis the five theoretical strands, I present in greater detail the analytical rationale that responds to the expectations formulated in chapter 2. Eventually, the factors are operationalised. In a QCA, 'factors' are usually referred to as 'conditions'. From now on, I use both terms interchangeably.

a) Conditions under study to explain the evolution of autonomy demands

The analysis of the evolution of autonomy demands comes with eight different outcomes to be explained. As set out in chapter 2, I study under which conditions both the demands of (i) regionalist and (ii) traditional parties (a) arise, (b) increase, (c) decrease and (d) disappear. The conditions under study vary for each analysis depending on the amount of pre-existing research and its suitability for a counterfactual analysis. In the analyses of regionalist party demands, I include sixteen conditions. In that of traditional party demands, I include twelve. They are summarised in Table 10.

To account for sociological factors, I use three conditions. My unit of analysis being on the group level, I account for what I will call 'sociological distinctiveness', i.e. sub-state communities' linguistic, historical or geographic distinctiveness. Furthermore, I account for the presence of past or current 'political grievances'. These two factors are included in both the analyses of regionalist and traditional party demands. For the analyses of when regionalist party demands increase and decrease, I add a third factor that I call 'demand frustration'. Contrary to the former two, it is not directly derived from the empirical literature above but appeared relevant in my preliminary historical research on all studied cases (see chapter 4 for a description of my method). I found indeed that regionalist party demands can exacerbate when not met during a substantial amount of time or when already obtained autonomy prerogatives are withdrawn (Gevers et al., 1998; Laffan, 1999; Dowling, 2014).

Table 10. Conditions under study for the evolution of autonomy demands and directional expectations

Theory	Condition	Regionalist party demands				Traditional party demands			
		Arise	Incr.	Decr.	Disapp.	Arise	Incr.	Decr.	Disapp.
Sociologic	Sociological distinctiveness	●	●	⊗	⊗	●	●	⊗	⊗
	Past/present political grievances	●	●	⊗	⊗	●	●	⊗	⊗
	Demand frustration	-	●	⊗	-	-	-	-	-
Economic	Economic distinctiveness	●	●	⊗	⊗	●	●	⊗	⊗
Institutionalist	Prospects for legislative autonomy	●	-	-	-	●	-	-	-
	Presence of legislative autonomy	●	-	-	-	●	-	-	-
	Institutional dissatisfaction	-	●	-	-	-	●	-	-
	Demand realisation	-	-	-	●	-	-	-	-
	Democracy	●	●	⊗	⊗	●	●	⊗	⊗
Functionalist	Asymmetrical demands	●	●	⊗	-	●	●	⊗	⊗
	Asymmetrical autonomy	●	●	⊗	-	●	●	⊗	⊗
	Non-requested increase	-	●	-	-	-	●	-	-
Rational-choice	Regionalist competitor	-	●	⊗	-	-	-	-	-
	Regionalist party threat (reg.)	-	-	-	-	●	●	⊗	⊗
	(Nat.) Government participation	-	⊗	●	●	-	-	-	-
	Strategic repositioning	-	-	⊗	⊗	-	-	-	-
	Size	Control							

Note: ● = present, ⊗ = absent, = not included in the analysis.

To capture economic factors, I use the main condition of the theoretical strand in both the analyses of regionalist and traditional party demands by considering sub-state communities' relative 'economic distinctiveness', i.e. being either much richer or much poorer than other regions.

To account for institutionalist factors, I use five conditions. In the analysis of when regionalist and traditional party demands arise, I account for whether autonomy has been conferred ('presence of autonomy') or was likely to be conferred soon ('prospects of autonomy'). In the analysis of when regionalist party demands disappear, I account for whether past demands where realised ('demand realisation'). In all analyses, I control for whether the political system could be considered being a 'democracy' or not. Finally, in the analysis of when regionalist and traditional party demands increase, I account for another factor that was not directly derived from the empirical literature but I found to be relevant in my historical exploration. What I call 'institutional dissatisfaction' refers to manifest shortcomings in conferred institutions that lead parties to call for reforms (Dehousse, 1986; Shortridge, 2010).

Functionalist factors are represented through three conditions. In all analyses except for the disappearing of demands, I consider the presence of 'asymmetrical demands' and 'asymmetrical autonomy' by verifying whether other sub-state communities in a country had higher demands or autonomy statutes. In the analysis of when regionalist and traditional party demands increase, I furthermore consider whether it was preceded by a 'non-requested increase' in the autonomy statute that was then simply endorsed.

Rational-choice factors are accounted for through four conditions. In the analyses of when regionalist party demands increase and decrease, I account for the presence of another 'regionalist competitor'. In the analyses of when regionalist party demands increase, decrease and disappear, I account for whether the party had a 'government participation'. In the

analyses of traditional party demands, I consider whether a 'regionalist party threat' was present on the regional level. Eventually, in the analysis of when regionalist party demands decrease or disappear, I use once more a condition that is not directly derived from the reviewed empirical literature but whose importance came out of the preliminary historical research of the cases. When regionalist parties face a perceived loss of distinctiveness and declining electoral support, some of them go through 'strategic repositioning' by relabelling their party and trying to highlight alternative political contents to prevent their decline (Van Haute & Pilet, 2006; Magone, 2008; Kim & Solt, 2017).

Finally, I include a condition that has proven relevant in existing research and that can be considered partly functionalist and partly contextual in nature: the 'size' of sub-state communities. Hooghe and Marks (2016) found indeed that larger regional tiers of government tend to obtain higher degrees of autonomy, which they attribute to the fact that larger entity sizes facilitate the internalisation of externalities and scale effects. In addition to this functionalist interpretation, I would add a cross-theoretical one since I expect other factors from different theoretical stands to play out differently in territories of different sizes. Regionalist pressures from a large sub-state entity, for example, might be perceived much more seriously by a central government than such pressures in a small entity. Similarly, expected electoral advantages might be taken much more seriously in a large than in a small entity.

After having presented all the conditions included in the analyses to allow for a systematic longitudinal cross-sectional and cross-theoretical comparison, it should be justified why certain factors mentioned as relevant in the preceding review of the literature were not retained. On the one hand, there were individual-level factors like citizens' subjective political identity or MPs' current mandate and career pattern that were not suitable for a group-level analysis. On the other hand, there was the degree of proportionality of electoral systems that was not taken into account because in the three countries under study, regionalist parties have entered parliament under both proportional (Belgium and Spain) and majoritarian (United Kingdom) electoral systems. Furthermore, testing its relation to the degree of regionalist party demands makes sense when measuring sub-state autonomy in degree but not with a transition analysis of one critical moment to another. Finally, government participation was taken into consideration for the analysis of regionalist party demands but not for that of traditional parties because of the contradictory evidence suggesting that traditional parties have demanded autonomy both in government and opposition, and because of the already high number of conditions included.

b) Conditions under study to explain the evolution of autonomy statutes

The analysis of the evolution of autonomy statutes comes also with four different outcomes to be explained: under which conditions statutes (a) arise, (b) increase, (c) decrease and (d) disappear. The conditions under study vary for some analyses and are summarised in Table 11. In total, fourteen are included.

Table 11. Conditions under study for the evolution of autonomy statutes and directional expectations

Theory	Condition	Arise	Increase	Decrease	Disappear
Sociologic	Sociological distinctiveness	●	●	⊗	⊗
	Past/present political grievances	●	●	⊗	⊗
Economic	Economic distinctiveness	●	●	⊗	⊗
Institutionalist	Democracy	●	●	⊗	⊗
Functionalist	Asymmetrical autonomy	●	●	⊗	⊗
	Symmetrical autonomy conception	●	-	-	-
	Symmetrical autonomy conferral/increase	-	●	-	-
Rational-choice	Regionalist party threat (nat.)	●	●	⊗	⊗
	Regionalist party threat (reg.)	●	●	⊗	⊗
	Traditional party support	●	●	⊗	⊗
	Expected electoral (ally) success	●	●	⊗	⊗
	Reliance on regionalist support	●	●	⊗	⊗
	Secessionist threat	-	-	-	●
	Size	Control			

Note: ● = present, ⊗ = absent, = not included in the analysis.

Some of the conditions are identical to those retained in the previous analyses and were included in all present ones: 'sociological distinctiveness' of sub-state communities; 'past or present political grievances'; 'economic distinctiveness'; the presence of 'democracy'; 'asymmetrical autonomy'; and the control for the 'size' of sub-state communities.

For functionalist factors, two more conditions were taken into consideration. In the analysis of when autonomy statutes arise, I account for whether there was a 'symmetrical autonomy conception' by the state (i.e. as to be conferred to all recognised communities). In the analysis of when autonomy statutes increase, I account for whether there was a 'symmetrical autonomy conferral' by the state (i.e. as to be increased for all recognised communities).

Among rational-choice factors, five new conditions were included. In all analyses, I account for whether a 'regionalist electoral threat' existed either on the regional and on the national level, for whether there was 'traditional party support' to the conferral or increase, and for whether governing parties 'expected electoral success' either for their own party or those who share the same left-right stance (called 'ally' here). Another condition I include for all analyses is not derived from the literature review above but stems from my preliminary historical exploration of the cases: concessions of autonomy were indeed sometimes made when governing parties faced 'reliance on regionalist support' (as a minority cabinet for example) (Colomer, 1998). Finally, the presence of a serious 'secessionist threat' was included as condition in the analyses of when autonomy statutes disappear.

After having presented the conditions included in the analyses of autonomy statutes, another justification for those not retained although found relevant in the review of the literature is necessary. As for the previous analyses, individual-level factors like citizens' subjective political identity or MPs' current mandate and career pattern were not included because they are not suitable for a group-level analysis. Moreover, the number of demanding parties on the sub-state level, the number of parties in the national government and the number of entities in a country were not retained because they are continuous factors that are not suitable for a dichotomised analysis relying on the presence and absence of conditions.

The internal division of sub-state community demands, finally, could have qualified as dichotomous condition but given the contradictory existing evidence and the already high number of rational-choice conditions under consideration, it was not included. Despite being excluded in the formal analysis, contextual elements and case-insights will be mobilised throughout the interpretation of the findings and in the discussion of the results.


c) Analytical rationale of the selected conditions

While the condition selection above mainly aimed at including the most important factors from each of the five major theoretical strands in order to study when, where and how they interact when leading to the rise and evolution of autonomy demands and statutes, one should note that two further analytical considerations were taken into account for their selection.

First, while some conditions are 'dynamic', i.e. evolved over time in the cases under study, others are rather 'static'. In most sub-state communities, the sociological distinctiveness and their (relative) population size remained largely identical over time. They can thus be considered static characteristics taken into account in the analysis. All other conditions, in turn, varied more or less substantively and can hence be considered dynamic. This dynamic character is important when trying to account for a phenomenon like the evolution of autonomy demands and statutes that is itself dynamic.

Secondly, while some conditions were 'structural' or 'contextual' in nature, i.e. influenced the context in which state and sub-state actors operated, others were 'agency'-based, i.e. related directly to behaviour of state and sub-state actors within these contexts. This combination of context and agency is equally important for the analyses when trying to account for a phenomenon that is expected to play out differently in different contexts and yet needs agency to be brought forward. This analytical rationale, summarised in Figure 3, relies on sociological and economic factors to account for sub-state communities' socio-economic context. Institutionalist and functionalist factors, in turn, capture mostly the evolution of the functionalo-institutional context inside and outside the sub-state community. Rational-choice factors, finally, do both account for the strategic context surrounding actors' decisions and bring agency in to the analysis.

Figure 3. Analytical rationale of the selected conditions



From the description above, it follows that the analyses of the evolution of regionalist party demands of traditional party demands and of autonomy statutes are carried out separately. The reason for this is that one cannot study more than one outcome in the same analysis. However, to do justice to my first theoretical argument, i.e. that autonomy demands and statutes need to be studied jointly, I included (i) the extent of existing autonomy statutes in the analyses of regionalist and traditional party demands as separate condition; and (ii) the extent of regionalist and traditional party demands as separate conditions (regionalist threat and traditional party support) in the analyses of autonomy statutes. While this joint consideration is at first static in the analyses carried out in chapter 6-8, chapter 9 will bring all results together and, thereby, also provide a joint account of the dynamic evolution of autonomy demands and statutes.

d) Types of conditions, operationalisation and case disaggregation

The factors under study in a QCA are operationalised as 'conditions' that express the extent to which a factor is present. There are three ways in which a condition can be operationalised: as *crisp-set* (cs), as *multi-value-set* (mv) or as *fuzzy-set* (fs). Crisp-sets are dichotomous conditions that account for the presence [1] or the absence [0] of a factor. Multi-value-sets are also distinctively categorised conditions but allow to account for multiple qualitatively different categories of a factor. It is important to note that multi-value-sets do not express degrees of presence of a factor but qualitatively different categories (e.g. being much richer than other sub-state communities [1], being of roughly the same wealth than other sub-state communities [0] and being much poorer than other sub-state communities [-1]). Fuzzy-sets, finally, are conditions that express the degree to which a factor is present [1,00] or absent [0,00], with a single qualitative turn-over point [0,50]. One should note that fuzzy-sets are not probabilities (i.e. how likely it is that a condition is present) but expressions of degrees (i.e. how much a factor is present or absent).

In the present research, the outcomes under study are operationalised as crisp-sets because a clear dichotomy can be established for the critical moments identified in chapter 2: when autonomy demands or statutes arise, increase, decrease and disappear. The scores for each outcome are obtained based on the Sub-state Autonomy Scale data presented in chapter 3. Table 12 summarises how they are operationalised and which cases are relevant for each analysis. For a case to be relevant, the outcome needs to have at least the possibility to occur. For example, in the analysis of when autonomy arises, only cases to which legislative autonomy has not yet been conferred are relevant. For the analyses of when autonomy increases, decreases or disappears, in turn, only cases in which legislative autonomy has been conferred in the past are relevant. For the analyses of when autonomy increases and disappears, cases need furthermore not to equal respectively the maximum and the minimum amount of possible autonomy.

Table 12. Operationalisation of the studied outcomes based on the SAS

Outcome	Value	Empirical observation	Operationalisation
Arise	1	Administrative (or no) autonomy becomes legislative autonomy demand/statute	$(SAS\text{-}T_1 < 0{,}50) * (SAS\text{-}T_2 > 0{,}50)$
	0	Administrative (or no) autonomy demand/statute persists	$(SAS\text{-}T_1 < 0{,}50) * (SAS\text{-}T_2 < 0{,}50)$
	NA	Already demanding/detaining legislative autonomy	$(SAS\text{-}T_1 > 0{,}50)$
Increase	1	Legislative autonomy demand/statute increases	$(SAS\text{-}T_1 > 0{,}50) * (SAS\text{-}T_2 > SAS\text{-}T_1)$
	0	Legislative autonomy demand/ statute is identical or decreases	$(SAS\text{-}T_1 > 0{,}50) * (SAS\text{-}T_2 \leq SAS\text{-}T_1)$
	NA	There is no legislative autonomy demand/statute, or it is already an indep. demand (cannot increase)	$(SAS\text{-}T_1 < 0{,}50) + (SAS\text{-}T_2 < 0{,}50) + (SAS\text{-}T_2 \geq 1)$
Decrease	1	Legislative autonomy demand/statute decreases	$(SAS\text{-}T_2 > 0{,}50) * (SAS\text{-}T_2 < SAS\text{-}T_1)$
	0	Legislative autonomy demand/ statute is identical or increases	$(SAS\text{-}T_1 > 0{,}50) * (SAS\text{-}T_2 \geq SAS\text{-}T_1)$
	NA	There is no legislative autonomy demand/statute	$(SAS\text{-}T_1 < 0{,}50) + (SAS\text{-}T_2 < 0{,}50)$
Disappear	1	Legislative autonomy becomes administrative (or no) autonomy demand/statute	$(SAS\text{-}T_1 > 0{,}50) * (SAS\text{-}T_2 < 0{,}50)$
	0	Legislative autonomy demand/statute persists	$(SAS\text{-}T_1 > 0{,}50) * (SAS\text{-}T_2 > 0{,}50)$
	NA	Already demanding/detaining administrative (or no) autonomy	$(SAS\text{-}T_1 < 0{,}50) + (SAS\text{-}T_2 = 0)$

Note: * = logical AND, + = logical OR. T_2 = moment of analysis, T_1 = moment preceding T_2. 1 = present, 0 = absent, NA = irrelevant.

As for the conditions under study, while most could be dichotomised and were hence translated into crisp-sets, three required to be operationalised as multi-value-sets because such a dichotomy could not be established. This was the case for the 'sociological distinctiveness' of sub-state communities that was operationalised as three-point multi-value-set. A distinction is made between strong, medium and no distinctiveness by adding up respectively one point when a community has (i) a distinct language, (ii) an own institutional history and (iii) geographical isolation. 0 then corresponded to no, 1 to medium and 2 as well as 3 to a strong sociological distinctiveness (see Appendix 8). The 'political grievances' of sub-state communities was operationalised as four-point multi-value-set. By looking for the political discourse in the different sub-state communities and based on expert consultations (see Appendix 9), a distinction between omnipresent (3), recurrent (2), seldom (1) and absent (0) grievances was made. Finally, the 'economic distinctiveness' of sub-state communities was operationalised as a three-point multi-value-set. A distinction was made between relative economic wealth (1), relative economic difficulty (-1) and an equal relative economic situation (0) based on historical regional GDP data (see Appendix 10). In the three cases, a multi-value calibration was preferred because it allowed each category to be considered as a distinct qualitative anchor in the comparison and minimisation process, which would not have been possible with a fuzzy-set calibration (Haesebrouck, 2015). In the case of economic distinctiveness, the condition furthermore captured two different qualitative realities that do not correspond to the two poles (presence-absence) of a single

Table 13. Operationalisation of the conditions included in the analyses and appendices comprising their coding

Condition	Analysis	Value	Operationalisation	Appendix
Sociological distinctiveness	All	0–2	Multi-value set from no (0) to medium (1) and strong (2) based on Σ(Dist. lang., Inst. hist, Geo. isol.) – max. = 2	8
Distinct language	All	1	The language associated with the SSC differs from the politically dominant state language	
Institutional history	All	1	The SSC has/had own political institutions that differ(ed) from the politically dominant ones.	
Geographical isolation	All	1	The SSC is separated from the rest of the country by clear geographical markers (sea, mountains, etc.)	
Political grievances	All	0–3	Multi-value-set based on own research and expert query: omnipresent (3), recurrent (2), seldom (1), absent (0)	9
Demand frustration	All	1	(An auton. demand is not met by auton. institutions for 10 years) + (An auton. statute is withdrawn or reduced)	–
Economic distinctiveness	All	-1–1	Multi-value set based on relative econ. wealth (1) and difficulty (-1)	10
Relative econ. wealth	All	1	((Reg. GDPcap / Nat. GDPcap) ≥ 1,1 for min. 5 years) * ((Reg. GDP / Nat. GDP) ≥ 0,10 for min. 5 years)	
Relative econ. difficulty	All	-1	(Reg. GDPcap / Nat. GDPcap) ≤ 0,90 for min. 5 years	
Equal rel. econ. situation	All	0	(Rel. econ. wealth ≠ 1) * (Rel. econ. diff. ≠ 1)	
Prospects for autonomy	All	1	Political (constitutional) negotiations for autonomy conferral to more than one SSC have been engaged	11
Presence of legisl. autonomy	All	1	AUT-SAS > 0,50	–
Institutional dissatisfaction	All	1	The functioning of obtained legisl. institu. is described as problematic by more than one party	12
Demand realisation	RP - All	1	AUT-SAS ≥ RP-SAS	–
	TP - All	1	AUT-SAS ≥ TP-SAS	
Democracy	All	1	(Constr. on exec. = 1) * (Comp. elections = 1)	13
Constrains on executive	All	1	Polity 5 (2018) database indicator XCONST = 7	
Competitive elections	All	1	Unconditional male suffrage * no electoral manipulation	
Asymmetrical demands	Ars.	1	(RP-SAS + TP-SAS of other SSCs > 0,50) * (RP-SAS + TP-SAS of other SSCs > studied outcome)	–
	Inc./Dec./Dsp.	1	RP-SAS or TP-SAS of other SSCs > studied outcome	
Asymmetrical autonomy	Ars.	1	(AUT-SAS of other SSCs > 0,50) * (AUT-SAS of other SSCs > studied outcome)	–
	Inc./Dec./Dsp.	1	AUT-SAS of other SSCs > studied outcome	
Non-requested increase	All	1	The AUT of a SSC is increased following a logic of symmetry with others rather than on own request	14
Symetr. autonomy conception	All	1	Constitutional framework foresees legisl. autonomy for all SSCs with roughly equal competences	15
Symetr. autonomy conferral	All	1	Legislation foresees autonomy increase for all SSCs	16
Regionalist competitor	All	1	Another RP demands more autonomy * The other RP is represented in the national or regional parliament	17
Regionalist party threat (reg.)	All	1	(RP-SAS > AUT-SAS) * -BEL/SPA: RP has group stat. in reg. parl. + lower house -UK: RP has group. stat in rel. parl. + seat in lower house	18
Regionalist party threat (nat.)	All	1	(RP-SAS > AUT-SAS) * -BEL/SPA: RP has group status in lower house -UK: RP has a seat in lower house	19
Government participation	All	1	RP participates in the national government	20
Strategic repositioning	All	1	RP redefines its scope beyond the regionalisation issue	21
Traditional party support	All	1	TP-SAS ≥ AUT-SAS	–
Expected elect. (ally) success	All	1	The leading party of the national government or a party that shares its socio-econ. left-right stance obtained most of the votes (min. 5% more than others) in the SSC in the last election (nat. elections before the instalment of reg. institutions, reg. elections thereafter)	22
Reliance on region. support	All	1	The national government relies on support of RP (majority or minority cabinet)	23
Secessionist threat	All	1	The SSC has declared independence or taken actions that lead the nat. government to think it will soon do so	24
Size	All	1	SSC population ≥ 5% of state population	25
All crisp-set conditions	All	0	¬ 1	–

Note: * = logical AND, + = logical OR, ¬ logical negation. SSC = sub-state community, RP = regionalist party, TP = traditional party, AUT = conferred autonomy. BEL = Belgium, SPA = Spain, UK = United Kingdom.

set. For all other conditions, the precise operationalisation is summarised in Table 13. The latter also refers to the Appendices in which the coding of the conditions that are not based on the SAS is specified.

Based on the operationalisation specified in Table 13, data to assign the scores for all conditions under analysis was collected. This collection relied either on the SAS data (see Appendix 4) or on existing socio-political and historical literature, on economic statistics, election data and demographic data, as specified in the respective Appendices 12-25. The coding of the conditions and outcomes has been made for all cases on annual basis. For each analysis, cases where disaggregated based on 'periods of change': when there was a change in the score of either the outcome or the conditions included in the respective analyses. The number of cases under study hence varies for each analysis and will be specified accordingly in the presentation of the results. The units of analysis are thus sub-state communities that are observed over time and disaggregated temporarily based on changes in either the outcome or one of the conditions.

3. Method of analysis

To analyse in which combination and at which moments of the demand and conferral process these conditions have proven relevant, Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) uses two main analytical tools: the analysis of necessity and the analysis of sufficiency. I describe both of them hereunder and doing so, I draw as before on the works of Rihoux and Ragin (2009) as well as on that of Schneider and Wagemann (2012) who are the leading generalist references in the field.

a) Analysis of necessity

A first analytical moment in the QCA is the so-called analysis of necessity. Its objective is to examine if some factors are always associated with an outcome. For example, it will determine the degree to which some sociological, economic, institutional, functionalist or rational-choice factors are always present when autonomy demands or statutes arise or evolve, and can therefore be considered 'necessary' for them, or not. In crisp-set and multi-value-set terms, for it to be necessary, one always wants condition X to be present when outcome Y occurs. Two parameters are calculated to assess the degree of necessity of a (combination of) condition(s): consistency and relevance of necessity.

The 'consistency' of necessity determines the actual extent to which a (combination of) condition(s) is necessary for the outcome. It is obtained by dividing the number of co-occurrence of the (combination of) condition(s) X and the outcome Y, by the number of occurrences of the outcome Y, such that:

$$\frac{\sum(X_i = 1, Y_i = 1)}{\sum(Y_i = 1)}$$

The 'relevance' of necessity determines the extent to which a consistent necessity relation is trivial or not. This means that it is not because some factors are always present when autonomy demands or statutes arise or evolve, that their constant association is actually a necessity relation. There are indeed two instances in which a (combination of) condition(s) *X* can achieve a high consistency of necessity for outcome *Y* in a quite irrelevant manner. First, when the number of cases belonging to *X* is much higher than the number of cases belonging to *Y*, one can suspect that *X* is simply a very large set of cases rather than in a strong necessity relation with *Y*. Secondly, and related to the first issue, when *X* is a constant for (almost) all cases and therefore by definition always present when the (any) outcome is present. To detect both sources of trivialness, a *Relevance of Necessity* score (RoN) can be calculated. I use the most recent and comprehensive one by Schneider and Wagemann (2012, p. 236):

$$\frac{\sum(1 - x_i)}{\sum(1 - min(x_i, y_i))}$$

In the analyses that follow, I go with the common standards of the discipline and only consider a (combination of) condition(s) necessary for an outcome to occur if it achieves a consistency of necessity of at least 0,90 and a relevance of necessity of at least 0,50 (Thomann, Oana, & Wittwer, 2018).

b) Analysis of sufficiency and minimisation

A second analytical moment in the QCA is the so-called analysis of sufficiency. Its objective is to examine if an outcome is always associated with certain conditions. For example, it will determine the degree to which some sociological, economic, institutional, functionalist or rational-choice factors consistently lead to the rise or evolution of autonomy demands or statutes arise or evolve, and can therefore be considered sufficient for them, or not. In crisp-set and multi-value-set terms, for it to be sufficient, one always wants outcome *Y* to occur when condition *X* is present. Two parameters are calculated to assess the degree of sufficiency of a (combination of) condition(s): consistency and coverage of sufficiency.[23]

The 'consistency' of sufficiency determines the actual extent to which a (combination of) condition(s) is sufficient of the outcome. That means that one checks if some of the aforementioned factors lead consistently to the rise or evolution of autonomy demands or statutes, or if they also occur if these outcomes are absent. The consistency of sufficiency is obtained by dividing the number of co-occurrence of the (combination of) condition(s) *X* and the outcome *Y*, by the number of occurrences of the (combination of) condition(s) *X*, such that:

$$\frac{\sum(X_i = 1, Y_i = 1)}{\sum(X_i = 1)}$$

[23] In a fuzzy-set QCA, one would also have had to check the *Proportional Reduction in Inconsistency* (PRI) to avoid simultaneous sub-set relations.

The 'coverage' of sufficiency, in turn, determines how much of the outcome is explained by the sufficient (combination of) condition(s). That means that one checks how many occurrences of the outcome, i.e. instances of rising or evolving autonomy demands, are actually associated with a certain (combination of) condition(s). Since multiple (combinations of) condition(s) can explain different instances of the outcome, one checks how big the share of explained instances is for each (combination of) condition(s). The coverage of sufficiency is obtained by dividing the number of co-occurrence of the (combination of) condition(s) X and the outcome Y, by the number of occurrences of the outcome Y (and is hence the logical equivalent of the consistency of necessity), such that:

$$\frac{\sum(X_i = 1, Y_i = 1)}{\sum(Y_i = 1)}$$

In an analysis of multiple combinations of conditions leading to the same outcome, one distinguishes between 'raw' and 'unique' coverage. The raw coverage takes into account all cases covered by a specific combination, independent of the coverage of other combinations. The unique coverage, in turn, takes only into account the cases that are 'uniquely' covered by a specific combination, i.e. that are not covered by any other combination. Put differently, one checks how many instances of the outcome are only explained by a certain (combination of) condition(s) (unique coverage), and how many instances of the outcome are explained by multiple (combinations of) conditions.

In its analysis of sufficiency, a QCA explicitly looks for most parsimonious combination of conditions that explains (is sufficient for) an outcome. The so-called 'minimisation process' follows Boolean logics[24] and matches 'similar conjunctions' so that conditions specifications that logically lead to identical outcomes are excluded such that:

If:	$X_1 * X_2 * \ X_3$	$\rightarrow Y$	(1)
And if:	$X_1 * X_2 * {\sim}X_3$	$\rightarrow Y$	(2)
Then:	$X_1 * X_2$	$\rightarrow Y$	

If I see for example that sociologically distinctive (X_1) and economically distinctive (X_2) sub-state communities receives sub-state autonomy (Y) when regionalist party threats (X_3) are both present (premise 1) and absent (premise 2), I conclude that sociological and economic distinctiveness are sufficient for the conferral of sub-state autonomy (the example is purely fictional).

In addition, 'logically redundant prime implicants' are minimised. This means that terms which are logically implied twice in a formula are equally excluded such that:[25]

[24] The Boolean operators used in this chapter are the logical AND (*), the logical OR (+), the logical negation (~) and the logical implication (→). X_x refers to conditions, while Y refers to the outcome.

[25] I borrowed the example from Schneider and Wagemann (2012, p. 110).

$$\textit{If:}\quad \overbrace{(X_1 * X_2 * X_3) + (X_1 * X_2 * {\sim}X_3)}^{} + \overbrace{({\sim}X_1 * X_2 * X_3) + ({\sim}X_1 * {\sim}X_2 * X_3)}^{} \rightarrow Y$$

$$\textit{Then:}\quad (X_1 * X_2) + (X_2 * X_3) + ({\sim}X_1 * X_3) \rightarrow Y$$

$$\textit{And:}\quad (X_1 * X_2) + ({\sim}X_1 * X_3) \rightarrow Y$$

The minimisation of similar conjunction and logically redundant prime-implicants is based on an analysis of the so-called 'truth table'. The truth table is a list of all observed configurations (of conditions), the outcome they are associated with and the corresponding cases. Ideally, one wants each configuration to be associated with the same outcome. Otherwise, there is contradicting evidence which leads to inconsistency of sufficiency that needs to be either resolved or discussed.

The reduction potential of a QCA is limited when the number of possible configurations (combinations of conditions) exceeds the actual number of observed configurations. When there are non-observed configurations, i.e. combinations of conditions for which we do not know to which outcome they lead, one can indeed not match similar conjunctions like in the example above. Such non-observed configurations are called 'logical remainders'.

In QCA, there are three approaches for dealing with logical remainders. When opting for the 'conservative solution', one does not integrate them at all and bases the minimisation only on observed configurations. This leads to the longest solution term and comes at the risk of overestimating the importance of some conditions. When opting for the 'most parsimonious solution', simplifying assumptions about logical remainders, i.e. expectations about their outcome, are made independently of theoretical plausibility in order to achieve the most succinct solution. This leads to the shortest solution term and comes at the risk of underestimating the importance of some conditions. When opting for the 'intermediate solution', one makes simplifying assumptions based on informed theoretical expectations. This leads to an intermediation solution term that tries to balance the over- and underestimation of conditions' importance.

In the present research, I opt for the latter solution because solid theoretical expectations can be made based on the existing literature. 'Simplifying assumptions' about the outcome of non-observed configurations will be made in line with the directional expectations set out in the previous sub-sections and summarised in Table 10 and Table 11, such that:

If:	$X_1 * X_2 * {\sim}X_3$	$\rightarrow Y$	(1) Observed configuration
And if:	X_3	$\rightarrow Y$	(2) Directional expectation
Then:	$X_1 * X_2 * X_3$	$\rightarrow Y$	(3) Simplifying assumption – based on 1 and 2
And:	$X_1 * X_2$	$\rightarrow Y$	Conclusion – based on 1 and 3

For instance, if I observe a configuration in which the presence of sociological distinctiveness (X_1) and omnipresent political grievances (X_2) lead to the rise of regionalist party demands (Y) without asymmetrical demands being present (${\sim}X_3$), but I have no configuration of cases indicating what sub-state communities do when they are sociologically distinctive, have omnipresent political grievances and asymmetrical demands are present. I then return to my directional expectation saying that asymmetrical demands (X_3) contribute

to the rise of regionalist party demands (Y). From this, I derive the simplifying assumption that even in the presence of asymmetrical demands (X_3), sociological distinctiveness (X_1) and omnipresent political grievances (X_2) would have led to the rise of regionalist party demands (Y). On this basis, I conclude that regionalist party demands (Y) arise in the presence of sociological distinctiveness (X_1) and omnipresent political grievances (X_2), regardless of asymmetrical autonomy demands.

For my crisp-set conditions, I simplify the presence of conditions vis-à-vis their absence. For the three multi-value conditions, I simplify the absence of economic distinctiveness vis-à-vis the presence of relative economic wealth and relative economic difficulty respectively; I simplify absent vis-à-vis seldom, seldom vis-à-vis recurrent, and recurrent vis-à-vis omnipresent political grievances; and I simplify none vis-à-vis medium, and medium vis-à-vis strong sociological distinctiveness. When additional assumptions are made, they are justified separately in the minimisation notes.

The description of the analysis of sufficiency underlines once more the utility of QCA for disentangling the present research problem. It allows indeed not only to assess the individual relevant of factors for the outcome but explicitly examines their interaction, such that:

If:	$X_1 * {\sim}X_2$	$\rightarrow {\sim}Y$	(1) Observed configuration
And if:	${\sim}X_1 * X_2$	$\rightarrow {\sim}Y$	(2) Observed configuration
And if:	$X_1 * X_2$	$\rightarrow Y$	(3) Observed configuration
Then:	$X_1 * X_2$	$\rightarrow Y$	Conclusion of 1, 2 and 3

For example, if we see repetitively that the factors X_1 and X_2 do individually not lead to outcome Y, but that their mutual presence does, we are not in front of a co-incidence but of an interaction effect. While each factor is individually insufficient for the outcome to occur, their combination is. Given that this minimal working example can be extended to a large number of conditions, QCA is perfectly suited for analysing under which (combination of) conditions autonomy demands and statutes arose and evolved.

4. Rendering QCA suitable for longitudinal large-n analyses

QCA was initially conceived as a 'static' method of analysis (Ragin, 1987). This means that it did not allow to account for the temporal order of conditions or for the variation of cases over time (Boswell & Brown, 1999, p. 181; Schneider & Wagemann, 2012, p. 80). Therefore, a growing number of methodological innovations has been developed to render QCA 'time sensitive' (Furnari, 2018). A first strand of innovations is *condition-focussed* in that they either account for the temporal sequence of conditions (Caren & Panofsky, 2005; Ragin & Strand, 2008; Hak, Jaspers, & Dul, 2015) or process QCA in two-steps as to distinguish contextual 'remote' conditions from agency-oriented 'proximate' conditions (Schneider, 2019). A second strand is *case-focussed* and suggests how to use QCA *longitudinally*, i.e. with temporarily disaggregated cases. They provide calibration mechanisms for time series QCA (Hino, 2009), adapt traditional consistency measurements for panel data QCA (Garcia-Castro & Ariño, 2016), or trace within-case changes over time in order to discover the 'trajectories'

in which different combinations of conditions lead to the studied outcome (Pagliarin & Gerrits, 2020).

While the existing works clearly improve the ability of QCA to integrate various aspects of time, they remain silent on (i) *how to best disaggregate cases temporarily* and (ii) *how to deal with the contradictory configurations that can arise from temporarily disaggregated cases*. Both questions are important for the present research because the autonomy demands and statutes of sub-state communities were studied over time. In order to do so, I disaggregated cases based on changes in their characteristics – i.e. when cases' membership in either a condition or the outcome under study change – rather than on a fixed (multi)annual basis. I call this 'change-based intervals' (CBIs). While superior in both conceptual and empirical terms, CBIs increase the chance for two types of artificial contradictory configurations to arise. To address these, I developed what I call a 'flexible lag condition' (FLC). It offsets the artificial contradictions and accounts for the average duration it takes for a (combination) of conditions to be present before the outcome occurs.

a) Why to prefer change-based intervals (CBIs) over fixed intervals

In longitudinal QCA, there are two ways to disaggregate cases temporarily – as alluded to by De Meur, Rihoux, and Yamasaki (2009, p. 162). On the one hand, one can disaggregate them in fixed intervals (e.g. every year, every five years, every ten years, etc.). The rationale behind this is to look for potential changes in a case but to do so in an exogenous manner that is not dependent on the case itself. On the other hand, one can disaggregate them based on changes in the characteristics of the case. That is when a case changes its membership in either a condition or the outcome. I call this *change-based intervals* (CBIs). The rationale behind this is to consider that, when changes in a condition or the outcome occur, we are presented with a new empirical reality that needs to be captured separately, i.e. as a new case. In this respect, one should note that considering the different development stages of a case as separate units of analysis is an important methodological choice that needs to be reflected in the interpretation of the analysis (Ragin, 1992; Goertz, 2017).

There are three reasons why I think that CBIs are to be preferred over fixed intervals when carrying out longitudinal QCA. First, it prevents contradictory condition realities from falling within a single interval. When the condition or outcome properties of a case do change at the middle of a fixed-interval, the researcher has to choose if the properties are considered different since the beginning of the interval during which they changed or only since the beginning of the subsequent one. Both choices comprise some degree of inaccuracy and can lead to anachronisms when several conditions and/or the outcome change during the same interval. Secondly, it avoids empirical redundancies over several intervals. When the condition or outcome properties of no case change over two or more fixed intervals, a case is disaggregated without presenting a new empirical reality. This leads to redundancies that distort necessity and sufficiency parameters. Thirdly, and most importantly, it reflects accurately the moment in which empirical realities change. By disaggregating cases each time

that the properties of a case change for either a condition or the outcome, one provides a precise picture of the empirical case realities throughout time and prevents anachronisms because the anteriority, simultaneity and posteriority of changes are correctly reflected.

The three reasons above rely on the assumption that the temporal change of the conditions and outcome under study is irregular – which I expect to apply to the vast majority of research problems in the humanities. When condition-change should nevertheless be regular, CBIs will simply equal fixed intervals because the change-based disaggregation will coincide with the regular condition change. A first methodological argument of this thesis is hence that CBIs are preferable in any longitudinal QCA because they can only improve but not worsen the empirical observation.

The aforementioned methodological innovations on longitudinal QCA have illustrated their procedure with cases that have been disaggregated based on fixed intervals. In his example of the three ways to calibrate time-series QCA, Hino (2009) went with ten-year intervals. Garcia-Castro and Ariño (2016), developed their pooled, within and between consistency measurements based on fixed annual intervals. Pagliarin and Gerrits (2020), in turn, used Hino's (2009) example for their own illustration. However, they grouped redundant configurations and made clear that their procedure also works with "different time-specific development stages" (p. 8) – which corresponds to CBIs. I would encourage forthcoming methodological work to go in this direction too because all the innovations above are compatible with CBIs. More generally, I would strongly encourage empirical applications of longitudinal QCA to reflect the choice between change-based and fixed intervals in light of the arguments above.

A consequence of existing longitudinal QCA methods being developed and illustrated with fixed intervals, however, is that little attention has been dedicated to the problem of artificially contradictory configurations arising from temporarily disaggregated cases. As I show in the next sub-section, such contradictions are more likely with (albeit not limited to) CBIs. Furthermore, the illustration of Hino (2009) (and that of Pagliarin and Gerrits (2020) who replicate it for their method) are based on a case disaggregation with only two time points. That of Garcia-Castro and Ariño (2016) involves a ten annual points but includes only a single condition. The likelihood of artificial contradictions, however, increases also with the number of temporal disaggregations as well as with number of conditions included in the analysis. Taken together, these three elements hint to why artificially contradictory configurations were not yet on the radar of my precursors – in addition to the fact that QCA is a comparatively young method, certainly when used longitudinally. The interest of longitudinal research increases however with the number of disaggregated cases and conditions (Gerrits & Pagliarin, 2020).

b) The problem of artificially contradictions in longitudinal QCA

When carrying out a longitudinal QCA, one can run into the problem of two types of artificially contradictory configurations. They are illustrated with a succinct theoretical example in Table

14 representing a case that has been disaggregated temporarily (x_1-x_7 are the different development stage of case x). A longer example drawn from the present analysis follows below. I call these contradictions 'artificial' because they come with the temporal disaggregation of cases rather than with contradictory empirical evidence, as I argue below.

Type 1 contradictions arise when the configuration leading to the presence of the outcome is identical to the temporarily preceding configuration, except for the outcome which is absent (e.g. x_6 and x_7).

Type 2 contradictions arise when the number of contradicting configurations is artificially increased by configurations that are not grouped – either because they are repeated in fixed interval disaggregation, or because they are separated in CBI disaggregation by a condition that is neither sufficient on its own, nor necessary in a sufficient combination of conditions (INUS) (e.g. x_4, x_5 and x_6 would be one configuration if condition X_4 was minimised).

Table 14. Theoretical example of artificial contradictions coming with the temporal disaggregation of case x

Cases	Conditions				Outcome	Contradiction types
	X_1	X_2	X_3	X_4		
Case x_1 (1963-1971)	1	1	0	0	0	
Case x_2 (1972-1979)	1	1	0	1	0	
Case x_3 (1980-1995)	1	1	0	0	0	
Case x_4 (1996-1999)	1	1	1	0	0	
Case x_5 (2000-2004)	1	1	1	1	0	→ Type 2 contradiction
Case x_6 (2005-2007)	1	1	1	0	0	
Case x_7 (2008-2020)	1	1	1	0	1	→ Type 1 contradiction

When reflecting on the likelihood of these two types of contradictions, I cannot make a statistical evaluation in the absence of a sufficient number of existing applications. However, the following reflections lead me to expect that CBIs are more likely to produce both Type 1 and Type 2 contradictions than fixed intervals. Type 1 contradictions are likely in change-based disaggregation because a change in the outcome creates *by definition* a new configuration. A contradiction between the outcome configuration and the last configuration then arises unless a change in one condition of the preceding configuration occurs exactly at the same point in time. With fixed intervals, this kind of disaggregation is possible when intervals and empirical changes coincide. But it otherwise seems less likely since multi-annual intervals can be coded in such a way that condition and outcome changes fall in the same interval. As for Type 2 contradictions, if one considers that all conditions under study are seldomly necessary in all paths (and even the solution) of a QCA, it is very likely that conditions that are neither sufficient on their own, nor necessary in a sufficient combination of conditions (INUS) will contribute to change-based case disaggregation and thereby artificial increase the number of contradicting configurations. With fixed intervals, case disaggregation does not depend on such conditions. They rather come with the risk of multiplying identical configurations (see above).

There are two more factors that influence the likelihood of artificial contradictions and they hold equally for CBI and fixed interval disaggregation. Both (i) the number of disaggregated periods and (ii) the number of conditions included in the analysis influence the number of configurations that can be contradicting and ungrouped – both for the configuration preceding the one that leads to the outcome (impacting the likelihood of Type 1 contradictions), and for all other configurations (impacting the likelihood of Type 2 contradictions).

Now, one might want to argue that these two sources of contradiction are legitimate because a change in the outcome should be accompanied by a change in at least one condition for a meaningful relationship between a combination of conditions and the outcome to be established. This would indeed be the ideal scenario. However, this purist interpretation omits time as a crucial condition in itself. For some combination of conditions to translate into a change in the outcome, a certain amount of time might indeed be needed without any other change in the combination. When looking at the democratisation of electoral systems, for example, one can see that it can take a few years after the enlargement of voting rights for new parties to come up (Gevers et al., 1998).

To my knowledge, there is only one theoretical suggestion and one recent application that partially address this problem. In their reflection on how to analyse policy processes with QCA, Fischer and Maggetti (2017, pp. 10-12) propose five ways to 'address the challenge of temporality'. One of them consists in accounting for time with a separate condition that distinguishes between younger and older cases. In their research on the best performing business model in Formula One racing between 2005 and 2014, Aversa, Furnari, and Haefliger (2015) go in this direction too and avoid what I called Type 1 contradictions by analysing data separately on a biannual basis and then using a one-year lag. This idea of a fixed lag goes in the right direction and might be suitable for analyses of short absolute time-frames in an area with rapid and regular changes. For the study of longer time-frames and irregular changes like in most of the research in the humanities, however, a fixed lag proves problematic because the required amount of time to be accounted for is variable. This is the reason why I propose to use a flexible lag whose time frame is determined by the changes of cases' membership in the conditions and the outcome under study.

c) How to resolve artificial contradictions with a flexible lag condition (FLC)

To account for time as an omitted condition through a flexible lag condition (FLC), three things are needed. First, instead of grouping identical configurations in a standard frequency-based truth-table, temporarily disaggregated cases need to be ordered in a chronological truth table (e.g. x_1, x_2, x_3, … x_7). This allows identical combinations of conditions that directly follow on each other in the same disaggregated case to be considered jointly (see next point).

Table 15. Theoretical example of how the flexible lag condition (FLC) resolves the artificial contradictions coming with the temporal disaggregation of case x

Cases	Conditions					Outcome
	X_1	X_2	X_3	X_4	Lag for $X_1 * X_2 * X_3$	
Case x_1 (1963-1971)	1	1	0	0	0	0
Case x_2 (1972-1979)	1	1	0	1	0	0
Case x_3 (1980-1995)	1	1	0	0	1	0
Case x_4 (1996-1999)	1	1	1	0	0	0
Case x_5 (2000-2004)	1	1	1	1	0	0
Case x_6 (2005-2007)	1	1	1	0	0	0
Case x_7 (2008-2020)	1	1	1	0	1	1

Secondly, as illustrated in Table 15, a lag condition needs to capture each change in either the combination of conditions or the outcome under study. This means that it has to equal 1 for the last row of a series of identical combinations of conditions (e.g. x_3 vis-à-vis x_1-x_3), as well as when the outcome occurs (e.g. x_7). The rationale behind this is twofold. On the one hand, identical combinations of conditions that are separated by an unnecessary condition for sufficiency (e.g. x_4) are grouped again. On the other hand, the contradiction coming with the fact that a combination of conditions might need time to translate into the outcome is resolved. This lag condition is flexible in that it takes different values depending on the combination of conditions under study. It is outcome-driven in that its main aim is to mirror the time period that lies between the starting point of a combination of conditions and the occurrence of an outcome. That the lag condition follows changes in the combination of conditions is absolutely crucial because it prevents it from becoming a tautology. Indeed, if condition X_3 would have been present for x_2, the lag would have been present for x_2 as well because it would have been the last row of a series of identical combinations of conditions (a single one). The outcome being absent, a contradiction would have arisen even in the presence of the lag – thereby preventing it from being a tautology.

Thirdly and finally, the average amount of time between the starting point of a combination of conditions and the occurrence of an outcome should be measured. This complements the standard consistency and coverage information provided by a QCA with a specification on how much time is needed in average for a combination of conditions to translate into an outcome. In order to assess both the average duration and its variability, I suggest to calculate the mean and the standard deviation of the temporal lag.

To integrate the rationale described above in a longitudinal QCA, I suggest to proceed in six steps that I illustrate with an example drawn from the present research. Step 1-3 are dedicated to the analysis of necessity. Step 4-6 are dedicated to the analysis of sufficiency. A summary of the protocol can be found in Table 16. The example concerns the conditions under which regionalist party demands arise. The unit of analysis are sub-state communities that are observed over time and disaggregated temporarily with CBIs based on changes in either the outcome or one of the conditions. The total number of cases after disaggregation equals 332.

Table 16. Protocol for a longitudinal QCA with a flexible lag condition (FLC)

I. Analysis of necessity	
Step 1:	• Import a chronological truth table with all conditions and the outcome in a QCA analysis software
Step 2:	• Calculate the consistency of necessity for all (combinations of) conditions • Retain those achieving at least 0,90
Step 3:	• Generate separate chronological truth tables for all (combinations of) conditions retained in step 2 • Calculate the relevance of necessity for each of them and retain those achieving at least 0,50 • Inspect necessity plots visually to confirm the necessity relation
II. Analysis of sufficiency	
Step 4:	• Import a chronological truth table with all conditions and the outcome in a LQCA analysis sheet
Step 5:	• List the configuration of conditions for each disaggregated case in which the outcome is present • Manually minimise similar conjunctions
Step 6:	• Enter the obtained path formulas in the analysis sheet that generates a FLC for each of them • Make sure that conditions that were previously found to be necessary are not omitted • Check the consistency of sufficiency scores and retain those paths for which it achieves 0,75 • Check the cases of paths whose sufficiency decedes 0,75 and search for case-based explanations • Interpret the results according to traditional QCA practices

Step 1. I started by importing the data that I had formatted as chronological truth table with CBIs taking into consideration changes in all conditions and the outcome under study in the data analysis software *R*.[26]

Step 2. I calculated the parameters of necessity for all conditions with the help of the QCA package (Dusa, 2018, 2019). I retained – at first – all (combinations of) conditions that achieved a consistency of necessity of at least 0,90.

Step 3. For each (combination of) condition(s) passing this threshold, I generated a separate chronological truth table whose CBIs took only into consideration changes in the outcome and in the (combination of) conditions for which the necessity test was conducted. If the truth table would also have taken other conditions into account, this would have generated empirical redundancies that distort the relevance of necessity (RoN) score. For each (combination of) condition(s), I calculated the RoN score proposed by Schneider and Wagemann (2012, p. 236) using QCA package again (Dusa, 2018, 2019).[27] Those achieving a RoN score of at least 0,50 and satisfying a visual inspection as suggested by Thomann et al. (2018, pp. 38-39) were considered necessary for the outcome to occur and retained *per se* in the subsequent analyses of sufficiency. In my analysis, this was the case for the presence of democracy (Cons.Nec.: 0,949, RoN: 0,530).

From the description of these first three steps, it follows that the analysis of necessity does not involve the flexible lag condition. It is not entirely 'time blind' though, insofar as the chronological order of the conditions based on CBIs remains important for the definition of what is considered as a different development stage of a case and is therefore taken into consideration as a distinct case in the analysis of necessity. Beside from relying on temporarily disaggregated cases, however, the analysis of necessity does not dig further into the importance of time for the cases.

[26] A function facilitating this task can be found in Appendix 26. It is called CBI.df().

[27] A function facilitating the generation of a separate truth table on which the analysis of necessity is conducted can be found in Appendix 26. It is called CBI.AoN().

Step 4. To pursue with the analysis of sufficiency, I could not use classical QCA software (*R*, *fsQCA* or *Tosmana*) because they rely on frequency-based truth tables. I therefore imported my chronologically ordered truth table with CBIs taking into consideration changes in all conditions and the outcome in a Microsoft Excel sheet (see Appendix 27). I coded the sheet in such a way that I could carry out the analysis of sufficiency in the following manner.

Step 5. For each temporarily disaggregated case in which the outcome was present, I listed the configuration of conditions so I could directly compare them. As illustrated in Table 17 for path 1, I manually minimised similar conjunctions by taking into account previously elaborated directional expectations (and separately justified simplifying assumptions when applicable). I thereby obtained different possible intermediate solution paths.[28]

Table 17. Illustration of the manual minimisation for path 1 of the analysis

Cases for path 1	S_DIS	E_DIS	P_GRI	PRO_A	PRE_A	ASY_D	ASY_A	DEMO	SIZE
Cat_1907, Cat_1976	2	1	3	0	0	1	0	1	1
Cat_1931	2	1	3	0	0	0	0	1	1
Bsq_1976	2	0	3	0	0	1	0	1	1
Sco_1934	2	0	3	0	0	1	1	1	1
Gal_1931, Gal_1977	2	-1	3	0	0	1	0	1	1
Fla_1919, Fla_1954	2	-1	3	0	0	0	0	1	1
Bsq_1918, Bsq_1931, Nav_1918, Nav_1931	2	0	3	0	0	1	0	1	0
Nav_1976, CIs_1976	2	0	3	0	0	0	0	1	0
NIN_1921	2	-1	3	0	1	1	0	1	0
GsC_1929	2	-1	3	0	0	1	0	1	0
CIs_1932	2	0	3	1	0	1	0	1	0
Directional expectation	2←1←0	1*-1←0	3←2←1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0
Intermediate solution	2		3					1	

Note: $x_2 \leftarrow x_1$ = a present outcome for x_1 is also expected for x_2.

Step 6. I manually entered the obtained intermediate solution paths in the Excel sheet (panel C of Appendix 27). I coded it in such a way that it calculated the consistency and coverage scores for each of these paths (panel E of Appendix 27). These scores took into consideration the flexible lag condition (FLC) that was generated automatically (and separately) for each entered combination of conditions (panel B of Appendix 27). It also provided the mean and standard deviation of the lag for each combination of conditions.

Table 18 provides an illustration of the FLC for path 1 in which large sub-state communities with a strong sociological distinctiveness and omnipresent political grievances see a regionalist party coming up and demanding legislative autonomy when the political regime is democratic. While in some cases the outcome occurred directly without Type 1 contradictions to be resolved, the FLC was helpful in resolving the Type 1 contradictions for outcome in which this was not the case. In Flanders, for example, the regionalist movement had lost political credibility after the second world war due to collaboration and it was only after a certain number of years that a regionalist party reached enough public support to become significant again. In Scotland, the lag can be explained by the fact that the electoral system (first past the post) made it more difficult for a regionalist party to become significant. This happened nevertheless after some time had passed. In Galicia, the Francoist dictatorship

[28] The notes on the manual minimisation of the other paths can be found in Appendix 28.

had long supressed civil society organisation and it was only one year after the transition to democracy that a regionalist party was able to constitute as solidly as to reach significant public support. Since path 1 achieved perfect consistency, there were no Type 2 contradictions to be resolved. To nevertheless illustrate the use of the FLC for them, I added a fictious cases.

Table 18. Illustration of the flexible lag condition (FLC) for path 1 (non-INUS conditions and fictious cases in grey)

Cases	OUTC	Conditions										Resolved contr.		Duration
		S_DIS	E_DIS	P_GRI	PRO_A	PRE_A	ASY_A	ASY_D	DEMO	SIZE	FLC	Type 1	Type 2	(years)
Fla_1830-1918	0	2	-1	3	0	0	0	0	0	1	1		-	
Fla_1919-1919	1	2	-1	3	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	○		0
Fla_1947-1953	0	2	-1	3	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	●		
Fla_1954-1954	1	2	-1	3	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	●		6
GsC_1925-1928	0	2	-1	3	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	●		
GsC_1929-1929	1	2	-1	3	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	●		3
Bsq_1868-1875	0	2	0	3	0	1	1	0	0	0	0		-	
Bsq_1876-1876	0	2	0	3	0	0	1	0	0	0	0		-	
Bsq_1877-1900	0	2	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	1		-	
Bsq_1901-1917	0	2	0	3	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	●		
Bsq_1918-1918	1	2	0	3	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	●		16
Bsq_1924-1930	0	2	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	1		-	
Bsq_1931-1931	1	2	0	3	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	○		0
Bsq_1938-1965	0	2	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		-	
Bsq_1966-1975	0	2	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	1	1		-	
Bsq_1976-1976	1	2	0	3	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	○		0
CIs_1868-1876	0	2	-1	3	0	0	1	1	0	0	0		-	
CIs_1877-1900	0	2	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		-	
CIs_1901-1923	0	2	0	3	0	0	1	0	0	0	0		-	
CIs_1924-1930	0	2	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	1		-	
CIs_1931-1931	0	2	0	3	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	●		
CIs_1932-1932	1	2	0	3	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	●		1
CIs_1938-1975	0	2	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	1		-	
CIs_1976-1976	1	2	0	3	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	○		0
Cat_1868-1876	0	2	1	3	0	0	1	1	0	1	0		-	
Cat_1877-1900	0	2	1	3	0	0	0	0	0	1	0		-	
Cat_1901-1906	0	2	1	3	0	0	1	0	0	1	1		-	
Cat_1907-1907	1	2	1	3	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	○		0
Cat_1924-1930	0	2	1	3	0	0	0	0	0	1	1		-	
Cat_1931-1931	1	2	1	3	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	○		0
Cat_1938-1975	0	2	1	3	0	0	0	0	0	1	1		-	
Cat_1976-1976	1	2	1	3	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	○		0
Gal_1868-1876	0	2	-1	3	0	0	1	1	0	1	0		-	
Gal_1877-1900	0	2	-1	3	0	0	0	0	0	1	0		-	
Gal_1901-1923	0	2	-1	3	0	0	1	0	0	1	0		-	
Gal_1924-1930	0	2	-1	3	0	0	0	0	0	1	1		-	
Gal_1931-1931	1	2	-1	3	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	○		0
Gal_1938-1975	0	2	-1	3	0	0	0	0	0	1	1		-	
Gal_1976-1976	0	2	-1	3	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	●		
Gal_1977-1977	1	2	-1	3	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	●		1
Nav_1868-1876	0	2	0	3	0	0	1	1	0	0	0		-	
Nav_1877-1895	0	2	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		-	
Nav_1896-1900	0	2	-1	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	1		-	
Nav_1901-1910	0	2	-1	3	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	●		
Nav_1911-1917	0	2	0	3	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	●		
Nav_1918-1918	1	2	0	3	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	●		16
Nav_1924-1930	0	2	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	1		-	
Nav_1931-1931	1	2	0	3	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	○		0
Nav_1938-1975	0	2	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	1		-	
Nav_1976-1976	1	2	0	3	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	○		0
NIN_1921-1921	1	2	-1	3	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	○		0
Sco_1801-1831	0	2	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	0		-	

Cases	OUTC	Conditions										Resolved contr.		Duration
		S_DIS	E_DIS	P_GRI	PRO_A	PRE_A	ASY_A	ASY_D	DEMO	SIZE	FLC	Type 1	Type 2	(years)
Sco_1832-1849	0	2	0	2	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	-		
Sco_1850-1852	0	2	0	3	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	-		
Sco_1853-1869	0	2	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	-		
Sco_1870-1917	0	2	0	3	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	-		
Sco_1918-1920	0	2	0	3	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	●		
Sco_1921-1933	0	2	0	3	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	●		
Sco_1934-1934	1	2	0	3	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	●		15
Fict_1900-1920	0	2	0	3	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	-		
Fict_1921-1945	0	2	1	3	0	0	0	0	1	1	0		●	
Fict_1946-1975	0	2	0	3	0	0	0	0	1	1	1		●	
													Mean	3,22
													Std. dev.	5,93

Note: ● = rows for which the FLC resolved a contradiction. ○ = rows for which the FLC did not need to resolve a contradiction (immediate occurrence of the outcome). - = cases not covered by the path.

During this step, I verified not to omit the condition found to be necessary before. I realised, however, that one path was sufficient for the outcome to occur without democracy being present – even if it passed the formal necessity test before (with an imperfect consistency score coming from the very cases of this path). I kept the path and decided to (i) nuance the necessity of democracy and to (ii) discuss the uniqueness of the cases (Ireland in 1832 and 1870) in this respect (see below).

I checked the consistency and coverage scores for all paths as well as the respective average lags. I retained those with a consistency of at least 0,75, in line with the standards of the discipline (Schneider & Wagemann, 2010).[29] For those below 0,75, I verified the contradictory cases and searched for case-based explanations of the inconsistencies (facilitated by panel D of Appendix 27). Since such explanations could always be found in the present research, I retained the paths and discussed it accordingly in the presentation of the results (e.g. path 4 and 5). If such explanations cannot be found, I advise to remove the combination and leave the cases uncovered.

The results of my analysis are summarised in Table 19. It shows that five different combinations of conditions are sufficient for regionalist parties to come up and demand legislative autonomy. In this section, I will only make a basic interpretation of paths 1, 2 and 3, as well as of their respective lags, for the sake of the methodological illustration. A substantive interpretation can be found in chapter 6. Specific attention will then of course also be dedicated to the cases that support and contradict each (or multiple) path(s), as well as to those covered by none.

[29] The difference between the minimally accepted scores for the analyses of necessity and sufficiency comes with the fact that a statement of necessity is a much stronger claim than a statement of sufficiency. If one says, for example, that a condition is 'necessary' for an outcome, one does not want expectations to this claim, or at least only very well discussed ones. If one says that a condition is 'sufficient' for an outcome, in turn, it is easier to subject this claim to certain conditions.

Table 19. QCA results for when regionalist party demands arise (illustration)

Conditions		Sufficiency (solution paths)					Nec.
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	
Sociological distinctiveness		2	2	2	1	1	
Past/present political grievances		3	3	2	2	2	
Economic distinctiveness			-1				
Asymmetrical demands				1	1	1	
Prospects for autonomy						1	
Asymmetrical autonomy							
Presence of autonomy							
Democracy		1		1	1	1	1
Size			1		1		
Temporal lag (years)	Mean	3,22	40,00	11,00	3,00	2,25	-
	Std. dev.	5,93	30,41	15,84	4,24	3,30	-
Consistency		1,000	1,000	0,800	0,667	0,500	0,949
Raw coverage		0,462	0,154	0,205	0,051	0,103	0,530
Unique coverage		0,359	0,051	0,205	0,026	0,077	-
Relevance of necessity		-	-	-	-	-	0,530
Solution consistency				0,846			
Solution coverage				0,846			
Number of cases (outcome present)				332 (39)			

Note: Condition numbers correspond to the multi-value score taken by the condition.

In path 1, we see that in a democratic country, large sub-state communities with a strong sociological distinctiveness and omnipresent political grievances will see a regionalist party come up and demand legislative autonomy in average within 3,22 years (st. dev. = 5,93) after these four conditions are united. This path is perfectly consistent and covers 46,20% of the disaggregated cases.

In path 3, we see that in a democratic country, sub-state communities with a strong sociological distinctiveness and recurrent political grievances will see a regionalist party come up and demand legislative autonomy when there are asymmetrical autonomy demands in other communities. In average, this will occur within 11,00 years (st. dev. = 15,84) after these four conditions are united. This path is consistent for 80% of the cases and concerns 20,50% of the disaggregated cases. One can here see that the length of the average lag is already more substantive but when one considers the time needed for parties to create and gather public support, it seems still plausible.

In path 2, finally, we see that in a non-democratic country, regionalist parties can come up and demand legislative autonomy when sub-state communities have a strong sociological distinctiveness, omnipresent political grievances, are in relative economic difficulty and have a large group size. In average, it takes 40 years for these four conditions to translate into the outcome (st. dev. = 30,41). This path is perfectly consistent and concerns 15,40% of the disaggregated cases. This time, however, one notices a very long average lag, even when considering the creation and uptake of parties takes time. Yet, when looking into the cases (Ireland in 1832 and 1870), one can see that we talk about a quite old and particular political context without competitive elections that should be taken into consideration accordingly in the interpretation that will be made in chapter 6.

Three elements should be retained from the preceding illustration. First, the method proves successful in meaningfully resolving longitudinal research problems with a systematic set-theoretic comparison. Secondly, the flexible lag condition is not only useful for

overcoming artificial contradictions but also provides interesting complementary information on the time interval it takes for conditions to translate into the outcome. Thirdly, despite its suitability for large-n analyses, the method remains case-oriented and allows for in-depth qualitative inquiries. A second methodological argument of this thesis is hence that the artificial contradictions arising from change-based case disaggregation should be resolved with a flexible lag condition as presented above.

d) Potential pitfalls and how to address them

Despite this positive appraisal, the procedure for carrying out longitudinal QCA with a flexible lag condition (FLC) I suggest is subject to four potential pitfalls that need to be addressed. First, there is a risk for the FLC to hide a condition that has been omitted in the analysis. To avoid this, the distribution of the FLC needs to be checked carefully for each path. Thereby, one needs to reflect if it could correspond to a factor that is not taken into consideration by the analysis. Generally speaking, the longer the average lag of a path, the higher is the probability it is underspecified and that an important condition has been omitted. What constitutes an acceptable average lag depends on the topic of the research and should be justified in light of the temporal dynamics that come with it. As a standard of good practice, the distribution of the chronologically ordered data sets and of the lags corresponding to each path found relevant in the analyses should be made available.[30]

Secondly, longitudinal case disaggregation comprises a risk for producing skewed outcomes. In longitudinal observations, it can indeed take some time (and several intervals) before an outcome occurs. This is even more true for CBIs because cases are disaggregated temporarily each time cases' membership in a condition or the outcome change. When changes in the conditions are more frequent than changes in the outcome, which is likely – certainly with an increasing number of conditions, the number of negative cases will exceed the number of positive cases. The problem of such a skew is that high levels of consistency can easily be achieved by many conditions when explaining the positively skewed absence of the outcome. For this reason, I will not carry out the analyses of when the outcome is absent. Instead, I will discuss the negative cases in the interpretation in chapter 9. Should one nevertheless decide to carry out the analyses of absent outcomes despite its skewness, the results should be interpreted very cautiously. That being said, it needs to be emphasised that not carrying out the analysis of the absence of the outcome does not exempt the QCA from its asymmetrical causality property. This means that the absence of the conditions leading to the presence of the outcome can still not be assumed to explain all the absence of the outcome. It just accounts for the historical counterfactual, i.e. not all conditions necessary for sufficiency yet being united.

[30] For the present research, the chronologically ordered data sets and the distribution of the lags used in the analyses can be found on: https://www.dropbox.com/s/b8w72i78who1mvm/Niessen_PhDAnalysis_FLC-LQCA.xlsx?dl=0.

Thirdly, the FLC works well with analyses in which the occurrence of the outcome closes the development process of a case (e.g. when regionalist demands for legislative autonomy arose). For analyses where an outcome can occur multiple times in the development process of a case (e.g. when regionalist demands for legislative autonomy increase), one can obtain contradictory configurations because the period of observation ended without the outcome occurring, although all conditions that previously led to the outcome are united. If this happens, one needs to consider carefully where to place the end of the observation, i.e. to reflect until when one thinks a case can still evolve. This 'possibility of evolution' is indeed a precondition for a meaningful longitudinal analysis. Should one extend the period of observation beyond the last occurring outcome, it should be signalled if future evolutions are possible or if the case can be considered 'closed'. If evolutions are still possible, contradictions observed at the end of the distribution should be nuanced because the outcome might just not have occurred yet. If no further evolutions are possible, the contradictions observed at the end of the distribution are to be interpreted as such. In the present research, I decided to carry out the analyses of increasing and decreasing autonomy demands and statutes until the most recent observed period (2020), even if the later did not close with the occurrence of the outcome. I then discussed the results accordingly.

Fourthly, with the minimisation and the calculation of consistency and coverage scores being carried out in two separate steps, there is a risk for researchers to 'play around' with consistency and coverage scores of conjunctions independently of theoretically informed simplifying assumptions. If there is indeed no combination of conditions contradicting a statement of sufficiency due to non-observed configurations, minimised combinations can achieve high consistency scores even if they do not comprise all parts that were necessary for sufficiency to be obtained. It is therefore crucial that the formulas entered in the Excel sheet always rely on combinations of conditions whose minimisation follows theoretically informed simplifying assumptions (see steps 3 and 4 of the procedure described above) and that minimisation notes are transparently reported.

5. Conclusion on the methodological strategy of the research

In this chapter, I have presented the methodological strategy of the research by detailing the functioning of the Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and by selecting and operationalising the conditions under analysis. While doing so, I have shown the usefulness of QCA for the present study. QCA is indeed particularly suitable for constellational research problems and allows to assess in which combination and at which moment of the demand and conferral process different factors prove important. While QCA was initially conceived as a static analysis, i.e. not allowing to analyse evolving cases over time, I have developed a methodological innovation that allows to use QCA longitudinally. More specifically, I have shown why the cases under study should be disaggregated based on change-based intervals (CBIs) and how a flexible lag condition (FLC) should be used to resolve the two types of

artificial contradictory configurations that can result from temporal case disaggregation – both being the main methodological arguments of the thesis.

While the procedure has been designed in response to the needs of the present research, it is suitable for other longitudinal research in the humanities and beyond. By pursuing the work of recent methodological developments that aim at rendering QCA 'time sensitive', it has made two main contributions to the field.

First, it encourages both methodological work on longitudinal QCA and empirical applications to reflect about how cases are disaggregated temporarily. While illustrated with fixed intervals, the existing calibration mechanisms suggested by Hino (2009) for time series QCA, the different consistency measurements proposed by Garcia-Castro and Ariño (2016) for panel data QCA and the trajectory QCA developed by Pagliarin and Gerrits (2020) are all compatible with CBIs.

Secondly, it tries to bridge two worlds by providing a procedure that allows to analyse an important number of cases and conditions longitudinally, while at the same preserving a strong case-oriented approach. Since artificial contradictions are most likely with an increasing number of time-points and conditions, as well as with CBIs in general, the FLC procedure is most useful for them. The fact that the interest of longitudinal analyses increases with the number of studied cases and conditions (Gerrits & Pagliarin, 2020) underlines the usefulness of the methodological innovation I propose. This lets me hope that it will facilitate the entrance of QCA to the field of longitudinal analyses and enrich existing small-n process-tracings or large-n variance-based analyses with a set-theoretic approach. Despite its suitability for mid-n and large-n analyses, longitudinal QCA with a FLC preserves a strong case-oriented and qualitative perspective and remains thereby loyal to QCA's original foundations (Ragin, 1987; Rihoux & Lobe, 2015). The procedure encourages indeed to fully unravel the dynamics of the studied phenomenon by inspecting and discussing the chronological development of confirming, contradictory and non-covered cases, as well as by inspecting and interpreting the lag condition. The trajectory-based approach of Pagliarin and Gerrits (2020) can constitute an interesting complement to the present procedure when the development-stages and order of the condition-changes are traced.

In the future, it would be useful to develop ways to automatise longitudinal QCA with a FLC that is at this stage not embedded in conventional QCA software. The main challenge with this will reside in the high number of possible configurations with which the FLC can be combined.

Part II.
Analysis

Chapter 5. The evolution of sub-state autonomy demands and statutes in Belgium, Spain and the United Kingdom

Before analysing the conditions under which sub-state autonomy demands in Belgium, Spain and the United Kingdom arose and evolved, it is useful to dedicate some time to the evolution of the phenomena under study itself. In this first chapter of the analytical part of the dissertation, I therefore first provide a general historical review of the autonomy question in each country. In a second, third and fourth section, I proceed by reviewing the evolution of sub-state autonomy, of regionalist party demands and of traditional party demands based on the SAS data.

1. A brief history of sub-state autonomy in Belgium, Spain and the United Kingdom

When reviewing the historical evolution of autonomy in the different sub-state communities, one can see that the decentralisation of legislative competences took place at different moments, contexts and paces in the countries under study. In the three sub-sections below, I review the historical developments for each of them – proceeding by the order of where legislative decentralisation appeared first.

a) Spain

Historically speaking, the first of the three to experience legislative decentralisation was Spain. The country as we know it today was built on the medieval Crowns of Castile and Aragon, having themselves integrated various older kingdoms (like that of Asturias, Galicia, León, Majorca and Navarre), principalities (like that of Cantabria and Catalonia) and taifas (like that of Badajoz, Granada, Murcia, Sevilla and Toledo) (Phillips & Rahn, 2015, chapter 3). After the union of the two crowns in 1469 and the reigns of the Habsburgs (1516-1715) and Bourbons (1715-1868), the first Spanish transition to democracy with partly free elections (1868-1874) opened the way for the First Spanish Republic (1873-1874). In the absence of consolidated institutions, it was only of short duration and replaced by a second Bourbon reign (1874-1923) during most of which the two main parties, *Liberals* et *Conservatives*, arranged an alternance in power – the so-called '*Turno pacifico*' (Magone, 2008, chapter 1).

To understand how the first experience of legislative decentralisation then came up, one has to go back in time to the 16th century when King Ferdinand II of Aragon, after conquering the Kingdom of Navarre in 1513, allowed the latter to maintain its historic provincial institutions and '*Fueros*' in exchange of loyalty to the new king (Mees, 2019, chapter 1). The *Fueros* were granted to each province of the former kingdom – Álava, Biscay, Gipuzkoa and

Navarre, together called the Basque Country[31] – and consisted in a series of special prerogatives: legislating themselves on fiscal matters except for a fixed amount to be paid annually to the king, freedom of military conscription and the right to reject national laws if they were contradictory to existing provincial laws (Strong, 1893; Agirreazkuenaga, 2011). Their provincial deputations and *Fueros* persisted until 1876 when, during the elaboration of the new Spanish Constitution, the provinces of Álava, Biscay and Gipuzkoa refused their autonomy to be reduced to administrative prerogatives in order to be integrated in the framework of the new Constitution. Instead of a reduction, their *Fueros* were withdrawn. The province of Navarre, however, had already accepted in 1841 its *Fueros* to be reduced to administrative fiscal acts. They were integrated and hence maintained by the new Spanish Constitution (Castells, 2003). In exchange of acceptance for the regime, they were even maintained during the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera (1923-1930) (Miranda Rubio, 2005). When one considers the Spanish state as modern from 1868 onwards, i.e. from the year in which the country knew its first transition to democracy leading up to the First Spanish Republic, the *Fueros* that the Basque provinces of Álava, Biscay and Gipuzkoa detained until 1876 can be regarded as the first – yet short – example of legislative decentralisation in Spain.

A second experience of legislative decentralisation in Spain took place under the Second Spanish Republic (1931-1936). During the elaboration of the Constitution, parties and politicians in Catalonia and the four provinces of the Basque Country, pushed for a federal constitution with regional autonomy to be adopted (Beramendi, 2003). In these two regions, the *Turno Pacifico* had already been broken by the beginning of the 20th century because the obvious successes of the Catalan *Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya* and the Basque *Partido Nacionalista Vasco* could not be dissimulated by the hegemonic *Liberal* and *Conservative Parties*. Instead of a properly federal constitution, however, a special provision for the institution of 'Autonomous Regions' was foreseen by articles 11 and 12 of the Constitution, stipulating that: "one or several neighbouring provinces" can "organise themselves as autonomous region" if "a statute of autonomy (…) is proposed by a majority of municipalities or by municipalities whose electoral census corresponds to two-thirds of that of the region" (Constitution of the Spanish Republic, 1931).

It was seized in Catalonia to which legislative institutions with competences in various policy fields were conferred in 1932 (Casanova, 2010, chapter 2). In 1934, the statute was temporarily suspended because the Catalan regional president, Lluís Companys, had ambiguously declared that Catalonia would form a "state in the Spanish Federal Republic", which was perceived as a serious secessionist threat by the Spanish government (Payne, 1993, p. 216). The statute was recovered in 1936 and maintained until the outbreak of the civil war in the same year.

[31] Historically, the Basque Kingdom of Navarre comprised the provinces of Labourd, (Lower) Navarre and Soule that were situated north to the Pyrenees, and the provinces of Álava, Biscay, Gipuzkoa and (Upper) Navarre which were situated south of the Pyrenees. During the conquest of the Kingdom of Navarre by King Ferdinand II of Aragon in 1513, the southern provinces were conquered, while the northern provinces stayed independent as remaining Kingdom of Navarre. They were integrated into the French Kingdom in 1589 (Mees, 2019, chapter 1).

In the Basque Country, a statute installing a single parliament for the four provinces was elaborated in 1931 but it did not reach sufficient support in Navarre (where administrative foral rights were still in place) (Casanova, 2010, chapter 2; Mikelarena Peña, 2013). Instead, a statute for the three remaining provinces was elaborated and adopted in 1936 (including taxation powers in relation to the former *Fueros*) (Molina, 2011). It was of very short duration only because the civil war broke out in the same year.

Several other regions aimed at obtaining their own autonomy statute, but without success. In Galicia, a statute of autonomy was drafted following demands by the *Partido Galeguista* and accepted in 1936 by the Spanish *Cortes* but it never entered into force due to the eminent outbreak of the civil war (Álvarez, 2018). In Valencia, a draft for an autonomy statute was elaborated on initiative of the *Derecha Regional Valenciana* and adopted by a majority of municipalities in 1932, but it was not considered by the *Cortes* before the outbreak of the civil war (Valls, 1992). In the Balearic and Canary Islands, projects were drafted on initiatives of the *Partit Regionalista de Mallorca* and the *Partido Nacionalista Canario* but never put to a vote in the islands (Llul & Mir, 1975; Bravo de Laguna, 2004).

With the Spanish civil war (1936-1939) and the Francoist dictatorship (1939-1975), the second Spanish experience with legislative decentralisation ended. However, due to their support for Franco's *Popular Front* during the civil war, the provinces of Navarre and Álava were allowed to maintain their provincial institutions and exercise administrative fiscal autonomy (Ortega & Zurutuza, 2011).

After Franco's death and the Spanish transition to democracy from 1975 onwards, Catalan and Basque parties pushed once more for the recognition of regional autonomy in the newly created Constitution (Magone, 2008, chapter 1 & 3). They succeeded in their demand and the possibility for creating so-called 'Autonomous Communities' was foreseen. Initially, this was supposed to be only applicable to Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia who, because of the adoption of their statutes during the Second Republic, were considered as 'historic communities'. However, political parties in Andalusia, the Canary Islands, Navarre and Valencia demanded a mechanism allowing all Spanish provinces to constitute autonomous communities – leading to the distinctive expression of '*Café para todos*' ('coffee for all') (Ysàs, 2002). Consequently, it was foreseen that "bordering provinces with common historic, cultural and economic characteristics, island territories and provinces with historic regional status may accede to self-government" (Spanish Constitution, 1978, art. 143) through two different 'routes'. The so-called 'fast-track' route foresaw an immediate instalment of autonomous institutions with a higher amount of competences (notably for social and sanitary as well as educational matters) (Spanish Constitution, 1978, art. 151), while the 'slow-track' route foresaw an instalment of autonomous institutions with this higher amount of competences only to be acquired after five years (Spanish Constitution, 1978, art. 143 §2). For a community to take the fast-track, it needed the support of the "corresponding Provincial Councils or inter-island bodies but also by three-quarters of the municipalities of each province concerned, representing at least the majority of the electorate of each one" within six months (Spanish Constitution, 1978, art. 151). For the slow-track

route, it was sufficient to have the support of "two-thirds of the municipalities whose populations represent at least the majority of the electorate of each province" within six months (Spanish Constitution, 1978, art. 143).

Because of their autonomy statute during the Second Republic, the second interim provision of the Constitution allowed Catalonia (in 1979), the Basque Country (in 1979, without Navarre) and Galicia (in 1981) to immediately take the fast-route track without having to satisfy the special requirements of article 151. Andalusia fulfilled the requirements of the fast-track route and obtained legislative autonomy in 1981 (Newton, 1982).[32] Navarre was allowed to take the fast-track route in 1982 by virtue of the fourth interim provision of the Constitution in order to integrate the special Basque Economic Agreement that was installed to regulate the special taxation powers that the four historic Basque provinces obtained in light of their former *Fueros* (Calvo, 1996). The communities of Valencia and the Canary Islands fulfilled the requirements of the slow-track route but obtained the same powers than the fast-track regions in 1982 through negotiated special transfer laws (Canals, 1989).

Other autonomous communities were created through the slow-track route in Aragon (1982), Asturias (1981), the Balearic Islands (1983), Cantabria (1981), Castile and León (1983), Castile-la Mancha (1982), Extremadura (1983), La Rioja (1982) and Murcia (1982). By virtue of article 144 a) of the Constitution, the community of Madrid was instituted as capital region "in the national interest" in 1983 (Magone, 2008, pp. 194-195).

Since then, two general enlargements have taken place. In 1992, the competences of the slow-track regions were increased to equal those of the fast-track regions (for social and sanitary as well as for educational matters) (Machado, 1992). In 1997, following demands of the Catalan regionalist party *Convergència i Unió* (CiU) and in exchange of their support to the first Aznar government, the taxation powers of all autonomous communities were increased (except of the Basque Country and Navarre whose taxation powers still exceed those of the others) (Almendral, 2003).

Despite the increased competence symmetry between autonomous communities resulting from these two transfers, two more asymmetries persist (in addition to the Basque foral rights). First, the Basque Country, Catalonia and Navarre have their own community police with considerable prerogatives (S. Greer, 1995). Secondly, in recognition of their historic civil codes, Aragon, the Balearic Islands, the Basque Country, Catalonia, Galicia and Valencia have special competences in the field of civil law (Bataller, 2009).

[32] Initially, the referendum on the creation of an Andalusian Autonomous Community of 1980 received an overall approval of 94% of the 64% participating voters. A majority of support among all voters was reached in all provinces except for Almería. In the latter, 91% of the 51% participating voters supported the creation, which consisted in a total support of only 42% (Vera, 1980). At the end of a long political quarrel between regional and national politicians, an *Organic Referendum Law* was adopted to allow the result in a province that fails the minimal requirement to be overturned if a majority of members of the *Cortes* elected in that province support the creation of the autonomous community. The effect of that law was made retroactive by another organic law for the province of Almería and thereby allowed the autonomous community of Andalusia to follow the fast-track route (Robledo, 1993).

Finally, there are two negative cases of autonomy conferral that have to be signalled in contemporary Spanish autonomy dynamics. On the one hand, despite autonomy demands by the regionalist *Unión del Pueblo Leonés* (UPL) since 1986, an own autonomy statute has never been conferred to the three provinces of Salamanca, Zamora and León that the UPL wants to constitute an own autonomous community independent of the existing Castile and León community (Navarro, 2019). On the other hand, following a referendum on the independence of Catalonia that was held on 1st October 2017 despite having been previously suspended by the Constitutional Court, and following an independence motion that was passed on 27th October 2017 by the Catalan parliament, the autonomous institutions of Catalonia have been suspended on 28th October 2017 by the Spanish government invoking article 155 of the Constitution. After new elections on 21st December 2017, the functioning of the Catalan institutions has resumed (Cetrà, Casanas-Adam, & Tàrrega, 2018).

b) United Kingdom

The second of the three countries under study to experience legislative decentralisation was the United Kingdom. It consists in the Union of the Kingdom of England and the Principality of Wales (concluded in 1536), which was joined by the Kingdom of Scotland in 1707 and by the Kingdom of Ireland in 1801 (Welsh, 2003).

Despite the union being freshly concluded, regionalist Irish parties with significant electoral support already brought up demands for independence (*Irish Repeal*, 1832-1851) or legislative autonomy (*Home Rule League*, 1870-1882; *Irish Parliamentary Party*, 1874-1922) in the middle of the 19th century. By the beginning of the 20th century, the demands of the independence movement now led by *Sinn Féin* (SF, 1905-) had given birth to a fierce political conflict. These so-called 'Home-Rule' demands were particularly strong in the southern (majoritarian and catholic) part of the country, while the question was disputed in the northern (minoritarian) part between pro-independence 'nationalists' (mainly catholic) and contra independence 'unionists' (mainly protestant) (Jackson, 2003, chapter 2). To appease the independence demands which even led to a violent revolution between 1919 and 1921, and to recognise the political heterogeneity between the north and the south of the country, far-reaching legislative autonomy was conferred by the British government in 1920 to two newly created parliamentary assemblies of 'Southern Ireland' and 'Northern Ireland' (English, 2008, chapter 5). The line between the two was subject to much dispute. While the British government had initially considered to make Northern Ireland correspond to the historic Irish province of 'Ulster', unionist representatives conceded in light of the 1918 elections that there was sufficient unionist support for a stable government in only six counties of the historic province.[33] The presence of significant nationalist minorities within these six counties was not signalled because SF refused to participate in the committee preparing the autonomy arrangement (Rankin, 2006). Eventually, the six counties were

[33] These six counties were Antrim, Armagh, Down, Fermanagh, Londonderry and Tyrone.

retained as territory of Northern Ireland. In 1921, elections were held in both Northern and Southern Ireland but the southern assembly, in which SF obtained 124 out of 128 MPs, never seated. Instead, the southern part declared independence and entered into negotiations with the (remaining) United Kingdom. An Anglo-Irish Treaty was signed in December 1921 and the Irish Free State Act was passed by the Westminster parliament in 1922 (Killeen, 2007).

Northern Ireland, however, remained part of the United Kingdom. While some changes to the former border had been foreseen by the joint Irish Boundary Commission to do justice to minorities on both sides of the border, a press leak before the conclusion of the works led to heavy protests on both nationalist and unionist sides (Rankin, 2006). The adjustment was abandoned and the Northern Irish assembly used the 'opting-out' foreseen by the Irish Free State Act in order to remain part of the United Kingdom (Jackson, 2003, chapter 10). Northern Ireland preserved the autonomous institutions that were at first wanted neither by the now unionist majority (having sought the union of the country), nor by the nationalist minority (seeking unification with the Republic of Ireland). The political resources and space provided by the autonomous institutions, however, was soon welcomed by the unionist majority which excluded the nationalist minority from power (Walker, 2004, chapter 3). This exclusion led to a violent political conflict by the end of the 1960s known as 'The Troubles', when nationalist protests for more political inclusion were supressed by the police and followed by a series of deadly confrontations between mutually retaliating nationalist and unionist paramilitary forces (Edwards & McGrattan, 2012). In 1971, the autonomy statute was withdrawn and a peace process was launched. It was concluded in 1998 by the so-called Good Friday Agreement, installing a power-sharing assembly with legislative competences in various policy fields once again (Clancy, 2016). While its powers were enlarged in 2011 and 2020, they were temporarily suspended from 2003-2006 and from 2017-2019 due to a political deadlock between the two power-sharing groups.

The second sub-state community in the United Kingdom to obtain legislative competences was Scotland. While it had preserved an own legal and educational system since its entrance into the union in 1707, its self-governance was then mainly administrative with a Secretary of State for Scotland administrating so-called Scottish affairs for the government (Shaw, 1999). After Scottish forces had supported the 'Jacobite uprising' to replace the British King in 1745, the function of Secretary of State for Scotland was abolished. It was only restored in 1885 following persistent demands by Scottish MPs, together with a newly created Scottish Office administrating multiple policy sectors (Keating, 1976). Since 1892, the Secretary of State for Scotland is member of the British government. Despite this more substantive administrative autonomy being conferred, demands for full legislative autonomy persisted. While legislative autonomy had been claimed by the *Liberal Party* since the 1880s as well as by the *Labour Party* in the 1920s and since 1974, the *Scottish National Party* (SNP) has claimed different forms of Scottish independence since its foundation in 1934 (Kellas, 1965; Mitchell, 1998; Lynch, 2002). Following electoral victories by the SNP in the 1970s in the traditionally leftist Scotland, the *Labour Party* promised a referendum on the conferral of legislative devolution in case of an electoral victory (Mitchell, 1998). A first referendum was

held in 1979 under the Callaghan government and failed to meet the requirement of 60% of support by the total electorate (51,60% of the 63,70% participating voters were in favour) (Balsom & McAllister, 1979). Labour renewed its commitment to a referendum in the 1990s and a second popular consultation was hold in 1997 under the first Blair government. It succeeded in reaching the requirement of a simple majority (74,30% of the 60,20% participating voters), leading in 1998 to the first Scottish devolution act and statute with various legislative competences (Pattie, Denver, Mitchell, & Bochel, 1998). It was enlarged a first time in 2012. Upon demand of the SNP that obtained several important electoral successes, the UK government accepted in 2014 to hold a referendum on Scottish independence – among others because it expected the outcome to be negative (Cetrà & Harvey, 2019). 55.30% of the 84.60% participating voters did then indeed oppose Scottish independence (Mullen, 2014). This outcome led to another enlargement of the devolution statute in 2016, which seemed to have settled the independence question for some time. However, the decision of the United Kingdom to leave the European Union, while a large majority of the Scottish electorate had voted against this in the 2016 Brexit referendum, led the SNP to call for another independence referendum in 2020 (P. Anderson & Keil, 2020).

The last sub-state community in the United Kingdom to obtain legislative autonomy was Wales. Belonging to the Kingdom of England since 1536, both its administration and legal system were fully integrated into that of England (Jenkins, 2007). It was only in the wake of the Irish Home-Rule movement and the developments in Scotland that demands for own legislative autonomy were issued since the 1920s by the *Liberal Party* and the regionalist *Plaid Cymru* (PC) (Morgan, 1971; Elias, 2009). This led in 1964 to the creation of the Welsh Office and the installation of the Secretary of State for Wales – in light of those existing for Scotland (Griffiths, 1999). Following electoral successes by PC in the 1970s and the evolution in Scotland, the *Labour Party* also committed itself to referenda on devolution in Wales – though limited to secondary law-making powers though (i.e. capable of detailing primary legislation that was still adopted by the UK parliament for all policy fields (R. Deacon, 2012, p. 140)) (Mitchell, 1998). In 1979 and 1997 two referenda on Welsh devolution were held in parallel to the Scottish ones. While the first was opposed by 79,70% of the 59,10% participating voters, the second received a tight majority of support with 50,30% of the 50,20% participating voters being in favour (Balsom & McAllister, 1979; Broughton, 1998). A Welsh devolution act was passed in 1998 and established a Welsh Assembly with secondary law-making powers. In 2011, a third referendum was held on whether primary law-making powers should be conferred to the Welsh Assembly. It received support by 63,50% of the 35,60% participating voters and led to the conferral of a Welsh statute with legislative competences (Jones & Scully, 2012). This statute was enlarged in 2014 and 2017.

Unlike the Irish, Scottish and Welsh cases, there are two sub-state communities in the United Kingdom where demands for legislative autonomy were raised but not followed by legislative devolution statutes: England and Cornwall. In England, the debate was mainly

brought up in response to the so-called 'West Lothian Question'[34], pointing to the paradox that for certain policies, Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish MPs could vote on matters in the Westminster parliament that only concern England because the matters have been devolved for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland (Bogdanor, 2010). Three solutions to this problem have been proposed. First, in the wake of the devolved assemblies put in place for Northern Ireland, Scotland, Wales and London, the Blair Labour governments had foreseen devolved regional assemblies to be introduced in different English regions. After a clear rejection in a first referendum held in North East England on the matter, however, the plans were abandoned (Ayres, Flinders, & Sandford, 2018). Secondly, some politicians from different parties have put the idea of an English Parliament on the table. Although being official *United Kingdom Independence Party* (UKIP) policy from 2010-2018 (Hayton, 2016), the question of English devolution has never received significant political support and was therefore not pursued. Finally, to solve the problem at least provisionally, it was decided in 2015 that bills which exclusively concern England can only be passed if a majority of English MPs supports them (Gover & Kenny, 2018).

In Cornwall, an own legislative devolution statute has been claimed based on the Cornish language and identity by *Mebyon Kernow* since 1967 and by the *LibDems* since the late 1990s (B. Deacon & Tregidga, 2003; Willett & Tredinnick-Rowe, 2016). In 2015, a unitary political authority was established and the Cornwall Council obtained administrative competences in various policy fields, like culture, health, social care or transports (Willett, 2016). However, except for the singular experience of the Stannary Parliament allowing Cornish Tinners between 1305 and 1753 to legislate on fiscal questions concerning the tin industry (Cruickshanks, 1986), legislative autonomy was never conferred in Cornwall.

Finally, there is the case of London which, *strictu sensu*, never obtained legislative competences. However, the establishing of the Greater London Authority in 2000 with a 25-member assembly holding enlarged administrative competences and a directly elected mayor was part of the devolution policy of the first Blair (Labour) government and is therefore often considered analogous to the other (legislative) devolution arrangements in the United Kingdom (Travers, 2002).

c) Belgium

The last of the three countries to experience legislative decentralisation was Belgium. The country, whose parts consisted in different duchies (Brabant, Limburg and Luxemburg) counties (Flanders, Hainaut and Namur) and a principality (Liège) during the Middle-Ages, belonged to the Burgundian (1384-1482), Habsburgian (1482-1549), Spanish (1549-1715) and Austrian Netherlands (1715-1792)[35] before being integrated, after French occupation (1792-1815), into the United Kingdom of the Netherlands in 1815 (Cook, 2002). In 1830, the

[34] The term was coined the Scottish Westminster MP for West Lothian, Tam Dalyell, who brought up the question in parliament several times (Bogdanor, 2010).

[35] The Principality of Liège remained largely independent until 1792.

nine catholic southern (Belgian) provinces of the kingdom acceded to independence after a short revolution because they were numerically underrepresented in parliament and did not want to accept a protestant king (Witte, Craeybeckx, & Meynen, 2009, chapter 1).

Despite having had a population speaking Flemish dialects in the north and Walloon dialects in the south from its very beginning, Belgium was set up as a unitary state with a French-speaking political elite throughout the country. Following demands by the so-called Flemish Movement (composed of various Flemish intellectuals, associations and politicians), different language laws were adopted by the end of the 19th century to facilitate the use of Dutch in the judiciary, administration and education – up until recognising Dutch as a second official language and the Dutch version of the Constitution to have equal legal force (1898) (Mabille, 2011, pp. 175-176).

At the beginning of the 20th century, the vision of the Flemish Movement to make Belgium a bilingual country (both in Flanders and Wallonia) led to the creation of a (smaller) Walloon movement that feared a numerical political domination by the Dutch-speaking (catholic) majority (Gevers et al., 1998; Joris, 1998; Delforge, 2012). During the First World War, the German occupiers created two distinct administrative units in the north and the south of Belgium with administrative competences, and tolerated the creation of a Council of Flanders in 1917 by nationalist associations – both with the aim to weaken national sentiments in the country (Wils, 2014). Despite some ideological heterogeneity in the Council, whose members were chosen at first by the associations, the most radical members succeeded in adopting a declaration of Flemish independence by the end of 1917. The occupiers did not recognise it and required a legitimate council to be elected. After proposing a list of candidates and gathering 50 000 supporting signatures, a second Council was formed and adopted another declaration on Flemish independence in 1918. This was inconvenient for the occupiers, however, who dissolved the Council (Mommaerts & van Hees, 1998).

After the end of the war, the radical fractions of the Flemish Movement had lost some credibility because of their collaboration with the occupiers, so that the more moderate claims in the movement (for linguistic equality in the administration and education) took the forefront (Gevers et al., 1998). The enlargement of voting rights in the interbellum gave increasing voice to Flemish popular classes and, thereby, to regionalist parties which first came up in the 1920s and 1930s. An advanced set of language rights was adopted in the 1930s – moving the country further to regional monolingualism in the education and administration (Mabille, 2011). In parallel, radical fractions of the Flemish Movement developed again and founded the *Vlaamsch Nationaal Verbond* (VNV) (Gevers et al., 1998).

After World War I when the Treaty of Versailles was signed, Belgium furthermore received a tiny territory from Germany as war reparation. The so-called 'East Cantons' of Eupen, Malmedy and Sankt-Vith were incorporated into the Province of Liège (Minke, 2010). Despite some linguistic facilities in the municipal administration and primary education, the objective was to progressively assimilate the German-speaking population. This resulted in serious political grievances that split the society into supporters of the new Belgian state and other supporting regionalist parties advocating for a return to Germany (Brüll, 2005).

During the Second World War, Belgium was occupied once more by the Germans. Contrary to the First World War, no specific institutional arrangement was foreseen. The VNV supported the occupiers and hoped for the integration of Flanders in a Pan-German state. At the end of the war, the radical fractions of the Flemish Movement had again lost most of their credibility due to their collaboration (Gevers et al., 1998).

It was only in the middle of the 1950s that the Flemish Movement took up again. Following the demographic and economic expansion of Flanders and nourished by a political elite that had for the first time gone through a fully Flemish higher education, the regionalist *Volksunie* defended a federalist program and obtained increasing electoral support in the 1960s and 1970s (De Winter, 1998b). In 1963, these regionalist pressures led to the administrative partition of the country through a 'linguistic border', which consisted in classifying municipalities as either Dutch-, French- or German-speaking (with special facilities for those close to a linguistic border) (Rillaerts, 2010). By the end of the 1960s, (protective) Francophone regionalism manifested itself in the creation and success of the *Rassemblement Wallon* in Wallonia and the *Front démocratique des francophones* (FDF) in Brussels (Buelens & Van Dyck, 1998). The regionalist success further threatened the traditional parties whose internal division on the autonomy question led to their split into respective Flemish and Francophone christian-democratic (in 1968), liberal (in 1972) and socialist (in 1978) parties (De Winter, Swyngedouw, & Dumont, 2006).

The German-speaking language area, who had returned to Germany during the war (1940-1945) but was attached to Belgium again after it, was largely depoliticised in the 1950s because of rejection and shame of its German past (Cremer, 2001). Belgium was therefore largely accepted as new state and it was only at the end of the 1960s that demands for own cultural autonomy and an equal treatment in the Belgian state reforms came up. In 1971, the regionalist *Partei der Deutschsprachigen Belgier* was founded (Niessen, 2020).

A first round of legislative decentralisation became possible because the demands of Flemish MPs for autonomy in cultural and linguistic matters were joined by demands of Walloon MPs for autonomy in economic matters. While Flemish demands aimed at cultural and political emancipation, Walloon demands aimed at increased control over a declining Walloon regional economy that had been surpassed by the Flemish in the middle of the 1960s (Quévit, 1978). In 1970, the so-called First State Reform met the Flemish demands by creating councils with legislative powers in cultural matters for the newly installed *Flemish Community* and *French Community* (Brassinne de la Buissière, 1979). A council for the *German-speaking Community* followed in 1974 with administrative powers that were enlarged in 1983 to legislative ones (Brassinne de la Buissière & Kreins, 1984).[36] In 1980, the so-called Second State Reform met the Walloon demands by creating Councils with legislative powers in economic matters for the newly installed *Flemish Region* and *Walloon Region* (and

[36] Remember that in 1980, the name of the Dutch Culture Community was changed to 'Flemish Community' and that of the French Culture Community to 'French Community'. In 1983, the name of the German Culture Community was changed to 'German-speaking Community'. This came amongst others with the fact that their competences were enlarged beyond cultural matters.

increased and the competences of the communities) (Brassinne de la Buissière, 1980a, 1980b). While the German-speaking Community remained an own entity for community matters, it was integrated into the *Walloon Region* for regional matters. A Council for the *Brussels-Capital Region* was installed in 1989 by the Third State Reform (De Bruycker, 1989).

The reason for this complex state architecture with two sets of legislative sub-state entity levels (Communities and Regions) is due to the special bilingual situation of Brussels. While formerly being a Flemish city, the proportion of Francophones in the capital had increased progressively since 1830 and surpassed the Flemish at the beginning of the 20th century (Rillaerts, 2010). When setting up the community institutions related to cultural and so-called 'personalised matters', it was decided that in the absence of clear geo-linguistic lines in the capital and not to institute further 'sub-nationalities', Francophone institutions in Brussels would be governed by the decrees[37] of the French Community, while Dutch-speaking institutions would be governed by the decrees of the Flemish Community. Setting up the regional institutions, it was decided that for economic and so-called 'territorialised matters', Brussels would need an own region because of its specificity as capital (Deschouwer, 2012, pp. 74-77).

Three particularities should be noted in this respect. First, after its creation, the Flemish Region transferred all its powers to the Flemish Community – thereby *de facto* fusing both institutions (Deschouwer, 2012, p. 56).[38] Secondly, some community aspects in Brussels are dealt with by special institutions (Delwit & Deschouwer, 2009). While the Francophone MPs of the Brussels Parliament are grouped as *French Community Commission* (COCOF), the Dutch-speaking MPs are grouped as *Flemish Community Commission* (VGC). Legislative competences for some social and sanitary matters were transferred to the former from the French Community. The latter only received administrative competences from the Flemish Community. Altogether, the Brussels MPs even form the *Common Community Commission* (COCOM) that has legislative competences for community policies that cannot be divided linguistically in Brussels (e.g. family allowances) (Nassaux, 2013). Today, the question of simplifying this architecture by transferring all community competences to the Brussels Region is heavily debated among several political parties. Those mostly against this option are, on the one hand, the Flemish nationalist and christian-democratic parties which consider Brussels to be a Flemish city whose Dutch-speaking population should be governed by the same rules than Flanders (De Ridder & Fraga, 1986; Witte, 2008). On the other hand, several members of different Francophone parties keep advocating for the French Community to be treated as a separate political entity (Rocour, 2013). Thirdly, the German-speaking language area is in a special situation insofar as for community matters, it has own community institutions, but for regional matters, it is integrated in the Walloon Region. During the different state reforms the Walloon Region transferred the exercise of some regional

[37] In Belgium, 'decrees' are the laws of sub-state entities. For the Brussels-Capital Region, one speaks of 'ordinances'.

[38] In the Flemish parliament, regional matters are only voted by MPs elected in Flanders, while for community matters, MPs elected in both Flanders and Brussels vote.

competences for the German-speaking language area to the German-speaking Community (Bouhon, Niessen, & Reuchamps, 2015).

After this complex set of institutions was put in place by the three first state reforms, the three subsequent ones aimed at further developing the decentralised state architecture. The Fourth State Reform in 1993 aimed at consolidating the federal nature of the Belgian state by constitutionally recognising the country to be a federation, by foreseeing direct elections for all sub-state entity parliaments,[39] and by enlarging the competences of both regions and communities (Alen & Peeters, 1995). The Fifth State Reform in 2001 reviewed the fiscal and borrowing autonomy of the sub-state entities and further enlarged their competences (Peeters, 2003). Until then, Flemish and Francophone parties had – despite divergences and intense negotiations – mostly agreed on the setup and progressive enlargement of sub-state institutions. After 2001, however, Francophone parties were mostly satisfied and did not want to go further (Swenden & Jans, 2006). After many of its former demands had been met, the *Volksunie* declined in the 1990s and split in 2001 into different fractions of which the *Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie* (N-VA) came out as its main regionalist successor (Deschouwer, 2009b). It shifted the Flemish regionalist discourse towards economic questions and claimed further decentralisation so that a left-wing Wallonia and right-wing Flanders could govern themselves accordingly (Wauters & Bouteca, 2016). In 2010, the N-VA became the biggest party in Flanders and exerted significant pressure on the other Flemish parties that only wanted to participate in the federal government if further competence transfers would be carried out. On the Francophone side, most parties, and especially the *Socialist Party* (which was the largest one), were still very reluctant to this – especially because the claimed competences concerned the health care and social security sector. It was only after 541 days of negotiations and governmental deadlock that an agreement on a Sixth State Reform with further competence enlargements in these fields could be reached (without the N-VA on the Flemish side, for whom the reform did not go far enough, and without the FDF on the Francophone side, for whom it went too far) (Deschouwer & Reuchamps, 2013). While this has as of today been the last reform of the Belgian federal state structure, a seventh reform has started to be debated among political parties – mainly to simplify the heterogeneous competence distribution in federal Belgium. Flemish nationalists and christian-democrats have argued in this respect that the distribution should be homogenised by decentralising additional competences. Flemish liberals and socialists as well as traditional Walloon parties have argued the opposite, i.e. aim for homogenisation by recentralising competences (Van Wynsberghe, 2020).

2. The evolution and content of sub-state autonomy statutes

In the wake of this historical overview on the dynamics of sub-state autonomy in Belgium, Spain and the United Kingdom, the present section will use the SAS data to look with greater

[39] Before, only the Parliament of the German-speaking Community (since 1974) and that of the Brussels-Capital Region (since 1989) used to be elected.

detail into the extent of autonomy that has been transferred to sub-state communities in the three countries, into the political competences that have been conferred as well as into the enlargement patters that can be observed once institutions have been put into place. It closes with an overview on the legal frameworks in place for the conferral and enlargement of autonomy in each of the three countries.

a) Evolution of the extent of conferred sub-state autonomy

A glance at the evolving extent of sub-state autonomy in the different sub-state community following the SAS data, summarised in Figure 4, allows to depict the broader political patterns of the aforementioned historical description.

In Belgium, one can see on the one hand that Flanders and Wallonia are the sub-state entities that do both lead the autonomist evolution and that have the highest degree of autonomy of all sub-state entities. The two Brussels communities and the German-speaking one follow – in time and concerning the extent of conferred autonomy. In general, one can nicely see how steady and incremental the increases of sub-state autonomy in Belgium have been.


In Spain, the vivid evolutions in the Basque Country and Catalonia stand out. The latter reflect well the two autonomist moments during the Second Republic on the one hand and after the transition to democracy on the other. The Basque statute exceeds the Catalan by a little, whose suspension in 2017 can easily be spotted. The other communities follow and come close to the Basque and Catalan statutes – the slow-track regions taking a little more time for this than the fast-track regions. León stands out as a negative case. In general, one can clearly see how symmetrical the statutes of the Spanish autonomous communities are and that they have only been reformed on few occasions.

In the United Kingdom, the lead was taken by Ireland whose southern part became independent soon after the conferral of its autonomy statute. The autonomy remained in the northern part but was suspended several times due to the conflict between the two main political communities. Quite some time passed before Scotland followed as devolved entity, seeing its statute enlarged twice. The same can be said for Wales whose institutions even took some time to pass from administrative to legislative autonomy. Cornwall, England and London stand out as negative cases, which fits into the general tendency that devolution statutes in the United Kingdom are asymmetrical and evolved with a few incremental changes.

Taken together, the autonomy evolution in these cases was mainly due to changes in the self-rule dimension. While some transitions from group rights to self-rule prerogatives were also observable, the extent of cases' shared rule statutes remained largely identical. On the one hand, this is due to the fact that the Sub-state Autonomy Scale (SAS) has been designed to be fine-grained on the self-rule dimension and to only capture shared rule changes that were deemed relevant for a significant change of its degree of autonomy. On the other hand, there were objectively speaking much more self-rule than shared rule reforms in these cases,

also when one looks at indicators like the Regional Authority Index who provides a more fine-grained account of shared rule (Hooghe & Marks, 2016, pp. 152-154). Since the interest of the present research consists in analysing evolutions from administrative to legislative self-rule, as well as extensions of the latter, the predominance of changes observed on the self-rule dimension is rather a positive than a negative thing. To have a correct assessment of cases' overall degrees of autonomy, however, the consideration of shared rule – even if it is constant – remains important for the SAS.


Figure 4. Evolution of sub-state communities' autonomy statutes on the SAS



* *Note:* Fast-track multi-prov. (with civil code): Galicia, Valencia [slow-track with extended competences]. Fast-track multi-prov. (no civil code): Andalusia, Canary Islands (since 1927) [slow-track with extended comp.]. Slow-track multi-prov. (with civil code): Aragon, Balearic Islands. Slow-track multi-prov. (no civil code): Castile and León, Castile-la Mancha, Extremadura, Madrid. Slow-track uni-prov. (no civil code): Asturias, Canary Islands (until 1927), Cantabria, La Rioja, Murcia. The 1917 increase on the graph for Flanders and Wallonia is only applicable to Flanders (Council of Flanders).

After a sub-state community-based comparison of autonomy statutes, it is interesting to look at the average tendencies per country, as summarised in Figure 5. The average line is expressed by the annual mean of all sub-state autonomy statutes conferred in a country.[40] As an indicator of variability, I use the first and third quartile (expressing where 25% of the statutes lie respectively below and above) so that the measurement expresses an effectively observed and not a theoretical statute (as the standard deviation would have done). This allows to draw three further interesting lessons. First, Belgium has the highest average degree of conferred autonomy but also a substantial degree of asymmetry. Secondly, Spain's average degree of conferred autonomy is at the first glance higher than that of the United Kingdom. However, this is due to the fact that England, London and Cornwall have not obtained legislative devolution statutes and that the Spanish statutes, in turn, are very symmetrical. Thirdly, and related to the previous point, one can retain that the highest conferred devolution statutes in the United Kingdom exceed the Spanish ones.

Figure 5. Evolution of countries' average conferred autonomy on the SAS




* *Note:* Line: mean. Shape: 1st and 3rd quartiles.

b) Comparison of conferred sub-state autonomy competences

After considering the evolving overall extent of conferred sub-state autonomy in the three countries, it is interesting to examine the evolution the precise competences on which the conferred statutes rely, as summarised by Figure 6.

[40] For Northern Ireland, only one statute has been counted.

Figure 6. Evolution of sub-state communities' legislative autonomy statutes by competence



* *Note:* Fast-track multi-prov. (with civil code): Galicia, Valencia [slow-track with extended competences]. Fast-track multi-prov. (no civil code): Andalusia, Canary Islands (since 1927) [slow-track with extended comp.]. Slow-track multi-prov. (with civil code): Aragon, Balearic Islands. Slow-track multi-prov. (no civil code): Castile and León, Castile-la Mancha, Extremadura, Madrid. Slow-track uni-prov. (no civil code): Asturias, Canary Islands (until 1927), Cantabria, La Rioja, Murcia. For the Ireland statute in 1921, see Northern Ireland from 1921-1972.

When looking at the commonness of elected assemblies and own executives, one can see that they are conferred from the beginning of almost all legislative statutes – with the exception of Flanders and Wallonia where they were introduced a few years after the statutes were put in place.

Cultural and educational matters are comprised in almost all statutes as well (Brussels (Flemish) being an exception)[41] and to a quite large degree since their first conferral. There has been one enlargement of educational matters in Belgium as well as for slow-track communities in Spain [Score as of today – Belgium: 1,00, Spain: 0,50, UK: 0,75].

Social and sanitary matters are also comprised in almost all statutes as well (Brussels (Flemish) being once more the exception), but they tend to be conferred to a lower degree first and then to be enlarged progressively. This has been the case twice in Belgium, once in Spain for slow-track communities and once in Scotland and Wales.

Territorial matters are, without exception, conferred in all statutes. They have been conferred immediately to a high degree in Belgium, to a medium degree in Spain and the United Kingdom and were enlarged once in Scotland and Wales. [Score as of today – Belgium: 1,00, Spain: 0,50, UK: 0,75].

Economic matters, in turn, are conferred to a less general extent. While they have been rather largely decentralised in Belgium (with two enlargements for the regions), they are only conferred to a limited extent in Spain and the United Kingdom. [Score as of today – Belgium: 0,75, Spain: 0,25, UK: 0,25].

The conferral of social security matters is a recent development that took place in Belgium and in Scotland to a limited extend, and in Northern Ireland in a more substantive manner.[42] In Spain, talks on a transfer to the Basque Country have been initiated but the transfer has not yet taken place (Gorospe, 2020). [Score as of today – Belgium: 0,25, Spain: 0,00, UK: 0,25 for Scotland, 0,75 for Northern Ireland].

Citizenship and immigration matters are conferred to a limited degree only in all three countries. While the responsibility for the integration of foreigners has been decentralised quite soon, no further enlargements in this field took place [Score as of today – Belgium: 0,25, Spain: 0,25, UK: 0,25].

The oversight on local government has been conferred to all sub-state communities but its degree varies in the three countries. While it is quite advanced in Belgium (where one enlargement took place) and the United Kingdom, it is more limited in Spain [Score as of today – Belgium: 0,75, Spain: 0,50, UK: 0,75].

Police matters, in turn, have been conferred and enlarged for some sub-state communities in Spain (Basque Country, Catalonia, Navarre) and the United Kingdom (Scotland and Northern Ireland) but to none in Belgium. The extent in the UK exceeds that in

[41] Remember the Flemish Community Commission in Brussels had not obtained legislative competences because the Flemish nationalist and christian-democratic parties wanted Dutch-speakers in Brussels to be governed by the same rules than those of the Flemish Community (see above).

[42] One should note that the Northern Irish enjoys substantive autonomy in the field of social security but that, as of today, it has been decided to couple it to the general British social security system.

Spain although both are high [Score as of today – Belgium: 0,00, Spain: 0,75, UK: 1,00]. The other side of the 'law and order' coin, defence matters, have been decentralised in none of the three countries however.

General penal and civil law is another competence that has been decentralised and enlarged to some extent in Spain (to the Basque Country, Navarre, Catalonia, Galicia, Valencia, Aragon and the Balearic Islands) as well as in the United Kingdom (for Scotland and Northern Ireland) but not in Belgium [Score as of today – Belgium: 0,00, Spain: 0,50, UK: 0,75]. One should note though, that despite the aforementioned decentralisation of some civil law aspects in Spain, no own judicial systems exist at community level. This is well the case in Scotland and Northern Ireland [Score as of today – Belgium: 0,00, Spain: 0,00, UK: 0,75].

Fiscal autonomy has again been an important matter of decentralisation in the three countries. While the scope was enlarged in each of them, the extent is more developed in Belgium and the United Kingdom than in Spain – with the exception of the Basque Country and Navarre, whose fiscal autonomy stands out in international comparison for the historical reasons that have been pointed out earlier [Score as of today – Belgium: 0,75, Spain: 0,50 (Basque Country and Navarre: 1,00), UK: 0,75].

Although closely linked to fiscal considerations, the conferral of borrowing autonomy was more limited in Spain and the United Kingdom, and has been developed progressively in Belgium [Score as of today – Belgium: 1,00, Spain: 0,25, UK: 0,25].

Constitutive autonomy, in turn, has again been largely conferred in the three countries. After progressive enlargements, it is today substantively conferred in Belgium, Spain and the United Kingdom – with Scotland being the most advanced entity in the latter [Score as of today – Belgium: 0,75, Spain: 0,75, UK: 0,75 (Scotland: 1,00)].

Conducting international relations in one's competence areas is a prerogative that has only been conferred in Belgium – and even completely at once so [Score as of today – Belgium: 1,00, Spain: 0,00, UK: 0,00].

The extent to which sub-state entities are free from legislative vetoes by the state level is quite a difficult legal question. In Belgium, it is guaranteed through the equality of decrees[43] and laws that is enacted in the Constitution. In Spain, it is ambiguous because for some competences (like education), the state can provide framework legislation and it is for the constitutional court to decide how far this can go (Losada & Máiz, 2005). In the United Kingdom, the dominant legal doctrine asserts that the national parliament is sovereign in all its decisions (Little, 2004). In 2005, the so-called 'Sewel Convention' was adopted by UK Parliament and later added to the Scotland Act (2016, section 28, §8) and Wales Act (2017, section 2), stating that "the Parliament of the United Kingdom will not normally legislate with regard to devolved matters without the consent of the Scottish Parliament/[Welsh] Assembly". However, as stated by the Convention itself, it is a "political undertaking" rather than legally binding since Parliament "retains full power to legislate on devolved matters" (Bowers, 2005, p. 2). The latter interpretation has been reaffirmed by the UK Supreme Court

[43] Remember that in Belgium, 'decrees' are the laws of sub-state entities. For the Brussels-Capital Region, one speaks of 'ordinances'.

(2017) and was used by the government as justification not to seek the support of the devolved parliaments when exiting the European Union (Keating, 2018) [Score as of today – Belgium: 1,00, Spain: 0,00, UK: 0,00].

Another legally debatable question comes with the extent to which the statues of sub-state entities are guaranteed. In Belgium, the consociational federal architecture guarantees mutual vetoes on state reforms to Flemish and Francophone MPs in the national parliament. In Spain, the Constitution provides an explicit procedure for suspending the statutes of autonomous communities when "an Autonomous Community does not fulfil the obligations imposed upon it by the Constitution or other laws, or acts in a way that is seriously prejudicial to the general interest of Spain" (Spanish Constitution, 1978, art. 155). In the United Kingdom, the autonomy statutes of Scotland and Wales stipulate that they cannot be withdrawn without the support of a majority of the Scottish and Welsh population, although this is contradicted by the precited doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. For Northern Ireland, the situation is different because the Good Friday power sharing statute is based on an international agreement with the Republic of Ireland that cannot be withdrawn unilaterally by the United Kingdom (O'Leary, 2018). However, it can be and has been suspended when the two power sharing groups cannot overcome political deadlock [Score as of today – Belgium: 1,00, Spain: 0,00, UK: 0,50 for Scotland and Wales, 1,00 for Northern Ireland].

When trying to group the competences that are conferred at the initial, early and later stages of the decentralisation processes, different enlargement patterns can be distinguished. In the early days of sub-state autonomy statutes, it is often cultural, educational as well as social and sanitary competences that are conferred together with directly elected assemblies and own executives. Enlargement processes often concern at first economic and territorial matters. Later, they can also touch upon financial (fiscal and borrowing) and, sometimes, upon social security matters. The remaining special competences and statutory autonomy aspects can in turn be regulated at very different moments of the conferral process.

c) Legal frameworks

Despite the many points of comparison that exist between the sub-state autonomy dynamics in the three countries from a political point of view, the conferred statutes rely on very different legal frameworks in each of them. To better understand the procedure based on which the autonomy statutes in the three countries have been adopted and amended, I review in this last sub-section the different principles, enactment procedures, legal nature and distribution of sub-state autonomy statutes in Belgium, Spain and the United Kingdom. A synthetic overview can be found in Table 20.

A first legal difference is to be found among the principles based on which autonomy is enacted in the three countries. In Belgium, the Constitution lists the general rules of functioning of the federal state and the federated entities, while the competence distribution between regions, communities and the national authority is detailed in special laws. An amendment of the Constitution requires a two-thirds majority in both houses of the national

Table 20. Synthetic overview on the comparison of autonomy statutes in Belgium, Spain and the United Kingdom from a legal perspective

	Belgium	Spain	United Kingdom
Principle	• Constitution lists principles • Special laws comprise competence distribution for regions and communities	• Constitution lists principles • Autonomy statutes (passed as organic laws) list competences that can be transferred • Royal transfer decrees carry out the transfers	• No written constitution: parliamentary sovereignty • Devolution Acts comprise principles and competence distribution
Enactment	• Constitution: two-thirds majority in both houses of the state parliament • Special laws: simple majority – with simple majority in each language group – in both houses of the state parliament	• Constitution: three-fifths majority in both houses of the state parliament, or two-thirds in the Congress and simple majority in the Senate • Organic laws: simple majority in the Congress and the autonomous community parliament (with referendum in the historic Communities) • Royal transfer decrees: negotiated by state and sub-state administrations, approved by the national Council of Ministers	• Devolution acts: simple majority in the state parliament
Legal nature and state structure	• Formal recognition of the federal state character • Legislative decentralisation with explicitly attributed competences to sub-state entities	• Affirmation of the indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation • Recognition of the autonomy rights of the nationalities and regions • Legislative decentralisation with explicitly attributed competences to sub-state entities	• Historic consideration as 'union' state • Legislative devolution based on implicitly or explicitly attributed competences to sub-state entities (depending on the scheme, see below)
Distribution	• Mostly exclusive competences (exceptions for parallel and implicit competences) • Equality of sub-state and state laws • International relations are conducted by both the state and sub-state levels depending on the distribution of competences	• Attributed competences for the communities • Possible framework legislation by the state (can create diffuseness in the distribution)	• Transferred matters scheme: everything listed as transferred (Wales 1999-2017) • Reserved matters scheme: everything not listed as reserved to the state (Scotland, Wales since 2017, Northern Ireland 1921-1972) • Reserved and excepted matters scheme: everything not listed as reserved to the state, with special exclusion for excepted matters [not transferable in the future] (Northern Ireland since 1998) * Parity convention in Northern Ireland: social security is devolved but follows the rest of the UK

parliament. Changing the special laws requires in turn a simple majority as well as a simple majority of both Dutch- and French-speaking MPs in both houses (Lejeune, 2014). In Spain, the Constitution also lists the general rules of functioning of the state and the autonomous communities. However, autonomy statutes are passed as organic laws for each community to list the competences that can be transferred. Furthermore, it is only via royal transfer decrees that these competences are effectively transferred. The revision of the Spanish Constitution requires either a three-fifths majority in both houses of the state parliament, or a two-thirds majority in the Congress and a simple majority in the Senate. Organic laws are adopted with a simple majority by both the Congress and the parliament of an autonomous community (with referenda being required in the Basque Country, Catalonia and Galicia). Royal transfer decrees are in turn negotiated by state and sub-state administrations and approved *in fine* by the national Council of ministers (García de Enterría, 2008). In the United Kingdom, things are much simpler because in the absence of a written Constitution, the national parliament adopts devolution acts with a simple majority that comprise the principles and the competences distribution for each devolution arrangement (R. Deacon, 2012).

A second difference exist among the legal nature of the state structures and the different autonomy statutes. Since 1993, the Belgian Constitution formally recognises that "Belgium is a federal state" (Belgian Constitution, 2017, art. 1), and the legislative decentralisation is based on explicitly attributed competences. In Spain, the Constitution affirms the "indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation", while recognising the "autonomy rights of the nationalities and regions by which it [the state] is composed" (Spanish Constitution, 1978, art. 2). The legislative decentralisation is also based on explicitly attributed competences. In the United Kingdom, some speak of the country as a 'union state', which is however a sociological term referring to the state formation rather than a legal qualification (Rokkan & Urwin, 1982; Mitchell, 2006). It can be considered as a regionalised state where devolution arrangements can either rely on implicitly or explicitly attributed competences depending on the transfer scheme (see below).

A third and final difference comes with the distribution of competences in the three multi-level states. In Belgium, competences are generally exclusive, i.e. only the state level to which they are attributed can legislate on them.[44] State laws and sub-state decrees are recognised as having equal legal force,[45] and international relations are conducted by both the state and sub-state levels in their respective policy fields. In Spain, the competences that have been attributed to the autonomous communities are exercised by them but the national state can adopt framework legislations for "suppletory" purposes (Spanish Constitution, 1978, art. 149 §3). In the United Kingdom, the distribution of competences depends on the scheme that has been foreseen by a devolution act. The 'transferred matters scheme' (which applied to Wales from 1999-2017) only confers the competences that have been explicitly listed as such. The 'reserved matters scheme' (which applied to Scotland since 1998, to Wales

[44] An exception is made for so-called 'implicit' competences (Lejeune, 2014, pp. 747-756).

[45] The equality of legal force is recognized by article 19 §2 of the Special Law on Institution Reforms of 8 August 1980.

since 2017 and to Northern Ireland from 1921-1972) confers all competences that have not been explicitly listed as reserved to the national state. The 'reserved and excepted matters scheme' (which applies to Northern Ireland since 1998) works like a reserved matters scheme but details a few competences that have to stay reserved – even in the future. Finally, Northern Ireland is subject to another specificity which is the so-called 'parity convention'. It integrates Northern Ireland in the general social security scheme of the United Kingdom even if the competence has in theory been devolved.

3. The evolution and content of regionalist party demands

In the present section, I carry on with the exploration of the SAS data by looking with greater detail into the regionalist party demands in the three countries. After a discussion of the evolving extent of regionalist autonomy demands, I compare the competence fields that the latter have demanded with the actual competences their sub-state communities have obtained.


a) Evolution of the extent of regionalist party demands

When situating the evolving extent of regionalist party demands vis-à-vis the actual autonomy statutes in the respective sub-state communities, as summarised in Figure 7, another set of political patterns can be depicted.

In Belgium, one can see the radical demands that have been present in Flanders and the German-speaking Community during the interbellum. More importantly, one sees how contemporary demands have evolved progressively and preceded the incremental extension of Belgian sub-state autonomy. The case of the Flemish community in Brussels is curious because it is the only regionalist party not demanding legislative decentralisation. As explained in the historical section, this comes with the position of Flemish nationalists to consider Brussels a Flemish city and its Dutch-speaking inhabitants as part of the Flemish Community for whom the same rules should be made. As such, there is hence no regionalist party defending the position of Dutch-speakers in Brussels only.

In Spain, we can see that the demands in the Basque Country have always been very stable, while those in Catalonia and Galicia have radicalised up to independence claims in recent years. In Catalonia, this happened in parallel to the 2017 constitutional crisis. In Galicia, this took place in parallel with increased inter-regionalist party competition. In the Balearic Islands, demands have also increased but in a more moderate manner. Demands have declined over time in Navarre and the Canary Islands. One should note, however, that this does not come with the moderation of a regionalist party but with a more moderate party surpassing the radical one in popular support (see chapter 6). In the other autonomous communities, the regionalist party demands have been more limited and have equalled the current autonomy statutes since the symmetrical 1992 enlargement. In Castile and León,

Figure 7. Evolution of sub-state autonomy statutes and regionalist party demands on the SAS



Castile-la Mancha, Murcia as well in Madrid, where autonomy is more been framed in a functional manner, regionalist parties have never come up.

In the United Kingdom, one can see how the demands in Ireland, Nationalist Northern Ireland and Wales have radicalised up to independence claims at different points in time. While the former led to the independence of the Republic of Ireland, the nationalist demands in Northern Ireland operate in a contested political space as I have shown in the historical section. The regionalist demands in Unionist Northern Ireland are interesting in this respect because they only embraced autonomy after it was conferred and provided them with an advantageous own political space. Soon after the withdrawal of the statute in 1972, their demands even dropped and did only raise again because a power-sharing autonomy statute was the only solution to the political conflict. Independence demands in Wales radicalised much more recently – around the 2000s after administrative institutions had been conferred. In Scotland, in turn, the SNP has always claimed Scottish independence, even if the latter has had different meanings and political scopes throughout time depending on how loose the ties to preserve with the union were envisioned. In Cornwall, moderate regionalist demands have been present since the later 1960s but have remained unheard ever since. Regionalist demands in England came and went with the success of UKIP, and have therefore been of short duration therefore. In London, there has never been a regionalist party demanding legislative autonomy.

The evolutions observed above largely confirm existing typologies of regionalist parties that classify the latter according to the degree of their demands:

- De Winter (1998a): protectionist, autonomist, federalist, independentist, irredentist.
- Dandoy (2010): protectionist (conservative, participationist), decentralist (autonomist, federalist, confederalist), secessionist (independentist, irredentist, rattachist).
- Massetti and Schakel (2016): protectionist, federalist, ambiguous, separatist.

However, the dynamic and joint observation also shows that our understanding of regionalist parties can be complemented and enriched by accounting not only for the individual degree of demands but also for regionalist party position vis-à-vis the overall autonomy process in a country. More concretely, I propose to distinguish between four types of parties in such a typology:

- Autonomist leaders: parties asking for more autonomy than their sub-state community has, independently of the autonomy degree of other sub-state communities.
- Autonomist followers: parties asking for more autonomy than their sub-state community has because other sub-state communities enjoy a larger degree of autonomy.
- Satisfied followers: parties that are satisfied with the current autonomy degree of their sub-state community but who stated that, if the autonomy statute of other sub-state communities was to increase, they would want equal treatment.
- Satisfied protectionists: parties who are satisfied with the current autonomy degree of their sub-state community and who would not ask more if the autonomy statute of other sub-state communities was to increase.

One should note that the same party can be an autonomist leader for some competences, while it is an autonomist follower for others (e.g. the Catalan CiU wanted the same degree of fiscal autonomy than the Basque Country and Navarre, while having other autonomy demands besides – see SAS database). This typology is useful because it provides a better understanding of how the evolution of regionalist party demands operates – following the dynamics in the own sub-state community for some, following the dynamics in other sub-state communities for others. In so doing, it also points to the regionalist parties that are most likely to enter proactively into competition with national state actors, while others might just watch-out not to be forgotten.

b) Comparison of demanded competences as of today

When looking with greater detail into the competences that are claimed by regionalist parties as of today, as summarised in Figure 8, and comparing them to the effectively conferred competences that have been described in the last section, one can constitute different groups of parties that speak to the typologies above.

At first, there are independentist parties who consequently want their sub-state community to be fully autonomous in all policy fields (BNG, JxCat, PC, SF, SNP). Then, there are autonomist leaders – like the Flemish N-VA, the Basque PNV and the Navarrese GBai – that want their sub-state community to be fully autonomous in most policy fields, except for citizenship and immigration matters, the judicial system and defence policy where there demands are moderated and vary a little. The Balearic Més and the Canarian CCa-PNC, in turn, can be grouped insofar as they are autonomist leaders for some competences (like local governance and international relations), while they are autonomist followers for others (like fiscal autonomy).

The other parties are more moderate. The German-speaking Belgian ProDG, Défi in Francophone Brussels, the Leonese UPL and the Cornish MK are all autonomist followers in that they mainly want competences that have already been conferred to other sub-state communities in their countries. The Cornish MK and the Leonese UPL are a little exceptional insofar as they do not claim all competences that have been decentralised to other communities in their country. In this respect, they would be likely to become satisfied followers or protectionists if autonomy statutes would be conferred to them. The Unionist Northern Irish DUP would be such a satisfied follower at this stage because it does not demand additional competences right now but might in the future – either because other sub-state communities obtain them or because it becomes pro-active itself. Finally, the Valencian *Compromis*, the Aragonese PAR and CHA, the Asturian FAC and the Cantabrian PRC can be described as satisfied protectionist in that they do not demand additional competences despite other autonomous communities in Spain having obtained more.

Figure 8. Regionalist party demands by competence as of 2020





Figure 8. Continued



4. The evolution of traditional party demands

To conclude the exploration of the SAS data, I present in this section the evolution of traditional party demands by situating them vis-à-vis the evolution of regionalist party demands and sub-state communities' autonomy statutes, as summarised in Figure 9. Less


attention is dedicated to the demanded competences as of today because, as I explain below, they mostly equal the current autonomy statutes.

When looking at the evolution of traditional party demands in Belgium, one can see that, in Flanders, they have closely followed regionalist party demands since the 1960s. Similar developments can be observed in Wallonia until the 1980s, but since the disappearing of the regionalist party and since the Fourth State Reform in 1993, traditional parties have mostly reacted to Flemish demands. In Francophone Brussels, traditional and regionalist party demands have been rather close – preceding the different autonomy reforms that were enacted throughout time. The case of the Flemish community in Brussels is once more exceptional because traditional party demands exceed regionalist party demands. As explained earlier, nationalist parties consider it a part of the Flemish Community and do not want it to be governed by autonomous institutions. Traditional parties, however, have been in favour of an overall Brussels autonomy with a special recognition of the Dutch-speaking population. In the German-speaking Community, finally, traditional party demands have long followed regionalist ones and today, they even equal each other because both want the community to have the same competences than the other Belgian sub-state entities.

In Spain, traditional party demands have followed regionalist demands in almost all communities. While regionalist demands are still higher in Navarre, the Basque Country, Catalonia, Galicia, the Canary Islands and the Balearic Islands, they have equalled each other in the remaining communities since the 1992 reform and are satisfied with the obtained autonomy statutes. The only case where traditional party demands did not follow regionalist party demands was in León. In Castile and León, Castile-la Mancha, Murcia and Madrid, in turn, traditional parties demanded equal consideration in the decentralisation process without a regionalist party being present. A curious case is that of the *Partido Republicano Democrático Federal* (PRDF), which was a fraction of the Spanish leftist *Republican Party* and briefly gained support in various communities in the 1870s (not displayed in the figure for space reasons). Led Catalan romanticist Francesc Pi i Margall and inspired by his theories, it defended a federal vision of Spain and can be considered a traditional precursor to later Spanish regionalisms (Gabriel, 2004).

In the United Kingdom, developments have differed more substantively between sub-state communities. In Ireland, traditional and regionalist party demands were at first on the same level, before regionalist party demands radicalised. In Northern Ireland, the situation is once more particular insofar as among both Unionists and Nationalists, there have been periods where regionalist parties had such a high popular support that there were no significant traditional parties. When traditional parties were significant, they have held a moderate autonomist stance in Nationalist Northern Ireland, while for Unionists, they mostly followed the autonomy statutes in place. In Scotland, the *Liberal Party* had been autonomist since 1885, a stance that was only adopted by the *Labour Party* in the 1920s and after 1974 following the success of the *Scottish National Party*. A similar observation can be made for Wales although the support for Welsh autonomy among the *Liberal Party* appeared only in the 1920s. In Cornwall, the *LibDems* have followed the regionalist party demand since the late

Figure 9. Evolution of sub-state autonomy statutes, regionalist party demands and traditional party demands on the SAS



1990s. In England, there has never been significant support for devolution among traditional parties, while in London, it was limited to the administrative devolution that has been conferred.

When looking at the autonomy demands that persist among traditional parties as of today and which competences they entail, one will see that in almost all cases, the demands equal the obtained statutes. There are three exceptions in this respect. In Cornwall, the *LibDems* demand a devolution statute that has never been conferred. In Nationalist Northern Ireland, the SDLP demands additional devolution in almost all policy fields except for international relations. In the German-speaking Community of Belgium, the common position of all traditional parties and the regionalist one is that the community should enjoy all competences that have been transferred to the other federal entities – which is not the case at this stage.

5. Conclusion on the evolution of sub-state autonomy demands and statutes in Belgium, Spain and the United Kingdom

In this first empirical chapter of the dissertation, I have presented the evolution of sub-state autonomy demands and statutes in Belgium, Spain and the United Kingdom from different perspectives. A historical overview allowed to detect the long-term trajectories that these evolutions have taken. In Spain, sub-state autonomy was shown to have developed at two important moments in the country's history: during the Second Republic for Catalonia and the Basque Country, and after the transition to democracy at the end of the 1970s for all autonomous communities. The latter experience was particularly interesting when one considers how the demands in Catalonia and the Basque Country have been followed by other sub-state communities. In the United Kingdom, the Irish independence experience and the particular situation in Northern Ireland has reminded one that the country's devolution history dates back far before the Scottish and Welsh mobilisation and conferral. The incremental evolutions of the latter two, though, have proven most interesting in recent years. In Belgium, the historic review has shown how the federalisation of the country became possible once the historic Flemish demands for cultural autonomy were joined by Walloon demands for economic demands at the end of the 1960s. The peculiar situation of the Brussels-Capital region, in turn, was presented as the reason for the country's federal structure with two different sub-state levels. The German-speaking Community, finally, has been shown to have followed the dynamics in the other sub-state entities closely through an own mobilisation and recognition.

The political evolution of the autonomy statutes reflects this evolution. While Belgium has recently seen the highest average degree of sub-state autonomy conferred, its statutes also comprised substantial asymmetries. Spain, in turn, saw the second highest average degree of sub-state autonomy conferred, albeit in a much more symmetrical manner. In the United Kingdom, the devolution statutes of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland exceed the

Spanish ones but the country's average lies below that of Spain because of the substantial asymmetries that come with the absence of an English or Cornish statute.

When turning to the political evolution of autonomy demands, it has been shown that regionalist party demands have been very incremental in Belgium, with progressive enlargements throughout the different reforms of the state. In Spain, regionalist party positions have been very differentiated, with strong regionalist demands in Catalonia, the Basque Country, Navarre and Galicia, with strong but somewhat moderated demands in the Balearic and Canary Islands, and with much more moderated demands in other autonomous communities which are mostly satisfied with their current statute. In the United Kingdom, regionalist party demands have been very soon very radical in Ireland, Scotland, Wales and among Northern Irish Nationalists. Cornwall constitutes and exception with its much more moderated demands, while the exceptionalism of the English case comes mostly with the short-lived UKIP devolution demands. More generally, the description allowed to establish four alternative ideal types of regionalist party demands: autonomist leaders, autonomist followers, satisfied followers and satisfied protectionist. The presentation on the evolution of the traditional party demands, finally, showed that the latter very often followed regionalist party demands and, with a few exceptions, currently equal obtained autonomy statutes in most sub-state communities under study.

Despite its descriptiveness, the presentation of these evolutions has shed informative light on the autonomy demands and statutes in the three countries and has set them into a broader perspective. The objective of the three chapters to come is to look with greater detail into the determinants of these evolutions, i.e. to analyse under which conditions sub-state autonomy demands and statutes arose and evolved.

Chapter 6. When the autonomy demands of regionalist parties arise and evolve

The present chapter analyses the rise and evolution of regionalist party demands in the three countries. More specifically, it presents and discusses the results of the longitudinal Qualitative Comparative Analyses of when regionalist party demands for legislative autonomy arise, increase, decrease and disappear.

1. Democratisation, distinctiveness and grievances with spillovers – when regionalist party demands arise

The results of the first longitudinal QCA, summarised in Table 21, suggest that in the three countries under study, there were five conclusive combinations of conditions under which regionalist parties were founded and started to demand legislative autonomy for the sub-state community they aim to defend (see Appendix 28 for the minimisation notes). The commonality of the five paths is the presence of democracy, which appears to be an almost necessary condition for the rise of regionalist party demands (Cons.Nec.: 0,949, RoN: 0,530).

Table 21. QCA results for when regionalist party demands arise

Conditions		Sufficiency (solution paths)					Nec.
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	
Sociological distinctiveness		2	2	2	1	1	
Past/present political grievances		3	3	2	2	2	
Economic distinctiveness			-1				
Asymmetrical demands				1	1	1	
Prospects for autonomy						1	
Asymmetrical autonomy							
Presence of autonomy							
Democracy		1		1	1	1	1
Size			1		1		
Temporal lag (years)	Mean	3,22	40,00	11,00	3,00	2,25	-
	Std. dev.	5,93	30,41	15,84	4,24	3,30	-
Consistency		1,000	1,000	0,800	0,667	0,500	0,949
Raw coverage		0,462	0,154	0,205	0,051	0,103	0,530
Unique coverage		0,359	0,051	0,205	0,026	0,077	-
Relevance of necessity		-	-	-	-	-	0,530
Solution consistency				0,846			
Solution coverage				0,846			
Number of cases (outcome present)				332 (39)			

Note: Condition numbers correspond to the multi-value score taken by the condition.

Path 1. In sub-state communities with a strong sociological distinctiveness and omnipresent political grievances, regionalist parties came up shortly after states' transition to democracy with competitive elections. This was the case in the Basque Country (1918, 1931, 1976), the Canary Islands (1932, 1976), Catalonia (1907, 1931, 1976), Galicia (1931,

1977), Navarre (1918, 1931, 1976), Flanders (1919, 1954), the German-speaking Community (1929) and Scotland (1934). These are all cases where strong regionalist traditions have developed. Yet, one should note that the path is not limited to large sub-state communities because smaller ones, like the Canary Islands, the German-speaking Community, Navarre or the Basque Country (1918, 1931), have observed similar developments. The path achieves perfect consistency and covers 46,20% of the cases to be explained. The flexible lag condition indicates that it took on average 3,22 years for regionalist parties to arise under these conditions (std. dev.: 5,93).[46]

Path 2. A slightly different and yet connected case is Ireland (1832 and 1870). It was also a sub-state community with a strong sociological distinctiveness and omnipresent political grievances. Yet, it saw regionalist parties emerge in the absence of a democratic system with competitive elections. At that time, large parts of the population in the United Kingdom were not allowed to vote because they did not meet the necessary property requirements. However, because the Irish autonomy cause was also defended by upper classes, there were still enough votes in Ireland for regionalist parties to obtain significant support (O'Day, 1998). While this constitutes an exception to the statement of necessity made for the presence of democracy, it underlines the exceptionality of the Irish case and of the political context of that time. In addition to a strong sociological distinctiveness and omnipresent political grievances, one should also note the presence of relative economic difficulty that contributed to both the distinctiveness and the grievances of the community. The path achieves perfect consistency and covers 15,40% of the cases to be explained. At the same time, it comes with an average lag of 40 years (std. dev.: 30,31), which constitutes a significant delay – even when considering that the creation of parties takes time. Explanations can be found in the fact that the spread of the autonomy cause through different popular classes as described above may have taken time, and that the electoral first-past-the-post system made it more difficult for new parties to come up.[47]

Path 3. In sub-state communities with a strong sociological distinctiveness and recurrent political grievances, regionalist parties came up after asymmetrical autonomy demands in other sub-state communities when the political system was democratic. This was the case in Asturias (1987), the Balearic Islands (1932, 1977), Valencia (1932, 1982), the German-speaking Community (1971), Cornwall (1967) and Wales (1925). These are all slightly less prominent cases with somewhat less political grievances but which closely followed stronger regionalist movements in their country and thereby developed substantial regionalist pressures themselves. The path is consistent for 80% of the cases and covers 20,50% of those to be explained. It is contradicted by the case of Asturias in 1936 and the German-speaking Community in 1946, which are both exceptional. In Asturias, the experience

[46] Northern Irish Nationalists (1921) is also covered by path 1 but follows a different rationale. Nationalist parties did indeed already attract significant support before 1921 in Northern Ireland but where considered part of Ireland before that date.

[47] While cases with a first-past-the-post system can also be found among path 1, the presence of other cases contributed to keeping the average lag short.

of the Second Spanish Republic (1931-1936) did probably not last long enough for other regionalist movements in the rest of the country to spillover. In the German-speaking Community, in turn, it was the depoliticisation due to the German (war) past that did not provide fertile ground for the recent Flemish autonomy demands to spillover. The flexible lag condition indicates that it took in average 11 years (std. dev.: 15,84) for a regionalist party to come up under these conditions. The somewhat higher standard deviation comes with the Cornish case where autonomy demands took 48 years to spillover. As mentioned before, I would expect this to be due to the electoral first-past-the-post system which puts significant burdens on new parties to gain support, especially when they aim at representing a small sub-state community like Cornwall.

Path 4. The fourth explanatory path is close to the previous one in that it also explains the coming up of regionalist parties by asymmetrical autonomy demands in other communities when political grievances are recurrent and democracy is present. It shows, however, that this can also take place in sub-state communities with intermediate sociological distinctiveness when the population is substantive. This was the case for Wallonia (1964) and the Francophones in Brussels (1971). The path is consistent for 66,70% of the cases and covers 5,10% of those to be explained. The inconsistency comes with the Walloon case itself because after the decline of the regionalist *Rassemblement Wallon* in 1981, no other regionalist party came up in the community despite the same conditions were present. Instead, regionalist politicians joined the traditional socialist and liberal parties and issued their demands through them. If we consider that this decline has to be explained separately, I retain the path as conclusive, while keeping this caveat in mind. The lag shows that in these cases, the spillover took place within only 3 years in average (std. dev.: 4,24).

Path 5. The final path that was found to be consistent also concerns cases with intermediate sociological distinctiveness and recurrent political grievances in democratic political systems. It shows, however, that when these cases are not necessarily large, asymmetrical autonomy demands in other communities need to be complemented by concrete prospects for autonomy conferral before regionalist parties come up. This was the case in Aragon (1978), Cantabria (1978) and León (1986) where regionalist parties were founded to demand autonomy for their community once it become clear that the new Spanish Constitution would allow legislative autonomy for communities other than the so-called 'historic' ones. While the path covers 10,30% of the cases to be explained, it achieves only 50% of consistency because it contradicts the same cases in 1936. During the Second Republic, the Constitution did also entail a provision for the creation of autonomous communities but there were no regionalist parties in Aragon, Cantabria and León. As in the Asturian case, mentioned above, I would expect the interval during which that provision existed (1932-1936) as too short for new parties to come up, when one considers that these were the first years ever with truly competitive elections. In the 1970s, the average lag for

regionalist parties to come up under these conditions was short – 2,25 years (std. dev.: 3,30) – probably because the transition to democracy occurred much more progressively.[48]

Taken together, the five paths are consistent with 84,60% of the cases, the contradictions having been discussed above. While they also cover 84,60% of the cases to be explained, there are six more that remain unaddressed. A first one is La Rioja (1982) where a regionalist party came up after legislative institutions had already been conferred, even though there was no sociological or economic distinctiveness and only seldom political grievances. In this tiny community, legislative institutions were demanded by traditional parties because local elites wanted neither to be part of the Basque Country or Navarre (La Rioja was only very shortly part of the Kingdom of Navarre), nor of Castilla-la Mancha because the cohesive local elite (often trained at the University of Logroño) feared its influence to be dissolved in such a large community (Gomez Urdañez, 2020). A regionalist party came up through the provided political space as a centre party but declined in 2015 once it could no longer present itself with a distinctive political message. The second and third uncovered cases are those of Andalusia (1976) and Extremadura (1980). While having similarities with respectively path 4 and 5, their distinctiveness is of economic nature (relative difficulty). When accounted for as such, the proposed paths receive only little consistency but contradictions stem from cases where there was either not much time for a regionalist party to develop (Andalusia (1932, 1936), Extremadura (1932), León (1932)) or where regionalist parties disappeared after some time (Andalusia (2017), Extremadura (2016), Wallonia (1982)). While Andalusia (1976) and Extremadura (1980) can thus be associated to path 4 and 5, the ambiguous cross-case evidence should be kept in mind. A fourth uncovered case is that of England (2010) where the *United Kingdom Independence Party* defended the establishment of a devolved English Parliament. It was not a party priority because its main focus lay on the Brexit campaign but it was nevertheless endorsed because it went in hand with the party's defence of an English nationalism (Wellings, 2010; Hayton, 2016). The final fifth and sixth uncovered cases are Northern Irish Unionists (1922, 1998). As explained in the historical section, unionist parties initially did not want a devolved assembly for Northern Ireland but endorsed it in 1922 once the partition of Ireland appeared irreversible and when the assembly provided them with a political monopole. After the 1972 abolition following the Troubles, the *Ulster Unionist Party* was at first hesitant at the reestablishment of a power-sharing assembly but finally endorsed it in 1998 because it seemed the only way to re-establish peace (Walker, 2004, chapter 3).

[48] In addition to the those mentioned, two more cases concerned by this path are the Francophones in Brussels (1971) (confirming case) and Wallonia (1982) (contradictory case). Due to their large size (which is unspecified in Path 4), however, their constellations can be further minimised and are better explained by path 3.

2. Distinctiveness, grievances and frustration with spillovers for certain competences – when regionalist party demands increase

When turning to the analysis of when regionalist party demands increase, the results of the longitudinal QCA, summarised in Table 22, suggest that four combinations of conditions consistently led to regionalist demand increases in the three studied countries (see Appendix 29 for the minimisation notes). When looking for necessary conditions among these constellations, we can see that in almost all instances of demand increases (exceptions are discussed below), the regionalist party was not part of the national government (Cons.Nec.: 0,971) and the political system was democratic (Cons.Nec.: 0,971). Since this was also the case for most cases without increase, however, the relevance of the necessity relation appears low (RoNs are respectively 0,082 and 0,031). That being said, if one considers that the present analysis of when demands increase comprises only cases in which such demands had previously arisen; and when one considers that a democratic system with competitive elections was found necessary for the latter, it is not surprising that all cases in the present analysis are democratic. This undermines the condition's relevance of necessity, however, and it should therefore be nevertheless considered as such. As for parties' government participation, the same reasoning cannot be made and the necessity relation should indeed be considered trivial.

Table 22. QCA results for when regionalist party demands increase

Conditions		Sufficiency (solution paths)				Nec.
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	
Sociological distinctiveness		2	2			
Past/present political grievances		3	3	2 + 1	2 + 1	
Economic distinctiveness		-1 + 1	-1			
Demand frustration		1	1			
Asymmetrical demands				1	1	
Asymmetrical autonomy				1	1	
Non-requested increase					1	
Institutional dissatisfaction						
Regionalist competitor						
(Nat.) Government participation		0	0	0	0	
Democracy		1		1	1	1
Size		1	1			
Temporal lag (years)	Mean	19,00	29,67	11,00	0,00	-
	Std. dev.	24,27	21,22	12,41	0,00	-
Consistency		0,750	1,000	0,600	1,000	0,971
Raw coverage		0,088	0,088	0,618	0,235	0,347
Unique coverage		0,029	0,029	0,382	0,000	-
Relevance of necessity		-	-	-	-	0,031
Solution consistency		0,625				
Solution coverage		0,735				
Number of cases (outcome present)		151 (34)				

Note: Condition numbers correspond to the multi-value score taken by the condition.

Paths 1 and 2. The first two paths show that in large sub-state communities with a strong sociological and economic distinctiveness and omnipresent political grievances, regionalist party demands increase in the presence of what I called 'demand frustration', i.e. when autonomy demands remained unheard for more than ten years or when a conferred statute

was withdrawn or reduced. When this happened, regionalist parties were not part of the national government. This was the case for Ireland (1917), Flanders (1936) and Wales (2003) where longstanding demands for legislative autonomy were not met by the conferral of legislative institutions. In Catalonia (2015), the regionalist demand increased after the 2006 autonomy extension was ruled unconstitutional by the Spanish Constitutional Court and when it became clear it would not be replaced by other autonomy prerogatives. The difference between the two paths resides in the fact that the increases in Flanders (1936), Wales (2003) and Catalonia (2015) took place within democratic systems (path 1), while the increase in Ireland (1917) happened in the absence of competitive elections (path 2). The peculiarity of the Irish case in this respect has been explained above and should therefore not downplay the importance of democracy for this constellation. Both paths are particular insofar as, unlike the increases described in the other paths below, the present cases consist in transitions to independence demands. This means that it is in this constellation of conditions that we see the most salient form of exacerbation happen. While path 2 achieves perfect consistency, path 1 is consistent with 75% of the cases and both cover 8,80% of those to be explained. The contradiction for the latter stems from the Catalan case where in the late 1910s and early 1920s, the *Lliga Regionalista* did not increase its demand despite having demanded legislative autonomy for more than ten years already. This time frame may not have been large enough because the lag condition (avg.: 19, std. dev.: 24,27) indicates that the demand exacerbation can take more than ten years – a number I set by purpose not too high to capture these dynamics. In Flanders (1936), for example, the increase had taken 16 years, in Ireland (1917) 36 years and in Wales (2003) 46 years. In Catalonia, these developments could at first not take place because of dictatorship of Primo De Rivera from 1923 to 1930. After the transition to the Second Republic in 1931, however, the *Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya* was founded and immediately demanded Catalan independence.

Path 3. Regionalist party demands also increased in sub-state communities with recurrent or seldom political grievances (independently of their sociological or economic distinctiveness) when other sub-state communities had demanded and obtained more competences than them. In these instances, regionalist parties were not part of the national government and their state was democratic. This was the case in the Balearic Islands (1995), León (1988, 1997), England (2016), the Francophone community in Brussels (1990, 1994, 2002, 2014) and the German-speaking Community (1977, 1984, 1990, 1994, 2002). We see thus that spillover effects are not only important for the coming-into existence but also for the extension of regionalist demands in sub-state communities that are not on the forefront of autonomy demands in their state but who follow stronger regionalist movements. While the path covers a substantive amount of cases with 61,90% of those to be explained and relies on an average lag of 11 years (std. dev.: 12,41), it achieves only 60% of consistency. When we look at the contradicting cases, we see that they concern regionalist parties who followed strong regionalist movements in their country for some competences, but visibly not for others because at some point, their demands do no longer increase despite other communities in the country still having more competences (Andalusia (1998-2015), Aragon (1998-2015),

Asturias (2005-2020), the Balearic Islands (1936), Cantabria (1998-2020), Extremadura (1998-2014), La Rioja (1998-2014), León (1998-2020), Valencia (2008-2020), Francophones in Brussels (2015-2020), German-speaking Community (2015-2020), Cornwall (1968-1972, 1998-2020). This shows that spillover effects to weaker regionalist cases only work to a certain extent. While in Spain, for example, regionalist parties in smaller autonomous communities wanted equal treatment in the field of education or for social and sanitary competences, they have never demanded own police forces like in Catalonia, the Basque Country and Navarre, or a special taxation powers like those of the Basque Country and Navarre.[49]

Path 4. The fourth path relies on the same combination of conditions than the previous (and therefore partially overlaps with it) but shows that, when these conditions are complemented with a non-requested increase, i.e. when a sub-state community receives competences it had not asked for, regionalist parties automatically endorse them. This was the case in Andalusia (1997), Asturias (1997), Aragon (1997), Cantabria (1997), Extremadura (1997), La Rioja (1997) and Valencia (1997) where additional taxation powers were obtained following a campaign by the Catalan regionalist *Convergència i Unió* in exchange of their support to the first Aznar government (Almendral, 2003). In Wallonia (1971), the conferral of cultural competences was a Flemish demand that was endorsed in exchange for a later increase in economic competences. The German-speaking Community (2014), finally, received competences in the social security and health sector during the sixth state reform that were never demanded before but subsequently endorsed. The path achieves perfect consistency and covers 23,50% of the cases to be explained. The lag condition shows that the endorsements of non-requested competences by regionalist parties is immediate (avg.: 0, std. dev.: 0).

The four paths are consistent with 62,50% of the cases. As before, the contradictions have been discussed. Of the cases to be explained, 73,50% are covered, but eight remain unaddressed. Three of these increases followed upon competition of two regionalist parties in the same community. This was the case in Flanders (1985) when the *Vlaams Blok* (VB) competed with the *Volksunie* (VU), in Flanders (2002) when the VB competed with the *Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie* and in Galicia (2016) when *En Marea* competed with the *Bloque Nacionalista Galego* (BNG). While we see increases in the regionalist party demands following these competitions, the path achieves only 37,50% of consistency. There are indeed other comparable cases like Flanders (1986-1987, 2003-2013, 2019-2010), the Basque Country (1978-2020) and Catalonia (2010-2014) where the main regionalist party was also challenged by a more radical one but did not increase its demand. This contradictory evidence

[49] There has been one more contradictory case, that of Francophones in Brussel (1972-1976), where the demands of the *Front démocratique des francophones* (FDF) did not increase despite other communities had more competences. This was due to the fact after its creation and the issuing of its first demands in 1971, the FDF entered the federal government from 1977-1979. In 1980, the conferral of legislative institutions for Brussels was foreseen but this was only implemented in 1989. There was thus a time where demands were 'on hold'. After 1989, the FDF issued new demands.

does thus not allow for a conclusive statement on the importance of this condition. A fourth uncovered case is Northern Irish Nationalists (1982) where *Sinn Féin* replaced the *Nationalist Party* as the largest regionalist party. While the latter stood for an enhanced union between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, the former aimed at fully integrating the Republic. This radicalisation can be understood as a follow-up on the Troubles and the enduring negotiation over a new power-sharing agreement. To some extent, it can thus be associated with the 'demand frustration' that appeared importance in path 1 and 2. A fifth and sixth unexplained cases are Northern Irish Unionists (2007, 2017) where the *Democratic Unionist Party* demanded additional fiscal and policing competences – in light of those obtained by Scotland. This spillover did not translate in the coding because the overall autonomy statute of Northern Ireland was higher than that of Scotland (due to its social security competences), although the latter held some competences the former did not. The two cases can thus nevertheless be associated to those of path 3. A seventh uncovered case is Galicia (1997), where fiscal autonomy was obtained following the Catalan campaign described above without having been explicitly demanded by the BNG. Although it should be associated with path 4, it does not appear among its cases because the overall BNG demands were higher than the autonomy statutes obtained by other communities, leading to the absence of asymmetrical autonomy. Finally, there is the case of Flanders (1977) where the VU increased its demand because it was unsatisfied with legislative council put in place by the first state reform which was not directly elected and did not have an own executive. While this explanation appears consistent, it is not included above because it relies only on a single case.

3. Party change rather than demand moderation – when regionalist party demands decrease

The analysis of when regionalist party demands decrease is peculiar insofar as in the three countries under study, this (almost) never happened. There were only two instances where the extent of autonomy demanded by the largest regionalist party decreased. However, this was not due to a demand moderation, but to the fact that a more moderate regionalist party became the one with the largest popular support. While the identification of this decrease comes with my approach of looking at regionalist party demands at the aggregated rather than the individual level, the cases that are identified thanks to this approach provide interesting insights into the dynamics of inter-regionalist party politics. In light of the low number of cases, I did not conduct a separate QCA but describe them below.

Case 1. A first change of support for a more moderate regionalist party occurred in 1987 in the Canary Islands. After the Spanish transition to democracy in 1976, the largest regionalist party in the Canarias was the *Unión del Pueblo Canario* (UPC). Given the uncertainty of the Spanish political future and in light of the decolonisation movement in Africa, the party demanded Canarian independence and aimed for closer links with African states (Luis León, 2015). Following the democratisation of the Spanish state and the integration of the Canary Islands as an autonomous community, the UPC demands became

less salient and the party dissolved by the end of the 1980s. Since the autonomy question remained nevertheless important in a more moderate form, a regionalist party representing this ideology, the *Agrupaciones Independientes de Canarias*, followed-up and gained significant support.

Case 2. A second change of support for a more moderate regionalist party occurred in 2006 in Navarre. Formerly, the largest regionalist parties of the community had been *Herri Batasuna* (HB) from 1979-1998, *Euskal Herritarrok* (EH) from 1999-2002 and *Aralar* from 2003-2006, who all demand the independence of a larger Basque Country comprising the four provinces of Álava, Biscay, Gipuzkoa and Navarre. The political violence committed by the paramilitary organisation *Euskadi Ta Askatasuna* (ETA) between 1968-2010 led to several prosecutions in Spain, among which the 2003 interdiction of EH because they were found guilty of not having spoken-out against the perpetrated violence. *Aralar* was founded as a follow-up party and explicitly positioned itself against the ETA attacks. In 2007, this allowed it to enter a more moderate political coalition with the *Partido Nacionalista Vasco* and *Eusko Alkartasuna*, called *Nafarroa Bai* (NaBai). The coalition defended no longer an explicitly independentist position but supported enhanced autonomy as a way to an own Basque state in the long run.

4. Democratic breakdown or failed strategic repositioning – when regionalist party demands disappear

The results of the last longitudinal QCA analysing regionalist party demands, summarised in Table 23, indicate that the latter disappear in the presence of two combinations of conditions (see Appendix 30 for the minimisation notes). Among them, none appears to be necessary, i.e. there is no condition that is always present when regionalist party demands disappear.

Table 23. QCA results for when regionalist party demands disappear

Conditions		Sufficiency (solution paths) (1)	(2)	Nec.
Sociological distinctiveness			0	
Past/present political grievances				
Economic distinctiveness				
Demand realisation			1	
Strategic repositioning			0	
(Nat.) Government participation				
Democracy		0		
Size				
Temporal lag (years)	Mean	1,64	26,00	-
	Std. dev.	5,43	6,93	-
Consistency		0,917	1,000	
Raw coverage		0,579	0,158	
Unique coverage		0,579	0,158	-
Relevance of necessity		-	-	
Solution consistency		0,933		
Solution coverage		0,737		
Number of cases (outcome present)		99 (19)		

Note: Condition numbers correspond to the multi-value score taken by the condition.

Path 1. A first explanation for the disappearing of regionalist party demands consists in a single condition: the breakdown of democracy. We see that in the Balearic Islands (1937), the Basque Country (1923, 1937), the Canary Islands (1937), Catalonia (1923, 1937), Galicia (1937), Navarre (1923, 1937) and Valencia (1937), regionalist parties were no longer allowed to exist or to defend autonomist positions during the dictatorships of Primo de Rivera (1923-1930) and Francisco Franco (1937-1975). The path covers 57,90% of the cases to be explained and achieves 91,70% of consistency. The contradicting case is Ireland (1871-1917), where a regionalist party could exist in the absence of democratic institutions. Now, one should note that the Spanish experiences with dictatorial regimes are not comparable to the Irish situation where the non-democraticness stemmed from uncompetitive elections. How the latter context still allowed regionalist parties to emerge has been explained above. When looking at the temporal lag, we see that the disappearing of regionalist party demands under the Spanish dictatorships happened almost immediately.[50]

Path 2. In democratic contexts, regionalist party demands disappeared only in sub-state communities with little sociological distinctiveness when their autonomy demands were met and when they did not reposition themselves strategically as to cover another political issue. This has been the case in Andalusia (2016), Extremadura (2015) and La Rioja (2015). The demands of regionalist parties in these communities where indeed largely met and they did not search alternative political stakes to justify their distinctiveness. As the lag conditions show, this loss of distinctiveness can take some time though with an average duration of 26 years (std. dev.: 6,93). The path is perfectly consistent and covers 15,80% of the cases to be explained.

Taken together, the two paths above are consistent with 93,30% of the observed cases, contradictions having been explained. While 73,70% of the cases are covered, five more disappearing regionalist party demands need to be explained. Two of these are Flanders (1946) and the German-speaking Community (1945) where regionalist parties disappeared after the Second World War. In the Flemish case, radical fractions of the Flemish movement had collaborated with the German occupiers and thereby lost political credibility and support after the war. In the German-speaking case, the political space was depoliticised because of shaming for the recent belonging to Germany during the war. A third case consists in the disappearing of the *Rassemblement Wallon* (RW) in 1981. It can mostly be associated to the second path mentioned above because, even if some of its autonomy claims remained unmet at that time, the most important demands had been satisfied by the second state reform and the party did not strategically reposition itself afterwards. In this respect, one should note that the disappearing of the Flemish *Volksunie*, which is often portrayed in parallel to that of the RW (Deschouwer, 2009b), is not considered as a disappearing here because the Flemish regionalist demand, considered at the aggregated level, was pursued by the N-VA.

[50] The slightly higher reported lag comes with an unduly covered cases: that of Ireland (1852) where *Irish Repeal Party* disappeared after 18 years of existence. This decline came with the fact that the party was not very well consolidated. In 1870, another regionalist party, the *Home Rule League*, was founded and followed in its nationalist tradition by the *Irish Parliamentary Party*.

A fourth case is England (2019) where UKIP's demand for an English Parliament disappeared with the party's decline following the successful Brexit referendum. A fifth and final case is Northern Irish Unionists (1980). After the 1972 abolition of the devolved Northern Irish Assembly, the *Ulster Unionist Party* had a period where it did no longer support the instalment of a new assembly because it favoured political control from London. As explained before, it was only in 1998 that new legislative power-sharing institutions were accepted as only possible prospect for pacifying the political conflict.

5. Conclusion on the rise and evolution of regionalist party demands

In this chapter, I have presented the results of the first set of QCAs analysing the conditions under which regionalist party demands have come into existence and evolved. The findings show that in the cases under study, regionalist party demands arose either in sub-state communities with strong sociological or economic distinctiveness and political grievances, or came with the spillover of the demands of such cases to sub-state communities with weaker (albeit notable) forms of distinctiveness and grievances. In the latter case, a large group size or concrete prospects of autonomy compensated for weaker degrees of distinctiveness or grievances. Among almost all paths, a democratic political system with competitive elections appeared as a necessary condition to open the access to power for these new parties. The only exception is 19th century Ireland, where the regionalist cause was spread through various popular classes, so that regionalist parties could gain sufficient popular support without competitive elections.

The increase of regionalist party demands, once in place, appeared to come with the frustration of existing demands in large sub-state communities with strong sociological or economic distinctiveness, or with the spillover of other communities' demands or statutes in cases with lower political grievances. In the latter cases, non-requested increases led to an immediate endorsement. In all these instances of demand increases, regionalist parties were not in government – although this is also the case for the large majority of periods in which their demands did not increase. One can thus not truly speak of this as a necessary condition. While a similar observation can be made for the presence of democratic institutions, one should note that the latter proved already necessary for the emergence of regionalist party demands and is therefore a logical precondition for their rise.

The two instances of demand decreases among regionalist parties proved related to changes in the regionalist party with the largest popular support rather than with a moderation of a regionalist party's position. The two instances are interesting insofar as they show how popular preferences can move from radical to more moderated regionalists. In the Canary Islands, the support switch from the independentist UPC to the autonomist AIC came with the stabilisation of the political situation in Spain after the transition to democracy in the late 1970s and early 1980s and with the recognition of the Canary Islands as autonomous community in its own right. In Navarre, the change of support from the independentists HB and EH to the autonomist coalition NaBai came with the ban of the former two parties after

they sympathised with the political violence committed by the Basque paramilitary organisation ETA. It allowed their follow-up party, though, to enter a more moderated political coalition.

The disappearance of regionalist party demands, finally, occurred under two conditions. It came either with the breakdown of existing democratic institutions – a scenario that occurred twice during the Spanish dictatorships of Primo de Rivera and Francisco Franco. Or it happened when regionalist parties see their main demands realised and do not strategically reposition themselves as to take-up an alternative political stake.

Chapter 7. When the autonomy demands of traditional parties arise and evolve

In the present chapter, I pursue my analysis of the conditions under which autonomy demands evolve and I do so by turning to the demands that have been issued by traditional parties in Belgium, Spain and the United Kingdom. In the sections that follow, I present and discuss the results of the longitudinal Qualitative Comparative Analyses (QCA) of when traditional party demands for legislative autonomy arise, increase, decrease and disappear.

1. Distinctiveness and regionalist threats with spillovers – when traditional party demands arise

The results of the longitudinal QCA of when a traditional party arise, summarised in Table 24, suggest that there were four conclusive combinations of conditions under which traditional parties started to demand legislative autonomy in the studied sub-state communities (see Appendix 31 for the minimisation notes). Among them, no condition appears to be necessary.

Table 24. QCA results for when traditional party demands arise

Conditions		Sufficiency (solution paths)				Nec.
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	
Sociological distinctiveness		2	2	≠ 0		
Past/present political grievances		3	3	2	≠ 0	
Economic distinctiveness				-1	≠ 0	
Asymmetrical demands			1	1	1	
Asymmetrical autonomy						
Prospects for autonomy					1	
Presence of autonomy						
Regionalist threat (reg.)		1				
Democracy		1	1	1	1	
Size				1		
Temporal lag (years)	Mean	3,44	2,46	3,50	0,61	
	Std. dev.	9,23	7,69	3,54	0,51	
Consistency		0,818	0,867	0,667	0,545	
Raw coverage		0,161	0,232	0,036	0,321	
Unique coverage		0,000	0,071	0,036	0,321	-
Relevance of necessity		-	-	-	-	
Solution consistency		0,635				
Solution coverage		0,589				
Number of cases (outcome present)		334 (56)				

Note: Condition numbers correspond to the multi-value score taken by the condition.

Path 1. In sub-state communities with strong sociological distinctiveness and omnipresent grievances, a traditional party started to demand legislative autonomy following regionalist electoral threats when there were competitive democratic elections. This was the case in Catalonia (1907, 1931, 1976), the Basque Country (1931, 1976), Navarre (1976),

Galicia (1932) and Flanders (1964). We can see that these are all strong regionalist – although not necessarily large – cases where regionalist parties have been the driver of the autonomy demand and pushed traditional parties to react to their demand. The path achieves 81,80% of consistency and covers 16,10% of the cases to be explained. Contradictions stem from the case of Flanders (1919-1920, 1942-1945) where traditional parties did not demand legislative autonomy despite regionalist threats because the radical regionalist cause had lost much credibility in the end- and post-war periods due to their collaboration with the occupiers. The lag condition shows that it took not much time for regionalist threats to exert pressure: 3,44 years in average (std. dev.: 9,23).

Paths 2 and 3. A second and third path show that traditional parties also started to demand legislative autonomy in democratic states when autonomy demands existed in other sub-state communities and when their sub-state community had either a strong sociological distinctiveness and omnipresent political grievances, or when it was economically distinctive (relative difficulty) and had recurrent political grievances. In the latter case, however, the population sub-state community needs to be substantive. This was the case in the Canary Islands (1932, 1977), Navarre (1931) and Galicia (1977) for path 2, and in Andalusia (1977) and Wales (1925) for path 3. These are cases where regionalist parties may have existed but had not yet received enough electoral support to exert a true threat. Instead, the traditional party demands consisted in spillovers from autonomy demands in other sub-state communities. This illustrates that defending sub-state communities' cause is not reserved to regionalist parties but can also be taken up by traditional ones. The paths are consistent with respectively 86,70% and 66,70% of the cases and cover 23,20% and 3,60% of those to be explained. Contradictory cases for path 2 are Flanders (1929-1941) and the German-speaking Community (1925-1941). The former can be explained, as before, by the inter-war period where regionalist demands were much contested in Flanders due to the collaboration past. The latter comes with the fact that the *Socialist Party*, instead of explicitly following the demands of regionalist parties to reattach the German-speaking Community to Germany, demanded a newly and fairly organised popular consultation on the matter. It is thus not a formal autonomy or irredentist demand but closely related to the autonomist cause. The contradictory case for path 3, in turn, is Andalusia (1936). Like for other cases without strong distinctiveness and grievances during the Second Spanish Republic, my expectation is that the window of opportunity for spillovers was too short – especially in light of the only recent first true democratisation. The average lag shows that for the other cases in path 2 and 3, spillovers were rather quick with 2,46 and 3,50 years in average (std. dev.: 7,69 and 3,54).

Path 4. A slightly different working of demand spillovers is comprised in path 4 where sub-state communities that have some form of distinctiveness (sociological or economic) or grievances also saw a traditional party start to demand legislative autonomy if the state was democratic – but only when there was a concrete prospect for an autonomy arrangement to be conferred. This was the case in Asturias (1978), Aragon (1978), Cantabria (1978), Castile and León (1978), Castilla-la Mancha (1978), Extremadura (1978), La Rioja (1978), Madrid (1978), Murcia (1978), the Balearic Islands (1932, 1978), Valencia (1932, 1978), the German-

speaking Community (1968), Francophones in Brussels (1971) and Flemish in Brussels (1971) and Cornwall (1998). Despite the large case-coverage that includes 32,10% of the cases to be explained, the path achieves only 54,50% of consistency. Among the contradicting cases are those of the Second Spanish Republic where I expected the time for spillovers to be too short for cases without strong distinctiveness and grievances: Andalusia (1936), Aragon (1936), Asturias (1936), Cantabria (1936), Castile and León (1936), Castilla-la Mancha (1936), Extremadura (1936), La Rioja (1936), Madrid (1936), Murcia (1936), León (1936). In addition, there were the cases of León (1982-2020), Cornwall (1974-1979), England (1974-1979, 2019-2020) and London (1974-1979, 1998-2020).[51] In the Leonese case, no traditional party issued autonomy demands because they favoured its integration in the existing community of Castile and León. In Cornwall, the prospects were first to be realised for larger sub-state communities before traditional party attention could turn to this smaller community. In England, traditional parties have been talking about the autonomy question but for regional units within England rather than for the entity as a whole, albeit without coming to clear positions on the matter. In London, traditional parties have supported an administrative form of devolution. The difference with Madrid and Brussels is probably due to the fact that, in the United Kingdom, not all territorial entities have received devolved legislative institutions so that there is no 'default' situation to be created for the capital. The lag condition shows that demand spillovers that came with the concrete prospect for an autonomy statute occurred very quickly: within 0,61 years in average (std. dev.: 0,51).

The five paths above are consistent with 63,50% of the cases in which a traditional party started to demand legislative autonomy. As before, all contradictions have been discussed. While 58,9% of the cases are covered, the following ones need still to be explained. A first set of fifteen cases corresponds to the Spanish autonomous communities in which the *Partido Republicano Democrático Federal*, demanded the establishment of a federal Spanish republic in 1871. The party was a fraction of the *Republican Party* and led by the Catalan romanticist Francesc Pi i Margall. It was only short-lived and can be considered as a sort of precursor to later Spanish regionalisms – born within a major traditional party at that time (Gabriel, 2004). Then there are the cases of Ireland (1885) and Scotland (1885) for which the *Liberal Party* started to demand legislative autonomy. In the Irish case, it followed the regionalist threat and should therefore be associated with path 1. In that of Scotland, it followed the evolutions in Ireland and should therefore be read jointly with path 2. The two cases are not included in these respective paths, however, because there were no competitive democratic elections at that time, as commented upon in chapter 6. Four more cases are those of the Basque Country (1868, 1901) and Navarre (1868, 1901) where the *Carlist Party* demanded the reestablishment of the former foral rights – and thus of legislative autonomy – but not of any

[51] A final contradictory case was that of Northern Irish Unionists (2020) where the absence of a traditional party demand stems from the fact that from 1998-2020, there has been no traditional party with significant popular support.

additional competences. These cases where traditional party demands look like they arose in the absence of any threats or spillover consist in an historic peculiarity that led me to be cautious and not to minimise condition in other cases on this basis.[52] In the case of Wallonia (1968), the *Socialist Party* started to support legislative autonomy in response to the Flemish demand, that could no longer be ignored in light of the regionalist pressure in the community and the dyadic nature of the Belgian state where both communities have to agree to a state reform for it to be enacted. Finally, there has been the rise of traditional party demands among Northern Irish Unionists (1945, 1962) and Nationalists (1950). Although traditional parties there had endorsed the autonomy statute since soon after its conferral in 1921, they only gathered limited popular support for large parts of the 20th century so that they were sometimes not even represented in parliament and therefore not considered in the coding. The 'rise' of their autonomy demands here corresponds to their re-appearances.

2. Persisting conditions and further spillovers – when traditional party demands increase

The results of the longitudinal QCA analysing the increase of traditional party demands, summarised in Table 25, suggest that there were four conclusive combinations of conditions under which the autonomy demand of traditional parties increases in the sub-state communities under study (see Appendix 32 for the minimisation notes). Among them, no condition was found to be necessary neither.

Table 25. QCA results for when traditional party demands increase

Conditions		Sufficiency (solution paths)				Nec.
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	
Sociological distinctiveness		2	2 + 1	≠ 0		
Past/present political grievances		3	2	≠ 0		
Economic distinctiveness				≠ 0		
Asymmetrical demands			1	1	1	
Asymmetrical autonomy				1		
Non-requested increase					1	
Institutional dissatisfaction			1			
Regionalist threat (reg.)		1	1			
Democracy		1	1	1	1	
Size		1				
Temporal lag (years)	Mean	13,86	1,50	5,53	0,00	
	Std. dev.	13,30	2,12	9,49	0,00	
Consistency		0,636	0,500	0,623	1,000	
Raw coverage		0,222	0,032	0,603	0,270	
Unique coverage		0,206	0,016	0,397	0,048	-
Relevance of necessity		-	-	-	-	
Solution consistency		0,629				
Solution coverage		0,889				
Number of cases (outcome present)		238 (63)				

Note: Condition numbers correspond to the multi-value score taken by the condition.

Path 1. In large sub-state communities with strong sociological distinctiveness and omnipresent political grievances, the demands of a traditional party increased following regionalist electoral threats when there were competitive democratic elections. This was the

[52] Even if it has not been included in the minimisation, that of the Basque Country (1868) is covered by path 5.

case in Catalonia (1997, 2010), the Basque Country (1996), Flanders (1977, 1985, 1992, 1999, 2007), Scotland (2007, 2014) and Wales (1999, 2013, 2015). This shows that the rise and the increase of traditional party demands occurred under very similar conditions when strong regionalist actors persist. The only difference lies in the fact that regionalist threats lead to the rise of traditional party demands in both large and small sub-state communities with strong distinctiveness and grievances, while they lead to an increase in large ones only. The path covers 22,20% of the cases to be explained but is consistent with only 63,60% of them. Almost all contradicting cases, however, correspond in fact to the most recent evolutions in such communities – i.e. where regionalist threats are still present but did not (yet) lead to (another) increase in the traditional party demand: Flanders (2008-2020), the Basque Country (1997-2020), Catalonia (2011-2020), Galicia (1998-2020), Ireland (1918-1920), Scotland (2015-2020) and Wales (2016-2020). This shows that the demand change of traditional parties is incremental and only occurs after sufficient regionalist pressure has been accumulated – in the past every 13,86 years in average (std. dev.: 13,30) as the lag condition shows. How long this scenario can take place in the future, however, remains to be seen because there will be a point where traditional party demands can no longer increase – either because going further appears incompatible with their ideology or because there are no competences left to be decentralised. Another single contradicting case is Galicia (1936) where traditional party demands did not increase despite the presence of a regionalist threat. One should note, though that the Galician statute was only to be implemented in 1936, which never occurred due to the outbreak of the civil war, and that there was hence no time for traditional party demands to evolve further.

Path 2. A second path which saw traditional party demands for legislative autonomy increase could be observed in democratic states and sub-state communities with intermediate or strong sociological distinctiveness and recurrent political grievances in response to asymmetrical demands, a regionalist threat in the community, and a manifest institutional dissatisfaction. This was the case in Wallonia (1971) and the German-speaking Community (1977) where own regional councils were installed without own executive (and without direct elections for the former). The institutional dissatisfaction resulting from this (and the regionalist pressure for changing it) lead traditional parties to increase their demand in this sense. The increases were quite quick with 1,50 years in average (std. dev.: 2,12). The path coverage is limited, however, with only 3,20% of the cases to be explained. The supposedly low consistency of 50% comes with two artificial contradictions that stem from the same cases in a later period, i.e. when the dissatisfaction persisted until institutions were reformed, but when the demand did not increase further because it had already expressed the features to be reformed.

Path 3. Another series of increases of traditional party demands have taken place in sub-state communities with some form of distinctiveness (sociological or economic) or grievances when the state was democratic and when both the autonomy demands and statutes in other sub-state communities were larger. This has been the case in Asturias (1988), Aragon (1988), the Balearic Islands (1988), Castile and León (1988), Castilla-la Mancha (1988), Cantabria

(1988), Extremadura (1988), La Rioja (1988), Madrid (1988) and Murcia (1988), where the extent of education, social and sanitary competences obtained by the fast-track communities was also claimed by these slow-track communities 5-6 years after their creation. In Brussels (Flemish and Francophone) (1990, 1994, 2002, 2014) and the German-speaking Community (1984, 1990, 1994, 2002, 2011), traditional party demands have followed certain competences detained by the larger sub-state communities – Flanders and Wallonia. In Navarre (1987, 2007), finally, the demand increases by traditional parties were directed towards policing competences that had already been obtained in the Basque Country and Catalonia. All these cases – which lead to a path coverage of 60,30% – illustrate how external demands and statutes can also spillover within a few year (avg.: 9,71, std. dev.: 10,65) to traditional parties and that they too can act as an autonomy defender of their sub-state community. The consistency of the path only achieves 62,30%, however, because the spillover seems only to work for certain competences. There is indeed a number of contradictory cases for which exceeding external demands and statutes did either not spillover yet, or tend not to do so because they concern competences that are not claimed in these sub-state communities: Brussels (Flemish, 2015-2020), Brussels (Francophone, 2015-2020), German-speaking Community (2015-2020), Aragon (1998-2020), Asturias (2005-2020), Balearic Islands (1998-2020), Cantabria (1998-2020), Canary Islands (2006-2020), Castile and León (1998-2020), Castilla-la Mancha (1998-2020), Catalonia (2011-2020), Extremadura (1998-2020), La Rioja (1998-2020), Madrid (1998-2020), Murcia (1998-2020), Valencia (2008-2020), Scotland (2015-2020), Wales (2016-2020). This observation had already been made for regionalist parties in cases with weaker regionalist dynamics. Then there are contradictory cases like Scotland (1970-1972), Wales (1955-1972) and Cornwall (1999-2020), where traditional party demands did not increase because these communities had not (yet) obtained legislative institutions. Their demand was thus above all focussed on the instalment of such institutions rather than on the extension of competences. With Catalonia (1936-1936), Navarre (1932-1934, 1936), Galicia (1936) and the Canary Islands (1936-1936), finally, we have contradictory cases which come with the fact that autonomous institutions under the Second Spanish Republic had either not (yet) been conferred or were very recent. There was thus not much time for debating competence extensions.

Path 4. A final path for the increase of traditional party demands came with the conferral of competences that the party had not requested but that it endorsed because the sub-state community had received them (in all cases, where this happened, the state was democratic and external demands were asymmetrical). This was the case in Andalusia (1997), Asturias (1997), Aragon (1997), the Balearic Islands (1997), the Canary Islands (1997), Cantabria (1997), Castile and León (1997), Castilla-la Mancha (1997), Galicia (1997), Extremadura (1997), La Rioja (1997), Madrid (1997), Murcia (1997) and Valencia (1997) where additional taxation powers were conferred after demands by the Catalan regionalist CiU in exchange of their support to the first Aznar government (Almendral, 2003). In Wallonia (1971), parties did not ask for cultural competences but accepted them in exchange of conferring economic competences as well. In the German-speaking Community (2014) and Wallonia (2014),

finally, social security competences that had been conferred during the sixth state reform following the demands by Flemish parties had not been demanded. They were endorsed in Wallonia once it became clear that the conferral was the only way out of an eternal governmental deadlock resulting from disagreements between Flemish and Walloon parties that both need to agree on institutional reforms for them to be implemented. In the German-speaking Community, the competences were endorsed after it became clear all communities would receive them. The path achieves perfect consistency and covers 27% of the cases to be explained. The lag condition shows that the endorsement of non-requested competences is immediate (avg.: 0, std. dev.: 0).

Taken together, the five paths above are consistent with 63,60% of the observed cases, contradictions having been explained. 88,90% of the cases are covered, yet seven more increasing traditional party demands need to be explained. On the one hand, there are the cases of the Basque Country (1871, 1936) and Navarre (1871) where it was not the same traditional party whose demands increased but another party which came up with more autonomous demands. In 1871, the Carlist demand for the restoration of the foral rights was replaced by the larger autonomy demands of the *Partido Republicano Democrático Federal*, which has been mentioned in the previous section. In 1936, the same Carlist demand was replaced by that of the *Leftist Republican Party* who had also supported the autonomy statutes in Catalonia and Galicia. Finally, there is the case of Wallonia (1981, 1990, 1994, 2002) where traditional party demands increased gradually because their support was needed for enacting the state reforms that Flemish parties had been requesting throughout time. These agreements to the first five state reforms (1970 to 2001) have been found through intense negotiations and can be described as following external demands. In the case of the sixth state reform (2014), negotiations were much lengthier and more difficult and should therefore be considered as a non-requested increase, as described before.

3. Many ways in but no way back – do traditional party demands never decrease?

When turning to the analysis of when traditional party demands for legislative autonomy decreased, we are confronted with the peculiar situation that, in the three countries under study and for the period of observation, there has been no sub-state community where traditional party demands for legislative autonomy were lower in the present than they were in the past. This does not mean that there were no traditional parties demanding less legislative autonomy, it means that there has always been at least one traditional party demanding at least as much legislative autonomy for the sub-state community as itself or other traditional parties have demanded in the past.

At first, one would thus be inclined to conclude that, once a certain amount of competences has been claimed, there is no way back and that parties will stick to these demands. This would come with two kinds of rationale. On the one hand, when competences have been obtained by a sub-state entity, they provide manifest institutional and policy advantages that actors on the sub-state level do not want to give up – be they in government

and able to use them, or in opposition and hoping to use them in the future. On the other hand, when competences have not yet been obtained by a sub-state entity, formulating additional autonomy demands is a political strategy that parties want to keep in order to preserve their political credibility.

One should note, however, that in Belgium, there have been recent debates among traditional parties on whether some competences of the sub-state entities should not be recentralised (Reuchamps et al., 2020). The main reason for this debate is the heterogeneous competence distribution in federal Belgium. Many decentralised areas – especially for sanitary and economic matters – are indeed distributed in a very complex manner between state and sub-state entities. Flemish nationalists and christian-democrats share this concern but argue that the distribution should be homogenised by decentralising additional competences. Flemish liberals and socialists, as well as traditional Walloon parties, have argued the opposite (Van Wynsberghe, 2020).

It remains thus to be seen whether autonomy demands are really a way with no return for traditional parties or if there are institutionally beneficial and politically credible avenues for them to moderate their autonomy position and recentralise some formerly decentralised competences. Moreover, it remains to be seen if such a decision will be shared by all traditional parties or if one will always uphold a non-decreasing autonomist position.

4. Democratic breakdown – when traditional party demands disappear

The results of the last longitudinal QCA, summarised in Table 26, indicate that in the countries under study, there is only one path that has been found conclusive for explaining when traditional party demands for legislative autonomy disappear (see Appendix 33 for the minimisation notes).

Table 26. QCA results for when traditional party demands disappear

Conditions		Sufficiency (solution paths) (1)	Nec.
Sociological distinctiveness			
Past/present political grievances			
Economic distinctiveness			
Asymmetrical demands			
Asymmetrical autonomy			
Regionalist threat (reg.)			
Democracy		0	0
Size			
Temporal lag (years)	Mean	2,11	-
	Std. dev.	1,83	-
Consistency		0,931	0,931
Raw coverage		0,931	0,587
Unique coverage		0,931	-
Relevance of necessity		-	0,683
Solution consistency		0,931	
Solution coverage		0,931	
Number of cases (outcome present)		153 (29)	

Note: Condition numbers correspond to the multi-value score taken by the condition.

Path 1. We see indeed that in almost all cases (93,10%), autonomy demands by traditional parties disappeared when democratic institutions broke down. Thereby, the absence of democracy does not only appear to be a sufficient but also a necessary condition for the outcome to occur (Cons.Nec.: 0,931, RoN: 0,683). This has been the case in the Basque Country (1923, 1937), the Balearic Islands (1937), Catalonia (1923, 1937), the Canary Islands (1937), Galicia (1937), Navarre (1923, 1937) and Valencia (1937). The path achieves almost perfect consistency (93,10%). Contradicting cases are Ireland (1886-1917) and Scotland (1886-1917) where traditional party demands did not disappear in the absence of competitive democratic elections. While the exceptionality of the Irish case and the spillover of the *Liberal Party* demands for Scotland have been explained above, one should also note that the absence of competitive elections cannot be compared to the breakdown of democratic institutions that occurred under the two Spanish dictatorships and that explains the cases listed above.

The uncovered cases are Northern Irish Unionists (1949, 1998) where traditional parties did not obtain any significant popular support and, therefore, parliamentary representation. This consists thus in a simple lack of support for traditional parties rather than in a disappearing autonomy demand. Furthermore, one should note that among the cases covered by the solution, there are also the disappearing demands of the *Partido Republicano Democrático Federal*, that should be understood as a short-lived experience of regionalism due to little party cohesion rather than a consequence of democratic brake-down. These cases also lead to an average lag of 2,11 years (std. dev.: 1,83) that would otherwise be 0 because democratic breakdown led to an immediate disappearing of the traditional party demand in the cases listed above.

5. Conclusion on the rise and evolution of traditional party demands

In this chapter, I have presented the results of the QCAs analysing the conditions under which traditional party demands have started to demand legislative autonomy and under which these demands evolved. The findings show that traditional party demands arose in the cases under study either in the presence of a regionalist threat in sub-state communities with strong sociological distinctiveness and political grievances when the political system was democratic, or when the demands from other communities spilled over to cases with some (or even stronger) forms of socio-economic distinctiveness and grievances. In the latter case, a large group size or concrete prospects of autonomy compensated for weaker degrees of distinctiveness or grievances.

The increase of traditional parties' demands for legislative autonomy, in turn, appeared to occur under similar conditions. Put differently, the persistence of regionalist threats in strongly distinctive and aggrieved sub-state communities and the spillover of the demands and statutes to sub-state communities with some socio-economic distinctiveness and grievances proved sufficient for further demand increases among traditional parties when the

political system was democratic. The latter scenario was sometimes furthermore combined with institutional dissatisfaction, or with non-requested increases.

When it came to the decrease of traditional parties' demands for legislative autonomy, it curiously appeared that no such instance was found among the cases under study. While this could lead one to conclude that traditional parties have to stick to demanded degrees of autonomy once they have done so, it was signalled that there are currently vivid debates in Belgium about a potential recentralisation of competences among several traditional parties. However, whether and to which extent this will actually happen remains to be seen.

The disappearing of autonomy demands among traditional parties, finally, showed to occur only in cases of democratic breakdown. As for the disappearing of regionalist party demands, this had been the cases during the two Spanish dictatorships of the 20th century.

Chapter 8. When the autonomy statutes of sub-state communities arise and evolve

After having analysed the determinants of autonomy demands by regionalist and traditional political parties in the previous two chapters, this final chapter of the analytical part of the dissertation turns to the determinants of autonomy statutes in the three countries under study. It does so, like before, by presenting and discussing the results of longitudinal Qualitative Comparative Analyses (QCA) of when autonomy statutes with legislative competence arise, increase, decrease and disappear.

1. Democracy, distinctiveness, regionalist threats and traditional party support with spillovers – when autonomy statutes arise

The results of the longitudinal QCA analysing when autonomy statutes arise, summarised in Table 27, suggest that there are two conclusive combinations of conditions under which legislative autonomy is conferred for the first time (see Appendix 34 for the minimisation notes). The common points of these two paths is traditional party support and the presence of democracy, which appear to be present in almost all instances of legislative autonomy conferral (Cons.Nec.: 0,868 and 0,973, exceptions are explained below). When looking at their relevance of necessity score, we see that traditional party support exceeds the critical 0,50 anchor (0,509) and can therefore be considered a necessary condition. As for the presence of democracy, we see a slightly lower relevance score (0,468) – pointing to a trivial necessity relation because most cases under investigation were democratic. While this caveat is to be kept in mind, the importance of the condition as part of the sufficient paths below should not be underestimated in light of the examples provided.

Path 1. To sub-state communities with strong sociological distinctiveness and omnipresent political grievances, autonomous institutions were conferred by democratic states in the presence of a regionalist threat (on both the regional and national level) and traditional party support in the community. This was the case in Catalonia (1932, 1936, 1979, 2018), the Basque Country (1936, 1979), Ireland (1921), Scotland (1998), Wales (2011) and Flanders (1971). These are, once more, cases with strong regionalist pressures that constituted major drivers of the autonomy question in their country. As indicated by the lag condition, it takes in average 8,31 years (std. dev.: 12,16) for national governments to follow such pressures and confer legislative autonomy. While the path covers 34,20% of the case to be explained, it achieves a consistency of 86,70%. The two contradicting cases are Catalonia (1907-1922) and Galicia (1936-1936). In Catalonia, elections were competitive enough to be considered democratic and break the arranged successes of the *Liberal* and *Conservative*

Table 27. QCA results for when autonomy statutes arise

Conditions		Sufficiency (solution paths) (1)	Sufficiency (solution paths) (2)	Nec.	
Sociological distinctiveness		2	≠ 0		
Past/present political grievances			≠ 0		
Economic distinctiveness		3	≠ 0		
Asymmetrical autonomy			1		
Symmetric autonomy conferral			1		
Regionalist threat (nat.)		1			
Regionalist threat (reg.)		1			
Traditional party support		1	1	1	
Expected electoral (ally) success					
Reliance on regionalist support					
Democracy		1	1		1
Size					
Temporal lag (years)	Mean	8,31	0,52	-	-
	Std. dev.	12,16	0,57	-	-
Consistency		0,867	0,556	0,868	0,973
Raw coverage		0,342	0,395	0,367	0,383
Unique coverage		0,342	0,395	-	-
Relevance of necessity		-	-	0,509	0,468
Solution consistency		0,683			
Solution coverage		0,737			
Number of cases (outcome present)		610 (38)			

Note: Condition numbers correspond to the multi-value score taken by the condition.

parties during the *Turno Pacifico*. In the rest of Spain (with exception of the Basque country), however, one could not speak of a truly democratic regime and therefore also not of a fully responsive government, which might explain why the Catalan demands were not followed. In Galicia, demands were followed and legislative institutions were to be granted if the civil war had not broken-out before the conferral.

Path 2. In sub-state communities with some form of distinctiveness (sociological or economic) or grievances, legislative institutions were conferred in democratic states when a symmetrical autonomy conferral was planned by the state and demanded by traditional parties in the community. This was the case in Andalusia (1981), Asturias (1981), Aragon (1982), the Balearic Islands (1982), Castile and León (1983), Castilla-la Mancha (1982), Canary Islands (1982), Cantabria (1982), Galicia (1981), Extremadura (1983), La Rioja (1988), Madrid (1982) and Murcia (1982), Navarre (1982) and Valencia (1982). We can see that these are all Spanish cases where the autonomist cause followed on from stronger regionalist pressures in the Basque Country and Catalonia – and did so quite quickly as the average lag of 0,52 years (std. dev.: 0,57) shows. While the path covers 39,50% of the cases to be explained, it achieves only a consistency of 55,60%. This comes with contradicting cases like the Balearic Islands (1933-1934, 1936), Canary Islands (1934, 1936), Galicia (1933-1934, 1936), Navarre (1933-1934, 1936) and Valencia (1933-1934, 1936) where autonomous institutions did not follow upon the issued demands and the constitutional provision for a symmetrical autonomy conferral. As the dates indicate, the cases concern the years of the Second Spanish Republic that did not last long enough for autonomous institutions to be conferred elsewhere than in the Basque Country and Catalonia. In the Basque Country (1934), another contradicting case, a first autonomy conferral failed because

the extent of the demanded statute was not acceptable to the Spanish *Cortes*. A second more moderated try in 1936 succeeded.

The two paths above are together consistent with 68,30% of the cases in which legislative autonomy arose. The reasons for the existing inconsistencies have been discussed. While 73,70% of the cases to be explained have been covered, thirteen more need to be explained. A first of these cases is the Basque Country (1868) where foral legislative autonomy obtained during the Middle-Age was still detained when I began my period of observation. It was abolished in 1876 during the elaboration of the new Constitution. It is the only case under study where a legislative autonomy statute was (shortly) in place in a non-democratic state. The case of Wallonia (1971), in turn, obtained legislative autonomy once the Flemish demands for cultural autonomy were joined by Walloon demands for economic autonomy and, thereby, created a mutual agreement on decentralising legislative competences. The case has thus similarities with path 1 when one considers the explicit regionalist (and traditional) party demand (and threat) in Wallonia. It has similarities with path 2 when one considers that the initial impetus for federal reforms came mostly from Flemish parties. It is perfectly consistent but as a singular case in this respect, no separate path was foreseen. Another combination of conditions achieving perfect consistency but only relying on a single case is the German-speaking Community (1984). Its legislative autonomy was conferred once the two larger sub-state communities had obtained it, once both regionalist and traditional parties demanded it and once national parties were ensured that their regional branches would be part in the first government. In the case of Brussels (Francophone and Flemish) (1990), the conferral of legislative autonomy cannot exactly be described as 'symmetrical' because of the dual community situation and competence distribution in the capital. However, the conferral followed the evolutions of the Flemish and Walloon cases and should therefore be read jointly with path 2, while keeping its peculiar situation in mind. Another set of cases that should be associated with path 2 is that of Northern Irish Unionists and Nationalists (1921) where, even if we cannot speak of an exact symmetry either, legislative institutions were obtained following the instalment of the Southern Irish Assembly. These are also the cases where traditional party support for the statute in the community did not exist immediately. Finally, there are the cases of Northern Irish Unionists and Nationalists (1998, 2007, 2020), where the conferral corresponded to the reestablishment of legislative autonomy after previous suspensions.

2. Persisting conditions and further spillover 2.0 – when autonomy statutes increase

When looking at the results of the longitudinal QCA analysing when autonomy statutes increase, summarised in Table 28, we see that there are two conclusive combinations in the presence of which existing autonomy statutes are enlarged (see Appendix 35 for minimisation notes). Just as for the rise of autonomy statutes, traditional party support and democracy are also always present when autonomy statutes increase, pointing at a consistent necessity relation (Cons.Nec.: 0,983 and 1,000). However, given their presence among most

cases – both when the outcome is present and absent – only low relevance of necessity scores are achieved (RoN: 0,073 and 0,011). When one considers, though, that autonomy statutes can only increase when they have previously been conferred; and that traditional party support and a democratic state were found necessary this conferral, it is logical that these conditions are present in almost all cases of the present analysis. While this source of trivialness should be kept in mind, the importance of the two conditions for the increase of autonomy statutes should not be underestimated.

Table 28. QCA results for when autonomy statutes increase

Conditions		Sufficiency (solution paths) (1)	Sufficiency (solution paths) (2)	Nec.	Nec.
Sociological distinctiveness		2			
Past/present political grievances		3			
Economic distinctiveness					
Asymmetrical autonomy			1		
Symmetrical increase			1		
Regionalist threat (nat.)		1			
Regionalist threat (reg.)		1			
Traditional party support		1	1	1	
Expected electoral (ally) success					
Reliance on regionalist support					
Democracy		1	1		1
Size		1			
Temporal lag (years)	Mean	7,67	0,00	-	-
	Std. dev.	5,50	0,00	-	-
Consistency		0,706	1,000	0,983	1,000
Raw coverage		0,200	0,567	0,390	0,392
Unique coverage		0,200	0,567	-	-
Relevance of necessity		-	-	0,073	0,011
Solution consistency		0,902			
Solution coverage		0,767			
Number of cases (outcome present)		267 (60)			

Note: Condition numbers correspond to the multi-value score taken by the condition.

Path 1. In large sub-state communities with strong sociological distinctiveness and omnipresent economic grievances, autonomy statutes were increased in democratic states when regionalist parties exerted an electoral threat (on both the regional and national level) and when a traditional party supported the increase. This was the case in Catalonia (1997, 2019), the Basque Country (1996), Scotland (2012, 2016), Wales (2014, 2017) and Flanders (1981, 1990, 1994, 2002, 2014). When comparing these conditions and cases to those of the first path explaining the conferral of legislative autonomy, we can see many similarities. I.e. that the increase of legislative autonomy occurred in strong regionalist cases when regionalist party pressures persisted after the enactment of their statute. A difference between both scenarios consists in the fact that regionalist threats led to the enactment of autonomy statutes in both large and small sub-state communities with strong distinctiveness and grievances, while they only led to autonomy increases in large communities. The lag condition indicates that it took in the past in average 7,67 years (std. dev.: 5,50) for this to happen. The path covers 20% of the cases to be explained and is consistent with 70,60% of them. Contradictions come from the most recent evolutions in the cases cited above, where regionalist pressures persist but have not yet lead to further increases: Flanders 2019-2020,

Basque Country 2019-2020, Catalonia 2019-2020, Scotland 2017-2020, Wales 2018-2020. Until when these pressures lead to increases remains to be seen.

Path 2. A second path leading to the increase of autonomy statutes also comprises similarities with the previously explained initial conferral of autonomy. It shows that democratic states conferred additional competences to sub-state communities with various degrees of distinctiveness and grievances when other communities in the country had previously obtained these competences and when the conferral was done for purposes of symmetry. This has been the case in Andalusia (1997), Aragon (1992, 1997), Asturias (1992, 1997), the Balearic Islands (1992, 1997), the Canary Islands (1997), Cantabria (1992, 1997), Castile and León (1992, 1997), Castilla-la Mancha (1992, 1997), Galicia (1997), Extremadura (1992, 1997), La Rioja (1992, 1997), Madrid (1992, 1997), Murcia (1992, 1997), Valencia (1997), Brussels (Francophone and Flemish) (1994, 2002, 2014) and the German-speaking Community (1990, 1994, 2002, 2014). We see thus that there is not only cross-community spillover for the demands and conferral of autonomy statutes but also for their increase. The lag condition shows that this happened without delay – that is to say within the year – once traditional party support for a symmetrical conferral had been gathered (avg.: 0, std. dev.: 0). The path achieves perfect consistency and covers 56,70% of the cases to be explained.

Taken together, the two paths are consistent with 90,20% of the cases where autonomy statutes increased and all contradictions having been discussed. 76,70% of these cases are covered, leaving the following ones in need for further explanations. Among them, there are the cases of Wallonia (1981, 1990, 1994, 2002, 2014) where autonomy increases followed agreements with Flemish parties on the further federalisation of the country. Enlargements came with Walloon regionalist and traditional party demands in 1981 (and partly in 2002), thereby having similarities with path 1. They largely came with Flemish demands in 1990, 1994 and 2014, having similarities with path 2 because competences extensions were symmetrical for both Flanders and Wallonia. Another case to be explained is Brussels (Francophone and Flemish) (1995) where the formerly bilingual province of Brabant was split in a Flemish-speaking part, a francophone part and the Brussels-Capital Region that took over the provincial competences on its territory. The reform was thus a consequence of the communitarian conflict between Flanders and Wallonia rather than driven by a demand from the Brussels communities. In the German-speaking Community, in turn, some competence increases (2000, 2005, 2019) did not just follow symmetrical spillovers from the other communities but were obtained through transfers of competence that the Walloon Region used to exercise on its territory. In the Belgian federal state comprising two kinds of federated entities with partly overlapping territories, the regions and communities, the German-speaking Community is indeed an own entity for community matters but belongs to the Walloon Region for regional matters. To allow it nevertheless to exert some regional competences, transfers have been negotiated by the German-speaking and the Walloon governments. They were partly facilitated by congruent coalitions (in 2000 and 2005) and partly by former promises a governing party had made when it was in the opposition (2019) (Niessen, 2020). In Navarre (1987, 2007), competence enlargements in the policing sector

were allowed after they had previously been conferred to the Basque Country and Catalonia. We can thus not speak of a true symmetrical conferral but of some symmetry between autonomous communities with a more advanced statute. Finally, there are the cases of Northern Irish Nationalists and Unionists (2011) that obtained additional policing competences in light of those obtained by Scotland. They had not obtained them before because the United Kingdom had an extended control over police forces after the Troubles. Once the situation had progressively pacified, the competences were conferred.

3. Enacted to last – do autonomy statutes never decrease?

When analysing the conditions under which conferred autonomy statutes decrease, we are once more confronted with the peculiar situation that, in the three countries under study and for the period of observation, the extent of conferred legislative autonomy statutes has never been decreased. At first, this seems logical for two reasons. On the one hand, one would not expect regionalist or traditional parties to demand less autonomy – in light of discussions in chapter 6 and 8. Legislative autonomy provides sub-state entities with political resources that parties want to keep and whose demand can constitute an explicit political strategy. On the other hand, it might be politically delicate for central governments to remove competences that they had previously conferred. When considering the salient political dynamics that have often led to their conferral, there are indeed good reasons to expect political tensions after autonomy decreases.

That being said, I have explained in the previous chapter that in Belgium, several Flemish and Francophone traditional parties in have spoken out in favour of recentralising competences because they consider the current competence division too complex and inefficient – especially in the field of sanitary and economic matters. It remains thus to be seen if these demands are followed by recentralisation reform or if, on the contrary, competence distributions are homogenised by further decentralisation, as requested by Flemish nationalists and christian-democrats.

4. Democratic break down or secessionist threats – when autonomy statutes disappear

Finally, when looking at the results of the longitudinal QCA of when autonomy statutes disappear, summarised in Table 29, we see that two paths have been found conclusive for explaining when conferred legislative autonomy statutes are withdrawn (see Appendix 36 for the minimisation notes). Both rely on a single condition of which none has been found necessary.

Path 1. In sub-state communities where political actions were perceived as a serious secessionist threat by the national government, autonomous institutions have been withdrawn or, to be more precise, suspended. In Catalonia (1934, 2017) this has indeed happened at two occasions. Once during the Second Spanish Republic when the Catalan president Lluís Companys proclaimed an 'independent Catalan state within the Spanish

Table 29. QCA of when autonomy statutes disappear

Conditions		Sufficiency (solution paths) (1)	Sufficiency (solution paths) (2)	Nec.
Sociological distinctiveness				
Past/present political grievances				
Economic distinctiveness				
Asymmetrical autonomy				
Secessionist threat		1		
Regionalist threat (nat.)				
Regionalist threat (reg.)				
Traditional party support				
Expected electoral (ally) success				
Reliance on regionalist support				
Democracy			0	
Size				
Temporal lag (years)	Mean	0,00	2,00	-
	Std. dev.	0,00	3,46	-
Consistency		1,000	1,000	
Raw coverage		0,182	0,273	
Unique coverage		0,182	0,273	-
Relevance of necessity		-	-	
Solution consistency		1,000		
Solution coverage		0,455		
Number of cases (outcome present)		172 (11)		

Note: Condition numbers correspond to the multi-value score taken by the condition.

Republic'. The ambiguous formulation was taken very seriously by the Spanish government who suspended the Catalan autonomy statute from 1934 to 1936. In 2017, a referendum on Catalan independence of Catalonia was organised although it had previously been suspended by the Constitutional Court. After an independence motion was passed by the Catalan parliament, the Spanish government decided to suspend its statute until new elections had been organised and a new government been installed. The lag condition shows that the suspensions occurred almost immediately after the perceived threat (avg.: 0, std. dev.: 0). The path achieves perfect consistency and covers 18,20% of the cases to be explained.

Path 2. A second context in which autonomy statutes were withdrawn is following the breakdown of democratic institutions. In the Basque Country (1937) and Catalonia (1937), the autonomous institutions that had been conferred during the Second Spanish Republic were withdrawn after the civil war and during the Francoist dictatorship. The path achieves perfect consistency and covers 27,30% of the cases to be explained. While the withdrawals in the Basque Country and Catalonia occurred in the year of the democratic breakdown, the slightly higher lag comes with an unduly covered case, the Basque Country (1876). Its legislative foral institutions were not withdrawn because of a democratic breakdown (although the absence of a democratic regime might have contributed to it) but because the government considered the legislative sub-state autonomy to be incompatible with the newly drafted Spanish Constitution, as explained in the historical section.

The two paths above are perfectly consistent and cover 45,50% of the cases to be explained. The instances of disappearing autonomy statutes that have not yet been explained are Northern Irish Unionists and Nationalists (1972, 2003, 2017). In their case, there were no secessionist threats or democratic breakdowns. However, the political conflict between both groups had exacerbated to a point where the autonomy statute could not be upheld by the

United Kingdom government. In 1972, this happened as a consequence of the Troubles. In 2003 and 2017, the withdrawal came with political deadlock when nationalist and unionist parties could not agree on forming a power-sharing government.

5. Conclusion on the rise and evolution of autonomy statutes

In this chapter, I have presented the results of the QCAs analysing the conditions under which autonomy statutes are conferred for the first time and under which they evolve thereafter. The findings show that in the cases under study, legislative autonomy was conferred for the first time when either regionalist threats were present (on the regional and national levels) in sub-state communities with strong sociological distinctiveness and political grievances, or when autonomy statutes were conferred for reasons of symmetry to sub-state communities with weaker (yet present) socio-economic distinctiveness and grievances. For these conferrals, the support of a traditional party and the presence of democratic institutions appeared necessary.

The increase of these conferred autonomy statutes appeared to occur under similar conditions. It was indeed following regionalist threats (on the regional and national levels) in sub-state communities with strong sociological distinctiveness and political grievances, or for reason of symmetry that existing autonomy statutes were enlarged. The presence of democratic institutions and traditional party support (although present among both increasing and non-increasing cases because they were preconditions for the initial conferral) proved to be important scope conditions again.

The inquiry of decreasing autonomy statutes showed that such there has been no such decrease among the cases under study. This seems plausible when one considers that neither regional nor traditional parties have many incentives to demand less autonomy (as seen before) and that should be delicate for central governments to remove competences they have already conferred. Yet, the current recentralisation demands in Belgium show that such a scenario is not excluded when parties discuss a more efficient reorganisation of political competences in the multi-level state. As mentioned earlier, the concrete realisation thereof remains to be seen.

The disappearing of legislative autonomy statutes, finally, appeared to occur under two conditions. It came either with the presence of a serious secessionist threat – as it has been the case twice in Catalonia. Or it was associated with the breakdown of democratic institutions, like during the two Spanish dictatorships.

Part III.
Discussion and conclusion

Chapter 9. Comparative sub-state mobilisation and restructuring: towards a theory of three waves of centrifugal sociological decentralisation

In the proceeding analyses, I have provided a detailed account of the (combinations of) conditions under which the autonomy demands and statutes in Belgium, Spain and the United Kingdom have varied throughout the last two centuries. The objective was to complement the existing knowledge that sociological and economic differences, institutions, functional spillovers and interests are important for the rise and evolution of autonomy demands and statutes, by showing more precisely in which combination, in which cases and at which stages of the decentralisation process they matter. Beyond this refined cross-theoretical examination, the research aimed at providing a specified knowledge of the paradox of federalism, that is to know whether the conferral or the non-conferral of sub-state autonomy lead to greater accommodation or exacerbation of autonomy demands.

In this discussion chapter, I want to go beyond the detailedness of the preceding analyses and derive their main lessons for these two objectives. To do so, I first discuss the relevance of the combinations of different theoretical strands for the explanation of different moments of the demand and conferral process. In addition to the lessons drawn from the comparative theoretical assessment, I proceed to a joint consideration of the rise and evolution of autonomy demands and statutes, which allows me to identify two waves of centrifugal sociological decentralisation as an overarching tendency and pattern of the phenomenon under study. Secondly, I look into the lessons of these results for the paradox of federalism by showing what consequences state decisions to confer or not to confer autonomy have for the accommodation and exacerbation of autonomy demands.

Since these two considerations are based on past evolutions in the cases under study, I use a third section to look at their recent political dynamics and, based on the longer-term trajectories identified before, formulate a few expectations about future evolutions of the cases under study. These expectations concern both the possible evolutions within the second wave of centrifugal sociological decentralisation and a potential transition towards a third one.

1. Shaping the waves: comparative theoretical assessment

In the sub-sections below, I look back at the (combinations of) conditions that have proven sufficient for explaining the rise and evolution of autonomy demands and autonomy statutes – with specific attention for the theoretical strands to which they belong in order to show

which of these strands are relevant at different moments of the demand and conferral process. When sequencing autonomy demands and statutes in a joint consideration, the patterns that emerge from this comparison can be interpreted as different waves of sub-state mobilisation and restructuring that I propose as a new cross-theoretical perspective on the phenomenon.

a) How different theories interact when driving sub-state autonomy demands and statutes

Regionalist party demands. In the cases under study, the rise and evolution of regionalist party demands has been shown to follow sociological factors in an important manner, while being complemented at different stages by functionalist, institutionalist and rational-choice factors.

For the rise of regionalist party demands, sociological factors (like their distinctiveness and political grievances) were sufficient for the creation of a regionalist party when they were strong and when the political system was democratic, which shows that the institutionalist context is an important scope condition. When sociological factors were of intermediate strength, they needed to be complemented by functionalist factors (like demand spillovers) for regionalist party demands to arise. When sociological factors were weaker (but still important), they needed to be complemented by functionalist factors (like demand spillovers) and by institutionalist factors (like concrete prospects for autonomy conferral) or a large group size. In all of these cases, the presence of a democratic institutional framework proved equally necessary.

When it comes to the increase of regionalist party demands, demands radicalised until independence demands in large sub-state communities when strong sociological factors (their distinctiveness and political grievances) were present, and when demands for legislative autonomy were not met for a substantial amount of time. Classifying this 'demand frustration' in a theoretical strand is a bit difficult because one can think of it as a sociological factor when relating it to political grievances (as I did in chapter 2), or as a rational-choice factor when thinking of it as a strategic choice of regionalist party elites to increase political pressure on the central government. When considering that both mechanisms are probably at work at the same time, one can speak of a combination of sociological and rational-choice factors here, with an important institutional context because the presence of democracy proved once more relevant. In sub-state communities where sociological factors were of intermediate strength, they needed to be complemented by functionalist factors (like spillovers from other demands or statutes) or by institutionalist factors (like non-requested increases of the own statutes) for regionalist party demands to increase. The presence of democratic institutions remained a necessary condition for these cases.

The disappearing of regionalist party demands, finally, can be related on the one hand to the failure of the necessary institutional context: the breakdown of democratic institutions with competitive elections. On the other hand, it can follow a combination of institutionalist factors (the realisation of regionalist parties' autonomy demands) and rational-choice factors (the absence of strategic repositioning of regionalist parties' main political stake).

When comparing these results to those of the existing studies in the field, one can see that sociological theories see their importance for the rise and evolution of regionalist parties largely confirmed. Both sociological distinctiveness and political grievances proved indeed very important starting points, or what I called earlier the 'raw material', for the creation and evolution of regionalist party demands. Functionalist theories, in turn, see their importance confirmed when sociological factors are of intermediate strength. It is then when spillovers from strong to weaker regionalist cases occurs. The same could be said for institutionalist theories. One should note, though, that they have not only been important when sociological factors are of intermediate strength, but also for providing the institutional context in which regionalist party demands could rise and evolve: a democratic system with competitive elections. Rational-choice factors, although they appear important in constellations leading to the increase or disappearing of regionalist party demands, tended to be less frequently of importance in the analyses of the evolution of regionalist party demands. This does not mean, however, that they would not be important for regionalist party dynamics. On the one hand, we will see below that they are of outmost importance for the competition of regionalist parties with traditional ones. On the other hand, there are some rational-choice considerations, like the motivations behind regionalist parties' changing positions, that could not be fully tested in this research.

Traditional party demands. When turning to the rise and evolution of traditional party demands, we see in the cases under study that sociological factors were once more of importance but that they needed to be complemented to a larger extent by rational-choice, functionalist and institutionalist factors.

Traditional party demands for legislative autonomy came into existence when sociological factors (distinctiveness and grievances) were strong and when they were complemented either with a rational-choice factor (the presence of a regionalist threat) or with a functionalist one (the spillover of other autonomy demands). When sociological factors were weaker, they needed to be complemented by both functionalist (demand spillovers) and institutionalist factors (concrete prospects for an autonomy conferral). In all of these constellations, the political system needed to be democratic, underlining once more the importance of the institutional context.

The increase of traditional party demands followed a similar pattern. They increased indeed in larger sub-state communities when sociological factors (their distinctiveness and grievances) were strong and complemented by rational-choice factors (regionalist party threats). When sociological factors were of intermediate or weaker strength, they needed to be complemented respectively by institutionalist (institutional dissatisfaction) or functionalist factors (spillovers from other demands or statutes). Non-requested institutional increases were equally sufficient for the increase of traditional party demands. The presence of democratic institutions was also important for each of these constellations.

The disappearing of traditional party demands, finally, relied on a single institutionalist factor, or its absence to be more precise: the breakdown of the necessary democratic context with competitive elections.

The comparison of these results to those of existing studies shows that attention that the latter paid to rational-choice factors is well deserved because the inter-party competition between regionalist and traditional parties proved indeed an important factor for explaining the evolution of traditional party demands. The combination of these factors to sociological, functionalist and institutionalist factors should be underlined though. Regionalist threats are, as we have seen before, indeed most likely to be strong in sociologically distinct and aggrieved sub-state communities. One could furthermore expect that traditional parties are more receptive to autonomy claims in such communities. Constellations with functionalist spillovers have proven as relevant for the demand evolution of traditional parties as for that of regionalist ones, although the underlying mechanisms might be slightly different. Regionalist parties who see other sub-state communities having higher demands or statutes can be expected to increase their own demands following motives of equal consideration. Traditional parties, in turn, can either increase their demands following such motives of equal consideration, or because they are under regionalist threat and find it more easily acceptable to endorse levels of autonomy once they are already demanded (or received) elsewhere. Institutionalist factors, finally, have shown to be important both in different constellations (when current institutions proved unsatisfying or in case of non-requested increases) and as an important background condition: the presence of democratic institutions for the rise and increase of traditional party demands, and its absence for their disappearance.

Autonomy statutes. In the analyses of the conferral and evolution of autonomy statutes, variables from various theoretical strands appear to interact in the cases under study at the different moments of the process.

Autonomy statutes were conferred when sociological factors (distinctiveness and political grievances) were strong and complemented with rational-choice factors (regionalist party threats and traditional party support). When sociological factors were weaker, they needed to be complemented with functionalist (spillovers from other statutes) and institutionalist (symmetrical conferral) factors. In both cases, a democratic institutional context was necessary.

The increase of autonomy statutes appeared under a similar pattern. Either sociological factors (distinctiveness and grievances) were strong and complemented by rational-choice factors (regionalist party threats and traditional party support), or it were functionalist (spillover from other statutes) and institutionalist factors (symmetrically conceived increases) who drove the increase. In the latter case, sociological factors did exceptionally not appear to be of importance anymore. In all constellations, a democratic institutional context proved necessary.

The disappearing of autonomy statutes, finally, was related either to the breakdown of this democratic institutional context, or to a rational choice-factor, namely the presence of a serious secessionist threat.

When comparing these results to those of the existing studies in the field, one sees the importance of sociological theories confirmed in cases of strong distinctiveness and grievances, but also that these are far from sufficient on their own and require to be

complemented by factors from the other theoretical stands. Rational-choice factors are a very important complement in this respect because both regionalist and traditional party demands appear necessary for strong sociologically distinct sub-state communities to obtain and increase autonomy. That secessionist threats can be sufficient for autonomy statues to be withdrawn further confirms the theories' importance. Functionalist factors start to be important once at least one sub-state community in the state has received autonomous institutions and complement both sociological and institutionalist factors. The latter appear important both for the evolution of institutions once they are in place, and as a background condition insofar as a democratic political space is required for the conferral and increase of legislative autonomy, and can explain its disappearing when absent.

Joint consideration and comparison to initial expectations. When looking back at these lessons for each theoretical strand, a broader cross-theoretical picture can be identified. While sociological theories emerged as crucial for driving regionalist party demands, it was shown that the stronger they were, the less they needed to be complemented by other factors. For traditional party demands, they were important insofar as pressures by regionalist parties tended to be stronger in sociologically distinct communities, and insofar as traditional parties were probably more inclined to respond to regionalist pressures in sociologically distinct communities. Factors from economic theories were retained in some constellations but appeared often rather as a complement to sociological distinctiveness than as a distinguishing factor on their own. This confirms largely the reading of the existing literature. Functionalist theories and their spillover effects have proved important in almost all analysis – usually as a complementing explanatory factor for cases who followed the autonomy dynamics of strong regionalist ones. While factors from institutionalist theories have often interacted with functionalist factors and complemented them, the presence of democratic institutions has proven to be the most important scope condition for the rise and evolution of both regionalist and traditional autonomy demands and for the conferral of autonomy statutes. Rational-choice factors appeared at first of more limited importance for regionalist party demands, but it was shown that they were critical in the inter-party competition between regionalist and traditional parties, as well as for the conferral of autonomy when it required both regionalist party threats and traditional party support.

The summary in Table 30 that focusses on the rise and increase of the different outcomes under study shows that there are usually one or two paths combining sociological (and economic) with rational-choice factors, and one or two others combining sociological (and economic) with functionalist and/or institutionalist (and sometimes rational-choice) factors. When looking at the cases behind these two kinds of constellations, an interesting pattern appears. The former are often sub-state communities with strong sociological distinctiveness and political grievances that are sufficient for the creation of a regionalist party, and that are combined with rational-choice factors for the increase of regionalist party demands, for the rise and increase of traditional party demands as well as for the conferral and increase of autonomy statutes. The latter, in turn, are sub-state communities with intermediate or weaker sociological distinctiveness and political grievances and for whom

Table 30. Overview on the combination of different theoretical strands in the analyses of when autonomy demands and statutes arise and increase

Outcome		Path	Sociol. factors	Econ. factors	Funct. factors	Instit. factors	Rat.-ch. factors	Democr. scope	Cases
Regionalist party demands	Arise	1+2	●	(●)				(●)	Cat_1907, Bsq_1918, Bsq_1931, Bsq_1976, Cat_1931, Cat_1976, CIs_1932, CIs_1976, Fla_1919, Fla_1919, Fla_1954, Fla_1954, Gal_1931, Gal_1931, Gal_1977, Gal_1977, GsC_1929, Ire_1832, Ire_1870, Nav_1918, Nav_1931, Nav_1976, NIN_1921, Sco_1934
		3+4	●		●			●	Wls_1925, Ast_1987, BIs_1932, BIs_1977, BFr_1971, Cor_1967, GsC_1971, Val_1932, Val_1982, Wln_1964
		5	●		●	●		●	Ara_1978, Can_1978, Leo_1986
	Increase	1+2	●	●			●	(●)	Cat_2015, Fla_1936, Ire_1917, Wls_2003
		3	●		●			●	BIs_1995, BFr_1990, BFr_1994, BFr_2002, BFr_2014, Eng_2016, GsC_1977, GsC_1984, GsC_1990, GsC_1994, GsC_2002, Leo_1988, Leo_1997
		4	●		●	●		●	Ast_1997, And_1997, Ara_1997, Can_1997, Ext_1997, GsC_2014, Rio_1997, Val_1997, Wln_1971
Traditional party demands	Arise	1	●				●	●	Cat_1907, Bsq_1931, Bsq_1976, Cat_1931, Cat_1976, Fla_1964, Gal_1932, Nav_1976
		2+3	●	(●)	●			●	Gal_1977, And_1977, CIs_1932, CIs_1977, Nav_1931, Wls_1925
		4	●		●	●		●	Ara_1978, Ast_1978, BIs_1932, BIs_1978, BFl_1971, BFr_1971, ClM_1978, Cor_1998, Can_1978, CyL_1978, Ext_1978, GsC_1968, Mad_1978, Mur_1978, Rio_1978, Val_1932, Val_1978
	Increase	1	●				●	●	Bsq_1996, Cat_1997, Cat_2010, Fla_1977, Fla_1985, Fla_1992, Fla_1999, Fla_2007, Sco_2007, Sco_2014, Wls_1999, Wls_2013, Wls_2015
		2	●		●	●		●	GsC_1977, Wln_1971
		3+4	(●)		●			●	And_1997, Ara_1988, Ara_1997, Ast_1988, Ast_1997, BIs_1988, BIs_1997, BFl_1990, BFl_1994, BFl_2002, BFl_2014, BFr_1990, BFr_1994, BFr_2002, BFr_2014, ClM_1988, ClM_1997, CIs_1997, Can_1988, Can_1997, CyL_1988, CyL_1997, Ext_1988, Ext_1997, Gal_1997, GsC_1984, GsC_1990, GsC_1994, GsC_2002, GsC_2011, GsC_2014, Mad_1988, Mad_1997, Mur_1988, Mur_1997, Nav_1987, Nav_2007, Rio_1988, Rio_1997, Val_1997, Wln_1971, Wln_2014
Autonomy statutes	Arise	1	●				●	●	Bsq_1936, Bsq_1979, Cat_1932, Cat_1936, Cat_1979, Cat_2018, Fla_1971, Ire_1921, Sco_1998, Wls_2011
		2	●		●		●	●	And_1981, Ara_1982, Ast_1981, BIs_1982, ClM_1982, CIs_1982, Can_1982, CyL_1983, Ext_1983, Gal_1981, Mad_1982, Mur_1982, Nav_1982, Rio_1982, Val_1982
	Increase	1	●				●	●	Bsq_1996, Cat_1997, Cat_2010, Fla_1981, Fla_1990, Fla_1994, Fla_2002, Fla_2014, Sco_2012, Sco_2016, Wls_2014, Wls_2017
		2			●	●	●	●	And_1997, Ara_1992, Ara_1997, Ast_1992, Ast_1997, BIs_1992, BIs_1997, BFl_1994, BFl_2002, BFl_2014, BFr_1994, BFr_2002, BFr_2014, ClM_1992, ClM_1997, CIs_1997, Can_1992, Can_1997, CyL_1992, CyL_1997, Ext_1992, Ext_1997, Gal_1997, GsC_1990, GsC_1994, GsC_2002, GsC_2014, Mad_1992, Mad_1997, Mur_1992, Mur_1997, Rio_1992, Rio_1997, Val_1997

Note: ● = present in the path(s), (●) present in one of two otherwise similar paths.

the rise and increase of regionalist and traditional party demands as well as of autonomy statutes comes with functionalist spillovers or institutional symmetries from the former cases, and can be complemented with rational-choice factors.

The preceding results, although more specified, tend to be in line with the four general expectations formulated in chapter 2. First, we see indeed that the first autonomy demands in one or several large, distinctive and aggrieved sub-state communities in a country came up following the combination of sociological (and economic) and rational-choice factors, i.e. when distinctive identities and grievances were mobilised by regionalist parties and, through their electoral threat, pushed a traditional party to also defend the autonomy cause. State actors accepted to confer autonomy to these sociologically distinct communities when the regionalist pressure was high enough and when the autonomy cause was joined by a traditional party. Beyond the initial expectations, we saw that, when not accepted, autonomy demands in such communities radicalised up to independence demands. Secondly, as expected, we see that the autonomy demands coming up subsequently in one or several smaller or less distinctive and aggrieved sub-state communities were driven by a combination of functionalist, institutionalist and rational-choice factors – sometimes complemented with sociological and economic factors, i.e. through the spillover of autonomy demands and statutes from the large and strongly distinctive communities. The more distinctive or aggrieved a community, the less factors enabling the spillover were required. Thirdly, it was confirmed that the evolution of autonomy demands and statutes in large, strongly distinctive and aggrieved sub-state communities comes with a combination of sociological, economic and rational-choice factors in already existing institutional environments, i.e. through the persistence of regionalist party threats and traditional party support that demand additional competences once statutes are in place. Fourthly, the evolution of autonomy demands and statutes in one or several smaller or less distinctive and aggrieved sub-state communities were driven by a combination of functionalist, institutionalist and rational-choice factors – again sometimes complemented with sociological and economic factors. I.e., as expected, that increasing demands and statutes from large and strongly distinctive communities spilled over to them and that the spillovers were eased in the presence of greater distinctiveness and grievances.

There is thus a kind of two-step process in the dynamics of sub-state mobilisation and restructuring that will be explored in greater detail in the next sub-section. A first empirical argument of the thesis at this stage, however, is that in the cases under study, the rise and increase of autonomy demands and statutes were driven by a combination of sociological (and economic) and rational-choice factors for strongly distinctive and aggrieved sub-state communities, and by a combination of sociological, functionalist, institutionalist and rational-choice factors for sub-state communities with weaker distinctiveness and grievances, to which the demands and statutes of the former have spilled over.

While these lessons confirm many of the results of existing studies on the importance of factors from different theoretical strands, the utility of this comparison comes with the interactions that appear between the theories. We see indeed not only that factors from

different theoretical strands matter but also in which combination, in which cases and at which stages of the demand and conferral process. Furthermore, initial expectations and intuitions receive finally empirical proofs. Beyond existing knowledge, the existence of two types of sub-state communities and the different combinations of factors that are relevant for their evolution have been identified. The precise unfolding of these two set of cases and their articulation is the subject of the next sub-section.

A final note in this cross-theoretical discussion should be dedicated to those factors that were not retained in any of the analyses and to the outcomes that were not observed. For the factors, this was the case for 'regionalist competitors', i.e. the presence of other regionalist parties beside the largest one, which were expected to lead the latter to increase its autonomy demand. It was also the case for the 'expected electoral (ally) success', i.e. the expectation of governing parties that their regional branch (or a party with the same left-right stance) will be in power at the regional level. This should have contributed to the conferral of legislative autonomy and its increase. Finally, there was the 'reliance on regionalist support', i.e. a government needing the support of regionalist parties to stay in power, which was expected to also contribute to the conferral and increase of legislative autonomy. None of these factors was indeed found relevant in the analysis for which they were expected to. This can have two reasons. On the one hand, a factor can be minimised (not retained) in the analysis of sufficiency if it appears that other (combinations of) factors are sufficient for consistently explaining the occurrence of the outcome without this particular factor (see chapter 4, 3.b). On the other hand, a factor is not retained when it presents contradictory evidence, i.e. when it is present both when the outcome occurs and does not occur.

Expected electoral (ally) success and reliance on regionalist support were both associated with their expected outcomes but they were minimised because the other constellations were sufficient for explaining the outcome without them. Does this mean that they do not contribute to the conferral and increase of autonomy statutes? No. It means that, based on the cross-case evidence, we see that the conferrals and increases can be expected to have taken place without them. Yet, they may very well have contributed to and further facilitated these outcomes.

The presence of regionalist competitors, in turn, has been shown to present contradictory case evidence. The condition was associated with the increase of regionalist party demands in Flanders (1985) when the *Vlaams Blok* (VB) competed with the *Volksunie*, in Flanders (2002) when the VB competed with the N-VA and in Galicia (2016) when *En Marea* competed with the *Bloque Nacionalista Galego*. There were other comparable cases, however, like Flanders (1986-1987, 2003-2013, 2019-2010), the Basque Country (1978-2020) and Catalonia (2010-2014) where the main regionalist party was also challenged by a more radical one but did not increase its demand. This contradictory evidence does thus not allow for a conclusive statement on the importance of this condition and further research would be necessary to re-examine why the mechanism apparently only worked in some cases but not in others. Given that regionalist parties do not only compete with one other on the autonomy dimension, a deeper look into the problem should also take into account the inter-

party competition on other political dimensions (e.g. left-right) as a potential explanation for why positions on the autonomy question do not radicalise, i.e. that the parties compete rather on the former than on the latter.


Finally, there was one type of outcome that was not truly observed in the three cases under study: the decrease of regionalist party demands, of traditional party demands and of autonomy statutes themselves. While in some sub-state communities, there were instances where the largest popular support among regionalist parties changed from a radical to a less radical one – which was captured by my operationalisation of regionalist party demands as a demand moderation – no true demand moderations within the same party were observed. Once autonomy demands or statutes came up, they remained indeed either constant, increased or disappeared totally. But there was no gradual decrease. Two questions derive from this observation. First, one may wonder if there is a selection bias among the cases or, put differently, if such decreases are observed in other similar cases. To my knowledge, even in other cases of centrifugal sociological decentralisation like Italy or France, no such demand or statute decreases have occurred. One may thus want to conclude that in such cases, autonomy demands and statutes do never decrease. Secondly, however, one may also wonder to which extent the cases and phenomena can be considered to be at the end of their development process or, put differently, if decreases could be observed in the future. As alluded to in the previous chapters, it is indeed likely that future evolutions take place in some of the cases. The current debates among a seventh Belgian state reform in which some competences could be transferred back to the central state, while others are decentralised are one example – although their actual realisation remains to be seen. More generally, the current findings reflect the development processes in the three countries as of today and may need to be confirmed in the future with updated evidence. To this end, a reflection on possible evolutions follows at the end of this chapter.

b) The waves of centrifugal sociological decentralisation

The preceding cross-theoretical assessment has shown that there are two important cross-theoretical patterns driving the rise and increase of sub-state autonomy demands and statutes: In sub-state communities with strong sociological distinctiveness and political grievances, it were these sociological factors that, combined with rational-choice choice factors like regionalist electoral threats, could explain the rise and increase of autonomy demands and statutes. In sub-state communities with intermediate or weaker forms of sociological distinctiveness and political grievances, it were functionalist demands and statute spillovers that, together with institutional consequences and rational-choice factors like traditional party politics, could explain the rise and increase of autonomy demands and statutes.

When exploring these two patterns in a more sequential way, i.e. looking for their temporal progression and how they mutually influenced each other, as summarised in Figure 10, the rise and increase of autonomy demands and statutes can be interpreted as having

Figure 10. Graphical representation of the results and how they can be understood as waves of sub-state mobilisation and restructuring



proceeded in two 'waves'. By waves, I mean important stages in the political process. More precisely, I refer to two stages of which the first has set the ground for the second and influenced it in an important manner.

Wave 1. At the beginning of the sub-state mobilisation process, we see regionalist parties coming up in sub-state communities with strong sociological distinctiveness and political grievances once the political system becomes democratic. This happened in cases like Flanders (1919, 1954), the German-speaking Community (1929), the Basque Country (1918, 1931, 1976), the Canary Islands (1932, 1976), Catalonia (1907, 1931, 1976), Galicia (1931, 1977), Navarre (1918, 1931, 1976), Ireland (1832, 1870), Scotland (1934) or Wales (1925).

These parties demanded legislative autonomy for their sub-state community and, when they perform electorally well enough to constitute a serious electoral threat, at least one traditional party endorsed the autonomy cause and also demanded legislative autonomy for the sub-state community. This was the case in Flanders (1964), the Basque Country (1931, 1976), Catalonia (1907, 1931, 1976), the Canary Islands (1932, 1977), Galicia (1932, 1977), Navarre (1931, 1976) and Ireland (1885). For Scotland and Wales, the *Liberal Party* had already claimed devolution statutes since 1885 and 1925 respectively. The mechanism described above, however, was observed in the 1970s when the *Labour Party* endorsed legislative devolution for Scotland and administrative devolution for Wales following the electoral successes of the *Scottish National Party* and *Plaid Cymru*.

When legislative autonomy was not conferred for a substantial amount of time to large sub-state communities with strong socio-economic distinctiveness and grievances, the regionalist party demands for legislative autonomy radicalised until independence demands. This was the case in Flanders (1936), Ireland (1917) and Wales (2003).

For legislative autonomy to be conferred, the traditional parties supporting the conferral of legislative autonomy needed to come to government or exert sufficient electoral pressure together with regionalist parties on the central government. This was the case in Flanders (1971), the Basque Country (1936, 1979), Catalonia (1932, 1979), Ireland (1921), Scotland (1998) and Wales (2011).

This first 'wave' of sub-state mobilisation and restructuring corresponds to the first combination of sociological (distinctiveness and grievances) and rational-choice factors (regionalist party threat and traditional party support). By enabling the rise of regionalist and traditional party demands, they led to the first set of autonomy demands within these countries. By enabling the conferral of legislative autonomy, they led to institutional precedents. These first sets of demands and statutes laid the ground for a second wave of sub-state mobilisation and restructuring. On the one hand, this touched sub-state communities with intermediate or weaker sociological distinctiveness that followed the example of stronger ones. On the other hand, it was the first step to the increase of their own statutes.

Wave 2. Sub-state communities with intermediate sociological distinctiveness and political grievances saw regionalist parties coming up to claim equal consideration when the autonomy conferral to the aforementioned communities became imminent or when it already

occurred. The concrete prospects obtaining an own statute because the constitution allowed for it or the size of a sub-state community further contributed to the regionalist party creation in sub-state communities with weaker sociological distinctiveness and political grievances. Cases in which this happened were the German-speaking Community (1971), the Francophone community in Brussels (1971), Andalusia (1976), Aragon (1978), Asturias (1987), the Balearic Islands (1977), Cantabria (1978), Extremadura (1980), La Rioja (1982), León (1986), Valencia (1932, 1982) or Cornwall (1967). In the case of Wallonia (1964), the conferral of autonomy to sub-state entities was not really imminent. Instead, the rise of the *Rassemblement Wallon* can rather be seen as a reaction to the Flemish regionalist demands and as in defence of Walloon interests through own legislative autonomy.

Autonomy demands spilled also over to traditional parties at this stage of the process. The spillover could occur in different ways, however. On the one hand, there were cases like Andalusia (1977), the Balearic Islands (1978), Cornwall (1998) and Wallonia (1968) where traditional party demands for legislative autonomy followed those of regionalist parties, or cases like the Francophone community in Brussels (1971), Aragon (1978) and Cantabria (1978) where traditional and regionalist party demands arose more or less at the same time. On the other hand, there were cases like the German-speaking Community (1968), Asturias (1978), Extremadura (1978), La Rioja (1978) and Valencia (1978) where traditional parties demanded legislative autonomy before the coming-up of regionalist parties, or cases like Castile and León (1978), Castilla-la Mancha (1978), Madrid (1978) and Murcia (1978) where traditional parties started demanding legislative autonomy and where regionalist parties never came-up later.

Legislative autonomy was conferred to these communities when traditional parties supported the conferral on the regional level and managed to convince their national counterparts to confer autonomy in a symmetrical manner when in government. This was the case in the German-speaking Community (1983), in Wallonia (1971) and in the remaining Spanish autonomous communities (1981-1983). This can be considered as the beginning of the second wave and corresponds to the first interaction of sociological, functionalist, institutionalist and rational-choice factors.

The second wave went also on in the cases with stronger sociological distinctiveness and political grievances where the demands of regionalist parties were either not met or increased further in response to the evolutions in smaller or less distinctive and aggrieved communities. Through ongoing electoral threats, they pushed at least one traditional party to increase its autonomy demand, which was the case in Flanders (1977, 1985, 1922, 1999, 2007), the Basque Country (1996), Catalonia (1997, 2010), Scotland (2007, 2014) and Wales (1999, 2013, 2015).

When this traditional party came to power or when the joint political pressure of traditional and regionalist parties on the central government was sufficient, the autonomy statutes in Flanders (1981, 1990, 1994, 2002, 2014), the Basque Country (1996), Catalonia (1997, 2010), Scotland (2012, 2016) and Wales (2014, 2017) were increased. This can be regarded as the pursuing of the second wave and relied on a second combination of

sociological and rational-choice factors. Although it could not be tested explicitly in the analysis, the institutional spaces that were created through the first autonomy conferrals have most probably facilitated the ongoing articulation of autonomy demands through electoral campaigns for regional elections or through debates in the regional political arena.

These increases, or the differences that still persisted between the statutes of different sub-state communities led to another continuation of the second wave when both regionalist and traditional parties in sub-state communities with intermediate or weaker sociological distinctiveness increased their demand by claiming equal consideration in certain policy domains that appear important to them. In the preceding analysis, I have shown that this was the case for certain politically salient competences (often in the education or social and sanitary sector), while differences for other competences did not lead to demands for equal consideration. Regionalist party demands increased in this sense in the Francophone community in Brussels (1990, 1994, 2002, 2014), the German-speaking Community (1977, 1984, 1990, 1994, 2002), the Balearic Islands (1995) and England (2016). Among traditional parties, such increases took place in the Spanish slow-track communities in 1988, in Navarre (2007), in both the Francophone and Flemish communities in Brussels (1990, 1994, 2002, 2014) and in the German-speaking Community (1984, 1990, 1994, 2002, 2011). In addition, increases in autonomy demands among traditional parties could also come from the acknowledgement of institutional shortcomings (like the lack of a directly elected assembly or an own executive) when combined with regionalist threats at the regional level, like in Wallonia (1971) or the German-speaking Community (1977).

Central governments agreed to follow these autonomy demands and increase the statutes of sub-state communities when the competences concerned uncontested policy areas that had already been conferred to other sub-state entities. This was the case among the Spanish slow-track communities in 1992. Alternatively, the autonomy statutes of sub-state communities with lower degrees of sociological distinctiveness or political grievances could also be enlarged when communities with strong distinctiveness obtained additional competences that were, for reasons of symmetry, also conferred to the former. This was the case in the Francophone and Flemish communities in Brussels (1994, 2002, 2014), in the German-speaking Community (1990, 1994, 2002, 2014), Wallonia (1971) as well as in 1997 for Andalusia, Aragon, Asturias, the Balearic Islands, the Canary Islands, Cantabria, Castile and León, Castilla-la Mancha, Galicia, Extremadura, Madrid, Murcia, La Rioja and Valencia.

When there were competences among these symmetrical conferrals that had not been requested by regionalist or traditional parties, they were subsequently endorsed and let to demand increases. This was the case in Andalusia, Aragon, Asturias, Cantabria, Extremadura, La Rioja and Valencia in 1997, as well as in Wallonia (1971) and the German-speaking Community (2014) for both regionalist and traditional parties. In Wallonia (2014) as well as in 1997 in the Balearic Islands, Castile and León, Castilla-la Mancha, the Canary Islands, Galicia, Madrid and Murcia for traditional parties only. This further continuation of the second wave corresponds to the second interaction of sociological, functionalist, institutionalist and rational-choice factors.

The preceding developments lead me to the second empirical argument of the thesis. Namely that the dynamics of centrifugal sociological decentralisation can be usefully understood as waves, the first of which comes with autonomy demands and statutes in sub-state communities with strong sociological distinctiveness that, in turn, incite a second wave among sub-state communities with weaker (yet present) forms of distinctiveness, as well as their own extension. The utility of this understanding comes with a long-term perspective on sub-state mobilisation and restructuring and shows us not only when factors from different theoretical strains matter but also in which combination, in which cases and at which stages of the process. At the same time, this reading leaves two important questions open. First, does the conferral of the first wave accommodate or exacerbate sub-state autonomy dynamics when leading to the second wave? Secondly, it has not been specified where the second wave stops. Put differently, how far do spillover and institutionalist effects inciting for further demand and statute increases go? The next two sections are dedicated to these issues.

2. The problem of the second wave: what, if anything, resolves the paradox of federalism?

The question of whether the conferral of sub-state autonomy accommodates or exacerbates tensions between social groups in a state is not a new one. While different names have been given to the "dilemma of recognition" (De Zwart, 2005), the "paradox of autonomy" (L. M. Anderson, 2004) or the "paradox of federalism" (Erk & Anderson, 2009), authors agree that the conferral of sub-state institutions has the potential to both appease and aggravate tensions between state and sub-state entities. The conferral can appease tensions because it responds to (some) sub-state community demands, recognises the existence of diversity within the state and provides these communities with an enhanced access to political power. At the same time, this recognition can perpetuate social cleavages by institutionalising them. The institutionalisation of legislative autonomy, in turn, can both incite further competence conferrals and provide sub-state communities with enhanced resources to demand them.

In the introduction to this study, I have presented this paradox as the main puzzle of the research. Beyond the descriptive relevance to know what drives decentralisation, the varying degrees of sub-state mobilisation and restructuring in cases of centrifugal sociological decentralisation appeared indeed puzzling when faced with the same paradox. On this basis, I derived four main questions: (1a) When do legislative autonomy demands come up, i.e. where is the starting point of the phenomenon? (2a) When do states accept to confer legislative autonomy, i.e. when do states give-in to these demands despite knowing the paradox? (1b) When do legislative autonomy demands evolve, i.e. when do they get appeased or exacerbated? (2b) When do states reform autonomy statutes, i.e. when do states further give-in to the demands despite knowing the paradox?

The first question has received a twofold answer in the preceding analyses. On the one hand, there were the autonomy demands that came up through the sub-state mobilisation in large and strongly distinctive and aggrieved communities. On the other hand, there were smaller or less distinctive and aggrieved communities to which the demands or already

obtained statutes of the former communities spilled over. The starting point of the paradox are thus regional identities and grievances that are mobilised by political actors and interests, whose dynamics can spill over to other communities.

This leaves us wondering about the counterfactual though, i.e. when autonomy demands did not come up? On the aggregate level, all sub-state communities did at some point demand some degree of legislative autonomy because the presence of autonomy demands was inherent to the case selection.[53] I aimed indeed at studying cases that had either demand or obtained autonomy in order to capture the constructed nature of social groups through manifest group-based political behaviour or institutional realities. And within those groups that received autonomy without pre-existing autonomy demands, such demands came up later. On the longitudinal level, however, there were the historical counterfactuals, i.e. cases in which not all conditions leading to the later rise of autonomy demands were yet united. The absence of these combinations of conditions can thus be seen at the origin of (yet) absent autonomy demands.[54]

The second question of when states accept to confer autonomy has received a similar twofold answer in the preceding analyses. Again, there was a first set of large and strongly distinctive and aggrieved communities that obtained legislative autonomy following substantive regionalist threats that were joined by traditional party support. A second set of smaller or less distinctive and aggrieved communities, in turn, received their statutes in response to demands or conferrals that had spilled over from the former cases. One might thus be inclined to conclude that there is a general tendency in countries undergoing centrifugal sociological decentralisation to respond positively to autonomy demands despite facing the paradox that these demands might exacerbate subsequently.

A look at the negative cases, however, nuances this inference. In Cornwall, León and England, for example, no autonomy statutes have been conferred. In the English case, this was attributed to the shortness of the UKIP demand and the lack of cross-party support. In León, the UPL demand, although of longer duration, was not perceived as a serious regionalist threat and not joined by any traditional party neither.[55] In the case of Cornwall where the regionalist demands of MK date back to the late 1960s and were joined since the late 1990s by the *LibDems*, the conferral of legislative institutions seems already more likely. As of today, however, the autonomy demands were not able to exercise sufficient pressure nor to provide strategic incentives for the national government to confer autonomy. In addition to these contemporary cases, there are also historical instances where autonomy demands were not met over large periods of time. In Flanders from 1919-1945, in Ireland from 1870-1920 and in Wales from 1925-2010, regionalist demands for legislative autonomy were not met by the state. The latter cases, taken together with the Cornish one, nuance the previous conclusion that states facing sub-state mobilisation will always (immediately) opt for the

[53] The exception of the Londonian case has been commented on in chapter 2, section 4.b.

[54] The methodological caveats of asymmetrical causality in QCA, as set-out in chapter 4, section 4.d, should be kept in mind.

[55] Only in the Province of León did the socialist party support it, but not in Zamora and Salamanca.

decentralisation option of the paradox. Before doing so, there needs indeed to be significant distinctiveness and regionalist pressure on the sub-state level and incentives for spillovers.

This brings us to the third question, namely what happens to autonomy demands when met, and what happens to them when not met. In the preceding analyses, it was shown that demands increase both when autonomy is conferred and when it is not conferred. However, the increases of autonomy demands after the conferral of legislative institutions appeared much more gradual. In large and strongly distinctive and aggrieved communities, they increase until today and some demands appear to be not yet met. In smaller or less distinctive and aggrieved communities, autonomy demands increased after initial autonomy conferrals. Following a several round of conferral, however, many of them did no longer increase. When demands for legislative autonomy were not met over a substantive amount of time in large and strongly distinctive and aggrieved communities, in turn, the demand increases were much more radical and went until independence demands. This happened in the three aforementioned cases: in Ireland in 1917, in Flanders in 1936 and in Wales in 2003. When autonomy demands were not met in smaller or less distinctive and aggrieved communities like Cornwall and León, they did not radicalise until independence demands but appeared to simply persist rather than fade away.

For the paradox, this shows that despite both the conferral and non-conferral of legislative autonomy lead to demand increases, the latter proved to lead to much more radical increases in large and strongly aggrieved and distinctive communities. In smaller or less distinctive and aggrieved communities, autonomy demands can be accommodating after several conferral and reform waves. In the case of non-conferral, however, they persist. As for the silencing of autonomy demands in large and strongly distinctive and aggrieved communities, the preceding analyses showed that this only happens in dictatorships.

Finally, the question of when autonomy statutes are reformed towards further increases was shown to be above all related to the persistence of the conditions that led to the initial conferrals. For large and strongly distinctive and aggrieved communities, that is the persistence of regionalist party threats mobilising the community's distinctiveness and grievances. For smaller or less distinctive and aggrieved communities, that is the persistence of demand and statute spillovers. A look at the negative cases shows that once autonomy demands do no longer increase in smaller and less distinctive and aggrieved communities, further autonomy reforms also tend to stop. In larger and strongly distinctive and aggrieved communities, autonomy demands still exceed autonomy statutes as of today and an end of the process is not in sight.

These lessons of the results for the paradox of federalism, summarised in Table 31, leave us with both a sobering and an encouraging conclusion. The sobering conclusion is that the paradox cannot entirely be resolved. The encouraging conclusion is that the findings of the present study provide us with a better understanding of the consequences that different state decisions have for the exacerbation of sub-state autonomy demands and therefore help taking a decision when faced with the dilemma.

Table 31. Consequences of states' autonomy decisions for the demands in the studied cases

State decision	Consequences for autonomy demands	
	Accommodate/Silence	Exacerbate
Confer autonomy	Not (yet) reached in large and strongly distinctive communities After two waves of conferral and increase in smaller or less distinctive communities	Incremental increases in large and strongly distinctive communities
Not confer autonomy	Never, except in dictatorships	Radicalisation up to independence demands in large and strongly distinctive communities Persistent autonomy demands in smaller or less distinctive communities

The paradox of federalism cannot be resolved for two reasons. One the one hand, when we look at what has been described earlier as the second wave of centrifugal sociological decentralisation and at the analysis on which its interpretation relies, we find ample evidence that the conferral of legislative autonomy to one sub-state community in a country incites both an increase of its own autonomy demands and the spillover to autonomy demands among other communities in the country. While several conferral and extension rounds seem to accommodate some smaller or less distinctive and aggrieved sub-state communities, further autonomy demands in large and strongly distinctive and aggrieved sub-state communities persist. Taken solely, this could lead one to conclude that the conferral of legislative autonomy exacerbates the relations between state and sub-state entities. On the other hand, however, we have seen that not conferring legislative autonomy to large sub-state communities with strong socio-economic distinctiveness and political grievances leads the latter to radicalise their demands from autonomy to independence demands. In smaller or less distinctive and aggrieved communities, unmet demands simply persist. Taken together, this underlines that whatever choice the central government takes – i.e. to accommodate or not to accommodate autonomy demands – its decision will most likely lead to an increase of autonomy demands within large and strongly distinctive sub-state entities. Within smaller or less distinctive and aggrieved ones, the demands will at least persist.

Yet, despite the unresolvability of the dilemma, the findings of the study provide us with evidence on which one may base good reasons to opt for one option rather than the other. If one considers indeed that the non-conferral of legislative autonomy leads to a radicalisation of sub-state autonomy demands up-until independence claims within large and strongly distinctive and aggrieved sub-state communities, while the conferral leads to more moderate and incremental increases of sub-state autonomy demands among different sub-state communities, there are probably good reasons to prefer the latter over the former.

Based on the consideration above, a third empirical argument of the thesis is that the paradox of federalism needs to be acknowledged to a large extent as a political dilemma that cannot be fully resolved because both the conferral and non-conferral of sub-state autonomy lead to an increase of autonomy demands; but that the non-conferral of sub-state autonomy

can be expected to lead to a greater exacerbation of autonomy demands in large and strongly distinctive and aggrieved sub-state communities, while the non-conferral of autonomy in smaller or less distinctive and aggrieved sub-state communities appeared to lead to the persistence of the autonomy demands that conferrals accommodated after gradual increases.


In addition, we have seen that the political grievances among sub-state communities contribute in an important manner to the rise and increase of their autonomy demands. The recognition of sub-state diversity and the sharing of political power seem crucial to appease these tensions. How far the conferral of sub-state autonomy needs to go and how long the appeasement of these grievances takes, however, are questions that are beyond the reach of the present research. The 'problem of the second wave' is indeed still an ongoing evolution in the three countries under study. Yet, there are a few elements that provide us with hints as to when the second wave could stop and what a third one could look like.

3. Towards a third wave? Sub-state autonomy dynamics in the 21st century

The question of how far the increase and spillover of autonomy demands and statutes will go has attracted less attention among existing scholarship than the paradox of federalism. Most probably, this comes with the partially predictive nature of the question, which many political scientists – me included – are at unease with. Given that recent evolutions in the cases under study provide us with interesting elements on which to base some expectations, however, I will nevertheless develop a few of them.

As explained earlier, Toubeau and Massetti (2013) have identified the 'open-endedness' as one characteristic of territorial restructuring, i.e. that reforms of multi-level institutions are "without any over-arching design or a specific destination" (p. 301). This means that the evolution of reforms has no predefined end-goal, that reforms can take place both towards de- and re-centralisation, and that evolutions can go back and forth at all stages of the process. While I subscribe to this characterisation, there are four possible evolutions that seem plausible to me in the years to come, depending on the cases under study: (i) partial de-federalisation, (ii) quasi-confederalisation, (iii) independence and (iv) differentiated de- and re-federalisation, as illustrated in Figure 11.

Figure 11. Possible evolutions of the waves of centrifugal sociological decentralisation



A first scenario of evolution is what I called 'partial de-federalisation'. That means that after the decentralisation of a substantial amount of legislative competences and a few possible extensions, both regionalist and traditional parties within a sub-state community are satisfied with the obtained degree of autonomy and there are no further evolutions. I referred to 'federalisation' to qualify a process in which political powers have been transferred from the state to sub-state entities and that stopped with both entities detaining a substantial amount of competences (as opposed to 'confederalism', see below). I called it 'de-federalisation' to emphasise that the process only goes towards decentralisation (as opposed to differentiated processes, see below). I called if 'partial', to highlight that somewhere in the second wave of centrifugal sociological decentralisation, the autonomy demands of a sub-state community are satisfied and that the process stops there. Among the cases under study, the so-called non-historic autonomous communities in Spain present signs of such a possible evolution. In most of them, there are no (or only little) further autonomy demands and one could expect that the process stops there (or after a few further small enlargements). In this case, what would be interesting for further research to study is why sub-state communities come to be satisfied with a certain level of competences.

A second scenario of evolution is what I called 'quasi confederalisation'. It consists in the decentralisation of almost all legislative competences from the state to the sub-state level, with the preservation of the state for the joint-exercise of a few fundamental competences like defence, international relations or monetary policy. 'Confederalisation' implies that the second wave of centrifugal sociological decentralisation is pushed towards its end and that almost everything that can be decentralised without the state ceasing to exist is decentralised. The balance of power between the federal and federated entities is shifted entirely towards the federated entities on which the federal level is dependent. I called it 'quasi' because, despite such a state form fulfils most political characteristics of a confederation, legally speaking, a confederation requires the constituent units to be independent states (Watts, 2008; Behrendt & Bouhon, 2014). Among the cases under study, this is the current demand formulated by the Flemish *Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie* and by moderate members of the Basque *Partido Nacionalista Vasco*, while some of them also see it as an intermediate step on the way to independence. In the current state of affairs, it seems more likely as an option in Belgium than in Spain because the former has seen much more competences decentralised than the latter and because the position of the Spanish central state is much more hostile towards an advanced federalisation than the Belgian. As a dyadic federation with two major societal groups, the latter is in fact an aggregation of the positions of Flemish and Francophone parties, while Catalan or Basque nationalisms are in a minority position in the Spanish state. While the option has been effectively debated as a possible pathway for a future reform of the Belgian state, it is far from achieving unanimity and alternative differentiated proposals (see below) have also been put on the table.

A third scenario of evolution is that of 'independence'. It consists in the secession of a sub-state community from the state – be it through a unilateral or negotiated process. Independence implies to go beyond the second wave of centrifugal sociological

decentralisation and not to start any new one. This can happen through a radical evolution in the short-term or through a more progressive evolution in the longer term when, after the incremental conferral of almost all competences to a sub-state entity, it accedes to independence. Among the cases under study, this has been the demand formulated by the Flemish *Vlaams Belang*, by the Catalan *Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya*, *Junts per Catalunya* and some smaller Catalanist parties. It is also demanded by many members of the Basque PNV and *EH Bildu*, as well as by the *Scottish National Party* and the Welsh *Plaid Cymru*. Among these, the scenario seems most plausible in the case of Scotland. While a first independence referendum failed in 2014, the decision of the United Kingdom to leave the European Union has provided the ground for new discussions. In the 2016 Brexit referendum, a majority of Scottish voters had indeed voted against leaving the EU. Since then, the SNP demands a new referendum on Scottish independence. While a permission by the UK government would be needed for a new popular consultation to be held, the outcome remains uncertain in current opinion polls (The Guardian, 2021a). In the Belgian, Spanish and Welsh cases, the independence of sub-state entities seems unlikely in the short term. Either because the public support is insufficient, as in Flanders (Dodeigne & Niessen, 2019) and Wales (The Guardian, 2021b), or because the state is fiercely opposed to it, as in Spain (Cetrà & Harvey, 2019). This does not mean, however, that the scenario is impossible in the longer term.

A fourth and final scenario that seems plausible to me is what I called 'differentiated de- and re-federalisation'. It consists in decentralising and recentralising competences until achieving an equilibrium that seems desirable for both state and sub-state actors. Differentiated de- and re-centralisation implies going beyond the second wave and to start what could be qualified as a third wave of centrifugal sociological decentralisation. The rationale of reform is indeed no longer the increase of autonomy demands among sub-state communities with strong sociological distinctiveness and grievances whose demands and statutes spillover to other communities, but to find a reform model where competences can be de- and recentralised depending on the preferences of state and sub-state actors at different moments in time. It is called 'differentiated' because competences can be both de- and recentralised, and because different distribution equilibria can be found throughout time by different generations. Among the cases under study, the option of de- and recentralising competences has been debated by traditional and green parties in Belgium within both linguistic groups because they consider the current heterogeneous competence distribution as inefficient. It has been presented as the main alternative to the confederal model developed by the N-VA who would like to create further homogenisation by advanced decentralisation. While the option is above all discussed as a one-time solution for a seventh state reform, what I have in mind here is a long-term mechanism for differentiated federalisation. In the short term, it seems most likely to be realised in Belgium due to the current debates and the already advanced state of the country's decentralisation. It is plausible, however, that similar evolutions could take place in Spain or the United Kingdom as alternatives to the secessionism by some of their sub-state communities.

Following the considerations above, a fourth empirical argument of the thesis is that, based on the longer-term perspective of the analyses and the recent evolutions in the cases under study, there are four evolutions that seem plausible as a continuation of the two first waves of centrifugal sociological decentralisation: partial de-federalisation, quasi confederalisation, independence and differentiated de- and re-federalisation.

4. Conclusion on the comparative and cross-theoretical discussion of the results

In this chapter, I have discussed the results of the analyses with a threefold objective. First, I have compared the relevance of different theoretical strands for the different moments of sub-state mobilisation and restructuring. Secondly, I have discussed what the findings tell us about the consequence of sub-state autonomy for the accommodation and exacerbation of autonomy demands. Finally, I have developed a few expectations about future evolutions of the cases under study.

In the comparative theoretical assessment, I have shown that sub-state autonomy demands and statutes of the cases under study were driven by a combination of sociological (and economic) and rational-choice factors for strongly distinctive and aggrieved sub-state communities, and by a combination of sociological, functionalist, institutionalist and rational-choice factors for sub-state communities with weaker distinctiveness and grievances and to which the demands and statutes of the former have spilled over. The temporal sequencing of these developments led me to interpret the political dynamics through two 'waves', the first of which comes with autonomy demands and statutes in sub-state communities with strong sociological distinctiveness that, in turn, incite a second wave among sub-state communities with weaker (yet present) forms of distinctiveness, as well as their own extension. The identification of these theoretical combinations and the interpretation as waves have constituted the two first empirical arguments of the thesis.

When looking at the consequences of the findings for what I called 'the problem of the second wave' and what others have called 'the paradox of federalism', it has been shown that the paradox of federalism needs to be acknowledged to a large extent as a political dilemma that cannot be fully resolved because both the conferral and the non-conferral of demanded sub-state autonomy lead to an increase of existing autonomy demands. At the same time, the findings showed that the non-conferral of sub-state autonomy led to a greater exacerbation of sub-state autonomy demands in large and strongly distinctive and aggrieved sub-state communities. In smaller or less distinctive and aggrieved sub-state communities, the non-conferral of autonomy appeared to lead to the persistence of the autonomy demands that conferrals accommodated after gradual increases.

By reflecting what the results and recent political developments tell about expected evolutions of the second wave, I have shown that there are four plausible pathways: partial de-federalisation – which would lead to a halt of current decentralisation dynamics at some point some sub-state communities, quasi confederalisation – which would push current decentralisation dynamics at the end in other sub-state communities, independence – which

would lead to the accession to independence for some sub-state communities, and differentiated de- and re-federalisation – which would constitute a reform model where competences can be de- and recentralised depending on the preferences of state and sub-state actors at different moments in time. While the first and second pathway are evolutions within the second wave of centrifugal sociological decentralisation, the third pathway exits the wave-logic and the fourth pathway starts a new third wave. This has constituted the fourth empirical argument of the thesis.

Taken together, I have tried to develop with these three sections a new theoretical framework for interpreting and analysing the dynamics of sub-state mobilisation and restructuring through what I called 'the three waves of centrifugal sociological decentralisation'. The utility of the framework comes with its long-term perspective and its cross-theoretical base. More specifically, it showed not only 'that' but also in which combination, in which cases and at which moment of the process factors from different theoretical strands matter. By doing so, it also allowed one to understand how a first wave of autonomy demands and statutes led to a second one: through the spillover of demands and statutes on the one hand, and through the persistence of regionalist pressures on the other. Eventually, it opened informed perspectives on prospective evolutions that allow both political research and decision-makers to prepare for them. A few suggestions on how this can be done are developed in the concluding chapter that follows.

Chapter 10. Conclusion

When do sub-state communities demand autonomy and when do states accept to confer it? This question was the starting point of the present dissertation that aimed at comparing systematically under which conditions both sub-state mobilisation and sub-state restructuring occurred in three typical cases of centrifugal sociological decentralisation: Belgium, Spain and the United Kingdom. In this concluding chapter, I first summarise the main lessons that the research was able to provide on this question. I go on with a critical reflection on the limitations that these lessons are subject to. Finally, I close with some thoughts on the different ways that lie ahead to extend the research, further improve the way it was carried out and prepare for its implications.

1. When do sub-state communities demand and obtain autonomy

For much of modernity, the nation-state has been envisioned in Western Europe as the ideal locus for the exercise of political authority as well as for the political identification of the population over which the authority is exercised. Already for over a century, however, this conception has been challenged by political communities below the state level. These have become of increasing importance for many of their members' political identification and have been integrated in states' exercise of political authority following considerable autonomy demands that have been issued by various political actors on their behalf.

The most salient political dynamics on the sub-state level can be observed in what I described as 'cases of centrifugal sociological decentralisation'. These are sub-state entities that have been created with a departing trajectory from the state (rather than a coming-together trajectory), i.e. that have mobilised in favour of greater political autonomy for their sub-state entity. This mobilisation has taken place along sociological lines (rather than functional logics of scale), i.e. along cultural and linguistic diversity, geographical disparities or pre-existing institutional lines.

Among the political dynamics of sub-state mobilisation and restructuring, two moments were shown to be particularly salient and contested by state and sub-state actors: (i) the shift from administrative to legislative autonomy, and (ii) the subsequent extension of competences over different policy fields. The former entrusts sub-state entities with the institutional depth not only to implement but also to truly develop own regional public policy, which – together with own institutions – contribute to the development of own political spaces and identities. The latter, in turn, extends the scope of these legislative powers.

In the past, state actors have often been reluctant to entrust sub-state entities with such far-reaching competences, not only because of their hesitancy to give away power but also because of what has been described as the 'paradox of federalism'. While one may expect that

the conferral of legislative autonomy should accommodate sub-state demands, it was shown that this very conferral can also incite further demands in other policy areas and provide sub-state entities with the necessary resources to intensify the political competition. In turn, while one may expect that not conferring legislative autonomy could prevent such increasing autonomy demands, this very refusal can also exacerbate the political tensions.

Despite many comparable developments in cases of centrifugal sociological decentralisation, the degrees of autonomy that have been demanded on their behalf and the degrees of autonomy that have been conferred to them by the central state has varied greatly. This variation is puzzling when we consider that states are still facing the same paradox. More specifically, I identified two sets of pairwise questions in need of an answer: (1a) When do legislative autonomy demands come up, i.e. where is the starting point of the phenomenon? (2a) When do states accept to confer legislative autonomy, i.e. when do states give-in to these demands despite knowing the paradox? (1b) When do legislative autonomy demands evolve, i.e. when do they get appeased or exacerbated? (2b) When do states reform autonomy statutes, i.e. when do states further give-in to the demands despite knowing the paradox?

In the past, the evolution of autonomy demands and statutes has attracted significant scholarly attention that can be summarised in five major theoretical strands: sociological theories emphasising the importance of social identities and inter-group grievances; economic theories accounting for the distribution of wealth between sub-state entities; institutionalist theories explaining how institutions influence actors' decisions; functionalist theories underlining political and institutional spillovers; and rational-choice theories working with interests calculations that frame state and sub-state elites' behaviour.

Despite relying on a significant amount of cases, time-periods and theoretical perspectives, the existing research presented two important shortcomings. On the one hand, there was no joint account of the evolution of autonomy demands and autonomy statutes, although such a joint framework is needed to directly compare the evolution of autonomy demands and statutes over time in order to see how they mutually influence each other in the paradox of federalism. On the other hand, there were only few and limited cross-theoretical accounts, although they are needed to understand how factors are not only individually important but play out differently in different combinations, in different cases at different stages of the process.

To take up on this, I decided to study under which (combination of) conditions the autonomy demands and statutes of sub-state communities arose and evolved in cases of centrifugal sociological decentralisation – with an account for the mutual influence of autonomy demands and statutes.

To design a research capable of answering this question, I made four important conceptual choices, three of which were presented as the main theoretical arguments of the thesis. First, I chose to approach what I called 'sub-state communities' as populational rather than purely territorial or legal entities in order to account for the group-driven dynamic of the phenomenon under study. By subscribing to what Zuber (2013) developed as naturalised constructivist perspective on sub-state mobilisation, I considered social groups as a

meaningful category of analysis because they appear to be an important political frame of reference for the agents of sub-state dynamics. However, I acknowledged the constructed nature of social groups and I defined them based on a manifest group-based political behaviour or institution: "social groups for which autonomous institutions have been demanded or to which autonomous institutions have been conferred on a specific territory". Considering that this constituted one possibility among different other valid options, I have presented this as a conceptual choice rather than a theoretical argument.

Secondly, I described the autonomy dynamics within such sub-state communities and argued that, because the evolution of sub-state autonomy demands and statutes mutually influence each other – with demands creating pressures for the conferral of statutes and conferred statutes creating incitement for further demands, the two should be studied jointly if one wants to comprehensively account for the dynamics of centrifugal sociological decentralisation.

Thirdly, I looked with greater detail into autonomy statutes, which were considered as the legal prerogatives conferred to sub-state entities, and into autonomy demands, that were shown to rely on a heterogeneous group agency. To approach these heterogeneous demands, I chose to consider political parties within sub-state communities because of their certain degree of representativeness through elections, because of their spelled-out policy positions and because of their official position in the multi-level negotiation process. More importantly, I argued that both regionalist and traditional parties deserve consideration because they compete politically, influence each other and play both an important role in the formulation of sub-state communities' autonomy demands.

Fourthly, I developed a measurement capable of tracing the evolution of autonomy statutes and of regionalist and traditional party demands. To account for the important qualitative difference between administrative and legislative autonomy, and to account for the distribution of competences between the state and sub-state levels in a fine-grained manner, I argued that sub-state autonomy needs to be measured in kind, in degree and by competences at the same time. Since existing indicators, despite their increasing quality, were not able to fully realise this, I developed an own indicator incorporating these three properties: the Sub-state Autonomy Scale.

Drawing on the two pairwise questions derived based on the paradox of federalism, I identified four critical moments in the evolution of autonomy demands and statutes: when demands or statutes 'arise', i.e. shift from administrative to legislative autonomy, and when they evolve, i.e. 'increase', when they 'decrease' and when they 'disappear'. Under which conditions each of these occurred was first analysed separately. A joint account was then carried out in the discussion of their results. The factors taken into account for the comparisons were selected based on a systematic review of the literature on each of the five aforementioned theoretical strands.

When developing a methodological strategy to carry out the comparisons, I opted for a Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) because it allows to analyse in the presence or absence of which conditions an outcome occurs, while adopting a constellational (i.e.

explicitly looking for combinations of conditions) and equifinal (i.e. treating different combinations equally) view of causality. More specifically, its capacity to account for multiple combinations of conditions goes way beyond that of regression analyses. Since it tends to be a static method of analysis, however, I designed a procedure that renders it suitable for longitudinal comparisons. Thereby, I developed two main methodological arguments. First, that conditions should be disaggregated temporarily with change-based intervals (CBIs), i.e. each time when cases' membership in either a condition or the outcome under study change because it is the most accurate way to reflect changes in the empirical realities. Secondly, that the artificial contradictions that can arise from change-based case disaggregation should be resolved with a flexible lag condition (FLC) that consists in capturing each change in either the combination of conditions or the outcome under study because it resolves both kinds of contradictions. Despite its suitability for mid-n and large-n analyses, the procedure I developed preserved a strong case-oriented and qualitative perspective because it encourages inspecting and discussing the chronological development of confirming, contradictory and non-covered cases.

Before carrying out the comparison with that method, I reviewed the autonomy history of the three countries to get a better knowledge of the actual evolution of autonomy demands and statutes themselves. The cross-country comparison revealed that the highest average degrees of sub-state autonomy had been conferred in Belgium, although with substantial asymmetries between sub-state communities. In Spain, the second highest average degree of sub-state autonomy conferral was observed, but in a much more symmetrical manner. In the United Kingdom, finally, the Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish devolution statutes exceeded the Spanish ones, but the average degree of conferred sub-state autonomy was lower because of the substantial asymmetries coming with the absent English and Cornish statutes. Regionalist party demands, in turn, were shown to have been very incremental in Belgium through the different state reforms. In Spain, the difference between the strong Catalan, Basque, Navarrese and Galician autonomy demands, the somewhat moderated Balearic and Canary demands, and the much more moderated demands in the other autonomous communities stood out. In the United Kingdom, regionalist party demands appeared to be very soon very radical in Ireland, Scotland, Wales and among Northern Irish Nationalists. Cornwall proved much more moderated in this respect, while regionalist party demands in England were only present shortly with the UKIP. On this basis, four ideal types of regionalist party demands, alternative to existing typologies, were developed: autonomist leaders, autonomist followers, satisfied followers and satisfied protectionist. Finally, the review of traditional party demands revealed that they followed regionalist party demands in an important manner in the three countries under study, with a few exceptions in this respect having been noted.

In the QCA of the conditions under which autonomy demands and statutes arose and evolved in the three countries under study, different combinations of factors appeared. Sociological factors proved crucial for driving regionalist party demands and the stronger they were, the least they needed to be complemented by other factors. They were important

for traditional party demands given that pressures by regionalist parties tended to be stronger in sociologically distinct communities and because traditional parties were probably more inclined to follow regionalist pressures in sociologically distinct communities. Factors from economic theories proved important in some combinations but appeared often as a complement to sociological distinctiveness rather than constituting an own differentiating factor. The spillover effects of functionalist theories appeared to intervene in almost each analysis. This was mostly the case for sub-state communities whose autonomy dynamics followed that of strongly regionalist ones. Functionalist factors were often combined with and complemented by institutionalist factors. The democratic institutionalist context, however, proved on its own to be the most important scope condition for the rise and evolution of regionalist and traditional autonomy demands, as well as for the conferral of autonomy statutes. Rational-choice factors, finally, appeared crucial for the inter-party competition between regionalist and traditional parties. They were also important for the autonomy conferral that followed sometimes regionalist party threats, but always required traditional party support.

On this basis, a first empirical argument of the thesis retained that the rise and increase of autonomy demands and statutes can be considered to have been driven in the cases under study by a combination of sociological (and economic) and rational-choice factors for strongly distinctive and aggrieved sub-state communities, and by a combination of sociological, functionalist, institutionalist and rational-choice factors for sub-state communities with weaker distinctiveness and grievances and to which the demands and statutes of the former have spilled over.

When looking at how these developments followed on each other, I have interpreted the dynamics of centrifugal sociological decentralisation as two 'waves', the first of which came with autonomy demands and statutes in sub-state communities with strong sociological distinctiveness that, in turn, incited a second wave among sub-state communities with weaker (yet present) forms of distinctiveness, as well as their own extension. This interpretation has constituted a second empirical argument of the thesis and fulfilled to the cross-theoretical ambition of the research by showing in which combination, in which cases and at which stages of the process factors from different theoretical strands matter.

To see what these results tell us about the paradox of federalism and the two sets of pairwise questions I presented at the outset of this dissertation, I looked more explicitly in the analyses' lessons for the evolution and mutual influence of autonomy demands and statutes. By doing so, I showed that the 'paradox of federalism' cannot be fully resolved because in the analyses, both the conferral and non-conferral of sub-state autonomy proved leading to an increase of autonomy demands. At the same time, it was shown that the non-conferral of autonomy can be expected to lead to a greater exacerbation of sub-state autonomy demands in large and strongly distinctive and aggrieved sub-state communities, while the non-conferral of autonomy in smaller or less distinctive and aggrieved sub-state communities appeared to lead to the persistence of the autonomy demands that conferrals

accommodated after gradual increases. The latter lesson and the acknowledgement of the paradox have constituted a third empirical argument of the thesis.

When reflecting on what these results and recent developments in the cases under study tell us about longer-term perspectives of their evolution, I showed that there are four plausible scenarios of how the first two waves of centrifugal sociological decentralisation could continue: partial de-federalisation – which would lead to a halt of current decentralisation dynamics at some point for some sub-state communities, quasi-confederalisation – which would push current decentralisation dynamics at the end in other sub-state communities, independence – which would lead to the accession to independence for some sub-state communities, and differentiated de- and re-federalisation – which would constitute a reform model where competences can be de- and recentralised depending on the preferences of state and sub-state actors at different moments in time. This expectation has constituted a fourth and final empirical argument of the thesis.

Taken together, the analyses thus showed when and how factors from different theoretical stands interact when leading to the rise and evolution of autonomy demands and statutes and how autonomy demands and statutes mutually influence each other. This allowed to develop a new cross-theoretical frame for interpreting and analysing the dynamics of sub-state mobilisation and restructuring through what I called 'the three waves of centrifugal sociological decentralisation'. The utility of his framework resides in its long-term perspective on when autonomy demands and statutes arise and evolve, on how a first autonomy wave led to a second one – with all its implications for the paradox of federalism, and on what evolutions can be expected in the years to come.

2. Limitations

Despite the merits pointed out above, the findings of the research are subject to a series of limitations that should be signalled – both as a nuance to the present results and as an incitement for further research and improvement. Some of these limitations concern the conceptualisation of the research, while others relate to the empirical scope of the cases under investigation.

a) Conceptual limitations

The conceptual limitations of the research concern four main areas. First, there is the way the heterogeneous group agency within sub-state communities has been approached in order to assess the extent of the autonomy demands that are issued on their behalf. I decided to focus on political parties because they have official positions, can make claims of representativeness through their election and are the very actors negotiating with state elites about the autonomy conferral. One should remember, however, that beside political parties, civil society organisations can play an important role for the political mobilisation of sub-state entities and should therefore keep their place in research on sub-state mobilisation. Attempts

to create a unified conceptual framework for their study would be very welcomed to facilitate comparing their role both within and across different sub-state communities.

Another decision I made for the study of autonomy demands was to focus solely on one regionalist party (the one with the highest popular support) and on one traditional party (the one with the highest autonomy demand). While this was necessary for reasons of feasibility, one should keep in mind that several regionalist parties can exist in a sub-state community and influence the entities' autonomy dynamics – not only as regionalist competitors (for which it was accounted in the analyses). Equally, it is possible that several traditional parties adopt accommodating stances on the autonomy question and thereby impact the entities' interaction with state elites. To account for all this diversity, qualitative case studies are probably better suited than systematic large-n comparisons.

A second source of conceptual limitations concerns the way autonomy statutes have been considered. I decided indeed to approach them as the legal autonomy prerogatives that had been conferred to sub-state communities. One should note though, as signalled earlier, that there is a difference between the legal conferral of competence and the capacity to effectively exercise them. The exercise of a competence can for example depend on that of another, or require coordination with other sub-state entities or the central state. While the Sub-state Autonomy Scale's (SAS) assessed sub-state entities' competences relative to those of the state and could hence take into account some limits of effectiveness (for example regarding the education competences of the Spanish autonomous communities where the state preserves important framework powers), evaluating the potential coordination necessities between entities and levels went beyond the possibility of the present research.

A third series of conceptual limitations concerns the SAS more specifically. It was constructed by considering influential theoretical works on sub-state autonomy and the empirical realities of the cases under study. The objective was to ensure both the scale's theoretical meaningfulness through context and time and its empirical applicability. Since the number of studied countries is limited, however, one may wonder to which extent the scale is exportable to other cases. It can indeed not be excluded that additional country studies could lead to further refinements of the scale. Yet, the universe of sub-state communities under study can be considered sufficiently large to ensure a broad applicability *a priori*.

Another limitation related to the measurement of sub-state autonomy concerns the attention given to shared-rule. The SAS was by purpose conceived in a way that paid much more attention to self-rule than to shared-rule because of it was considered more important for 'allowing a political community below the state level to live according to its own rules'. However, one should keep in mind that despite its lower direct impact on autonomy than self-rule, shared-rule can have an important influence on sub-state communities' perceptions of autonomy (or the lack thereof) and would therefore deserve a study in its own right on the matter.

The most important limitation of the SAS related to the present research concerns the fact that the 'extent' of autonomy demands has been assessed, but not their actual 'saliency'. Put differently, two parties with the same formal autonomy demand might dedicate very

different importance to the autonomy question compared to other policy issues. While the previous limitations were more conceptual in nature and rather limit the scope of the thesis findings, the present one has direct consequences for the empirical interpretation of the findings. I concluded, for example, that the non-conferral of sub-state autonomy can be expected to cause greater exacerbation of autonomy demands than the conferral in large and strongly distinctive and aggrieved communities because the former led them to independence claims while the latter only translated into incremental increases of the autonomy demand. This assessment, however, concerns the extent of issued autonomy demands and not their saliency. Complementary research on the saliency of autonomy demands would thus be necessary to further specify this argument.

A fourth number of conceptual limitations, finally, concerns the selection of cases under study. While I aimed at studying 'social groups for which autonomous institutions have been demanded or to which autonomous institutions have been conferred on a specific territory', there have been some cases to which this definition could not be unambiguously applied.

On the one hand, there were two instances where the same territory was claimed by two sub-state communities, Brussels and Northern Ireland, and where I decided to consider each territory as belonging at the same time to the two distinct two sub-state communities that claim it (Francophones and Dutch-speakers for the former, Nationalists and Unionists for the latter). This allowed me to correctly identify the different autonomy demands that have been formulated on behalf of the four sub-state communities. The competences included in their autonomy statutes had hence also to be considered as being conferred to both sub-state communities in the two cases, although legally, the exercise is shared between them. When looking at the absolute level of their conferred autonomy on the SAS, this should be kept in mind.

On the other hand, and partially related to the previous point, I encountered the problem of the complex Belgian state architecture with two partially overlapping levels of federal sub-state entities. Preferring to consider social groups to which a uniform set of sub-state laws applied and for which specific autonomy claims had been made, I decided not to take the French Community as a distinct sub-state community but to consider the Francophone community in Brussels as one sub-state entity, and the French-speakers in Wallonia as part of a Walloon sub-state community. In addition to the fact that some could contest this choice by arguing that the French Community is a distinct social group that should be treated as such, this choice has two legal consequences that should be kept in mind. First, the Walloon sub-state community is considered to detain both regional and community competences although some of the latter are shared with the Francophone community in Brussels. Secondly, given the minority situation of the Francophone community in Brussels in this shared exercise and given that the exercise goes beyond its territorial scope, I did not consider the Francophones in Brussels to detain all community competences (only those transferred to the COCOF). This is legally not entirely correct, however, but neither is the opposite. When looking at the absolute level of their conferred autonomy on the SAS, this should again be kept in mind.

b) Empirical scope

In the present research, the question of when sub-state communities demand autonomy and when states accept to confer it was analysed through the study of three typical cases of centrifugal sociological decentralisation: Belgium, Spain and the United Kingdom. On the one hand, the choice to focus on Western Europe was motivated by the objective to study a region where the ideal of the modern nation-state had long been consolidated and was yet considerably challenged by centrifugal sociological sub-state mobilisation. It was also retained because it forms a more or less politically coherent and geographically proximate cross-national context I was familiar with. On the other hand, the selection of the three states within Western Europe came with the aim to select countries that differed in the extent of demanded and conferred autonomy, in terms of state structures and in degrees of symmetry between conferred autonomy arrangements. Despite the systematicity of these choices and the way the study was carried out in general, one may wonder how far the results obtained based on these three countries are able to travel to other cases? Two limits in this regard need to be signalled.

First, since the studied countries are typical cases of centrifugal sociological decentralisation, the findings obtained based on their analysis should be regarded as proving relevant mainly for cases with similar trajectories and rationales. This does not mean that sub-state mobilisation and restructuring cannot occur in centripetal coming-together federations like Switzerland, or in countries like the Netherlands where the decentralisation followed rather a functionalist rationale. It means, however, that one cannot guarantee that the factors, constellations and evolutions leading to sub-state mobilisation and restructuring in these cases are the same as for cases of centripetal sociological decentralisation. To get further insights in this respect, a distinct study of the former would be necessary. Also, the paradox of federalism is not of the same relevance. In a coming-together federation like Switzerland, for example, sub-state entities dispose of large autonomy since the state creation. In countries with functionalist decentralisation, in turn, sub-state demands tend to be less salient.

Secondly, one may then wonder to which extent the findings can travel to other cases of centrifugal sociological decentralisation. On the one hand, one would expect similar developments in the presence of similar constellations. On the other hand, one cannot exclude that some constellations unfold differently or, more certainly, that there are other constellations of conditions leading to similar developments. On this basis, I would advise to be cautious with generalisations on the relevance of specific combinations of conditions for other cases of centrifugal sociological decentralisation. For the combinations of different theoretical mechanisms in general, for the overall tendencies of the two decentralisation waves and for the expectations about future evolutions of these waves, however, similar developments can be expected in other cases of centrifugal sociological decentralisation.

3. Ways ahead

Following the summary of the thesis' main results and the reflection on the limitations they are subject to, different ways ahead can be identified for political research on sub-state mobilisation and restructuring. While the number of these ways is potentially much larger, I will focus on three that seem most promising to me. The first concerns the extension of the present research, the second concerns its improvement and the third concerns working on its implications.

A first way ahead for future political research would be to extend the present findings and test how they travel to other cases. This concerns cases of centrifugal sociological decentralisation insofar as one would want to test if there are other varieties of constellations leading to the rise and evolution of autonomy demands and statutes (e.g. in Italy or France). But this concerns also cases of sub-state mobilisation and restructuring with different trajectories and rationales insofar as one would also want to know what cross-theoretical patterns and developments drive their unfolding and which kind of long-term evolutions are applicable to them (e.g. Switzerland or Germany). While I explained earlier that the paradox of federalism is *a priori* less salient for them, an account of alternative forms of multi-level competition that can arise in such states would be equally valuable.

A second important way ahead would consist in improving the way sub-state autonomy demands are assessed. While the SAS provided already a substantively refined measurement of the 'extent' of autonomy demands formulated by regionalist or traditional parties within sub-state communities, measurements accounting for their 'saliency' would not only provide an improved account of the political relevance of autonomy demands but also allow for an even more precise interpretation of their consequences and their interaction with autonomy statutes in the paradox of federalism. While existing research has tried to approach the saliency of party positions with surveys of expert assessments (Bakker et al., 2015; Zuber & Szöcsik, 2019), alternative approaches to further objectify the assessments (through elite surveys or indicator-based socio-historic research) are worth exploring.

Thirdly, it would be important for further research to dedicate attention to the implications of the findings, namely the prospective evolutions that have been identified as plausible in light of the past evolutions and recent developments. For cases of partial de-federalisation, it would be important to understand where the equilibrium lies. Put differently, one would want to know when and why parties within some sub-state communities are satisfied at some point with the conferred degree of autonomy. For cases of quasi-confederalisation, it would be important to research if their design is politically viable and truly desired by the political parties who demand it, or if it is rather envisioned as an intermediate step to independence. Put differently, one would want to know if states with almost no competences can exist without problems and why parties would prefer them over accession to independence. For cases of independence, there has already been a substantive scholarly attention to the political, legal, sociological and normative consequences of secession. Further long-term reflections on the possibilities of 'worlds without nation-states'

(Wimmer, 2021) or the place of small nations in larger supra-state organisations (Colomer, 2007) remain crucial however. For cases of differentiated de- and re-federalisation, it would be important to find ways to practically implement the generational debate about the differentiated organisation of competences across different political levels. When considering the limits that current elite-driven consociational procedures reach in divided societies (Deschouwer, 2009a; Caluwaerts & Reuchamps, 2015), the exploration of alternative approaches involving citizen deliberation appears to deserve at least equal attention (Suiter & Reuchamps, 2016; O'Flynn & Caluwaerts, 2018).

With these suggestions and the lessons that precede, I hope to have contributed to a better understanding of sub-state autonomy mobilisation and restructuring in countries where these dynamics are most salient, namely those witnessing centrifugal sociological decentralisation. More concretely, knowing which combinations of conditions lead to the rise and evolution of sub-state autonomy demands and statutes, how this evolution can be interpreted, what are the consequences for the accommodation and exacerbation of political dynamics on the sub-state level and what future evolutions can be expected, are lessons that should inform academics studying, decision-makers governing and citizens living in multi-level states.

Appendices and references

Appendices

Appendix 1. Potential cases not meeting the selection criteria

Country	Potential sub-state communities	Reason for exclusion
Belgium	French Community	Complex Belgian federal architecture with two partially overlapping federated levels. In French-speaking Belgium, Walloons and Francophones in Brussels were retained as sub-state communities.
Spain	Ceuta	State belonging follows colonial heritage.
	Melilla	State belonging follows colonial heritage.
	Oversee territories	State belonging follows colonial heritage.
United Kingdom	Durham (North-East)	Regionalist party support never exceeded 5%.
	Guernsey	Not formally part of the United Kingdom.
	Isle of Man	Not formally part of the United Kingdom.
	Jersey	Not formally part of the United Kingdom.
	Oversee territories	State belonging follows colonial heritage.
	Yorkshire	Regionalist party support never exceeded 5%.

Appendix 2. List of consulted experts

Country	Territorial community	Object of the consultation	Expert	Affiliation
Belgium	For all territorial communities	Autonomy statutes	Frédéric Bouhon	Université de Liège
	Flanders & Brussels (Flemish)	Autonomy demands	Kris Deschouwer	Vrije Universiteit Brussel
		Autonomy demands	Dave Sinardet	Vrije Universiteit Brussel
	German-speaking Community	Autonomy demands	Christoph Brüll	Universität Luxemburg
	Wallonia	Autonomy demands	Jérémy Dodeigne	Université de Namur
		Autonomy demands	Min Reuchamps	Université catholique de Louvain
		Autonomy demands	Philippe Destatte	Institut Destrée
	Brussels (Francophone)	Autonomy demands	Régis Dandoy	Université libre de Bruxelles
Spain	For all territorial communities	Autonomy statutes	Xavier Arbós	Universitat de Barcelona
		Autonomy statutes	Mireia Grau Creus	Institut de l'Estudis de l'Autogovern
	Andalusia	Autonomy demands	Enrique Pérez Nieto	Universidad de Málaga
		Autonomy demands	Javier Contreras Becerra	Universidad de Jaén
	Aragon	Autonomy demands	José Tudela Aranda	Universidad de Zaragoza
	Asturias	Autonomy demands	Miguel Presno Linera	Universidad de Oviedo
	Balearic Islands	Autonomy demands	Antoni Marimon Riutort	Universitat de les Illes Balears
	Basque Country	Autonomy demands	Ludger Mees	Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea
		Autonomy demands	Mikel Erkoreka	Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea
		Autonomy demands	Luis Emaldi Azkue	Université de Bordeaux
	Canary Islands	Autonomy demands	Alberto Báez García	Universidad de La Laguna
	Cantabria	Autonomy demands	Angel Revuelta	Universidad de Cantabria
	Castile and León	Autonomy demands	Mariano Gonzalez Clavero	Universidad de Valladolid
	Catalonia	Autonomy demands	Antoni Rodon	Universitat Pompeu Fabra Barcelona
		Autonomy demands	Daniel Cetrà	University of Aberdeen
		Autonomy demands	Marc Sanjaume	Institut de l'Estudis de l'Autogovern
	Extremadura	Autonomy demands	Juan García Pérez	Universidad de Extremadura
	Galicia	Autonomy demands	Margarita Gomez Reino	Universidad National de Education a Distancia
		Autonomy demands	Tudi Kernalegenn	Université catholique de Louvain
	La Rioja	Autonomy demands	José Gomez Urdañez	Universidad de Logroño
	Murcia	Autonomy demands	Juan García Escribano	Universidad de Murcia
	Navarre	Autonomy demands	Ludger Mees	Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea

Country	Territorial community	Object of the consultation	Expert	Affiliation
	Valencia	Autonomy demands	Astrid Barrio	Universitat de València
		Autonomy demands	Juan Rodríguez Teruel	Universitat de València
	León	Autonomy demands	Mariano Gonzalez Clavero	Universidad de Valladolid
	For all territorial communities	Traditional party demands in the 19th and first half of the 20th century	Josep Maria Fradera	Universitat Pompeu Fabra Barcelona
			Josep Pich Mitjana	Universitat Pompeu Fabra Barcelona
United Kingdom	For all territorial communities	Autonomy statutes	Aileen McHarg	University of Durham
		Autonomy statutes	Tom Mullen	University of Glasgow
	England	Autonomy demands	Jack Sheldon	University of Cambridge
	London	Autonomy demands	Jack Sheldon	University of Cambridge
	Scotland	Autonomy demands	Nicola McEwen	University of Edinburgh
		Autonomy demands	Coree Brown Swan	University of Edinburgh
	Ireland	Autonomy demands	John Coakley	Queens University Belfast
	Northern Ireland (Nat. & Uni.)	Autonomy demands	John Coakley	Queens University Belfast
		Autonomy demands	Patrick Utz	University of Edinburgh
		Autonomy statutes	Gordon Anthony	Queens University Belfast
	Wales	Autonomy demands	Anwen Elias	Aberyswyth University
		Autonomy demands	Richard Parry	University of Edinburgh
		Autonomy statutes	Huw Pritchard	Cardiff University

Appendix 3. Sub-state Autonomy Scale (SAS) overview sheet provided for the interviews with legal experts

SUB-STATE AUTONOMY SCALE

Dimension		Content	Calculation	Score
I. Group rights		Absent		0.00
		Recognition of group/entity particularism	+0.03	0.03
		Partial ling./cult. facilities	+0.03	0.06
		Advanced ling./cult. facilities	+0.03	0.09
II.a Administrative Self-rule	a.1 Executive	Own administration for 1 policy sector	0.12 +0.00	0.12
		Own administration for ≥ 2 policy sectors	+0.02	0.14
	a.2 Advisory	Advisory competences in 1 policy sector	0.16 +0.00	0.16
		Advisory competences in ≥ 2 policy sectors	+0.02	0.18
		Directly elected assembly	+0.02	0.20
	a.3 Discretionary	Discretionary administration of 1 policy sector	0.22 +0.00	0.22
		Discretionary administration ≥ 2 policy sectors	+0.02	0.24
		Fiscal autonomy (adm.)	+0.02	0.26
		Borrowing autonomy (adm.)	+0.02	0.28
		Directly elected assembly	+0.02	0.30
		Own executive	+0.02	0.32
III. Shared rule (i)	State parliament	Guaranteed representation	+0.04	0.36
		Veto power	+0.04	0.40
	State government	Guaranteed representation	+0.04	0.44
		Veto power	+0.04	0.48
		Self-rule anchor		0.50
II.b Legislative Self-rule	Institutional statute	Directly elected assembly	0.52 +0.00	0.52
		Own executive	+0.02	0.54
	Policy scope	Cultural matters	+0.02	0.56
		Educational matters	+0.02	0.58
		Social and sanitary matters	+0.02	0.60
		Territorial matters	+0.02	0.62
		Economic matters	+0.02	0.64
		Social security matters	+0.02	0.66
		Citizenship and immigration matters	+0.02	0.68
	Special competences	Organization and oversight of local government	+0.02	0.70
		Police & defence	+0.02	0.72
		Judicial system & general penal and civil law	+0.02	0.74
	Financial autonomy	Fiscal autonomy (leg.)	+0.02	0.76
		Borrowing autonomy (leg.)	+0.02	0.78
	Statutory autonomy	Constitutive autonomy	+0.02	0.80
		International relations in competence areas	+0.02	0.82
		No government veto & guaranteed statute	+0.02	0.84
III. Shared rule (ii)	State parliament	Guaranteed representation	+0.04	0.88
		Veto power	+0.04	0.92
	State government	Guaranteed representation	+0.04	0.96
		Veto power	+0.04	1.00

SCORE CALCULATION

If (II.b > 0) → SAS = II.b + III.
If (II.b = 0) and (II.a.3 > 0) → SAS = II.a.3 + III.
If (II.b = 0) and (II.a.3 = 0) and (II.a.2 > 0) → SAS = II.a.2 + III.
If (II.b = 0) and (II.a.3 = 0) and (II.a.2 = 0) and (II.a.1 > 0) → SAS = II.a.1 + III.
If (II.b = 0) and (II.a.3 = 0) and (II.a.2 = 0) and (II.a.1 = 0) → SAS = I. + III.

SPECIFICATIONS

I. Cultural autonomy
- Recognition of group/entitiy particularism: in law or political practice.
- Linguistic or cultural facilities: Sub-state language used in (i) primary education, (ii) secondary education, (iii) administrations, (iv) judiciary. (v) Cultural subsidies. Partial: 1-3 out of (i-v). Enhanced: 4-5 out of (i-v).

II.a Administrative Self-rule
- Executive: institution implementing state decisions without room for manoeuvre (e.g. decentr. ministry).
- Advisory: institution that is deemed representative consulted by the state on behalf of the community.
- Discretionary: institution implementing state decisions with room for appreciation (e.g. decentr. ass./exec.).

II.b Legislative Self-rule

Policy scope & Special competences
- Cultural: culture, media, leisure and sports, arts and patrimony, use of language.
- Educational: primary, secondary and higher education, para-scholar education, scientific research.
- Social and sanitary: social assistance, health.
- Territorial: territorial management, environment, agriculture, housing, energy, transport, mobility, roads.
- Economic: economy, employment, trade, monetary policy.
- Social security: family allowances, health insurance, unemployment benefits, pensions.
- Citizenship and immigration: territorial access, residence permit, integration policy, naturalization.
- Organization and oversight of local govern.: municipal level (half score), intermediate level (half score).
- Police & defence: police force (half score), defence force (half score).
- Judicial system & general penal and civil law: judicial system (half score), penal law (quarter score), civil law (quarter score).

→ To be coded by comparing state and sub-state competences:
- Exclusive competence of the state level: 0.00 of the code.
- State level detains more competences than the sub-state level: 0.25 of the code.
- Competences of the state and the sub-state level are comparable: 0.50 of the code.
- Sub-state level detains more competences than the state level: 0.75 of the code.
- Exclusive competence of the sub-state level: 1.00 of the code.

Financial autonomy (draws on the Regional Authority Index):
- Fiscal:
  - Central government sets the base and rate of all sub-state taxes: 0.00 of the code
  - Sub-state level sets the rate of minor taxes: 0.25 of the code.
  - Sub-state level sets the base and rate of minor taxes: 0.50 of the code.
  - Sub-state level sets the rate of one major tax (income, corpor., VAT, sales): 0.75 of the code.
  - Sub-state level sets the rate and base of one major tax: 1.00 of the code.
- Borrowing:
  - Sub-state level cannot borrow: 0.00 of the code.
  - Sub-state level can borrow after prior authorization of the state: 0.33 of the code.
  - Sub-state level can borrow without author. but within certain rules: 0.67 of the code.
  - Sub-state level can borrow without central restrictions: 1.00 of the code.

Statutory autonomy:
- Constitutive autonomy: determine the rules of functioning of the sub-state institutions.
- International relations in competence areas: negotiate and ratify intern. agreements in competence areas.
- No government veto & guaranteed statute: state law cannot break sub-state law (half score) and sub-state institutions cannot be removed unilaterally (half score).

III. Shared rule
- Guaranteed representation: *de jure* (through quotas) or *de facto* (through electoral districts).
- Veto power: *de jure* (through special majorities) or *de facto* (through representation in cabinet).

Appendix 4. SAS database [aggregated scores – rounded to three decimals]

Sub-state community	Case ID	From	To	Traditional party demand		Regionalist party demand		Autonomy statute
				Party	Score	Party	Score	
Brussels (Flemish)	BFl1	1830	1890	KP	0,100	-	0,000	0,070
Brussels (Flemish)	BFl2	1891	1935	KP/KU	0,100	-	0,000	0,100
Brussels (Flemish)	BFl3	1936	1945	KU	0,100	VNV/VVB	0,100	0,100
Brussels (Flemish)	BFl4	1946	1953	CVP	0,100	-	0,000	0,100
Brussels (Flemish)	BFl5	1954	1957	CVP	0,100	CVV	0,100	0,100
Brussels (Flemish)	BFl6	1958	1963	CVP	0,130	VU	0,100	0,100
Brussels (Flemish)	BFl7	1964	1970	CVP	0,130	VU	0,100	0,130
Brussels (Flemish)	BFl8	1971	1989	PVV/CVP	0,620	VU	0,100	0,320
Brussels (Flemish)	BFl9	1990	1993	PVV(VLD)/CVP	0,632	VU	0,100	0,632
Brussels (Flemish)	BFl10	1994	1994	VLD/CVP	0,662	VB	0,100	0,652
Brussels (Flemish)	BFl11	1995	2001	VLD/CVP(CD&V)	0,672	VB	0,100	0,662
Brussels (Flemish)	BFl12	2002	2013	(Open)VLD/CD&V	0,700	VB	0,100	0,690
Brussels (Flemish)	BFl13	2014	2020	OpenVLD/CD&V	0,710	N-VA	0,100	0,710
Brussels (Francophone)	BFr1	1830	1899	PC/PL/POB	0,100	-	0,000	0,100
Brussels (Francophone)	BFr2	1900	1963	POB/PSB	0,130	-	0,000	0,100
Brussels (Francophone)	BFr3	1964	1970	PSB	0,320	FDF	0,320	0,130
Brussels (Francophone)	BFr4	1971	1989	PS(B)	0,620	FDF	0,620	0,320
Brussels (Francophone)	BFr5	1990	1993	PS/MR	0,647	FDF(MR)	0,657	0,632
Brussels (Francophone)	BFr6	1994	1994	PS/MR	0,677	FDF(MR)	0,687	0,647
Brussels (Francophone)	BFr7	1995	2001	PS/MR	0,687	FDF(MR)	0,697	0,677
Brussels (Francophone)	BFr8	2002	2013	PS/MR	0,715	FDF(MR)	0,720	0,705
Brussels (Francophone)	BFr9	2014	2020	PS/MR	0,725	FDF/Défi	0,735	0,725
German-sp. Community	GsC1	1925	1928	PSB	0,180	-	0,000	0,030
German-sp. Community	GsC2	1929	1940	PSB	0,180	CVP/HF	Ind.	0,030
German-sp. Community	GsC3	1945	1962	PSC/PL/SPB	0,090	-	0,000	0,030
German-sp. Community	GsC4	1963	1967	PSC/PLP/SPB	0,220	-	0,000	0,090
German-sp. Community	GsC5	1968	1970	PLP	0,590	-	0,000	0,090
German-sp. Community	GsC6	1971	1972	PLP	0,590	CWU/PDB	0,640	0,090
German-sp. Community	GsC7	1973	1976	PLP/PFF	0,590	PDB	0,640	0,260
German-sp. Community	GsC8	1977	1983	CSP/PFF/SP	0,625	PDB	0,670	0,260
German-sp. Community	GsC9	1984	1989	CSP/PFF/SP	0,642	PDB	0,682	0,585
German-sp. Community	GsC10	1990	1993	CSP/PFF/SP	0,662	PDB	0,687	0,607
German-sp. Community	GsC11	1994	1999	CSP/PFF/SP	0,722	(PJU-)PDB	0,737	0,652
German-sp. Community	GsC12	2000	2001	CSP/PFF/SP	0,722	PDB	0,737	0,657
German-sp. Community	GsC13	2002	2004	CSP/PFF/SP	0,740	PDB	0,755	0,670
German-sp. Community	GsC14	2005	2010	CSP/PFF/SP	0,740	PDB/ProDG	0,755	0,675
German-sp. Community	GsC15	2011	2013	CSP/PFF/SP	0,755	ProDG	0,755	0,675
German-sp. Community	GsC16	2014	2018	CSP/PFF/SP	0,770	ProDG	0,770	0,705
German-sp. Community	GsC17	2019	2020	CSP/PFF/SP	0,770	ProDG	0,770	0,710
Flanders	Fla1	1830	1890	KP	0,170	-	0,000	0,140
Flanders	Fla2	1891	1913	KP	0,220	-	0,000	0,170
Flanders	Fla3	1914	1916	KP	0,220	-	0,000	0,170

Sub-state community	Case ID	From	To	Traditional party demand		Regionalist party demand		Autonomy statute
				Party	Score	Party	Score	
Flanders	Fla4	1917	1918	KP	0,220	-	0,000	0,260
Flanders	Fla5	1919	1935	KU	0,220	Frontpartij	0,765	0,170
Flanders	Fla6	1936	1945	KU	0,220	VNV	Ind.	0,170
Flanders	Fla7	1946	1953	CVP	0,220	-	0,000	0,170
Flanders	Fla8	1954	1963	CVP	0,220	VU	0,730	0,170
Flanders	Fla9	1964	1970	CVP	0,705	VU	0,730	0,220
Flanders	Fla10	1971	1976	CVP	0,705	VU	0,730	0,705
Flanders	Fla11	1977	1980	CVP	0,770	VU	0,872	0,705
Flanders	Fla12	1981	1984	CVP	0,770	VU	0,872	0,770
Flanders	Fla13	1985	1989	CVP	0,822	VU	0,910	0,770
Flanders	Fla14	1990	1991	CVP	0,822	VU	0,910	0,802
Flanders	Fla15	1992	1993	CVP	0,857	VU	0,910	0,802
Flanders	Fla16	1994	1998	CVP	0,857	VU	0,910	0,857
Flanders	Fla17	1999	2001	CVP	0,900	VU	0,910	0,857
Flanders	Fla18	2002	2006	CD&V	0,900	N-VA	0,985	0,890
Flanders	Fla19	2007	2013	CD&V	0,905	N-VA	0,985	0,890
Flanders	Fla20	2014	2020	CD&V	0,905	N-VA	0,985	0,905
Wallonia	Wal1	1830	1899	KP/PL/POB	0,140	-	0,000	0,140
Wallonia	Wal2	1900	1916	POB	0,170	-	0,000	0,170
Wallonia	Wal3	1917	1918	POB	0,170	-	0,000	0,220
Wallonia	Wal4	1919	1960	POB/PSB	0,170	-	0,000	0,170
Wallonia	Wal5	1961	1963	PSB	0,220	-	0,000	0,170
Wallonia	Wal6	1964	1967	PSB	0,220	FW/PW	0,740	0,220
Wallonia	Wal7	1968	1970	PSB	0,700	FW/PW	0,740	0,220
Wallonia	Wal8	1971	1980	PSB	0,745	RW	0,787	0,705
Wallonia	Wal9	1981	1989	PS	0,770	-	0,000	0,770
Wallonia	Wal10	1990	1993	PS	0,837	-	0,000	0,802
Wallonia	Wal11	1994	2001	PS	0,857	-	0,000	0,857
Wallonia	Wal12	2002	2013	PS	0,890	-	0,000	0,890
Wallonia	Wal13	2014	2020	PS	0,905	-	0,000	0,905
Andalusia	And1	1868	1870	PDR	0,040	-	0,000	0,040
Andalusia	And2	1871	1875	PRDF	0,662	-	0,000	0,040
Andalusia	And3	1876	1922	PC-L/PD-RP	0,040	-	0,000	0,040
Andalusia	And5	1923	1930	-	0,000	-	0,000	0,000
Andalusia	And6	1931	1936	PRIzq	0,040	-	0,000	0,040
Andalusia	And7	1937	1975	-	0,000	-	0,000	0,000
Andalusia	And8	1976	1976	PSOE	0,070	PSA	0,677	0,070
Andalusia	And9	1977	1980	PSOE	0,677	PSA	0,677	0,070
Andalusia	And10	1981	1996	PSOE	0,677	PSA/PA	0,677	0,677
Andalusia	And11	1997	2015	PSOE	0,682	PA	0,682	0,682
Andalusia	And12	2016	2020	PSOE	0,682	-	0,000	0,682
Aragon	Ara1	1868	1870	PDR	0,040	-	0,000	0,040
Aragon	Ara2	1871	1875	PRDF	0,662	-	0,000	0,040

Sub-state community	Case ID	From	To	Traditional party demand		Regionalist party demand		Autonomy statute
				Party	Score	Party	Score	
Aragon	Ara3	1876	1922	PC-L/PD-RP	0,040	-	0,000	0,040
Aragon	Ara5	1923	1930	-	0,000	-	0,000	0,000
Aragon	Ara6	1931	1936	PRIzq	0,040	-	0,000	0,040
Aragon	Ara7	1937	1975	-	0,000	-	0,000	0,000
Aragon	Ara8	1976	1977	PSOE	0,070	-	0,000	0,070
Aragon	Ara9	1978	1981	PSOE	0,667	PAR	0,682	0,070
Aragon	Ara10	1982	1987	PSOE	0,667	PAR	0,682	0,667
Aragon	Ara11	1988	1991	PSOE	0,682	PAR	0,682	0,667
Aragon	Ara12	1992	1996	PSOE	0,682	PAR	0,682	0,682
Aragon	Ara13	1997	2020	PSOE	0,687	PAR/CHA	0,687	0,687
Asturias	Ast1	1868	1870	PDR	0,320	-	0,000	0,320
Asturias	Ast2	1871	1875	PRDF	0,662	-	0,000	0,320
Asturias	Ast3	1876	1922	PC-L/PD-RP	0,320	-	0,000	0,320
Asturias	Ast5	1923	1930	-	0,000	-	0,000	0,000
Asturias	Ast6	1931	1936	PRIzq	0,320	-	0,000	0,320
Asturias	Ast7	1937	1975	-	0,000	-	0,000	0,000
Asturias	Ast8	1976	1977	PSOE	0,320	-	0,000	0,320
Asturias	Ast9	1978	1980	PSOE	0,662	-	0,000	0,320
Asturias	Ast10	1981	1986	PSOE	0,662	-	0,000	0,662
Asturias	Ast11	1987	1987	PSOE	0,662	PAS(UNA)	0,677	0,662
Asturias	Ast12	1988	1991	PSOE	0,677	PAS(UNA)	0,677	0,662
Asturias	Ast13	1992	1996	PSOE	0,677	PAS	0,677	0,677
Asturias	Ast14	1997	2020	PSOE	0,682	PAS/URAS/FAC	0,682	0,682
Balearic Islands	BIs1	1868	1870	PDR	0,320	-	0,000	0,320
Balearic Islands	BIs2	1871	1875	PRDF	0,662	-	0,000	0,320
Balearic Islands	BIs3	1876	1922	PC-L/PD-RP	0,320	-	0,000	0,320
Balearic Islands	BIs4	1923	1930	-	0,000	-	0,000	0,000
Balearic Islands	BIs5	1931	1931	PRIzq	0,320	-	0,000	0,320
Balearic Islands	BIs6	1932	1936	PRIzq/PRC	0,662	PRM	0,662	0,320
Balearic Islands	BIs7	1937	1975	-	0,000	-	0,000	0,000
Balearic Islands	BIs8	1976	1976	PSOE	0,320	-	0,000	0,320
Balearic Islands	BIs9	1977	1977	PSOE	0,320	PSM	0,682	0,320
Balearic Islands	BIs10	1978	1981	PSOE	0,667	PSM	0,682	0,320
Balearic Islands	BIs11	1982	1987	PSOE	0,667	UM	0,682	0,667
Balearic Islands	BIs12	1988	1991	PSOE	0,682	UM	0,682	0,667
Balearic Islands	BIs13	1992	1994	PSOE	0,682	UM	0,682	0,682
Balearic Islands	BIs14	1995	1996	PSOE	0,682	PSM-ENE	0,800	0,682
Balearic Islands	BIs15	1997	2020	PSOE	0,687	PSM(-ENE)/Bloc/Més	0,800	0,687
Basque Country	Bsq1	1868	1870	Carlists	0,638	-	0,000	0,638
Basque Country	Bsq2	1871	1875	PRDF	0,662	-	0,000	0,638
Basque Country	Bsq3	1876	1900	PC-L/PD-RP	0,070	-	0,000	0,297
Basque Country	Bsq4	1901	1917	Carlists	0,617	-	0,000	0,297
Basque Country	Bsq5	1918	1922	Carlists	0,617	CNV	0,800	0,297

Sub-state community	Case ID	From	To	Traditional party demand		Regionalist party demand		Autonomy statute
				Party	Score	Party	Score	
Basque Country	Bsq6	1923	1930	-	0,000	-	0,000	0,000
Basque Country	Bsq7	1931	1935	Carlism	0,617	PNV	0,800	0,297
Basque Country	Bsq8	1936	1936	PRIzq	0,672	PNV	0,800	0,672
Basque Country	Bsq9	1937	1975	-	0,000	-	0,000	0,000
Basque Country	Bsq10	1976	1978	PSOE/(PP)	0,697	PNV	0,820	0,070
Basque Country	Bsq11	1979	1981	PSOE/(PP)	0,697	PNV	0,820	0,697
Basque Country	Bsq12	1982	1995	PSOE/(PP)	0,697	PNV	0,820	0,697
Basque Country	Bsq13	1996	2003	PSOE/(PP)	0,699	PNV	0,820	0,699
Basque Country	Bsq14	2004	2010	PSOE/(PP)	0,699	PNV	0,820	0,699
Basque Country	Bsq15	2011	2014	PSOE/(PP)	0,699	PNV	0,820	0,699
Basque Country	Bsq16	2015	2017	PSOE/(PP)	0,699	PNV	0,820	0,699
Basque Country	Bsq17	2018	2020	PSOE/(PP)	0,699	PNV	0,820	0,699
Canary Islands	CIs1	1868	1875	Independents	0,320	-	0,000	0,320
Canary Islands	CIs2	1876	1922	PC-L/PD-RP	0,320	-	0,000	0,320
Canary Islands	CIs3	1923	1930	-	0,000	-	0,000	0,000
Canary Islands	CIs4	1931	1931	PRIzq	0,070	-	0,000	0,070
Canary Islands	CIs5	1932	1936	PRIzq	0,662	PNC	0,662	0,070
Canary Islands	CIs6	1937	1975	-	0,000	-	0,000	0,000
Canary Islands	CIs7	1976	1976	PSOE	0,070	UPC	Ind.	0,070
Canary Islands	CIs8	1977	1981	PSOE	0,677	UPC	Ind.	0,070
Canary Islands	CIs9	1982	1986	PSOE	0,677	UPC	Ind.	0,677
Canary Islands	CIs10	1987	1996	PSOE	0,677	AIC/CC(a)(-PNC-CCN)	0,719	0,677
Canary Islands	CIs11	1997	2020	PSOE	0,682	CC(a)(-PNC-CCN)	0,719	0,682
Cantabria	Can1	1868	1870	PDR	0,040	-	0,000	0,320
Cantabria	Can2	1871	1875	PRDF	0,662	-	0,000	0,320
Cantabria	Can3	1876	1922	PC-L/PD-RP	0,320	-	0,000	0,320
Cantabria	Can5	1923	1930	-	0,000	-	0,000	0,000
Cantabria	Can6	1931	1936	PRIzq	0,320	-	0,000	0,320
Cantabria	Can7	1937	1975	-	0,000	-	0,000	0,000
Cantabria	Can8	1976	1977	PSOE/PP	0,320	-	0,000	0,320
Cantabria	Can9	1978	1981	PSOE/PP	0,662	PRC	0,677	0,320
Cantabria	Can10	1982	1987	PSOE/PP	0,662	PRC	0,677	0,662
Cantabria	Can11	1988	1991	PSOE/PP	0,677	PRC	0,677	0,662
Cantabria	Can12	1992	1996	PSOE/PP	0,677	PRC	0,677	0,677
Cantabria	Can13	1997	2020	PSOE/PP	0,682	PRC	0,682	0,682
Castile and León	CyL1	1868	1870	PDR	0,040	-	0,000	0,040
Castile and León	CyL2	1871	1875	PRDF	0,662	-	0,000	0,040
Castile and León	CyL3	1876	1922	PC-L/PD-RP	0,040	-	0,000	0,040
Castile and León	CyL5	1923	1930	-	0,000	-	0,000	0,000
Castile and León	CyL6	1931	1936	PRIzq	0,040	-	0,000	0,040
Castile and León	CyL7	1937	1975	-	0,000	-	0,000	0,000
Castile and León	CyL8	1976	1977	PSOE	0,070	-	0,000	0,070
Castile and León	CyL9	1978	1982	PSOE	0,662	-	0,000	0,070

Sub-state community	Case ID	From	To	Traditional party demand		Regionalist party demand		Autonomy statute
				Party	Score	Party	Score	
Castile and León	CyL10	1983	1987	PSOE	0,662	-	0,000	0,662
Castile and León	CyL11	1988	1991	PSOE	0,677	-	0,000	0,662
Castile and León	CyL12	1992	1996	PSOE	0,677	-	0,000	0,677
Castile and León	CyL13	1997	2020	PSOE	0,682	-	0,000	0,682
Castile-la Mancha	ClM1	1868	1870	PDR	0,040	-	0,000	0,040
Castile-la Mancha	ClM2	1871	1875	PRDF	0,662	-	0,000	0,040
Castile-la Mancha	ClM3	1876	1922	PC-L/PD-RP	0,040	-	0,000	0,040
Castile-la Mancha	ClM5	1923	1930	-	0,000	-	0,000	0,000
Castile-la Mancha	ClM6	1931	1936	PRIzq	0,040	-	0,000	0,040
Castile-la Mancha	ClM7	1937	1975	-	0,000	-	0,000	0,000
Castile-la Mancha	ClM8	1976	1977	PSOE	0,070	-	0,000	0,070
Castile-la Mancha	ClM9	1978	1981	PSOE	0,662	-	0,000	0,070
Castile-la Mancha	ClM10	1982	1987	PSOE	0,662	-	0,000	0,662
Castile-la Mancha	ClM11	1988	1991	PSOE	0,677	-	0,000	0,662
Castile-la Mancha	ClM12	1992	1996	PSOE	0,677	-	0,000	0,677
Castile-la Mancha	ClM13	1997	2020	PSOE	0,682	-	0,000	0,682
Catalonia	Cat1	1868	1870	PDR	0,100	-	0,000	0,070
Catalonia	Cat2	1871	1875	PRDF	0,662	-	0,000	0,070
Catalonia	Cat3	1876	1906	PC-L/PD-RP	0,070	-	0,000	0,070
Catalonia	Cat4	1907	1912	PRDF	0,662	LR	0,776	0,070
Catalonia	Cat5	1913	1922	PRDF	0,662	LR	0,776	0,320
Catalonia	Cat7	1923	1930	-	0,000	-	0,000	0,000
Catalonia	Cat8	1931	1931	PRIzq	0,662	ERC	Ind.	0,070
Catalonia	Cat9	1932	1933	PRIzq	0,662	ERC	Ind.	0,662
Catalonia	Cat10	1934	1935	PRIzq	0,662	ERC	Ind.	0,130
Catalonia	Cat11	1936	1936	PRIzq	0,662	ERC	Ind.	0,662
Catalonia	Cat12	1937	1975	-	0,000	-	0,000	0,000
Catalonia	Cat13	1976	1978	PSOE	0,682	CiU	0,800	0,070
Catalonia	Cat14	1979	1996	PSOE	0,682	CiU	0,800	0,682
Catalonia	Cat15	1997	2009	PSOE	0,692	CiU	0,800	0,692
Catalonia	Cat16	2010	2014	PSOE	0,694	CiU	0,800	0,694
Catalonia	Cat17	2015	2016	PSOE	0,694	JxSi	Ind.	0,694
Catalonia	Cat18	2017	2017	PSOE	0,694	JuntsxCat	Ind.	0,280
Catalonia	Cat19	2018	2020	PSOE	0,694	JuntsxCat	Ind.	0,694
Extremadura	Ext1	1868	1870	PDR	0,040	-	0,000	0,040
Extremadura	Ext2	1871	1875	PRDF	0,662	-	0,000	0,040
Extremadura	Ext3	1876	1922	PC-L/PD-RP	0,040	-	0,000	0,040
Extremadura	Ext5	1923	1930	-	0,000	-	0,000	0,000
Extremadura	Ext6	1931	1936	PRIzq	0,040	-	0,000	0,040
Extremadura	Ext7	1937	1975	-	0,000	-	0,000	0,000
Extremadura	Ext8	1976	1977	PSOE	0,070	-	0,000	0,070
Extremadura	Ext9	1978	1981	PSOE	0,662	-	0,000	0,070
Extremadura	Ext10	1980	1982	PSOE	0,662	EU	0,677	0,070

Sub-state community	Case ID	From	To	Traditional party demand		Regionalist party demand		Autonomy statute
				Party	Score	Party	Score	
Extremadura	Ext11	1983	1987	PSOE	0,662	EU	0,677	0,662
Extremadura	Ext12	1988	1991	PSOE	0,677	EU	0,677	0,662
Extremadura	Ext13	1992	1996	PSOE	0,677	EU/CEx/CREx-PREx	0,677	0,677
Extremadura	Ext14	1997	2014	PSOE	0,682	CEx/CREx-PREx/EU	0,682	0,682
Extremadura	Ext15	2015	2020	PSOE	0,682	-	0,000	0,682
Galicia	Gal1	1868	1870	PDR	0,100	-	0,000	0,070
Galicia	Gal2	1871	1875	PRDF	0,662	-	0,000	0,070
Galicia	Gal3	1876	1922	PC-L/PD-RP	0,070	-	0,000	0,070
Galicia	Gal4	1923	1930	-	0,000	-	0,000	0,000
Galicia	Gal5	1931	1931	PRIzq	0,070	PG	0,747	0,070
Galicia	Gal6	1932	1936	PRIzq	0,662	PG	0,747	0,070
Galicia	Gal7	1937	1975	-	0,000	-	0,000	0,000
Galicia	Gal8	1976	1976	PP/PSOE	0,060	-	0,000	0,070
Galicia	Gal9	1977	1980	PP/PSOE	0,682	BNPG(-PSG)	0,742	0,070
Galicia	Gal10	1981	1996	PP/PSOE	0,682	EG(-PSG)/BNG	0,742	0,682
Galicia	Gal11	1997	2015	PP/PSOE	0,687	BNG	0,747	0,687
Galicia	Gal14	2016	2020	PP/PSOE	0,687	BNG	Ind.	0,687
La Rioja	Rio1	1868	1870	PDR	0,320	-	0,000	0,320
La Rioja	Rio2	1871	1875	PRDF	0,662	-	0,000	0,320
La Rioja	Rio3	1876	1922	PC-L/PD-RP	0,320	-	0,000	0,320
La Rioja	Rio5	1923	1930	-	0,000	-	0,000	0,320
La Rioja	Rio6	1931	1936	PRIzq	0,320	-	0,000	0,320
La Rioja	Rio7	1937	1975	-	0,000	-	0,000	0,000
La Rioja	Rio8	1976	1977	PSOE/PP	0,320	-	0,000	0,320
La Rioja	Rio9	1978	1981	PSOE/PP	0,662	-	0,000	0,320
La Rioja	Rio10	1982	1987	PSOE/PP	0,662	PRP/PR	0,677	0,662
La Rioja	Rio11	1988	1991	PSOE/PP	0,677	PR	0,677	0,662
La Rioja	Rio12	1992	1996	PSOE/PP	0,677	PR	0,677	0,677
La Rioja	Rio13	1997	2014	PSOE/PP	0,682	PR	0,682	0,682
La Rioja	Rio14	2015	2020	PSOE/PP	0,682	-	0,000	0,682
Madrid	Mad1	1868	1870	PDR	0,040	-	0,000	0,040
Madrid	Mad2	1871	1875	PRDF	0,662	-	0,000	0,040
Madrid	Mad3	1876	1922	PC-L/PD-RP	0,040	-	0,000	0,040
Madrid	Mad5	1923	1930	-	0,000	-	0,000	0,000
Madrid	Mad6	1931	1936	PRIzq	0,040	-	0,000	0,040
Madrid	Mad7	1937	1975	-	0,000	-	0,000	0,000
Madrid	Mad8	1976	1977	PSOE	0,070	-	0,000	0,070
Madrid	Mad9	1978	1981	PSOE	0,662	-	0,000	0,070
Madrid	Mad10	1982	1987	PSOE	0,662	-	0,000	0,662
Madrid	Mad11	1988	1991	PSOE	0,677	-	0,000	0,662
Madrid	Mad12	1992	1996	PSOE	0,677	-	0,000	0,677
Madrid	Mad13	1997	2020	PSOE	0,682	-	0,000	0,682
Murcia	Mur1	1868	1870	PDR	0,040	-	0,000	0,040

Sub-state community	Case ID	From	To	Traditional party demand		Regionalist party demand		Autonomy statute
				Party	Score	Party	Score	
Murcia	Mur2	1871	1875	PRDF	0,662	-	0,000	0,040
Murcia	Mur3	1876	1922	PC-L/PD-RP	0,040	-	0,000	0,040
Murcia	Mur5	1923	1930	-	0,000	-	0,000	0,000
Murcia	Mur6	1931	1936	PRIzq	0,040	-	0,000	0,040
Murcia	Mur7	1937	1975	-	0,000	-	0,000	0,000
Murcia	Mur8	1976	1977	PSOE	0,070	-	0,000	0,070
Murcia	Mur9	1978	1981	PSOE	0,662	-	0,000	0,070
Murcia	Mur10	1982	1987	PSOE	0,662	-	0,000	0,662
Murcia	Mur11	1988	1991	PSOE	0,677	-	0,000	0,662
Murcia	Mur12	1992	1996	PSOE	0,677	-	0,000	0,677
Murcia	Mur13	1997	2020	PSOE	0,682	-	0,000	0,682
Navarre	Nav1	1868	1870	Carlists	0,628	-	0,000	0,297
Navarre	Nav2	1871	1875	PRDF	0,662	-	0,000	0,297
Navarre	Nav3	1876	1900	PC-L/PD-RP	0,297	-	0,000	0,297
Navarre	Nav4	1901	1917	Carlists	0,617	-	0,000	0,297
Navarre	Nav5	1918	1922	Carlists	0,617	CNV	0,800	0,297
Navarre	Nav6	1923	1930	-	0,297	-	0,000	0,297
Navarre	Nav7	1931	1936	Carlists	0,617	PNV	0,800	0,297
Navarre	Nav8	1937	1975	-	0,297	-	0,000	0,297
Navarre	Nav9	1976	1981	UPN/(PSOE)	0,694	HB	Ind.	0,297
Navarre	Nav10	1982	1986	UPN/(PSOE)	0,694	HB/EH	Ind.	0,694
Navarre	Nav11	1987	1994	UPN/(PSOE)	0,697	HB/EH	Ind.	0,697
Navarre	Nav12	1995	2002	UPN/(PSOE)	0,697	HB/EH	Ind.	0,697
Navarre	Nav13	2003	2006	UPN/(PSOE)	0,697	Aralar	Ind.	0,697
Navarre	Nav14	2007	2010	UPN/(PSOE)	0,699	NaBai	0,820	0,699
Navarre	Nav15	2011	2017	UPN/(PSOE)	0,699	NaBai	0,820	0,699
Navarre	Nav16	2018	2020	UPN/NA+/(PSOE)	0,699	NaBai/GBai	0,820	0,699
Valencia	Val1	1868	1870	PDR	0,040	-	0,000	0,040
Valencia	Val2	1871	1875	PRDF	0,662	-	0,000	0,040
Valencia	Val3	1876	1922	PC-L/PD-RP	0,040	-	0,000	0,040
Valencia	Val4	1923	1930	-	0,000	-	0,000	0,000
Valencia	Val5	1931	1931	PRIzq	0,040	-	0,000	0,040
Valencia	Val6	1932	1936	CEDA/PRIzq	0,662	DRV	0,662	0,040
Valencia	Val7	1937	1975	-	0,000	-	0,000	0,000
Valencia	Val8	1976	1977	PSOE/PP	0,070	-	0,000	0,070
Valencia	Val9	1978	1981	PSOE/PP	0,682	-	0,000	0,070
Valencia	Val10	1982	1996	PSOE/PP	0,682	UV	0,682	0,682
Valencia	Val11	1997	2020	PSOE/PP	0,687	UV/Compromis	0,687	0,687
León	Leo1	1868	1870	PDR	0,040	-	0,000	0,040
León	Leo2	1871	1875	PRDF	0,662	-	0,000	0,040
León	Leo3	1876	1922	PC-L/PD-RP	0,040	-	0,000	0,040
León	Leo5	1923	1930	-	0,000	-	0,000	0,040
León	Leo6	1931	1936	PRIzq	0,040	-	0,000	0,040

Sub-state community	Case ID	From	To	Traditional party demand		Regionalist party demand		Autonomy statute
				Party	Score	Party	Score	
León	Leo7	1937	1975	-	0,000	-	0,000	0,040
León	Leo8	1976	1985	PSOE	0,040	-	0,000	0,040
León	Leo9	1986	1987	PSOE	0,040	UPL	0,662	0,040
León	Leo10	1988	1996	PSOE	0,040	UPL	0,677	0,040
León	Leo11	1997	2020	PSOE	0,040	UPL	0,682	0,040
Ireland	Ire1	1801	1831	All	0,160	-	0,000	0,140
Ireland	Ire2	1832	1851	All	0,160	IR	Ind.	0,160
Ireland	Ire3	1852	1869	All	0,160	-	0,000	0,160
Ireland	Ire4	1870	1884	All	0,160	HRL/IPP	0,910	0,160
Ireland	Ire5	1885	1916	Liberals	0,910	IPP/SF	0,910	0,160
Ireland	Ire6	1917	1920	Liberals	0,910	SF	Ind.	0,160
Ireland	Ire7	1921	1921	Liberals	0,910	SF	Ind.	0,767
Northern Ireland (Nationalists)	NIN1	1921	1949	-	0,000	Nationalist	0,910	0,767
Northern Ireland (Nationalists)	NIN2	1950	1971	NI Labour	0,910	Nationalist	0,910	0,767
Northern Ireland (Nationalists)	NIN3	1972	1981	SDLP	0,910	Nationalist	0,910	0,080
Northern Ireland (Nationalists)	NIN4	1982	1997	SDLP	0,910	SF	Ind.	0,080
Northern Ireland (Nationalists)	NIN5	1998	2002	SDLP	0,910	SF	Ind.	0,763
Northern Ireland (Nationalists)	NIN6	2003	2006	SDLP	0,910	SF	Ind.	0,220
Northern Ireland (Nationalists)	NIN7	2007	2010	SDLP	0,910	SF	Ind.	0,763
Northern Ireland (Nationalists)	NIN8	2011	2016	SDLP	0,910	SF	Ind.	0,782
Northern Ireland (Nationalists)	NIN9	2017	2019	SDLP	0,910	SF	Ind.	0,220
Northern Ireland (Nationalists)	NIN10	2020	2020	SDLP	0,910	SF	Ind.	0,792
Northern Ireland (Unionists)	NIU1	1801	1890	All	0,160	-	0,000	0,160
Northern Ireland (Unionists)	NIU2	1891	1920	All	0,160	IUP/UUP	0,160	0,160
Northern Ireland (Unionists)	NIU3	1921	1921	-	0,000	UUP	0,160	0,767
Northern Ireland (Unionists)	NIU4	1922	1944	-	0,000	UUP	0,767	0,767
Northern Ireland (Unionists)	NIU5	1945	1948	Com. Labour	0,767	UUP	0,767	0,767
Northern Ireland (Unionists)	NIU6	1949	1961	-	0,000	UUP	0,767	0,767
Northern Ireland (Unionists)	NIU7	1962	1971	Ulster Liberal	0,767	UUP	0,767	0,767
Northern Ireland (Unionists)	NIU8	1972	1979	Alliance	0,767	UUP	0,767	0,080
Northern Ireland (Unionists)	NIU9	1980	1997	Alliance	0,767	UUP	0,080	0,080
Northern Ireland (Unionists)	NIU10	1998	2002	-	0,000	UUP	0,763	0,763
Northern Ireland (Unionists)	NIU11	2003	2006	-	0,000	UUP	0,763	0,220
Northern Ireland (Unionists)	NIU12	2007	2010	-	0,000	DUP	0,782	0,763
Northern Ireland (Unionists)	NIU13	2011	2016	-	0,000	DUP	0,782	0,782
Northern Ireland (Unionists)	NIU14	2017	2019	-	0,000	DUP	0,792	0,220
Northern Ireland (Unionists)	NIU15	2020	2020	-	0,000	DUP	0,792	0,792
Scotland	Sco1	1707	1744	Liberal	0,180	-	0,000	0,180
Scotland	Sco2	1745	1884	Liberal	0,280	-	0,000	0,070
Scotland	Sco3	1885	1891	Liberal	0,740	-	0,000	0,280
Scotland	Sco4	1892	1933	Liberal/(Labour)	0,740	-	0,000	0,320
Scotland	Sco5	1934	1973	Liberal	0,740	SNP	Ind.	0,320
Scotland	Sco6	1974	1997	Labour/Liberal(LibDems)	0,740	SNP	Ind.	0,320

Sub-state community	Case ID	From	To	Traditional party demand		Regionalist party demand		Autonomy statute
				Party	Score	Party	Score	
Scotland	Sco7	1998	2006	Labour/LibDems	0,740	SNP	Ind.	0,740
Scotland	Sco8	2007	2011	Labour/LibDems/Conserv.	0,752	SNP	Ind.	0,740
Scotland	Sco9	2012	2013	Labour/LibDems/Conserv.	0,752	SNP	Ind.	0,752
Scotland	Sco10	2014	2015	Labour/LibDems/Conserv.	0,782	SNP	Ind.	0,752
Scotland	Sco11	2016	2020	Labour/LibDems/Conserv.	0,782	SNP	Ind.	0,782
Wales	Wal1	1707	1849	All	0,070	-	0,000	0,070
Wales	Wal2	1850	1906	Liberals	0,180	-	0,000	0,070
Wales	Wal3	1907	1924	Liberals	0,180	-	0,000	0,180
Wales	Wal4	1925	1948	Liberals	0,685	PC	0,793	0,180
Wales	Wal5	1949	1963	Liberals	0,685	PC	0,793	0,230
Wales	Wal6	1964	1998	Liberals(LibDems)	0,685	PC	0,793	0,320
Wales	Wal7	1999	2002	LibDems	0,700	PC	0,793	0,360
Wales	Wal8	2003	2010	LibDems	0,700	PC	Ind.	0,360
Wales	Wal9	2011	2012	Labour/LibDems	0,700	PC	Ind.	0,700
Wales	Wal10	2013	2013	Labour/LibDems	0,717	PC	Ind.	0,700
Wales	Wal11	2014	2014	Labour/LibDems	0,717	PC	Ind.	0,717
Wales	Wal12	2015	2016	Labour/LibDems/Conserv.	0,747	PC	Ind.	0,717
Wales	Wal13	2017	2020	Labour/LibDems/Conserv.	0,747	PC	Ind.	0,747
England	Eng1	1707	2009	All	0,110	-	0,000	0,110
England	Eng2	2010	2015	All	0,110	UKIP	0,752	0,110
England	Eng3	2016	2018	All	0,110	UKIP	0,782	0,110
England	Eng4	2019	2020	All	0,110	-	0,000	0,110
London	Lon1	1707	1888	All	0,040	-	0,000	0,070
London	Lon2	1889	2020	All	0,332	-	0,000	0,332
Cornwall	Cor1	1707	1753	All	0,553	-	0,000	0,553
Cornwall	Cor2	1754	1889	All	0,040	-	0,000	0,040
Cornwall	Cor3	1888	1966	All	0,332	-	0,000	0,332
Cornwall	Cor4	1967	1997	All	0,332	MK	0,722	0,332
Cornwall	Cor5	1998	2020	LibDems	0,722	MK	0,722	0,332

Appendix 5. SAS database for autonomy statutes

Case ID	From	To	Full score	Group rights			Administrative Self-rule										Legislative Self-rule																								Shared rule			
							Ex. admin.		Adv. admin			Discr. admin.																																	
				Rec.	Part. fac.	Adv. fac.	1 sec.	Mltp. sec.	1 sec.	Mltp. sec.	El. ass.	1 sec.	Mltp. sec.	Bor.	Fisc.	El. ass.	Ow. exe.	El. ass.	Ow. exe.	Cul.	Edu.	Soc./ san.	Ter.	Eco.	Soc. sec.	Cit. imm.	Loc. gvm. Mun.	Loc. gvm. Int.	Loc. gvm. Tot.	Pol. & Def. Pol.	Pol. & Def. Def.	Pol. & Def. Tot.	Jud. sys. & Pe./ci. Jud.	Jud. sys. & Pe./ci. Pe./ci.	Jud. sys. & Pe./ci. Tot.	Bor.	Fisc.	Con.	Int.	No veto & guar. No vet.	No veto & guar. Guar.	No veto & guar. Tot.	Rep. Par.	Vet. Par.	Rep. Gvm.	Vet. Gvm.
BFl1	1830	1890	0,070	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
BFl2	1891	1935	0,100	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
BFl3	1936	1945	0,100	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
BFl4	1946	1953	0,100	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
BFl5	1954	1957	0,100	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
BFl6	1958	1963	0,100	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
BFl7	1964	1970	0,130	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
BFl8	1971	1989	0,320	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
BFl9	1990	1993	0,632	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0,75	0,25	0	0	0,5	0	0,25	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0	0	1	0	0,5	1	0	0	0
BFl10	1994	1994	0,652	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0,75	0,25	0	0	0,5	0	0,25	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0	1	1	0	0,5	1	0	0	0
BFl11	1995	2001	0,662	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0,75	0,25	0	0	0,5	1	0,75	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0	1	1	0	0,5	1	0	0	0
BFl12	2002	2013	0,690	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,75	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0,75	0,5	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0,75	0	1	1	0	0,5	1	0	0	0
BFl13	2014	2020	0,710	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,75	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0,75	0,75	0,25	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0,75	0,5	1	1	0	0,5	1	0	0	0
BFr1	1830	1899	0,100	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
BFr2	1900	1963	0,100	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
BFr3	1964	1970	0,130	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
BFr4	1971	1989	0,320	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
BFr5	1990	1993	0,632	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0,75	0,25	0	0	0,5	0	0,25	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0	0	1	0	0,5	1	0	0	0
BFr6	1994	1994	0,647	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,25	0	0,25	0,75	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0	0,25	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0	0	1	0	0,5	1	0	0	0
BFr7	1995	2001	0,677	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,25	0	0,25	0,75	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	1	0,75	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0	1	1	0	0,5	1	0	0	0
BFr8	2002	2013	0,705	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,75	1	1	1	1	0,25	0	0,25	0,75	0,5	0	0,25	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0,75	0	1	1	0	0,5	1	0	0	0
BFr9	2014	2020	0,725	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,75	1	1	1	1	0,25	0	0,25	0,75	0,75	0,25	0,25	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0,75	0,5	1	1	0	0,5	1	0	0	0
GsC1	1925	1928	0,030	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
GsC2	1929	1940	0,030	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
GsC3	1945	1962	0,030	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
GsC4	1963	1967	0,090	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
GsC5	1968	1970	0,090	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
GsC6	1971	1972	0,090	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
GsC7	1973	1976	0,260	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
GsC8	1977	1983	0,260	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
GsC9	1984	1989	0,585	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0,25	0,25	0	0	0	0,25	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0,5	0	0	0	0
GsC10	1990	1993	0,607	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0	1	1	1	1	0,75	1	0,5	0	0	0	0,25	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0	0	0	1	0	0,5	0	0	0	0
GsC11	1994	1999	0,652	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	0	0	0	0,25	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0	0	1	1	0	0,5	0,5	0	0	0
GsC12	2000	2001	0,657	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	0	0,25	0	0,25	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0	0	1	1	0	0,5	0,5	0	0	0
GsC13	2002	2004	0,670	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	0	0,25	0	0,25	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0,5	0,5	0	0	0
GsC14	2005	2010	0,675	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	0	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0	0,25	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0,5	0,5	0	0	0
GsC15	2011	2013	0,675	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	0	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0	0,25	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0,5	0,5	0	0	0
GsC16	2014	2018	0,705	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,75	0	0,25	0,25	0,25	1	0	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0,75	1	1	0	0,5	0,5	0	0	0
GsC17	2019	2020	0,710	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,25	0,25	0,25	0,25	1	0	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0,75	1	1	0	0,5	0,5	0	0	0
Fla1	1830	1890	0,140	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
Fla2	1891	1913	0,170	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
Fla3	1914	1916	0,170	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
Fla4	1917	1918	0,260	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
Fla5	1919	1935	0,170	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
Fla6	1936	1945	0,170	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
Fla7	1946	1953	0,170	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
Fla8	1954	1963	0,170	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
Fla9	1964	1970	0,220	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
Fla10	1971	1976	0,705	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0,25	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Fla11	1977	1980	0,705	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0,25	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Fla12	1981	1984	0,770	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0,25	0	1	0	0	1	1	0,25	0,25	0,75	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,25	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Fla13	1985	1989	0,770	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0,25	0	1	0	0	1	1	0,25	0,25	0,75	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,25	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Fla14	1990	1991	0,802	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0,33	0,5	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	0,5	0,75	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Fla15	1992	1993	0,802	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0,33	0,5	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	0,5	0,75	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Fla16	1994	1998	0,857	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,75	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Fla17	1999	2001	0,857	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,75	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Fla18	2002	2006	0,890	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,75	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,75	0,5	0	0,25	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0,75	0,75	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Fla19	2007	2013	0,890	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,75	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,75	0,5	0	0,25	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0,75	0,75	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Fla20	2014	2020	0,905	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,75	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,25	0,25	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0,75	0,75	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Wal1	1830	1899	0,140	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
Wal2	1900	1916	0,170	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
Wal3	1917	1918	0,220	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
Wal4	1919	1960	0,170	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
Wal5	1961	1963	0,170	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
Wal6	1964	1967	0,220	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
Wal7	1968	1970	0,220	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
Wal8	1971	1980	0,705	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0,25	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Wal9	1981	1989	0,770	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0,25	0	1	0	1	1	0,25	0,25	0,75	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,25	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1

Case ID	From	To	Full score	Group rights			Administrative Self-rule										Legislative Self-rule																										Shared rule			
							Ex. admin.		Adv. admin			Discr. admin.																																			
				Rec.	Part. fac.	Adv. fac.	1 sec.	Mltp. sec.	1 sec.	Mltp. sec.	El. ass.	1 sec.	Mltp. sec.	Bor.	Fisc.	El. ass.	Ow. exe.	El. ass.	Ow. exe.	Cul.	Edu.	Soc./ san.	Ter.	Eco.	Soc. sec.	Cit. imm.	Loc. gvm. Mun.	Loc. gvm. Int.	Loc. gvm. Tot.	Pol. & Def. Pol.	Pol. & Def. Def.	Pol. & Def. Tot.	Jud. sys. & Pe./ci. Jud.	Jud. sys. & Pe./ci. Pe./ci.	Jud. sys. & Pe./ci. Tot.	Bor.	Fisc.	Con.	Int.	No veto & guar. No vet.	No veto & guar. Guar.	No veto & guar. Tot.	Rep. Par.	Vet. Par.	Rep. Gvm.	Vet. Gvm.
Wal10	1990	1993	0,802	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0,33	0,5	0	1	0	1	1	1	0,5	0,75	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Wal11	1994	2001	0,857	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,75	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Wal12	2002	2013	0,890	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,75	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,75	0,5	0	0,25	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0,75	0,75	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Wal13	2014	2020	0,905	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,75	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,25	0,25	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0,75	0,75	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
And1	1868	1870	0,040	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
And2	1871	1875	0,040	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
And3	1876	1922	0,040	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
And5	1923	1930	0,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
And6	1931	1936	0,040	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
And7	1937	1975	0,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
And8	1976	1976	0,070	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
And9	1977	1980	0,070	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
And10	1981	1996	0,677	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
And11	1997	2015	0,682	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,75	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,75	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
And12	2016	2020	0,682	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,75	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,75	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Ara1	1868	1870	0,040	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Ara2	1871	1875	0,040	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Ara3	1876	1922	0,040	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Ara5	1923	1930	0,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ara6	1931	1936	0,040	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Ara7	1937	1975	0,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ara8	1976	1977	0,070	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Ara9	1978	1981	0,070	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Ara10	1982	1987	0,667	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,25	0,25	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Ara11	1988	1991	0,667	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,25	0,25	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Ara12	1992	1996	0,682	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Ara13	1997	2020	0,687	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,75	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	0,75	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Ast1	1868	1870	0,320	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Ast2	1871	1875	0,320	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Ast3	1876	1922	0,320	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Ast5	1923	1930	0,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ast6	1931	1936	0,320	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Ast7	1937	1975	0,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ast8	1976	1977	0,320	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Ast9	1978	1980	0,320	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Ast10	1981	1986	0,662	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,25	0,25	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Ast11	1987	1987	0,662	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,25	0,25	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Ast12	1988	1991	0,662	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,25	0,25	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Ast13	1992	1996	0,677	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Ast14	1997	2020	0,682	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,75	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,75	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Bls1	1868	1870	0,320	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Bls2	1871	1875	0,320	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Bls3	1876	1922	0,320	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Bls4	1923	1930	0,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bls5	1931	1931	0,320	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Bls6	1932	1936	0,320	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Bls7	1937	1975	0,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bls8	1976	1976	0,320	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Bls9	1977	1977	0,320	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Bls10	1978	1981	0,320	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Bls11	1982	1987	0,667	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,25	0,25	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Bls12	1988	1991	0,667	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,25	0,25	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Bls13	1992	1994	0,682	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Bls14	1995	1996	0,682	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Bls15	1997	2020	0,687	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,75	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	0,75	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Bsq1	1868	1870	0,638	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0,5	1	0	0,67	1	0,5	1	0,5	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,5	0,25	0,67	1	1	0	1	0	0,5	1	0	0	0
Bsq2	1871	1875	0,638	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0,5	1	0	0,67	1	0,5	1	0,5	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,5	0,25	0,67	1	1	0	1	0	0,5	1	0	0	0
Bsq3	1876	1900	0,297	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0,33	1	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Bsq4	1901	1917	0,297	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0,33	1	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Bsq5	1918	1922	0,297	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0,33	1	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Bsq6	1923	1930	0,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bsq7	1931	1935	0,297	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0,33	1	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Bsq8	1936	1936	0,672	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,25	0,25	0	0	0	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0,25	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	1	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Bsq9	1937	1975	0,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bsq10	1976	1978	0,070	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Bsq11	1979	1981	0,697	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0,25	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	1	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Bsq12	1982	1995	0,697	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0,25	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	1	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Bsq13	1996	2003	0,699	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,75	0	0,375	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	1	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Bsq14	2004	2010	0,699	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,75	0	0,375	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	1	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0

Case ID	From	To	Full score	Group rights			Administrative Self-rule										Legislative Self-rule																												Shared rule			
							Ex. admin.		Adv. admin			Discr. admin.																																					
				Rec.	Part. fac.	Adv. fac.	1 sec.	Mltp. sec.	1 sec.	Mltp. sec.	El. ass.	1 sec.	Mltp. sec.	Bor.	Fisc.	El. ass.	Ow. exe.	El. ass.	Ow. exe.	Cul.	Edu.	Soc./ san.	Ter.	Eco.	Soc. sec.	Cit. imm.	Loc. gvm. Mun.	Loc. gvm. Int.	Loc. gvm. Tot.	Pol. & Def. Pol.	Pol. & Def. Def.	Pol. & Def. Tot.	Jud. sys. & Pe./ci. Jud.	Jud. sys. & Pe./ci. Pe./ci.	Jud. sys. & Pe./ci. Tot.	Bor.	Fisc.	Con.	Int.	No veto & guar. No vet.	No veto & guar. Guar.	No veto & guar. Tot.	Rep. Par.	Vet. Par.	Rep. Gvm.	Vet. Gvm.
Bsq15	2011	2014	0,699	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,75	0	0,375	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	1	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Bsq16	2015	2017	0,699	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,75	0	0,375	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	1	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Bsq17	2018	2020	0,699	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,75	0	0,375	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	1	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
CIs1	1868	1875	0,320	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
CIs2	1876	1922	0,320	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
CIs3	1923	1930	0,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CIs4	1931	1931	0,070	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
CIs5	1932	1936	0,070	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
CIs6	1937	1975	0,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CIs7	1976	1976	0,070	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
CIs8	1977	1981	0,070	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
CIs9	1982	1986	0,677	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
CIs10	1987	1996	0,677	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
CIs11	1997	2020	0,682	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,75	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,75	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Can1	1868	1870	0,320	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Can2	1871	1875	0,320	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Can3	1876	1922	0,320	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Can5	1923	1930	0,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Can6	1931	1936	0,320	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Can7	1937	1975	0,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Can8	1976	1977	0,320	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Can9	1978	1981	0,320	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Can10	1982	1987	0,662	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,25	0,25	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Can11	1988	1991	0,662	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,25	0,25	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Can12	1992	1996	0,677	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Can13	1997	2020	0,682	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,75	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,75	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
CyL1	1868	1870	0,040	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
CyL2	1871	1875	0,040	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
CyL3	1876	1922	0,040	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
CyL5	1923	1930	0,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CyL6	1931	1936	0,040	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
CyL7	1937	1975	0,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CyL8	1976	1977	0,070	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
CyL9	1978	1982	0,070	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
CyL10	1983	1987	0,662	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,25	0,25	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
CyL11	1988	1991	0,662	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,25	0,25	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
CyL12	1992	1996	0,677	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
CyL13	1997	2020	0,682	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,75	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,75	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
ClM1	1868	1870	0,040	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
ClM2	1871	1875	0,040	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
ClM3	1876	1922	0,040	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
ClM5	1923	1930	0,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ClM6	1931	1936	0,040	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
ClM7	1937	1975	0,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ClM8	1976	1977	0,070	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
ClM9	1978	1981	0,070	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
ClM10	1982	1987	0,662	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,25	0,25	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
ClM11	1988	1991	0,662	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,25	0,25	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
ClM12	1992	1996	0,677	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
ClM13	1997	2020	0,682	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,75	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,75	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Cat1	1868	1870	0,070	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Cat2	1871	1875	0,070	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Cat3	1876	1906	0,070	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Cat4	1907	1912	0,070	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Cat5	1913	1922	0,320	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Cat7	1923	1930	0,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Cat8	1931	1931	0,070	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Cat9	1932	1933	0,662	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,25	0,25	0	0	0	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0,25	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Cat10	1934	1935	0,130	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Cat11	1936	1936	0,662	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,25	0,25	0	0	0	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0,25	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Cat12	1937	1975	0,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Cat13	1976	1978	0,070	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Cat14	1979	1996	0,682	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Cat15	1997	2009	0,692	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,75	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0,25	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	0,75	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Cat16	2010	2014	0,694	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,75	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,75	0	0,375	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	0,75	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Cat17	2015	2016	0,694	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,75	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,75	0	0,375	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	0,75	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Cat18	2017	2017	0,280	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Cat19	2018	2020	0,694	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,75	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,75	0	0,375	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	0,75	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Ext1	1868	1870	0,040	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0

Case ID	From	To	Full score	Group rights			Administrative Self-rule										Legislative Self-rule																												Shared rule			
							Ex. admin.		Adv. admin			Discr. admin.																																					
																								Loc. gvm.				Pol. & Def.			Jud. sys. & Pe./ci.								No veto & guar.							
				Rec.	Part. fac.	Adv. fac.	1 sec.	Mltp. sec.	1 sec.	Mltp. sec.	El. ass.	1 sec.	Mltp. sec.	Bor.	Fisc.	El. ass.	Ow. exe.	El. ass.	Ow. exe.	Cul.	Edu.	Soc./ san.	Ter.	Eco.	Soc. sec.	Cit. imm.	Mun.	Int.	Tot.	Pol.	Def.	Tot.	Jud.	Pe./ci.	Tot.	Bor.	Fisc.	Con.	Int.	No vet.	Guar.	Tot.	Rep. Par.	Vet. Par.	Rep. Gvm.	Vet. Gvm.
Ext2	1871	1875	0,040	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Ext3	1876	1922	0,040	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Ext5	1923	1930	0,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ext6	1931	1936	0,040	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Ext7	1937	1975	0,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ext8	1976	1977	0,070	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Ext9	1978	1981	0,070	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Ext10	1980	1982	0,070	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Ext11	1983	1987	0,662	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,25	0,25	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Ext12	1988	1991	0,662	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,25	0,25	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Ext13	1992	1996	0,677	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Ext14	1997	2014	0,682	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,75	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,75	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Ext15	2015	2020	0,682	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,75	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,75	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Gal1	1868	1870	0,070	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Gal2	1871	1875	0,070	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Gal3	1876	1922	0,070	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Gal4	1923	1930	0,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Gal5	1931	1931	0,070	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Gal6	1932	1936	0,070	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Gal7	1937	1975	0,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Gal8	1976	1976	0,070	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Gal9	1977	1980	0,070	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Gal10	1981	1996	0,682	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Gal11	1997	2015	0,687	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,75	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	0,75	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Gal14	2016	2020	0,687	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,75	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	0,75	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Rio1	1868	1870	0,320	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Rio2	1871	1875	0,320	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Rio3	1876	1922	0,320	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Rio5	1923	1930	0,320	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Rio6	1931	1936	0,320	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Rio7	1937	1975	0,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Rio8	1976	1977	0,320	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Rio9	1978	1981	0,320	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Rio10	1982	1987	0,662	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,25	0,25	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Rio11	1988	1991	0,662	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,25	0,25	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Rio12	1992	1996	0,677	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Rio13	1997	2014	0,682	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,75	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,75	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Rio14	2015	2020	0,682	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,75	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,75	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Mad1	1868	1870	0,040	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Mad2	1871	1875	0,040	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Mad3	1876	1922	0,040	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Mad5	1923	1930	0,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mad6	1931	1936	0,040	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Mad7	1937	1975	0,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mad8	1976	1977	0,070	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Mad9	1978	1981	0,070	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Mad10	1982	1987	0,662	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,25	0,25	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Mad11	1988	1991	0,662	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,25	0,25	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Mad12	1992	1996	0,677	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Mad13	1997	2020	0,682	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,75	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,75	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Mur1	1868	1870	0,040	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Mur2	1871	1875	0,040	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Mur3	1876	1922	0,040	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Mur5	1923	1930	0,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mur6	1931	1936	0,040	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Mur7	1937	1975	0,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mur8	1976	1977	0,070	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Mur9	1978	1981	0,070	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Mur10	1982	1987	0,662	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,25	0,25	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Mur11	1988	1991	0,662	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,25	0,25	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Mur12	1992	1996	0,677	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Mur13	1997	2020	0,682	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,75	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,75	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Nav1	1868	1870	0,297	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0,5	1	0	0,33	1	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Nav2	1871	1875	0,297	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0,5	1	0	0,33	1	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Nav3	1876	1900	0,297	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0,5	1	0	0,33	1	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Nav4	1901	1917	0,297	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0,5	1	0	0,33	1	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Nav5	1918	1922	0,297	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0,5	1	0	0,33	1	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Nav6	1923	1930	0,297	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0,5	1	0	0,33	1	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Nav7	1931	1936	0,297	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0,5	1	0	0,33	1	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0

Case ID	From	To	Full score	Group rights			Administrative Self-rule										Legislative Self-rule																												Shared rule			
							Ex. admin.		Adv. admin			Discr. admin.																																					
				Rec.	Part. fac.	Adv. fac.	1 sec.	Mltp. sec.	1 sec.	Mltp. sec.	El. ass.	1 sec.	Mltp. sec.	Bor.	Fisc.	El. ass.	Ow. exe.	El. ass.	Ow. exe.	Cul.	Edu.	Soc./ san.	Ter.	Eco.	Soc. sec.	Cit. imm.	Loc. gvm. Mun.	Loc. gvm. Int.	Loc. gvm. Tot.	Pol. & Def. Pol.	Pol. & Def. Def.	Pol. & Def. Tot.	Jud. sys. & Pe./ci. Jud.	Jud. sys. & Pe./ci. Pe./ci.	Jud. sys. & Pe./ci. Tot.	Bor.	Fisc.	Con.	Int.	No veto & guar. No vet.	No veto & guar. Guar.	No veto & guar. Tot.	Rep. Par.	Vet. Par.	Rep. Gvm.	Vet. Gvm.
Nav8	1937	1975	0,297	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0,5	1	0	0,33	1	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Nav9	1976	1981	0,297	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0,5	1	0	0,33	1	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Nav10	1982	1986	0,694	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,25	0	0,125	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	1	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Nav11	1987	1994	0,697	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0,25	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	1	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Nav12	1995	2002	0,697	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0,25	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	1	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Nav13	2003	2006	0,697	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0,25	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	1	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Nav14	2007	2010	0,699	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,75	0	0,375	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	1	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Nav15	2011	2017	0,699	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,75	0	0,375	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	1	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Nav16	2018	2020	0,699	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,75	0	0,375	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	1	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Val1	1868	1870	0,040	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Val2	1871	1875	0,040	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Val3	1876	1922	0,040	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Val4	1923	1930	0,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Val5	1931	1931	0,040	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Val6	1932	1936	0,040	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Val7	1937	1975	0,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Val8	1976	1977	0,070	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Val9	1978	1981	0,070	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Val10	1982	1996	0,682	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Val11	1997	2020	0,687	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,75	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	0,75	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Leo1	1868	1870	0,040	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Leo2	1871	1875	0,040	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Leo3	1876	1922	0,040	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Leo5	1923	1930	0,040	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Leo6	1931	1936	0,040	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Leo7	1937	1975	0,040	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Leo8	1976	1985	0,040	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Leo9	1986	1987	0,040	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Leo10	1988	1996	0,040	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Leo11	1997	2020	0,040	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Ire1	1801	1831	0,140	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,5	0	0	0
Ire2	1832	1851	0,160	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Ire3	1852	1869	0,160	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Ire4	1870	1884	0,160	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Ire5	1885	1916	0,160	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Ire6	1917	1920	0,160	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Ire7	1921	1921	0,767	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,25	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	1	0,25	0,75	0,75	0,75	1	0	0,5	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,33	0,25	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
NIN1	1921	1949	0,767	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,25	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	1	0,25	0,75	0,75	0,75	1	0	0,5	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,33	0,25	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
NIN2	1950	1971	0,767	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,25	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	1	0,25	0,75	0,75	0,75	1	0	0,5	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,33	0,25	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
NIN3	1972	1981	0,080	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
NIN4	1982	1997	0,080	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
NIN5	1998	2002	0,763	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,25	0,75	0,25	0,75	0,75	0,75	0	0	0	0,75	0,375	0,5625	0,33	0	0,75	0	0	1	0,5	1	0	1	0
NIN6	2003	2006	0,220	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
NIN7	2007	2010	0,763	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,25	0,75	0,25	0,75	0,75	0,75	0	0	0	0,75	0,375	0,5625	0,33	0	0,75	0	0	1	0,5	1	0	1	0
NIN8	2011	2016	0,782	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,25	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,25	0,75	0,25	0,75	0,75	0,75	1	0	0,5	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,33	0,25	0,75	0	0	1	0,5	1	0	1	0
NIN9	2017	2019	0,220	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
NIN10	2020	2020	0,792	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,75	0	0	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,25	0,75	0,25	0,75	0,75	0,75	1	0	0,5	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,33	0,75	0,75	0	0	1	0,5	1	0	1	0
NIU1	1801	1890	0,160	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
NIU2	1891	1920	0,160	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
NIU3	1921	1921	0,767	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,25	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	1	0,25	0,75	0,75	0,75	1	0	0,5	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,33	0,25	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
NIU4	1922	1944	0,767	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,25	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	1	0,25	0,75	0,75	0,75	1	0	0,5	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,33	0,25	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
NIU5	1945	1948	0,767	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,25	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	1	0,25	0,75	0,75	0,75	1	0	0,5	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,33	0,25	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
NIU6	1949	1961	0,767	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,25	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	1	0,25	0,75	0,75	0,75	1	0	0,5	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,33	0,25	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
NIU7	1962	1971	0,767	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,25	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	1	0,25	0,75	0,75	0,75	1	0	0,5	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,33	0,25	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
NIU8	1972	1979	0,080	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
NIU9	1980	1997	0,080	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
NIU10	1998	2002	0,763	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,25	0,75	0,25	0,75	0,75	0,75	0	0	0	0,75	0,375	0,5625	0,33	0	0,75	0	0	1	0,5	1	0	1	0
NIU11	2003	2006	0,220	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
NIU12	2007	2010	0,763	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,25	0,75	0,25	0,75	0,75	0,75	0	0	0	0,75	0,375	0,5625	0,33	0	0,75	0	0	1	0,5	1	0	1	0
NIU13	2011	2016	0,782	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,25	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,25	0,75	0,25	0,75	0,75	0,75	1	0	0,5	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,33	0,25	0,75	0	0	1	0,5	1	0	1	0
NIU14	2017	2019	0,220	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
NIU15	2020	2020	0,792	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,75	0	0	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,25	0,75	0,25	0,75	0,75	0,75	1	0	0,5	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,33	0,75	0,75	0	0	1	0,5	1	0	1	0
Sco1	1707	1744	0,180	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Sco2	1745	1884	0,070	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Sco3	1885	1891	0,280	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Sco4	1892	1933	0,320	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
Sco5	1934	1973	0,320	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
Sco6	1974	1997	0,320	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
Sco7	1998	2006	0,740	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0,25	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,75	0,75	0,75	1	0	0,5	0,75	0,75	0,75	0	0,25	0,5	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0

Case ID	From	To	Full score	Group rights			Administrative Self-rule										Legislative Self-rule																										Shared rule			
							Ex. admin.		Adv. admin			Discr. admin.																																				
				Rec.	Part. fac.	Adv. fac.	1 sec.	Mltp. sec.	1 sec.	Mltp. sec.	El. ass.	1 sec.	Mltp. sec.	Bor.	Fisc.	El. ass.	Ow. exe.	El. ass.	Ow. exe.	Cul.	Edu.	Soc./ san.	Ter.	Eco.	Soc. sec.	Cit. imm.	Loc. gvm. Mun.	Loc. gvm. Int.	Loc. gvm. Tot.	Pol. & Def. Pol.	Pol. & Def. Def.	Pol. & Def. Tot.	Jud. sys. & Pe./ci. Jud.	Jud. sys. & Pe./ci. Pe./ci.	Jud. sys. & Pe./ci. Tot.	Bor.	Fisc.	Con.	Int.	No veto & guar. No vet.	No veto & guar. Guar.	No veto & guar. Tot.	Rep. Par.	Vet. Par.	Rep. Gvm.	Vet. Gvm.
Sco8	2007	2011	0,740	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0,25	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,75	0,75	0,75	1	0	0,5	0,75	0,75	0,75	0	0,25	0,5	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
Sco9	2012	2013	0,752	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,75	0,75	0,75	1	0	0,5	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,33	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
Sco10	2014	2015	0,752	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,75	0,75	0,75	1	0	0,5	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,33	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
Sco11	2016	2020	0,782	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,75	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,25	0,25	0,25	0,75	0,75	0,75	1	0	0,5	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,33	0,75	1	0	0	0,5	0,25	1	0	1	0
Wal1	1707	1849	0,070	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Wal2	1850	1906	0,070	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Wal3	1907	1924	0,180	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Wal4	1925	1948	0,180	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Wal5	1949	1963	0,230	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Wal6	1964	1998	0,320	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
Wal7	1999	2002	0,360	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
Wal8	2003	2010	0,360	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
Wal9	2011	2012	0,700	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,75	0,75	0,75	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
Wal10	2013	2013	0,700	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,75	0,75	0,75	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
Wal11	2014	2014	0,717	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,75	0,75	0,75	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
Wal12	2015	2016	0,717	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,75	0,75	0,75	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
Wal13	2017	2020	0,747	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,75	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,25	0	0,25	0,75	0,75	0,75	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,75	0,75	0	0	0,5	0,25	1	0	1	0
Eng1	1707	2009	0,110	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
Eng2	2010	2015	0,110	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
Eng3	2016	2018	0,110	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
Eng4	2019	2020	0,110	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
Lon1	1707	1888	0,070	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Lon2	1889	2020	0,332	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,25	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Cor1	1707	1753	0,553	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0,25	0,25	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,25	0,125	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Cor2	1754	1889	0,040	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Cor3	1888	1966	0,332	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,25	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Cor4	1967	1997	0,332	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,25	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Cor5	1998	2020	0,332	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,25	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0

Appendix 6. SAS database for regionalist party demands

Case ID	From	To	Full score	Group rights			Administrative Self-rule											Legislative Self-rule																								Shared rule			
							Ex. admin.		Adv. admin			Discr. admin.														Loc. gvm.			Pol. & Def.			Jud. sys. & Pe./ci.						No veto & guar.							
				Rec.	Part. fac.	Adv. fac.	1 sec.	Mltp. sec.	1 sec.	Mltp. sec.	El. ass.	1 sec.	Mltp. sec.	Bor.	Fisc.	El. ass.	Ow. exe.	El. ass.	Ow. exe.	Cul.	Edu.	Soc./ san.	Ter.	Eco.	Soc. sec.	Cit. imm.	Mun.	Int.	Tot.	Pol.	Def.	Tot.	Jud.	Pe./ci.	Tot.	Bor.	Fisc.	Con.	Int.	No vet.	Guar.	Tot.	Rep. Par.	Vet. Par.	Rep. Gvm.	Vet. Gvm.
BFl1	1830	1890	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
BFl2	1891	1935	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
BFl3	1936	1945	0,100	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
BFl4	1946	1953	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
BFl5	1954	1957	0,100	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
BFl6	1958	1963	0,100	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
BFl7	1964	1970	0,100	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
BFl8	1971	1989	0,100	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
BFl9	1990	1993	0,100	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
BFl10	1994	1994	0,100	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
BFl11	1995	2001	0,100	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
BFl12	2002	2013	0,100	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
BFl13	2014	2020	0,100	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
BFr1	1830	1899	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
BFr2	1900	1963	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
BFr3	1964	1970	0,320	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
BFr4	1971	1989	0,620	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0,25	1	1	1	1	0	0,25	0,75	0,25	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,25	0	0	1	0	0,5	1	0	0	0
BFr5	1990	1993	0,657	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,25	0	0,5	0,75	0,25	0	0,25	1	0	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0	0	1	0	0,5	1	0	0	0
BFr6	1994	1994	0,687	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,25	0	0,5	0,75	0,25	0	0,25	1	0	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,5	1	1	0	0,5	1	0	0	0
BFr7	1995	2001	0,697	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,25	0	0,5	0,75	0,25	0	0,25	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,5	1	1	0	0,5	1	0	0	0
BFr8	2002	2013	0,720	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,75	1	1	1	1	0,25	0	0,5	0,75	0,5	0	0,25	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0,75	0,5	1	1	0	0,5	1	0	0	0
BFr9	2014	2020	0,735	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,75	1	1	1	1	0,25	0	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,25	0,25	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0,75	0,5	1	1	0	0,5	1	0	0	0
GsC1	1925	1928	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
GsC2	1929	1940	Ind.	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0
GsC3	1945	1962	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
GsC4	1963	1967	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
GsC5	1968	1970	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
GsC6	1971	1972	0,640	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
GsC7	1973	1976	0,640	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
GsC8	1977	1983	0,670	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0,25	0,75	0,25	0	0,25	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
GsC9	1984	1989	0,682	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0	1	1	1	1	1	0,25	0,75	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0	0,25	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
GsC10	1990	1993	0,687	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,75	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0	0,25	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
GsC11	1994	1999	0,737	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,75	0,25	0	0,25	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0	0,75	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
GsC12	2000	2001	0,737	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,75	0,25	0	0,25	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0	0,75	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
GsC13	2002	2004	0,755	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,75	0,5	0	0,25	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0,75	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
GsC14	2005	2010	0,755	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,75	0,5	0	0,25	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0,75	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
GsC15	2011	2013	0,755	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,75	0,5	0	0,25	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0,75	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
GsC16	2014	2018	0,770	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,25	0,25	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0,75	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
GsC17	2019	2020	0,770	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,25	0,25	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0,75	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
Fla1	1830	1890	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Fla2	1891	1913	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Fla3	1914	1916	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Fla4	1917	1918	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Fla5	1919	1935	0,765	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0,25	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Fla6	1936	1945	Ind.	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0
Fla7	1946	1953	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Fla8	1954	1963	0,730	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Fla9	1964	1970	0,730	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Fla10	1971	1976	0,730	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Fla11	1977	1980	0,872	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,75	0	0,25	1	1	1	0	0	0	0,5	0	0,25	0,33	0,5	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Fla12	1981	1984	0,872	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,75	0	0,25	1	1	1	0	0	0	0,5	0	0,25	0,33	0,5	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Fla13	1985	1989	0,910	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,75	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,75	0	0,25	1	1	1	0	0	0	0,5	0	0,25	1	0,75	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Fla14	1990	1991	0,910	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,75	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,75	0	0,25	1	1	1	0	0	0	0,5	0	0,25	1	0,75	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Fla15	1992	1993	0,910	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,75	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,75	0	0,25	1	1	1	0	0	0	0,5	0	0,25	1	0,75	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Fla16	1994	1998	0,910	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,75	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,75	0	0,25	1	1	1	0	0	0	0,5	0	0,25	1	0,75	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Fla17	1999	2001	0,910	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,75	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,75	0	0,25	1	1	1	0	0	0	0,5	0	0,25	1	0,75	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Fla18	2002	2006	0,985	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,75	1	0,75	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,75	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Fla19	2007	2013	0,985	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,75	1	0,75	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,75	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Fla20	2014	2020	0,985	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,75	1	0,75	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,75	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Wal1	1830	1899	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Wal2	1900	1916	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Wal3	1917	1918	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Wal4	1919	1960	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Wal5	1961	1963	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Wal6	1964	1967	0,740	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0,75	0,25	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Wal7	1968	1970	0,740	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0,75	0,25	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Wal8	1971	1980	0,787	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,25	1	1	1	1	1	0,25	0	0,75	0,25	0	0	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,25	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Wal9	1981	1989	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA

Case ID	From	To	Full score	Group rights			Administrative Self-rule										Legislative Self-rule																										Shared rule			
							Ex. admin.		Adv. admin			Discr. admin.																																			
				Rec.	Part. fac.	Adv. fac.	1 sec.	Mltp. sec.	1 sec.	Mltp. sec.	El. ass.	1 sec.	Mltp. sec.	Bor.	Fisc.	El. ass.	Ow. exe.	El. ass.	Ow. exe.	Cul.	Edu.	Soc./ san.	Ter.	Eco.	Soc. sec.	Cit. imm.	Loc. gvm. Mun.	Loc. gvm. Int.	Loc. gvm. Tot.	Pol. & Def. Pol.	Pol. & Def. Def.	Pol. & Def. Tot.	Jud. sys. & Pe./ci. Jud.	Jud. sys. & Pe./ci. Pe./ci.	Jud. sys. & Pe./ci. Tot.	Bor.	Fisc.	Con.	Int.	No veto & guar. No vet.	No veto & guar. Guar.	No veto & guar. Tot.	Rep. Par.	Vet. Par.	Rep. Gvm.	Vet. Gvm.
Wal10	1990	1993	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Wal11	1994	2001	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Wal12	2002	2013	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Wal13	2014	2020	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
And1	1868	1870	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
And2	1871	1875	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
And3	1876	1922	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
And5	1923	1930	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
And6	1931	1936	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
And7	1937	1975	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
And8	1976	1976	0,677	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
And9	1977	1980	0,677	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
And10	1981	1996	0,677	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
And11	1997	2015	0,682	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,75	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,75	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
And12	2016	2020	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Ara1	1868	1870	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Ara2	1871	1875	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Ara3	1876	1922	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Ara5	1923	1930	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Ara6	1931	1936	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Ara7	1937	1975	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Ara8	1976	1977	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Ara9	1978	1981	0,682	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Ara10	1982	1987	0,682	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Ara11	1988	1991	0,682	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Ara12	1992	1996	0,682	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Ara13	1997	2020	0,687	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,75	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	0,75	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Ast1	1868	1870	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Ast2	1871	1875	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Ast3	1876	1922	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Ast5	1923	1930	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Ast6	1931	1936	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Ast7	1937	1975	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Ast8	1976	1977	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Ast9	1978	1980	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Ast10	1981	1986	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Ast11	1987	1987	0,677	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Ast12	1988	1991	0,677	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Ast13	1992	1996	0,677	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Ast14	1997	2020	0,682	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,75	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,75	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
BIs1	1868	1870	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
BIs2	1871	1875	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
BIs3	1876	1922	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
BIs4	1923	1930	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
BIs5	1931	1931	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
BIs6	1932	1936	0,662	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,25	0,25	0	0	0	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0,25	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
BIs7	1937	1975	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
BIs8	1976	1976	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
BIs9	1977	1977	0,682	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
BIs10	1978	1981	0,682	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
BIs11	1982	1987	0,682	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
BIs12	1988	1991	0,682	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
BIs13	1992	1994	0,682	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
BIs14	1995	1996	0,800	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,75	0	0	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,75	0	0,375	0,75	0,5	0,625	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
BIs15	1997	2020	0,800	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,75	0	0	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,75	0	0,375	0,75	0,5	0,625	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
Bsq1	1868	1870	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Bsq2	1871	1875	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Bsq3	1876	1900	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Bsq4	1901	1917	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Bsq5	1918	1922	0,800	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,75	0	0	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,75	0	0,375	0,75	0,5	0,625	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
Bsq6	1923	1930	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Bsq7	1931	1935	0,800	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,75	0	0	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,75	0	0,375	0,75	0,5	0,625	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
Bsq8	1936	1936	0,800	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,75	0	0	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,75	0	0,375	0,75	0,5	0,625	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
Bsq9	1937	1975	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Bsq10	1976	1978	0,820	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,25	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,75	0	0,375	0,75	0,5	0,625	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
Bsq11	1979	1981	0,820	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,25	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,75	0	0,375	0,75	0,5	0,625	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
Bsq12	1982	1995	0,820	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,25	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,75	0	0,375	0,75	0,5	0,625	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
Bsq13	1996	2003	0,820	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,25	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,75	0	0,375	0,75	0,5	0,625	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
Bsq14	2004	2010	0,820	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,25	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,75	0	0,375	0,75	0,5	0,625	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0

Case ID	From	To	Full score	Group rights			Administrative Self-rule										Legislative Self-rule																										Shared rule			
							Ex. admin.		Adv. admin			Discr. admin.					El. ass.	Ow. exe.	Cul.	Edu.	Soc./ san.	Ter.	Eco.	Soc. sec.	Cit. imm.	Loc. gvm.			Pol. & Def.			Jud. sys. & Pe./ci.			Bor.	Fisc.	Con.	Int.	No veto & guar.			Rep. Par.	Vet. Par.	Rep. Gvm.	Vet. Gvm.
				Rec.	Part. fac.	Adv. fac.	1 sec.	Mltp. sec.	1 sec.	Mltp. sec.	El. ass.	1 sec.	Mltp. sec.	Bor.	Fisc.	El. ass.	Ow. exe.										Mun.	Int.	Tot.	Pol.	Def.	Tot.	Jud.	Pe./ci.	Tot.					No vet.	Guar.	Tot.				
Bsq15	2011	2014	0,820	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,25	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,75	0	0,375	0,75	0,5	0,625	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
Bsq16	2015	2017	0,820	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,25	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,75	0	0,375	0,75	0,5	0,625	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
Bsq17	2018	2020	0,820	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,25	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,75	0	0,375	0,75	0,5	0,625	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
CIs1	1868	1875	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
CIs2	1876	1922	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
CIs3	1923	1930	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
CIs4	1931	1931	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
CIs5	1932	1936	0,662	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,25	0,25	0	0	0	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0,25	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
CIs6	1937	1975	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
CIs7	1976	1976	Ind.	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
CIs8	1977	1981	Ind.	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
CIs9	1982	1986	Ind.	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
CIs10	1987	1996	0,719	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,75	0,25	0	0,25	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,75	0	0,375	0	0	0	0,33	1	1	0,5	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
CIs11	1997	2020	0,719	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,75	0,25	0	0,25	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,75	0	0,375	0	0	0	0,33	1	1	0,5	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Can1	1868	1870	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Can2	1871	1875	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Can3	1876	1922	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Can5	1923	1930	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Can6	1931	1936	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Can7	1937	1975	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Can8	1976	1977	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Can9	1978	1981	0,677	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Can10	1982	1987	0,677	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Can11	1988	1991	0,677	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Can12	1992	1996	0,677	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Can13	1997	2020	0,682	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,75	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,75	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
CyL1	1868	1870	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
CyL2	1871	1875	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
CyL3	1876	1922	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
CyL5	1923	1930	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
CyL6	1931	1936	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
CyL7	1937	1975	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
CyL8	1976	1977	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
CyL9	1978	1982	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
CyL10	1983	1987	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
CyL11	1988	1991	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
CyL12	1992	1996	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
CyL13	1997	2020	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
ClM1	1868	1870	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
ClM2	1871	1875	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
ClM3	1876	1922	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
ClM5	1923	1930	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
ClM6	1931	1936	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
ClM7	1937	1975	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
ClM8	1976	1977	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
ClM9	1978	1981	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
ClM10	1982	1987	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
ClM11	1988	1991	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
ClM12	1992	1996	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
ClM13	1997	2020	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Cat1	1868	1870	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Cat2	1871	1875	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Cat3	1876	1906	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Cat4	1907	1912	0,776	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,67	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,75	0	0	0,75	0,75	0,75	1	0	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,625	0,67	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
Cat5	1913	1922	0,776	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,67	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,75	0	0	0,75	0,75	0,75	1	0	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,625	0,67	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
Cat7	1923	1930	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Cat8	1931	1931	Ind.	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
Cat9	1932	1933	Ind.	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
Cat10	1934	1935	Ind.	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
Cat11	1936	1936	Ind.	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
Cat12	1937	1975	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Cat13	1976	1978	0,800	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,75	0	0	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,75	0	0,375	0,75	0,5	0,625	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
Cat14	1979	1996	0,800	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,75	0	0	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,75	0	0,375	0,75	0,5	0,625	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
Cat15	1997	2009	0,800	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,75	0	0	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,75	0	0,375	0,75	0,5	0,625	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
Cat16	2010	2014	0,800	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,75	0	0	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,75	0	0,375	0,75	0,5	0,625	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
Cat17	2015	2016	Ind.	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
Cat18	2017	2017	Ind.	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
Cat19	2018	2020	Ind.	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
Ext1	1868	1870	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA

Case ID	From	To	Full score	Group rights			Administrative Self-rule										Legislative Self-rule																										Shared rule			
							Ex. admin.		Adv. admin			Discr. admin.					El. ass.	Ow. exe.	Cul.	Edu.	Soc./ san.	Ter.	Eco.	Soc. sec.	Cit. imm.	Loc. gvm.			Pol. & Def.			Jud. sys. & Pe./ci.			Bor.	Fisc.	Con.	Int.	No veto & guar.			Rep. Par.	Vet. Par.	Rep. Gvm.	Vet. Gvm.
				Rec.	Part. fac.	Adv. fac.	1 sec.	Mltp. sec.	1 sec.	Mltp. sec.	El. ass.	1 sec.	Mltp. sec.	Bor.	Fisc.	El. ass.	Ow. exe.										Mun.	Int.	Tot.	Pol.	Def.	Tot.	Jud.	Pe./ci.	Tot.					No vet.	Guar.	Tot.				
Ext2	1871	1875	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Ext3	1876	1922	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Ext5	1923	1930	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Ext6	1931	1936	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Ext7	1937	1975	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Ext8	1976	1977	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Ext9	1978	1981	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Ext10	1980	1982	0,677	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Ext11	1983	1987	0,677	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Ext12	1988	1991	0,677	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Ext13	1992	1996	0,677	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Ext14	1997	2014	0,682	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,75	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,75	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Ext15	2015	2020	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Gal1	1868	1870	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Gal2	1871	1875	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Gal3	1876	1922	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Gal4	1923	1930	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Gal5	1931	1931	0,747	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	1	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,75	0	0	0,75	0,75	0,75	0	0	0	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	1	0,75	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
Gal6	1932	1936	0,747	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	1	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,75	0	0	0,75	0,75	0,75	0	0	0	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	1	0,75	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
Gal7	1937	1975	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Gal8	1976	1976	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Gal9	1977	1980	0,742	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,75	0	0	0,75	0,75	0,75	0	0	0	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	0,5	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
Gal10	1981	1996	0,742	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,75	0	0	0,75	0,75	0,75	0	0	0	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	0,5	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
Gal11	1997	2015	0,747	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,75	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,75	0	0	0,75	0,75	0,75	0	0	0	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	0,75	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
Gal14	2016	2020	Ind.	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
Rio1	1868	1870	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Rio2	1871	1875	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Rio3	1876	1922	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Rio5	1923	1930	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Rio6	1931	1936	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Rio7	1937	1975	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Rio8	1976	1977	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Rio9	1978	1981	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Rio10	1982	1987	0,677	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Rio11	1988	1991	0,677	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Rio12	1992	1996	0,677	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Rio13	1997	2014	0,682	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,75	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,75	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Rio14	2015	2020	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Mad1	1868	1870	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Mad2	1871	1875	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Mad3	1876	1922	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Mad5	1923	1930	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Mad6	1931	1936	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Mad7	1937	1975	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Mad8	1976	1977	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Mad9	1978	1981	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Mad10	1982	1987	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Mad11	1988	1991	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Mad12	1992	1996	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Mad13	1997	2020	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Mur1	1868	1870	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Mur2	1871	1875	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Mur3	1876	1922	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Mur5	1923	1930	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Mur6	1931	1936	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Mur7	1937	1975	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Mur8	1976	1977	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Mur9	1978	1981	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Mur10	1982	1987	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Mur11	1988	1991	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Mur12	1992	1996	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Mur13	1997	2020	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Nav1	1868	1870	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Nav2	1871	1875	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Nav3	1876	1900	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Nav4	1901	1917	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Nav5	1918	1922	0,800	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,75	0	0	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,75	0	0,375	0,75	0,5	0,625	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
Nav6	1923	1930	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Nav7	1931	1936	0,800	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,75	0	0	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,75	0	0,375	0,75	0,5	0,625	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0

Case ID	From	To	Full score	Group rights			Administrative Self-rule										Legislative Self-rule																										Shared rule			
							Ex. admin.		Adv. admin			Discr. admin.					El. ass.	Ow. exe.	Cul.	Edu.	Soc./ san.	Ter.	Eco.	Soc. sec.	Cit. imm.	Loc. gvm.			Pol. & Def.			Jud. sys. & Pe./ci.			Bor.	Fisc.	Con.	Int.	No veto & guar.			Rep. Par.	Vet. Par.	Rep. Gvm.	Vet. Gvm.
				Rec.	Part. fac.	Adv. fac.	1 sec.	Mltp. sec.	1 sec.	Mltp. sec.	El. ass.	1 sec.	Mltp. sec.	Bor.	Fisc.	El. ass.	Ow. exe.										Mun.	Int.	Tot.	Pol.	Def.	Tot.	Jud.	Pe./ci.	Tot.					No vet.	Guar.	Tot.				
Nav8	1937	1975	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Nav9	1976	1981	Ind.	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0
Nav10	1982	1986	Ind.	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0
Nav11	1987	1994	Ind.	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0
Nav12	1995	2002	Ind.	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0
Nav13	2003	2006	Ind.	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0
Nav14	2007	2010	0,820	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,25	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,75	0	0,375	0,75	0,5	0,625	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
Nav15	2011	2017	0,820	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,25	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,75	0	0,375	0,75	0,5	0,625	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
Nav16	2018	2020	0,820	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,25	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,75	0	0,375	0,75	0,5	0,625	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
Val1	1868	1870	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Val2	1871	1875	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Val3	1876	1922	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Val4	1923	1930	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Val5	1931	1931	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Val6	1932	1936	0,662	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,25	0,25	0	0	0	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0,25	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Val7	1937	1975	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Val8	1976	1977	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Val9	1978	1981	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Val10	1982	1996	0,682	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Val11	1997	2020	0,687	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,75	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	0,75	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Leo1	1868	1870	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Leo2	1871	1875	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Leo3	1876	1922	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Leo5	1923	1930	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Leo6	1931	1936	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Leo7	1937	1975	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Leo8	1976	1985	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Leo9	1986	1987	0,662	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,25	0,25	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Leo10	1988	1996	0,677	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Leo11	1997	2020	0,682	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,75	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,75	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Ire1	1801	1831	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Ire2	1832	1851	Ind.	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0
Ire3	1852	1869	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Ire4	1870	1884	0,910	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	1	1	1	1	0	1	0
Ire5	1885	1916	0,910	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	1	1	1	1	0	1	0
Ire6	1917	1920	Ind.	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0
Ire7	1921	1921	Ind.	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0
NIN1	1921	1949	0,910	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	1	1	1	1	0	1	0
NIN2	1950	1971	0,910	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	1	1	1	1	0	1	0
NIN3	1972	1981	0,910	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	1	1	1	1	0	1	0
NIN4	1982	1997	Ind.	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0
NIN5	1998	2002	Ind.	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0
NIN6	2003	2006	Ind.	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0
NIN7	2007	2010	Ind.	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0
NIN8	2011	2016	Ind.	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0
NIN9	2017	2019	Ind.	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0
NIN10	2020	2020	Ind.	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0
NIU1	1801	1890	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
NIU2	1891	1920	0,160	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
NIU3	1921	1921	0,160	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
NIU4	1922	1944	0,767	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,25	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	1	0,25	0,75	0,75	0,75	1	0	0,5	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,33	0,25	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
NIU5	1945	1948	0,767	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,25	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	1	0,25	0,75	0,75	0,75	1	0	0,5	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,33	0,25	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
NIU6	1949	1961	0,767	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,25	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	1	0,25	0,75	0,75	0,75	1	0	0,5	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,33	0,25	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
NIU7	1962	1971	0,767	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,25	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	1	0,25	0,75	0,75	0,75	1	0	0,5	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,33	0,25	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
NIU8	1972	1979	0,767	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,25	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	1	0,25	0,75	0,75	0,75	1	0	0,5	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,33	0,25	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
NIU9	1980	1997	0,080	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
NIU10	1998	2002	0,763	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,25	0,75	0,25	0,75	0,75	0,75	0	0	0	0,75	0,375	0,5625	0,33	0	0,75	0	0	1	0,5	1	0	1	0
NIU11	2003	2006	0,763	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,25	0,75	0,25	0,75	0,75	0,75	0	0	0	0,75	0,375	0,5625	0,33	0	0,75	0	0	1	0,5	1	0	1	0
NIU12	2007	2010	0,782	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,25	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,25	0,75	0,25	0,75	0,75	0,75	1	0	0,5	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,33	0,25	0,75	0	0	1	0,5	1	0	1	0
NIU13	2011	2016	0,782	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,25	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,25	0,75	0,25	0,75	0,75	0,75	1	0	0,5	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,33	0,25	0,75	0	0	1	0,5	1	0	1	0
NIU14	2017	2019	0,792	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,75	0	0	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,25	0,75	0,25	0,75	0,75	0,75	1	0	0,5	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,33	0,75	0,75	0	0	1	0,5	1	0	1	0
NIU15	2020	2020	0,792	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,75	0	0	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,25	0,75	0,25	0,75	0,75	0,75	1	0	0,5	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,33	0,75	0,75	0	0	1	0,5	1	0	1	0
Sco1	1707	1744	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Sco2	1745	1884	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Sco3	1885	1891	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Sco4	1892	1933	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Sco5	1934	1973	Ind.	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0
Sco6	1974	1997	Ind.	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0
Sco7	1998	2006	Ind.	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0

Case ID	From	To	Full score	Group rights			Administrative Self-rule										Legislative Self-rule																												Shared rule			
							Ex. admin.		Adv. admin			Discr. admin.																																					
				Rec.	Part. fac.	Adv. fac.	1 sec.	Mltp. sec.	1 sec.	Mltp. sec.	El. ass.	1 sec.	Mltp. sec.	Bor.	Fisc.	El. ass.	Ow. exe.	El. ass.	Ow. exe.	Cul.	Edu.	Soc./ san.	Ter.	Eco.	Soc. sec.	Cit. imm.	Loc. gvm. Mun.	Loc. gvm. Int.	Loc. gvm. Tot.	Pol. & Def. Pol.	Pol. & Def. Def.	Pol. & Def. Tot.	Jud. sys. & Pe./ci. Jud.	Jud. sys. & Pe./ci. Pe./ci.	Jud. sys. & Pe./ci. Tot.	Bor.	Fisc.	Con.	Int.	No veto & guar. No vet.	No veto & guar. Guar.	No veto & guar. Tot.	Rep. Par.	Vet. Par.	Rep. Gvm.	Vet. Gvm.
Sco8	2007	2011	Ind.	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0
Sco9	2012	2013	Ind.	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0
Sco10	2014	2015	Ind.	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0
Sco11	2016	2020	Ind.	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0
Wal1	1707	1849	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Wal2	1850	1906	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Wal3	1907	1924	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Wal4	1925	1948	0,793	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,67	0,75	1	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,5	0,25	0,25	0,75	0,75	0,75	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,67	0,75	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	0
Wal5	1949	1963	0,793	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,67	0,75	1	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,5	0,25	0,25	0,75	0,75	0,75	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,67	0,75	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	0
Wal6	1964	1998	0,793	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,67	0,75	1	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,5	0,25	0,25	0,75	0,75	0,75	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,67	0,75	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	0
Wal7	1999	2002	0,793	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,67	0,75	1	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,5	0,25	0,25	0,75	0,75	0,75	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,67	0,75	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	0
Wal8	2003	2010	Ind.	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0
Wal9	2011	2012	Ind.	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0
Wal10	2013	2013	Ind.	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0
Wal11	2014	2014	Ind.	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0
Wal12	2015	2016	Ind.	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0
Wal13	2017	2020	Ind.	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0
Eng1	1707	2009	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Eng2	2010	2015	0,752	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,75	0,75	0,75	1	0	0,5	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,33	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
Eng3	2016	2018	0,782	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,75	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,25	0,25	0,25	0,75	0,75	0,75	1	0	0,5	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,33	0,75	1	0	0	0,5	0,25	1	0	1	0
Eng4	2019	2020	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Lon1	1707	1888	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Lon2	1889	2020	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Cor1	1707	1753	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Cor2	1754	1889	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Cor3	1888	1966	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Cor4	1967	1997	0,722	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,25	1	1	1	1	1	0,25	0,25	0,25	0	0	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,25	1	0	0	0,5	0,25	1	0	1	0
Cor5	1998	2020	0,722	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,25	1	1	1	1	1	0,25	0,25	0,25	0	0	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,25	1	0	0	0,5	0,25	1	0	1	0

Appendix 7. SAS database for traditional party demands

Case ID	From	To	Full score	Group rights			Administrative Self-rule										Legislative Self-rule																								Shared rule			
							Ex. admin.		Adv. admin			Discr. admin.					El. ass.	Ow. exe.	Cul.	Edu.	Soc./ san.	Ter.	Eco.	Soc. sec.	Cit. imm.	Loc. gvm.			Pol. & Def.			Jud. sys. & Pe./ci.			Bor.	Fisc.	Con.	Int.	No veto & guar.			Rep. Par.	Vet. Par.	Rep. Gvm.	Vet. Gvm.
				Rec.	Part. fac.	Adv. fac.	1 sec.	Mltp. sec.	1 sec.	Mltp. sec.	El. ass.	1 sec.	Mltp. sec.	Bor.	Fisc.	El. ass.	Ow. exe.										Mun.	Int.	Tot.	Pol.	Def.	Tot.	Jud.	Pe./ci.	Tot.					No vet.	Guar.	Tot.				
BFl1	1830	1890	0,100	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
BFl2	1891	1935	0,100	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
BFl3	1936	1945	0,100	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
BFl4	1946	1953	0,100	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
BFl5	1954	1957	0,100	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
BFl6	1958	1963	0,130	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
BFl7	1964	1970	0,130	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
BFl8	1971	1989	0,620	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0,25	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0,75	0,25	0	0	0,5	0	0,25	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,25	0	0	1	0	0,5	1	0	0	0
BFl9	1990	1993	0,632	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0,75	0,25	0	0	0,5	0	0,25	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0	0	1	0	0,5	1	0	0	0
BFl10	1994	1994	0,662	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0,75	0,25	0	0	0,5	0	0,25	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,5	1	1	0	0,5	1	0	0	0
BFl11	1995	2001	0,672	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0,75	0,25	0	0	0,5	1	0,75	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,5	1	1	0	0,5	1	0	0	0
BFl12	2002	2013	0,700	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,75	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0,75	0,5	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0,75	0,5	1	1	0	0,5	1	0	0	0
BFl13	2014	2020	0,710	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,75	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0,75	0,75	0,25	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0,75	0,5	1	1	0	0,5	1	0	0	0
BFr1	1830	1899	0,100	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
BFr2	1900	1963	0,130	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
BFr3	1964	1970	0,320	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
BFr4	1971	1989	0,620	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0,25	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0,75	0,25	0	0	0,5	0	0,25	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,25	0	0	1	0	0,5	1	0	0	0
BFr5	1990	1993	0,647	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,25	0	0,25	0,75	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0	0,25	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0	0	1	0	0,5	1	0	0	0
BFr6	1994	1994	0,677	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,25	0	0,25	0,75	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0	0,25	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,5	1	1	0	0,5	1	0	0	0
BFr7	1995	2001	0,687	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,25	0	0,25	0,75	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	1	0,75	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,5	1	1	0	0,5	1	0	0	0
BFr8	2002	2013	0,715	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,75	1	1	1	1	0,25	0	0,25	0,75	0,5	0	0,25	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0,75	0,5	1	1	0	0,5	1	0	0	0
BFr9	2014	2020	0,725	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,75	1	1	1	1	0,25	0	0,25	0,75	0,75	0,25	0,25	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0,75	0,5	1	1	0	0,5	1	0	0	0
GsC1	1925	1928	0,180	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
GsC2	1929	1940	0,180	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
GsC3	1945	1962	0,090	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
GsC4	1963	1967	0,220	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
GsC5	1968	1970	0,590	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0,5	1	0	0	0
GsC6	1971	1972	0,590	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0,5	1	0	0	0
GsC7	1973	1976	0,590	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0,5	1	0	0	0
GsC8	1977	1983	0,625	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0,25	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
GsC9	1984	1989	0,642	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0	1	1	1	1	1	0,25	0,25	0	0	0	0,25	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
GsC10	1990	1993	0,662	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	0	0	0	0,25	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
GsC11	1994	1999	0,722	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,25	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	1	0,75	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0	0,75	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
GsC12	2000	2001	0,722	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,25	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	1	0,75	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0	0,75	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
GsC13	2002	2004	0,740	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,25	0,25	0	0,25	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0,75	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
GsC14	2005	2010	0,740	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,25	0,25	0	0,25	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0,75	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
GsC15	2011	2013	0,755	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,75	0,5	0	0,25	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0,75	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
GsC16	2014	2018	0,770	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,25	0,25	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0,75	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
GsC17	2019	2020	0,770	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,25	0,25	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0,75	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
Fla1	1830	1890	0,170	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
Fla2	1891	1913	0,220	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
Fla3	1914	1916	0,220	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
Fla4	1917	1918	0,220	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
Fla5	1919	1935	0,220	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
Fla6	1936	1945	0,220	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
Fla7	1946	1953	0,220	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
Fla8	1954	1963	0,220	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
Fla9	1964	1970	0,705	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0,25	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Fla10	1971	1976	0,705	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0,25	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Fla11	1977	1980	0,770	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0,25	0	1	0	1	1	0,25	0,25	0,75	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,25	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Fla12	1981	1984	0,770	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0,25	0	1	0	1	1	0,25	0,25	0,75	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,25	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Fla13	1985	1989	0,822	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,75	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Fla14	1990	1991	0,822	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,75	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Fla15	1992	1993	0,857	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,75	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Fla16	1994	1998	0,857	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,75	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Fla17	1999	2001	0,900	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,75	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,5	0,25	0,25	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0,75	0,75	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Fla18	2002	2006	0,900	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,75	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,5	0,25	0,25	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0,75	0,75	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Fla19	2007	2013	0,905	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,75	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,25	0,25	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0,75	0,75	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Fla20	2014	2020	0,905	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,75	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,25	0,25	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0,75	0,75	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Wal1	1830	1899	0,140	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
Wal2	1900	1916	0,170	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
Wal3	1917	1918	0,170	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
Wal4	1919	1960	0,170	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
Wal5	1961	1963	0,220	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
Wal6	1964	1967	0,220	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
Wal7	1968	1970	0,700	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,75	0,25	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Wal8	1971	1980	0,745	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	0,25	0	0,75	0,25	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Wal9	1981	1989	0,770	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0,25	0	1	0	1	1	0,25	0,25	0,75	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,25	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1

Case ID	From	To	Full score	Group rights			Administrative Self-rule										Legislative Self-rule																												Shared rule			
							Ex. admin.		Adv. admin			Discr. admin.																																					
				Rec.	Part. fac.	Adv. fac.	1 sec.	Mltp. sec.	1 sec.	Mltp. sec.	El. ass.	1 sec.	Mltp. sec.	Bor.	Fisc.	El. ass.	Ow. exe.	El. ass.	Ow. exe.	Cul.	Edu.	Soc./ san.	Ter.	Eco.	Soc. sec.	Cit. imm.	Loc. gvm. Mun.	Loc. gvm. Int.	Loc. gvm. Tot.	Pol. & Def. Pol.	Pol. & Def. Def.	Pol. & Def. Tot.	Jud. sys. & Pe./ci. Jud.	Jud. sys. & Pe./ci. Pe./ci.	Jud. sys. & Pe./ci. Tot.	Bor.	Fisc.	Con.	Int.	No veto & guar. No vet.	No veto & guar. Guar.	No veto & guar. Tot.	Rep. Par.	Vet. Par.	Rep. Gvm.	Vet. Gvm.
Wal10	1990	1993	0,837	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,75	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Wal11	1994	2001	0,857	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,75	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Wal12	2002	2013	0,890	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,75	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,75	0,5	0	0,25	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0,75	0,75	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Wal13	2014	2020	0,905	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,75	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,25	0,25	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0,75	0,75	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
And1	1868	1870	0,040	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
And2	1871	1875	0,662	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	0	0,5	0,5	0,25	0,25	0	0	0	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0,25	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
And3	1876	1922	0,040	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
And5	1923	1930	0,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
And6	1931	1936	0,040	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
And7	1937	1975	0,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
And8	1976	1976	0,070	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
And9	1977	1980	0,677	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
And10	1981	1996	0,677	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
And11	1997	2015	0,682	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,75	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,75	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
And12	2016	2020	0,682	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,75	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,75	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Ara1	1868	1870	0,040	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Ara2	1871	1875	0,662	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,25	0,25	0	0	0	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0,25	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Ara3	1876	1922	0,040	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Ara5	1923	1930	0,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ara6	1931	1936	0,040	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Ara7	1937	1975	0,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ara8	1976	1977	0,070	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Ara9	1978	1981	0,667	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,25	0,25	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Ara10	1982	1987	0,667	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,25	0,25	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Ara11	1988	1991	0,682	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Ara12	1992	1996	0,682	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Ara13	1997	2020	0,687	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,75	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	0,75	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Ast1	1868	1870	0,320	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Ast2	1871	1875	0,662	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,25	0,25	0	0	0	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0,25	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Ast3	1876	1922	0,320	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Ast5	1923	1930	0,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ast6	1931	1936	0,320	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Ast7	1937	1975	0,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ast8	1976	1977	0,320	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Ast9	1978	1980	0,662	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,25	0,25	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Ast10	1981	1986	0,662	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,25	0,25	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Ast11	1987	1987	0,662	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,25	0,25	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Ast12	1988	1991	0,677	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Ast13	1992	1996	0,677	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Ast14	1997	2020	0,682	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,75	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,75	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Bls1	1868	1870	0,320	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Bls2	1871	1875	0,662	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,25	0,25	0	0	0	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0,25	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Bls3	1876	1922	0,320	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Bls4	1923	1930	0,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bls5	1931	1931	0,320	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Bls6	1932	1936	0,662	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,25	0,25	0	0	0	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0,25	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Bls7	1937	1975	0,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bls8	1976	1976	0,320	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Bls9	1977	1977	0,320	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Bls10	1978	1981	0,667	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,25	0,25	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Bls11	1982	1987	0,667	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,25	0,25	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Bls12	1988	1991	0,682	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Bls13	1992	1994	0,682	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Bls14	1995	1996	0,682	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Bls15	1997	2020	0,687	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,75	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	0,75	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Bsq1	1868	1870	0,638	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	0,5	1	0	0,67	1	0,5	1	0,5	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,5	0,25	0,67	1	1	0	1	0	0,5	1	0	0	0
Bsq2	1871	1875	0,662	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,25	0,25	0	0	0	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0,25	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Bsq3	1876	1900	0,070	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Bsq4	1901	1917	0,617	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	0,5	1	0	0,33	1	0,5	1	0,5	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	1	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Bsq5	1918	1922	0,617	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	0,5	1	0	0,33	1	0,5	1	0,5	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	1	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Bsq6	1923	1930	0,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bsq7	1931	1935	0,617	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	0,5	1	0	0,33	1	0,5	1	0,5	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	1	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Bsq8	1936	1936	0,672	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0,33	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,25	0,25	0	0	0	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0,25	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	1	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Bsq9	1937	1975	0,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bsq10	1976	1978	0,697	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0,25	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	1	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Bsq11	1979	1981	0,697	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0,25	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	1	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Bsq12	1982	1995	0,697	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0,25	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	1	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Bsq13	1996	2003	0,699	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,75	0	0,375	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	1	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Bsq14	2004	2010	0,699	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,75	0	0,375	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	1	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0

Case ID	From	To	Full score	Group rights			Administrative Self-rule										Legislative Self-rule																												Shared rule			
							Ex. admin.		Adv. admin			Discr. admin.																																					
				Rec.	Part. fac.	Adv. fac.	1 sec.	Mltp. sec.	1 sec.	Mltp. sec.	El. ass.	1 sec.	Mltp. sec.	Bor.	Fisc.	El. ass.	Ow. exe.	El. ass.	Ow. exe.	Cul.	Edu.	Soc./ san.	Ter.	Eco.	Soc. sec.	Cit. imm.	Loc. gvm. Mun.	Loc. gvm. Int.	Loc. gvm. Tot.	Pol. & Def. Pol.	Pol. & Def. Def.	Pol. & Def. Tot.	Jud. sys. & Pe./ci. Jud.	Jud. sys. & Pe./ci. Pe./ci.	Jud. sys. & Pe./ci. Tot.	Bor.	Fisc.	Con.	Int.	No veto & guar. No vet.	No veto & guar. Guar.	No veto & guar. Tot.	Rep. Par.	Vet. Par.	Rep. Gvm.	Vet. Gvm.
Bsq15	2011	2014	0,699	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,75	0	0,375	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	1	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Bsq16	2015	2017	0,699	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,75	0	0,375	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	1	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Bsq17	2018	2020	0,699	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,75	0	0,375	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	1	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
CIs1	1868	1875	0,320	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
CIs2	1876	1922	0,320	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
CIs3	1923	1930	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
CIs4	1931	1931	0,070	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
CIs5	1932	1936	0,662	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,25	0,25	0	0	0	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0,25	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
CIs6	1937	1975	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
CIs7	1976	1976	0,070	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
CIs8	1977	1981	0,677	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
CIs9	1982	1986	0,677	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
CIs10	1987	1996	0,677	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
CIs11	1997	2020	0,682	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,75	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,75	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Can1	1868	1870	0,040	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Can2	1871	1875	0,662	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,25	0,25	0	0	0	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0,25	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Can3	1876	1922	0,320	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Can5	1923	1930	0,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Can6	1931	1936	0,320	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Can7	1937	1975	0,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Can8	1976	1977	0,320	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Can9	1978	1981	0,662	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,25	0,25	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Can10	1982	1987	0,662	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,25	0,25	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Can11	1988	1991	0,677	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Can12	1992	1996	0,677	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Can13	1997	2020	0,682	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,75	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,75	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
CyL1	1868	1870	0,040	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
CyL2	1871	1875	0,662	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,25	0,25	0	0	0	0	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0,25	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
CyL3	1876	1922	0,040	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
CyL5	1923	1930	0,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CyL6	1931	1936	0,040	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
CyL7	1937	1975	0,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CyL8	1976	1977	0,070	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
CyL9	1978	1982	0,662	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,25	0,25	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
CyL10	1983	1987	0,662	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,25	0,25	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
CyL11	1988	1991	0,677	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
CyL12	1992	1996	0,677	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
CyL13	1997	2020	0,682	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,75	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,75	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
ClM1	1868	1870	0,040	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
ClM2	1871	1875	0,662	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,25	0,25	0	0	0	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0,25	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
ClM3	1876	1922	0,040	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
ClM5	1923	1930	0,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ClM6	1931	1936	0,040	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
ClM7	1937	1975	0,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ClM8	1976	1977	0,070	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
ClM9	1978	1981	0,662	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,25	0,25	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
ClM10	1982	1987	0,662	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,25	0,25	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
ClM11	1988	1991	0,677	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
ClM12	1992	1996	0,677	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
ClM13	1997	2020	0,682	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,75	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,75	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Cat1	1868	1870	0,100	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Cat2	1871	1875	0,662	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,25	0,25	0	0	0	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0,25	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Cat3	1876	1906	0,070	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Cat4	1907	1912	0,662	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,25	0,25	0	0	0	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0,25	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Cat5	1913	1922	0,662	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,25	0,25	0	0	0	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0,25	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Cat7	1923	1930	0,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Cat8	1931	1931	0,662	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,25	0,25	0	0	0	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0,25	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Cat9	1932	1933	0,662	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,25	0,25	0	0	0	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0,25	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Cat10	1934	1935	0,662	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,25	0,25	0	0	0	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0,25	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Cat11	1936	1936	0,662	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,25	0,25	0	0	0	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0,25	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Cat12	1937	1975	0,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Cat13	1976	1978	0,682	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Cat14	1979	1996	0,682	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Cat15	1997	2009	0,692	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,75	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0,25	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	0,75	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Cat16	2010	2014	0,694	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,75	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,75	0	0,375	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	0,75	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Cat17	2015	2016	0,694	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,75	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,75	0	0,375	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	0,75	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Cat18	2017	2017	0,694	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,75	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,75	0	0,375	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	0,75	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Cat19	2018	2020	0,694	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,75	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,75	0	0,375	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	0,75	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Ext1	1868	1870	0,040	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0

Case ID	From	To	Full score	Group rights			Administrative Self-rule										Legislative Self-rule																												Shared rule			
							Ex. admin.		Adv. admin			Discr. admin.																																					
				Rec.	Part. fac.	Adv. fac.	1 sec.	Mltp. sec.	1 sec.	Mltp. sec.	El. ass.	1 sec.	Mltp. sec.	Bor.	Fisc.	El. ass.	Ow. exe.	El. ass.	Ow. exe.	Cul.	Edu.	Soc./ san.	Ter.	Eco.	Soc. sec.	Cit. imm.	Loc. gvm. Mun.	Loc. gvm. Int.	Loc. gvm. Tot.	Pol. & Def. Pol.	Pol. & Def. Def.	Pol. & Def. Tot.	Jud. sys. & Pe./ci. Jud.	Jud. sys. & Pe./ci. Pe./ci.	Jud. sys. & Pe./ci. Tot.	Bor.	Fisc.	Con.	Int.	No veto & guar. No vet.	No veto & guar. Guar.	No veto & guar. Tot.	Rep. Par.	Vet. Par.	Rep. Gvm.	Vet. Gvm.
Ext2	1871	1875	0,662	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,25	0,25	0	0	0	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0,25	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Ext3	1876	1922	0,040	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Ext5	1923	1930	0,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ext6	1931	1936	0,040	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Ext7	1937	1975	0,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ext8	1976	1977	0,070	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Ext9	1978	1981	0,662	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,25	0,25	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Ext10	1980	1982	0,662	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,25	0,25	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Ext11	1983	1987	0,662	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,25	0,25	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Ext12	1988	1991	0,677	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Ext13	1992	1996	0,677	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Ext14	1997	2014	0,682	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,75	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,75	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Ext15	2015	2020	0,682	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,75	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,75	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Gal1	1868	1870	0,100	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Gal2	1871	1875	0,662	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,25	0,25	0	0	0	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0,25	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Gal3	1876	1922	0,070	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Gal4	1923	1930	0,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Gal5	1931	1931	0,070	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Gal6	1932	1936	0,662	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,25	0,25	0	0	0	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0,25	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Gal7	1937	1975	0,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Gal8	1976	1976	0,060	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Gal9	1977	1980	0,682	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Gal10	1981	1996	0,682	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Gal11	1997	2015	0,687	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,75	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	0,75	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Gal14	2016	2020	0,687	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,75	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	0,75	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Rio1	1868	1870	0,320	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Rio2	1871	1875	0,662	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,25	0,25	0	0	0	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0,25	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Rio3	1876	1922	0,320	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Rio5	1923	1930	0,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Rio6	1931	1936	0,320	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Rio7	1937	1975	0,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Rio8	1976	1977	0,320	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Rio9	1978	1981	0,662	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,25	0,25	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Rio10	1982	1987	0,662	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,25	0,25	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Rio11	1988	1991	0,677	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Rio12	1992	1996	0,677	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Rio13	1997	2014	0,682	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,75	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,75	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Rio14	2015	2020	0,682	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,75	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,75	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Mad1	1868	1870	0,040	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Mad2	1871	1875	0,662	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,25	0,25	0	0	0	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0,25	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Mad3	1876	1922	0,040	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Mad5	1923	1930	0,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mad6	1931	1936	0,040	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Mad7	1937	1975	0,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mad8	1976	1977	0,070	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Mad9	1978	1981	0,662	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,25	0,25	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Mad10	1982	1987	0,662	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,25	0,25	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Mad11	1988	1991	0,677	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Mad12	1992	1996	0,677	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Mad13	1997	2020	0,682	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,75	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,75	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Mur1	1868	1870	0,040	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Mur2	1871	1875	0,662	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,25	0,25	0	0	0	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0,25	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Mur3	1876	1922	0,040	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Mur5	1923	1930	0,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mur6	1931	1936	0,040	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Mur7	1937	1975	0,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mur8	1976	1977	0,070	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Mur9	1978	1981	0,662	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,25	0,25	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Mur10	1982	1987	0,662	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,25	0,25	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Mur11	1988	1991	0,677	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Mur12	1992	1996	0,677	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Mur13	1997	2020	0,682	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,75	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,75	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Nav1	1868	1870	0,628	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0,5	1	0	0,33	1	0,5	1	0,5	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,5	0,25	0,67	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Nav2	1871	1875	0,662	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,25	0,25	0	0	0	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0,25	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Nav3	1876	1900	0,297	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0,5	1	0	0,33	1	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Nav4	1901	1917	0,617	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0,5	1	0	0,33	1	0,5	1	0,5	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	1	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Nav5	1918	1922	0,617	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0,5	1	0	0,33	1	0,5	1	0,5	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	1	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Nav6	1923	1930	0,297	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0,5	1	0	0,33	1	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Nav7	1931	1936	0,617	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0,5	1	0	0,33	1	0,5	1	0,5	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	1	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0

Case ID	From	To	Full score	Group rights			Administrative Self-rule										Legislative Self-rule																										Shared rule			
							Ex. admin.		Adv. admin			Discr. admin.					El. ass.	Ow. exe.	Cul.	Edu.	Soc./ san.	Ter.	Eco.	Soc. sec.	Cit. imm.	Loc. gvm.			Pol. & Def.			Jud. sys. & Pe./ci.			Bor.	Fisc.	Con.	Int.	No veto & guar.			Rep. Par.	Vet. Par.	Rep. Gvm.	Vet. Gvm.
				Rec.	Part. fac.	Adv. fac.	1 sec.	Mltp. sec.	1 sec.	Mltp. sec.	El. ass.	1 sec.	Mltp. sec.	Bor.	Fisc.	El. ass.	Ow. exe.										Mun.	Int.	Tot.	Pol.	Def.	Tot.	Jud.	Pe./ci.	Tot.					No vet.	Guar.	Tot.				
Nav8	1937	1975	0,297	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0,5	1	0	0,33	1	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Nav9	1976	1981	0,694	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,25	0	0,125	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	1	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Nav10	1982	1986	0,694	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,25	0	0,125	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	1	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Nav11	1987	1994	0,697	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0,25	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	1	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Nav12	1995	2002	0,697	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0,25	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	1	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Nav13	2003	2006	0,697	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0,25	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	1	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Nav14	2007	2010	0,699	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,75	0	0,375	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	1	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Nav15	2011	2017	0,699	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,75	0	0,375	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	1	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Nav16	2018	2020	0,699	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,75	0	0,375	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	1	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Val1	1868	1870	0,040	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Val2	1871	1875	0,662	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,25	0,25	0	0	0	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0,25	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Val3	1876	1922	0,040	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Val4	1923	1930	0,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Val5	1931	1931	0,040	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Val6	1932	1936	0,662	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,25	0,25	0	0	0	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0,25	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Val7	1937	1975	0,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Val8	1976	1977	0,070	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Val9	1978	1981	0,682	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Val10	1982	1996	0,682	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Val11	1997	2020	0,687	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,75	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	0,75	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Leo1	1868	1870	0,040	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Leo2	1871	1875	0,662	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,25	0,25	0	0	0	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0,25	0	0,5	0,25	0,33	0,5	0,75	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Leo3	1876	1922	0,040	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Leo5	1923	1930	0,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Leo6	1931	1936	0,040	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Leo7	1937	1975	0,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Leo8	1976	1985	0,040	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Leo9	1986	1987	0,040	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Leo10	1988	1996	0,040	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Leo11	1997	2020	0,040	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Ire1	1801	1831	0,160	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Ire2	1832	1851	0,160	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Ire3	1852	1869	0,160	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Ire4	1870	1884	0,160	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Ire5	1885	1916	0,910	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	1	1	1	0	1	0
Ire6	1917	1920	0,910	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	1	1	1	1	0	1	0
Ire7	1921	1921	0,910	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	1	1	1	1	0	1	0
NIN1	1921	1949	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
NIN2	1950	1971	0,910	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	1	1	1	1	0	1	0
NIN3	1972	1981	0,910	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	1	1	1	1	0	1	0
NIN4	1982	1997	0,910	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	1	1	1	1	0	1	0
NIN5	1998	2002	0,910	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	1	1	1	1	0	1	0
NIN6	2003	2006	0,910	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	1	1	1	1	0	1	0
NIN7	2007	2010	0,910	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	1	1	1	1	0	1	0
NIN8	2011	2016	0,910	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	1	1	1	1	0	1	0
NIN9	2017	2019	0,910	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	1	1	1	1	0	1	0
NIN10	2020	2020	0,910	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	1	1	1	1	0	1	0
NIU1	1801	1890	0,160	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
NIU2	1891	1920	0,160	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
NIU3	1921	1921	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
NIU4	1922	1944	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
NIU5	1945	1948	0,767	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,25	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	1	0,25	0,75	0,75	0,75	1	0	0,5	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,33	0,25	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
NIU6	1949	1961	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
NIU7	1962	1971	0,767	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,25	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	1	0,25	0,75	0,75	0,75	1	0	0,5	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,33	0,25	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
NIU8	1972	1979	0,767	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,25	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	1	0,25	0,75	0,75	0,75	1	0	0,5	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,33	0,25	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
NIU9	1980	1997	0,767	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,25	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,5	1	0,25	0,75	0,75	0,75	1	0	0,5	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,33	0,25	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
NIU10	1998	2002	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
NIU11	2003	2006	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
NIU12	2007	2010	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
NIU13	2011	2016	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
NIU14	2017	2019	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
NIU15	2020	2020	0,000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Sco1	1707	1744	0,180	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Sco2	1745	1884	0,280	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Sco3	1885	1891	0,740	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0,25	0	0	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,75	0,75	0,75	1	0	0,5	0,75	0,75	0,75	0	0,25	0,5	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
Sco4	1892	1933	0,740	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0,25	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,75	0,75	0,75	1	0	0,5	0,75	0,75	0,75	0	0,25	0,5	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
Sco5	1934	1973	0,740	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0,25	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,75	0,75	0,75	1	0	0,5	0,75	0,75	0,75	0	0,25	0,5	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
Sco6	1974	1997	0,740	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0,25	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,75	0,75	0,75	1	0	0,5	0,75	0,75	0,75	0	0,25	0,5	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
Sco7	1998	2006	0,740	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0,25	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,75	0,75	0,75	1	0	0,5	0,75	0,75	0,75	0	0,25	0,5	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0

Case ID	From	To	Full score	Group rights			Administrative Self-rule										Legislative Self-rule																										Shared rule			
							Ex. admin.		Adv. admin			Discr. admin.																																			
				Rec.	Part. fac.	Adv. fac.	1 sec.	Mltp. sec.	1 sec.	Mltp. sec.	El. ass.	1 sec.	Mltp. sec.	Bor.	Fisc.	El. ass.	Ow. exe.	El. ass.	Ow. exe.	Cul.	Edu.	Soc./ san.	Ter.	Eco.	Soc. sec.	Cit. imm.	Loc. gvm. Mun.	Loc. gvm. Int.	Loc. gvm. Tot.	Pol. & Def. Pol.	Pol. & Def. Def.	Pol. & Def. Tot.	Jud. sys. & Pe./ci. Jud.	Jud. sys. & Pe./ci. Pe./ci.	Jud. sys. & Pe./ci. Tot.	Bor.	Fisc.	Con.	Int.	No veto & guar. No vet.	No veto & guar. Guar.	No veto & guar. Tot.	Rep. Par.	Vet. Par.	Rep. Gvm.	Vet. Gvm.
Sco8	2007	2011	0,752	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,75	0,75	0,75	1	0	0,5	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,33	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
Sco9	2012	2013	0,752	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,75	0,75	0,75	1	0	0,5	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,33	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
Sco10	2014	2015	0,782	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,75	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,25	0,25	0,25	0,75	0,75	0,75	1	0	0,5	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,33	0,75	1	0	0	0,5	0,25	1	0	1	0
Sco11	2016	2020	0,782	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,75	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,25	0,25	0,25	0,75	0,75	0,75	1	0	0,5	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,33	0,75	1	0	0	0,5	0,25	1	0	1	0
Wal1	1707	1849	0,070	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Wal2	1850	1906	0,180	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Wal3	1907	1924	0,180	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Wal4	1925	1948	0,685	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,5	0,75	0,25	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
Wal5	1949	1963	0,685	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,5	0,75	0,25	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
Wal6	1964	1998	0,685	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,5	0,75	0,25	0,25	0	0,25	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
Wal7	1999	2002	0,700	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,75	0,75	0,75	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
Wal8	2003	2010	0,700	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,75	0,75	0,75	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
Wal9	2011	2012	0,700	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,75	0,75	0,75	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
Wal10	2013	2013	0,717	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,75	0,75	0,75	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
Wal11	2014	2014	0,717	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,5	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,25	0,75	0,75	0,75	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
Wal12	2015	2016	0,747	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,75	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,25	0	0,25	0,75	0,75	0,75	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,75	0,75	0	0	0,5	0,25	1	0	1	0
Wal13	2017	2020	0,747	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,75	1	1	1	1	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,25	0	0,25	0,75	0,75	0,75	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,75	0,75	0	0	0,5	0,25	1	0	1	0
Eng1	1707	2009	0,110	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
Eng2	2010	2015	0,110	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
Eng3	2016	2018	0,110	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
Eng4	2019	2020	0,110	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
Lon1	1707	1888	0,040	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Lon2	1889	2020	0,332	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,25	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Cor1	1707	1753	0,553	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0,25	0,25	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,25	0,125	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Cor2	1754	1889	0,040	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Cor3	1888	1966	0,332	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,25	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Cor4	1967	1997	0,332	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,25	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Cor5	1998	2020	0,722	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,33	0,25	1	1	1	1	1	0,25	0,25	0,25	0	0	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,33	0,25	1	0	0	0,5	0,25	1	0	1	0

Appendix 8. Condition coding for sub-state communities' sociological distinctiveness

Sub-state community	From	To	Distinctive language	Institutional history	Geographical isolation	Score
Brussels (Flemish)	1830	2020	1	0	0	1
Brussels (Francophone)	1830	1963	0	0	0	0
Brussels (Francophone)	1964	2020	1	0	0	1
Flanders	1830	2020	1	1	0	2
German-sp. Community	1925	1940	1	1	0	2
German-sp. Community	1945	2020	1	1	0	2
Wallonia	1830	1963	0	0	0	0
Wallonia	1964	2020	1	0	0	1
Andalusia	1868	2020	0	0	0	0
Aragon	1868	2020	0,5	1	0	1
Asturias	1868	2020	0,5	1	0,5	2
Balearic Islands	1868	2020	1	1	1	2
Basque Country	1868	2020	1	1	0	2
Canary Islands	1868	2020	0	1	1	2
Cantabria	1868	2020	0,5	0	0,5	1
Castile and León	1868	2020	0	0,5	0	0
Castile-la Mancha	1868	2020	0	0,5	0	0
Catalonia	1868	2020	1	1	0	2
Extremadura	1868	2020	0	0	0	0
Galicia	1868	2020	1	1	0	2
La Rioja	1868	2020	0	0	0	0
Madrid	1868	2020	0	0	0	0
Murcia	1868	2020	0	1	0	1
Navarre	1868	2020	1	1	0	2
Valencia	1868	2020	1	1	0	2
León	1868	2020	0,5	1	0	1
Cornwall	1801	2020	1	1	0,5	2
England	1801	2020	0	0,5	0	0
London	1801	2020	0	0	0	0
Ireland	1801	1921	1	1	1	2
Northern Ireland (Nationalists)	1921	2020	1	1	1	2
Northern Ireland (Unionists)	1801	2020	0	0	1	1
Scotland	1801	2020	1	1	0	2
Wales	1801	2020	1	1	0	2

Source: coded by the author based on his case studies and the following justifications

Sub-condition	Value	Justification
Linguistic distinctiveness	1	Own regional language
	0,5	Own regional dialect
	0	No distinctive language or dialect
Institutional history	1	Historical institutions identified with the contemporary SSC
	0,5	Historical institutions identified with part of the contemporary SSC
	0	No historical institutions
Geographical isolation	1	Clear geogr. isolation (full island or mountain encirclement)
	0,5	Partial geogr. isolation (peninsula or partial mountain encirclem.)
	0	No geographical isolation

Note: The 0,5 was used here to signal the presence of some distinctiveness. Given its limited scope, however, it was not taken into consideration for the summed score in Appendix 8. SSC = sub-state community.

Appendix 9. Condition coding for sub-state communities' political grievances

Sub-state community	From	To	Score
Brussels (Flemish)	1830	2020	3
Brussels (Francophone)	1830	1899	1
Brussels (Francophone)	1900	2020	2
Flanders	1830	2020	3
German-sp. Community	1925	1940	3
German-sp. Community	1945	2020	2
Wallonia	1830	1899	1
Wallonia	1900	2020	2
Andalusia	1868	2020	2
Aragon	1868	2020	2
Asturias	1868	2020	2
Balearic Islands	1868	2020	2
Basque Country	1868	2020	3
Canary Islands	1868	2020	3
Cantabria	1868	2020	2
Castile and León	1868	2020	1
Castile-la Mancha	1868	2020	1
Catalonia	1868	2020	3
Extremadura	1868	2020	2
Galicia	1868	2020	3
La Rioja	1868	2020	1
Madrid	1868	2020	0
Murcia	1868	2020	1
Navarre	1868	2020	3
Valencia	1868	2020	2
León	1868	2020	2
Cornwall	1801	2020	2
England	1801	2020	1
London	1801	2020	0
Ireland	1801	1921	3
Northern Ireland (Nationalists)	1921	2020	3
Northern Ireland (Unionists)	1801	2020	0
Scotland	1801	2020	3
Wales	1801	2020	2

Source: coded by the author based on his case studies and following the consultation of the following country experts

Country	Expert
Belgium	Wilfried Swenden (University of Edinburgh)
Spain	Juan Rodríguez Teruel (Universidad de Valencia)
United Kingdom	Nicola McEwen (University of Edinburgh), James Mitchell (University of Edinburgh)

Appendix 10. Condition coding for sub-state communities' economic distinctiveness

Sub-state community	From	To	Score
Brussels (Flemish)	1830	1944	0
Brussels (Flemish)	1945	2020	1
Brussels (Francophone)	1830	1944	0
Brussels (Francophone)	1945	2020	1
Flanders	1830	1960	-1
Flanders	1961	1985	0
Flanders	1986	2020	1
German-sp. Community	1925	1940	-1
German-sp. Community	1945	1983	-1
German-sp. Community	1984	2020	0
Wallonia	1830	1949	1
Wallonia	1950	1969	0
Wallonia	1970	2020	-1
Andalusia	1868	1875	1
Andalusia	1876	1911	0
Andalusia	1912	2020	-1
Aragon	1868	2020	0
Asturias	1868	1923	-1
Asturias	1924	1994	0
Asturias	1995	2004	-1
Asturias	2005	2020	0
Balearic Islands	1868	1902	-1
Balearic Islands	1903	1914	0
Balearic Islands	1915	1921	-1
Balearic Islands	1922	2020	0
Basque Country	1868	2020	0
Canary Islands	1868	1876	-1
Canary Islands	1979	2005	0
Canary Islands	2004	2020	-1
Cantabria	1868	1893	-1
Cantabria	1894	2020	0
Castile and León	1868	1981	-1
Castile and León	1982	2020	0
Castile-la Mancha	1868	1895	0
Castile-la Mancha	1896	2020	-1
Catalonia	1868	2020	1
Extremadura	1868	2020	-1
Galicia	1868	2020	-1
La Rioja	1868	1907	0
La Rioja	1908	1930	-1
La Rioja	1931	2020	0
Madrid	1868	1950	0
Madrid	1951	2020	1
Navarre	1868	1895	0
Navarre	1896	1910	-1
Navarre	1911	2020	0
Valencia	1868	2007	0
Valencia	2008	2020	-1
León	1868	1981	-1
León	1982	2020	0
Cornwall	1801	1849	0
Cornwall	1850	2020	-1
England	1801	1869	1
England	1870	2020	0
London	1801	1822	0
London	1823	2020	1
Ireland	1801	1921	-1
Northern Ireland (Nationalists)	1921	2020	-1
Northern Ireland (Unionists)	1801	2020	-1
Scotland	1801	1942	0
Scotland	1943	1972	-1
Scotland	1973	1978	0

Sub-state community	From	To	Score
Scotland	1979	2020	1
Wales	1801	1896	0
Wales	1897	2020	-1

Source: calculated and coded by the author based on the following sources

Country	Indicator	References
Belgium	GDP	Bayenet, Capron, and Liégeois (2007), Destatte (2014)
	Population	Vandenbroeke (1997), Docquier (1995), Statbel (ed.) (2020)
Spain	GDP	Prados de la Escosura (2017), Díez-Minguela, Martinez-Galarraga, and Tirado-Fabregat (2018)
	Population	Díez-Minguela et al. (2018)
United Kingdom	GDP	Thomas and Williamson (2020), Geary and Stark (2015), Kemp and Stephen (2013), unpublished data kindly shared by Ryland Thomas (Bank of England)
	Population	Census 1841 (ed.) (2020), National Records of Scotland (ed.) (2020), Office for National Statistics (ed.) (2020)

Note: For the calculations to be verifiable and the data to be available to other scholars, the full regional GDP and population dataset is available via: https://www.dropbox.com/s/q8rs7calmzly3n0/Regional-GDP_Database_Belgium-Spain-UK.xlsx?dl=0.

Appendix 11. Condition coding for sub-state communities' prospects of autonomy

Country	From	To	Score
Belgium	1830	1967	0
Belgium	1968	2020	1
Spain	1868	1931	0
Spain	1932	1936	1
Spain	1937	1977	0
Spain	1978	2020	1
United Kingdom	1801	1973	0
United Kingdom	1974	1979	1
United Kingdom	1980	1996	0
United Kingdom	1997	2020	1

Source: coded by the author based on his case studies and the following justifications

Country	Year	Justification
Belgium	1968	Beginnings of the legislative works of the first state reform
Spain	1932	The Constitution of the Second Republic, foreseeing the possibility of legislative autonomy for autonomous communities was adopted by December 1931 and it the autonomy clause became clear only very lately
	1937	Beginning of the francoist dictatorship
	1978	The Constitution of the contemporary Kingdom of Spain, foreseeing the possibility of legislative autonomy for autonomous communities was adopted by October 1978 and it the autonomy clause became clear throughout the year
United Kingdom	1974	Third Wilson (Labour) government (March 1974) openly declaring its support for devolution arrangements
	1980	First Thatcher (Conservative) government (May 1979) openly declaring its opposition to devolution arrangements
	1997	First Blair (Labour) government (May 1997) openly declaring its support for devolution arrangements

Appendix 12. Condition coding for sub-state communities' institutional dissatisfaction

Sub-state community	From	To	Score
Brussels (Flemish)	1830	2020	0
Brussels (Francophone)	1830	2020	0
Flanders	1868	1970	0
Flanders	1971	1980	1
Flanders	1981	2020	0
German-sp. Community	1925	1940	0
German-sp. Community	1945	1972	0
German-sp. Community	1973	1983	1
German-sp. Community	1984	2020	0
Wallonia	1868	1970	0
Wallonia	1971	1980	1
Wallonia	1981	2020	0
Andalusia	1868	2020	0
Aragon	1868	2020	0
Asturias	1868	2020	0
Balearic Islands	1868	2020	0
Basque Country	1868	2020	0
Canary Islands	1868	2020	0
Cantabria	1868	2020	0
Castile and León	1868	2020	0
Castile-la Mancha	1868	2020	0
Catalonia	1868	2020	0
Extremadura	1868	2020	0
Galicia	1868	2020	0
La Rioja	1868	2020	0
Madrid	1868	2020	0
Murcia	1868	2020	0
Navarre	1868	2020	0
Valencia	1868	2020	0
León	1868	2020	0
Cornwall	1801	2020	0
England	1801	2020	0
London	1801	2020	0
Ireland	1801	2020	0
Northern Ireland (Nationalists)	1801	2020	0
Northern Ireland (Unionists)	1801	2020	0
Scotland	1801	2020	0
Wales	1801	1998	0
Wales	1999	2010	1
Wales	2011	2020	0

Source: coded by the author based on his case studies and the following justifications

Sub-state community	Year	Justification
Flanders & Wallonia	1971 - 1980	Installation of own legislative institutions but without own executive creating frustration among several parties (need for national ministers to execute community decisions)
German-speaking Community	1973 - 1983	Installation of own institutions but without legislative power and own executive, creating frustrations among several parties on the limited possibilities of the community (need for national laws to confirm and for national ministers to execute community decisions)
Wales	1999 - 2010	Installation of own institutions but without legislative power creating frustrations among several parties on the legal scope (secondary law-making powers) of the institution

Appendix 13. Condition coding for sub-state communities' state of democracy

Country/ Sub-state community	From	To	Constraints on the executive	Competitive elections	Score
Belgium	1830	1852	0	0	0
Belgium	1853	1918	1	0	0
Belgium	1919	2020	1	1	1
Basque Country	1868	1900	1	0	0
Basque Country	1901	1922	1	1	1
Basque Country	1923	1930	0	0	0
Basque Country	1931	1936	1	1	1
Basque Country	1937	1975	0	0	0
Basque Country	1976	2020	1	1	1
Catalonia	1868	1906	1	0	0
Catalonia	1907	1922	1	1	1
Catalonia	1923	1930	0	0	0
Catalonia	1931	1936	1	1	1
Catalonia	1937	1975	0	0	0
Catalonia	1976	2020	1	1	1
Andalusia	1868	1922	1	0	0
Andalusia	1923	1930	0	0	0
Andalusia	1931	1936	1	1	1
Andalusia	1937	1975	0	0	0
Andalusia	1976	2020	1	1	1
Aragon	1868	1922	1	0	0
Aragon	1923	1930	0	0	0
Aragon	1931	1936	1	1	1
Aragon	1937	1975	0	0	0
Aragon	1976	2020	1	1	1
Asturias	1868	1922	1	0	0
Asturias	1923	1930	0	0	0
Asturias	1931	1936	1	1	1
Asturias	1937	1975	0	0	0
Asturias	1976	2020	1	1	1
Balearic Islands	1868	1922	1	0	0
Balearic Islands	1923	1930	0	0	0
Balearic Islands	1931	1936	1	1	1
Balearic Islands	1937	1975	0	0	0
Balearic Islands	1976	2020	1	1	1
Canary Islands	1868	1922	1	0	0
Canary Islands	1923	1930	0	0	0
Canary Islands	1931	1936	1	1	1
Canary Islands	1937	1975	0	0	0
Canary Islands	1976	2020	1	1	1
Cantabria	1868	1922	1	0	0
Cantabria	1923	1930	0	0	0
Cantabria	1931	1936	1	1	1
Cantabria	1937	1975	0	0	0
Cantabria	1976	2020	1	1	1
Castile-la Mancha	1868	1922	1	0	0
Castile-la Mancha	1923	1930	0	0	0
Castile-la Mancha	1931	1936	1	1	1
Castile-la Mancha	1937	1975	0	0	0
Castile-la Mancha	1976	2020	1	1	1
Castile and León	1868	1922	1	0	0
Castile and León	1923	1930	0	0	0
Castile and León	1931	1936	1	1	1
Castile and León	1937	1975	0	0	0
Castile and León	1976	2020	1	1	1
Extremadura	1868	1922	1	0	0
Extremadura	1923	1930	0	0	0
Extremadura	1931	1936	1	1	1
Extremadura	1937	1975	0	0	0
Extremadura	1976	2020	1	1	1
Galicia	1868	1922	1	0	0
Galicia	1923	1930	0	0	0

Country/ Sub-state community	From	To	Constraints on the executive	Competitive elections	Score
Galicia	1931	1936	1	1	1
Galicia	1937	1975	0	0	0
Galicia	1976	2020	1	1	1
La Rioja	1868	1922	1	0	0
La Rioja	1923	1930	0	0	0
La Rioja	1931	1936	1	1	1
La Rioja	1937	1975	0	0	0
La Rioja	1976	2020	1	1	1
Madrid	1868	1922	1	0	0
Madrid	1923	1930	0	0	0
Madrid	1931	1936	1	1	1
Madrid	1937	1975	0	0	0
Madrid	1976	2020	1	1	1
Murcia	1868	1922	1	0	0
Murcia	1923	1930	0	0	0
Murcia	1931	1936	1	1	1
Murcia	1937	1975	0	0	0
Murcia	1976	2020	1	1	1
Navarre	1868	1900	1	0	0
Navarre	1901	1922	1	1	1
Navarre	1923	1930	0	0	0
Navarre	1931	1936	1	1	1
Navarre	1937	1975	0	0	0
Navarre	1976	2020	1	1	1
Valencia	1868	1922	1	0	0
Valencia	1923	1930	0	0	0
Valencia	1931	1936	1	1	1
Valencia	1937	1975	0	0	0
Valencia	1976	2020	1	1	1
León	1868	1922	1	0	0
León	1923	1930	0	0	0
León	1931	1936	1	1	1
León	1937	1975	0	0	0
León	1976	2020	1	1	1
United Kingdom	1801	1917	1	0	0
United Kingdom	1918	2020	1	1	1

Source: coded by the author based on his case studies and the following justifications and sources

Country	Year	Justification for Competitive elections	Source for Constr. on executive
Belgium	1919	First elections with universal male suffrage	For all cases: XCONST indicator of the Polity 5 (2018) database
Spain	1901/ 1907	From 1876-1923, elections were manipulated by the *Conservative* and *Liberal Parties* who agreed to govern in alternance. The manipulation ceased in the Basque Country by 1901 and Catalonia by 1907 because the electorate voted massively for other parties. Elections for them can be deemed competitive from then onwards.	
	1931	First elections with universal male suffrage	
	1937	Beginning of Francoist dictatorship	
	1976	Transition to democracy with first elections with universal male suffrage after the francoist dictatorship	
United Kingdom	1918	First elections with universal male suffrage	

Appendix 14. Condition coding for non-requested autonomy increases

Sub-state community	From	To	Score
Brussels (Flemish)	1830	2020	0
Brussels (Francophone)	1830	2020	0
Flanders	1830	2020	0
German-sp. Community	1925	1940	0
German-sp. Community	1945	2013	0
German-sp. Community	2014	2014	1
German-sp. Community	2015	2020	0
Wallonia	1830	1970	0
Wallonia	1971	1971	1
Wallonia	1972	2013	0
Wallonia	2014	2014	1
Wallonia	2015	2020	0
Andalusia	1868	1996	0
Andalusia	1997	1997	1
Andalusia	1998	2020	0
Aragon	1868	1996	0
Aragon	1997	1997	1
Aragon	1998	2020	0
Asturias	1868	1996	0
Asturias	1997	1997	1
Asturias	1998	2020	0
Balearic Islands	1868	1996	0
Balearic Islands	1997	1997	1
Balearic Islands	1998	2020	0
Basque Country	1868	2020	0
Canary Islands	1868	1996	0
Canary Islands	1997	1997	1
Canary Islands	1998	2020	0
Cantabria	1868	1996	0
Cantabria	1997	1997	1
Cantabria	1998	2020	0
Castile and León	1868	1996	0
Castile and León	1997	1997	1
Castile and León	1998	2020	0
Castile-la Mancha	1868	1996	0
Castile-la Mancha	1997	1997	1
Castile-la Mancha	1998	2020	0
Catalonia	1868	2020	0
Extremadura	1868	1996	0
Extremadura	1997	1997	1
Extremadura	1998	2020	0
Galicia	1868	1996	0
Galicia	1997	1997	1
Galicia	1998	2020	0
La Rioja	1868	1996	0
La Rioja	1997	1997	1
La Rioja	1998	2020	0
Madrid	1868	1996	0
Madrid	1997	1997	1
Madrid	1998	2020	0
Murcia	1868	1996	0
Murcia	1997	1997	1
Murcia	1998	2020	0
Navarre	1868	2020	0
Valencia	1868	1996	0
Valencia	1997	1997	1
Valencia	1998	2020	0
León	1868	2020	0
Cornwall	1801	2020	0
England	1801	2020	0
London	1801	2020	0
Ireland	1801	2020	0

Sub-state community	From	To	Score
Northern Ireland (Nationalists)	1801	2020	0
Northern Ireland (Unionists)	1801	2020	0
Scotland	1801	2020	0
Wales	1801	2020	0

Source: coded by the author based on his case studies and the following justifications

Sub-state community	Year	Justification
German-speaking community	2014	The sixth state reform was mainly a request of Flemish political parties and could only be enacted after lengthy negotiations with the main Francophone political parties. Competences conferred to the Belgian communities were then also automatically transferred to the German-speaking Community who was not a demanding but accepting party to the reform.
Wallonia	1971	The first state reform and the creation of the Belgian communities was mainly a request of Flemish parties. Francophone parties accepted the creation in exchange for the Belgian regions to be later installed (1980).
	2014	The sixth state reform was mainly a request of Flemish parties and could only be enacted after lengthy negotiations with the main Francophone parties.
Spanish ACs except for the Basque country, Catalonia and Navarre (excl. León)	1997	The reform of the fiscal competences of the Spanish ACs was mainly a demand by Catalan parties. When accepted by the national government, it was symmetrically conferred to all ACs except the Basque country and Navarre. The latter two had already superior fiscal powers due to their foral rights.

Note: The considerations here hold for both traditional and regionalist party demands. ACs = autonomous communities.

Appendix 15. Condition coding for symmetrical autonomy conceptions

Country	From	To	Score
Belgium	1830	2020	0
Spain	1868	1931	0
Spain	1932	1936	1
Spain	1937	1977	0
Spain	1978	2020	1
United Kingdom	1801	2020	0

Source: coded by the author based on his case studies and the following justifications

Country	Year	Justification
Spain	1932	The Constitution of the Second Republic, foreseeing the possibility of legislative autonomy for autonomous communities was adopted by December 1931 and it the autonomy clause (for all) became clear only very lately
	1978	The Constitution of the contemporary Kingdom of Spain, foreseeing the possibility of legislative autonomy for (all) autonomous communities was adopted by October 1978 and it the autonomy clause (for all) became clear throughout the year

Appendix 16. Condition coding for symmetrical autonomy conferral

Sub-state community	From	To	Outcome
Brussels (Flemish)	1830	1993	0
Brussels (Flemish)	1994	1994	1
Brussels (Flemish)	1995	2001	0
Brussels (Flemish)	2002	2002	1
Brussels (Flemish)	2003	2013	0
Brussels (Flemish)	2014	2014	1
Brussels (Flemish)	2015	2020	0
Brussels (Francophone)	1830	1993	0
Brussels (Francophone)	1994	1994	1
Brussels (Francophone)	1995	2001	0
Brussels (Francophone)	2002	2002	1
Brussels (Francophone)	2003	2013	0
Brussels (Francophone)	2014	2014	1
Brussels (Francophone)	2015	2020	0
German-sp. Community	1925	1940	0
German-sp. Community	1945	1989	0
German-sp. Community	1990	1990	1
German-sp. Community	1991	1993	0
German-sp. Community	1994	1994	1
German-sp. Community	1995	2001	0
German-sp. Community	2002	2002	1
German-sp. Community	2003	2013	0
German-sp. Community	2014	2014	1
German-sp. Community	2015	2020	0
Flanders	1830	2020	0
Wallonia	1830	1989	0
Wallonia	1990	1990	1
Wallonia	1991	1993	0
Wallonia	1994	1994	1
Wallonia	1995	2001	0
Wallonia	2002	2002	1
Wallonia	2003	2013	0
Wallonia	2014	2014	1
Wallonia	2015	2020	0
Andalusia	1868	1996	0
Andalusia	1997	1997	1
Andalusia	1998	2020	0
Aragon	1868	1991	0
Aragon	1992	1992	1
Aragon	1993	1996	0
Aragon	1997	1997	1
Aragon	1998	2020	0
Asturias	1868	1991	0
Asturias	1992	1992	1
Asturias	1993	1996	0
Asturias	1997	1997	1
Asturias	1998	2020	0
Balearic Islands	1868	1991	0
Balearic Islands	1992	1992	1
Balearic Islands	1993	1996	0
Balearic Islands	1997	1997	1
Balearic Islands	1998	2020	0
Basque Country	1868	2020	0
Canary Islands	1868	1996	0
Canary Islands	1997	1997	1
Canary Islands	1998	2020	0
Cantabria	1868	1991	0
Cantabria	1992	1992	1
Cantabria	1993	1996	0
Cantabria	1997	1997	1
Cantabria	1998	2020	0
Castile and León	1868	1991	0

Sub-state community	From	To	Outcome
Castile and León	1992	1992	1
Castile and León	1993	1996	0
Castile and León	1997	1997	1
Castile and León	1998	2020	0
Castile-la Mancha	1868	1991	0
Castile-la Mancha	1992	1992	1
Castile-la Mancha	1993	1996	0
Castile-la Mancha	1997	1997	1
Castile-la Mancha	1998	2020	0
Catalonia	1868	2020	0
Extremadura	1868	1991	0
Extremadura	1992	1992	1
Extremadura	1993	1996	0
Extremadura	1997	1997	1
Extremadura	1998	2020	0
Galicia	1868	1996	0
Galicia	1997	1997	1
Galicia	1998	2020	0
La Rioja	1868	1991	0
La Rioja	1992	1992	1
La Rioja	1993	1996	0
La Rioja	1997	1997	1
La Rioja	1998	2020	0
Madrid	1868	1991	0
Madrid	1992	1992	1
Madrid	1993	1996	0
Madrid	1997	1997	1
Madrid	1998	2020	0
Murcia	1868	1991	0
Murcia	1992	1992	1
Murcia	1993	1996	0
Murcia	1997	1997	1
Murcia	1998	2020	0
Navarre	1868	2020	0
Valencia	1868	1996	0
Valencia	1997	1997	1
Valencia	1998	2020	0
León	1868	2020	0
Cornwall	1801	2020	0
England	1801	2020	0
London	1801	2020	0
Ireland	1801	2020	0
Northern Ireland (Nationalists)	1801	2020	0
Northern Ireland (Unionists)	1801	2020	0
Scotland	1801	2020	0
Wales	1801	2020	0

Source: coded by the author based on his case studies and the following justifications

Sub-state communities	Year	Justification
Brussels (Flemish & Francophone)	1994	The competence extension of the Belgian regions in 1994 was mainly a negotiation between Flemish and Francophone politicians – later also applied for the Brussels-Capital Region.
Brussels (Flemish & Francophone)	2014	The sixth state reform was mainly a request of Flemish parties and could only be enacted after lengthy negotiations with the main Francophone parties. Competences conferred to the Belgian regions were then also automatically transferred to the Brussels-Capital Region who was not a demanding but accepting party to the reform.
German-sp. Community	1990	While the administration of the education sector was a longstanding demand of German-speaking parties, the full conferral of legislative powers as foreseen by the 1990 reform mainly came to the community through symmetrical conferral to all communities.
	2002, 2014	The fifth and sixth state reforms were mainly a negotiation between Flemish and Francophone parties. Competences conferred to the Belgian communities were then also automatically transferred to the German-speaking Community.
Wallonia	1990, 1994, 2002	The 1990, 1994 and 2002 reforms were a negotiation both between Flemish and Francophone parties but whose impetus mainly came from the Flemish side – with a francophone interest in refinancing the communities.
	2014	The sixth state reform was mainly a request of Flemish parties and could only be enacted after lengthy negotiations with the main Francophone parties.
All Spanish ACs except Andalusia, the Basque Country, the Canary Islands, Catalonia, Galicia, Navarre, Valencia	1992	The original institution of the ACs had foreseen larger education as well as social and sanitary competences to the so-called 'fast-track' ACs as well as to the Canary Islands and Valencia (who were 'slow-track' regions with extended competences). In 1992, it was decided to confer the same competences in these sectors to all ACs.
All Spanish ACs except the Basque Country, Navarre and Catalonia	1997	The reform of the fiscal competences of the Spanish ACs was mainly a demand by Catalan parties. When accepted by the national government, it was symmetrically conferred to all ACs except the Basque country and Navarre. The latter two had already superior fiscal powers due to their foral rights.

Note: ACs = autonomous communities.

Appendix 17. Condition coding for regionalist party competitors

Sub-state community	From	To	Score
Brussels (Flemish)	1830	2020	0
Brussels (Francophone)	1830	2020	0
Flanders	1830	1978	0
Flanders	1979	2020	1
German-sp. Community	1925	1940	0
German-sp. Community	1945	2020	0
Wallonia	1830	2020	0
Andalusia	1868	2020	0
Aragon	1868	2020	0
Asturias	1868	2020	0
Balearic Islands	1868	2020	0
Balearic Islands	1982	1995	1
Balearic Islands	1996	2020	0
Basque Country	1868	1977	0
Basque Country	1978	2020	1
Canary Islands	1868	2020	0
Cantabria	1868	2020	0
Castile and León	1868	2020	0
Castile-la Mancha	1868	2020	0
Catalonia	1868	1975	0
Catalonia	1976	2014	1
Catalonia	2015	2020	0
Extremadura	1868	2020	0
Galicia	1868	2015	0
Galicia	2016	2020	1
La Rioja	1868	2020	0
Madrid	1868	2020	0
Murcia	1868	2020	0
Navarre	1868	2006	0
Navarre	2007	2020	1
Valencia	1868	2020	0
León	1868	2020	0
Cornwall	1801	2020	0
England	1801	2020	0
London	1801	2020	0
Ireland	1801	1921	0
Northern Ireland (Nationalists)	1921	1971	1
Northern Ireland (Nationalists)	1972	2020	0
Northern Ireland (Unionists)	1801	2020	0
Scotland	1801	2020	0
Wales	1801	2020	0

Source: coded by the author based on his case studies and the following justifications

Sub-state comm.	Year	Justification
Flanders	1979-2020	Regionalist party: N-VA. Regionalist competitor: VB.
Balearic Islands	1982-1995	Regionalist party: UM. Regionalist competitor: PSM.
Basque Country	1978-1997	Regionalist party: PNV. Regionalist competitor: HB (1978-1998), EH (1998-2005), Aralar (2005-2012), EH Bildu (2012-2020).
Catalonia	1976-2014	Regionalist party: CiU (1975-2015), JxSi (2015-2017), JxCat (2017-2020). Regionalist competitor: ERC (1975-2015, 2017-2020), PUC (2015-2017).
Galicia	2016-2020	Regionalist party: BNG. Regionalist competitor: En Marea.
Navarre	2007-2020	Regionalist party: NaBai (2007-2015), GBai (2015-2020). Regionalist competitor: CDN (2007-2011), Bildu (2011-2020).
N. Ireland (Nat.)	1921-1971	Regionalist party: Nationalist party. Regionalist competitor: SF.

Appendix 18. Condition coding for regionalist party threats (on the regional level)

Sub-state community	From	To	Score
Brussels (Flemish)	1830	2020	0
Brussels (Francophone)	1830	1989	0
Brussels (Francophone)	1990	2020	1
Flanders	1830	1918	0
Flanders	1919	1920	1
Flanders	1921	1924	0
Flanders	1925	1945	1
Flanders	1946	1960	0
Flanders	1961	2020	1
German-sp. Community	1925	1940	0
German-sp. Community	1945	1970	0
German-sp. Community	1971	2010	1
German-sp. Community	2011	2020	0
Wallonia	1830	1967	0
Wallonia	1968	1977	1
Wallonia	1978	2020	0
Andalusia	1868	1978	0
Andalusia	1979	1982	1
Andalusia	1983	2020	0
Aragon	1868	1981	0
Aragon	1982	1987	1
Aragon	1988	2020	0
Asturias	1868	2020	0
Balearic Islands	1868	1982	0
Balearic Islands	1983	1987	1
Balearic Islands	1988	1991	0
Balearic Islands	1992	2020	1
Basque Country	1868	1930	0
Basque Country	1931	1936	1
Basque Country	1937	1975	0
Basque Country	1976	2020	1
Canary Islands	1868	1986	0
Canary Islands	1987	2020	1
Cantabria	1868	1986	0
Cantabria	1987	1987	1
Cantabria	1988	2020	0
Castile and León	1868	2020	0
Castile-la Mancha	1868	2020	0
Catalonia	1868	1906	0
Catalonia	1907	1922	1
Catalonia	1923	1930	0
Catalonia	1931	1936	1
Catalonia	1937	1975	0
Catalonia	1976	2020	1
Extremadura	1868	1982	0
Extremadura	1983	1986	1
Galicia	1868	1930	0
Galicia	1931	1936	1
Galicia	1937	1988	0
Galicia	1989	2020	1
La Rioja	1868	2020	0
Madrid	1868	2020	0
Murcia	1868	2020	0
Navarre	1968	1975	0
Navarre	1976	2020	1
Valencia	1868	2020	0
León	1868	2020	0
Cornwall	1801	2020	0
England	1801	2009	0
England	2010	2018	1
England	2019	2020	0
London	1801	2020	0

Sub-state community	From	To	Score
Ireland	1801	1831	0
Ireland	1832	1851	1
Ireland	1852	1869	0
Ireland	1870	1921	1
Northern Ireland (Nationalists)	1921	2020	1
Northern Ireland (Nationalists)	1950	1971	0
Northern Ireland (Nationalists)	1972	2020	1
Northern Ireland (Unionists)	1801	1921	0
Northern Ireland (Unionists)	1922	1944	1
Northern Ireland (Unionists)	1945	1948	0
Northern Ireland (Unionists)	1949	1961	1
Northern Ireland (Unionists)	1962	1979	0
Northern Ireland (Unionists)	1980	1997	0
Northern Ireland (Unionists)	1998	2020	1
Scotland	1801	1969	0
Scotland	1970	2020	1
Wales	1801	1973	0
Wales	1974	2020	1

Source: coded by the author based on the SAS data and official elections results.

Particularity: when the political space could be considered as regionalised before the first regional elections take place (e.g. the German-speaking Community since 1925), assumed group status was taken into consideration.

Appendix 19. Condition coding for regionalist party threats (on the national level)

Sub-state community	From	To	Score
Brussels (Flemish)	1830	2020	0
Brussels (Francophone)	1830	1967	0
Brussels (Francophone)	1968	1984	1
Brussels (Francophone)	1985	2020	0
Flanders	1830	1918	0
Flanders	1919	1920	1
Flanders	1921	1924	0
Flanders	1925	1945	1
Flanders	1946	1960	0
Flanders	1961	2020	1
German-sp. Community	1925	1940	0
German-sp. Community	1945	2020	0
Wallonia	1830	1967	0
Wallonia	1968	1977	1
Wallonia	1978	2020	0
Andalusia	1868	1978	0
Andalusia	1979	1982	1
Andalusia	1983	2020	0
Aragon	1868	2020	0
Asturias	1868	2020	0
Balearic Islands	1868	2020	0
Basque Country	1868	1930	0
Basque Country	1931	1936	1
Basque Country	1937	1975	0
Basque Country	1976	2020	1
Canary Islands	1868	1992	0
Canary Islands	1993	2008	1
Canary Islands	2009	2020	0
Cantabria	1868	2020	0
Castile and León	1868	2020	0
Castile-la Mancha	1868	2020	0
Catalonia	1868	1906	0
Catalonia	1907	1922	1
Catalonia	1923	1930	0
Catalonia	1931	1936	1
Catalonia	1937	1975	0
Catalonia	1976	2020	1
Extremadura	1868	2020	0
Galicia	1868	1930	0
Galicia	1931	1936	1
Galicia	1937	2020	0
La Rioja	1868	2020	0
Madrid	1868	2020	0
Murcia	1868	2020	0
Navarre	1868	2020	0
Valencia	1868	2020	0
León	1868	2020	0
Cornwall	1801	2020	0
England	1801	2009	0
England	2010	2018	1
England	2019	2020	0
London	1801	2020	0
Ireland	1801	1831	0
Ireland	1832	1851	1
Ireland	1852	1869	0
Ireland	1870	1921	1
Northern Ireland (Nationalists)	1921	2020	1
Northern Ireland (Unionists)	1801	1921	0
Northern Ireland (Unionists)	1972	1979	1
Northern Ireland (Unionists)	1980	2002	0
Northern Ireland (Unionists)	2003	2010	1
Northern Ireland (Unionists)	2011	2016	0

Sub-state community	From	To	Score
Northern Ireland (Unionists)	2017	2019	1
Northern Ireland (Unionists)	2020	2020	0
Scotland	1801	1969	0
Scotland	1970	2020	1
Wales	1801	1973	0
Wales	1974	2020	1

Source: coded by the author based on the SAS data and official elections results.

Appendix 20. Condition coding for regionalist parties' government participation

Sub-state community	From	To	Score
Brussels (Flemish)	1830	1976	0
Brussels (Flemish)	1977	1979	1
Brussels (Flemish)	1980	1987	0
Brussels (Flemish)	1988	1991	1
Brussels (Flemish)	1992	2013	0
Brussels (Flemish)	2014	2018	1
Brussels (Flemish)	2019	2020	0
Brussels (Francophone)	1830	1976	0
Brussels (Francophone)	1977	1979	1
Brussels (Francophone)	1980	2020	0
Flanders	1830	1976	0
Flanders	1977	1979	1
Flanders	1980	1987	0
Flanders	1988	1991	1
Flanders	1992	2013	0
Flanders	2014	2018	1
Flanders	2019	2020	0
German-sp. Community	1925	1940	0
German-sp. Community	1945	2020	0
Wallonia	1830	1973	0
Wallonia	1974	1977	1
Wallonia	1978	2020	0
Andalusia	1868	2020	0
Aragon	1868	2020	0
Asturias	1868	2020	0
Balearic Islands	1868	2020	0
Basque Country	1868	2020	0
Canary Islands	1868	2020	0
Cantabria	1868	2020	0
Castile and León	1868	2020	0
Castile-la Mancha	1868	2020	0
Catalonia	1868	2020	0
Extremadura	1868	2020	0
Galicia	1868	2020	0
La Rioja	1868	2020	0
Madrid	1868	2020	0
Murcia	1868	2020	0
Navarre	1868	2020	0
Valencia	1868	2020	0
León	1868	2020	0
Cornwall	1801	2020	0
England	1801	2020	0
London	1801	2020	0
Ireland	1801	1921	0
Northern Ireland (Nationalists)	1921	2020	0
Northern Ireland (Unionists)	1801	2020	0
Scotland	1801	2020	0
Wales	1801	2020	0

Source: coded by the author based on official government data.

Appendix 21. Condition coding for regionalist parties' strategic repositioning

Sub-state community	From	To	Score
Brussels (Flemish)	1830	2020	0
Brussels (Francophone)	1830	2015	0
Brussels (Francophone)	2016	2020	1
Flanders	1830	2020	0
German-sp. Community	1925	1940	0
German-sp. Community	1945	2009	0
German-sp. Community	2010	2020	1
Wallonia	1830	2020	0
Andalusia	1868	2020	0
Aragon	1868	2020	0
Asturias	1868	2010	0
Asturias	2011	2020	1
Balearic Islands	1868	2014	0
Balearic Islands	2015	2020	1
Basque Country	1868	2020	0
Canary Islands	1868	2020	0
Cantabria	1868	2020	0
Castile and León	1868	2020	0
Castile-la Mancha	1868	2020	0
Catalonia	1868	2020	0
Extremadura	1868	2020	0
Galicia	1868	2020	0
La Rioja	1868	2020	0
Madrid	1868	2020	0
Murcia	1868	2020	0
Navarre	1868	2020	0
Valencia	1868	2009	0
Valencia	2010	2020	1
León	1868	2020	0
Cornwall	1801	2020	0
England	1801	2020	0
London	1801	2020	0
Ireland	1801	2020	0
Northern Ireland (Nationalists)	1801	2020	0
Northern Ireland (Unionists)	1801	2020	0
Scotland	1801	2020	0
Wales	1801	2020	0

Source: coded by the author based on his case studies and the following justifications

Sub-state community	Year	Justification
Brussels (Francophone)	2016-2020	FDF becoming Défi in 2015
German-speaking Community	2010-2020	ProDG (unofficially) succeeding to the dissolved PDB
Asturias	2011-2020	Split from former regionalists PAS/URAS and split from the PP turning into FAC
Balearic Islands	2015-2020	PSM creating Més with a few smaller parties
Valencia	2010-2020	Compromis (unofficially) succeeding to the UV

Appendix 22. Condition coding for governments' expected electoral (ally) success

Sub-state community	From	To	Score
Brussels (Flemish)	1830	2020	0
Brussels (Francophone)	1830	2020	0
Flanders	1830	1883	0
Flanders	1884	1936	1
Flanders	1937	1938	0
Flanders	1939	1945	1
Flanders	1946	1946	0
Flanders	1947	1954	1
Flanders	1955	1957	0
Flanders	1958	1999	1
Flanders	2000	2007	0
Flanders	2008	2018	1
Flanders	2019	2020	0
German-sp. Community	1925	1931	1
German-sp. Community	1932	1940	0
German-sp. Community	1945	1946	0
German-sp. Community	1947	1954	1
German-sp. Community	1955	1957	0
German-sp. Community	1958	2006	1
German-sp. Community	2007	2020	0
Wallonia	1830	1953	0
Wallonia	1954	1958	1
Wallonia	1959	1967	0
Wallonia	1968	1974	1
Wallonia	1975	1976	0
Wallonia	1977	1981	1
Wallonia	1982	1987	0
Wallonia	1988	2014	1
Wallonia	2015	2020	0
Andalusia	1868	1873	1
Andalusia	1874	1918	0
Andalusia	1919	1922	1
Andalusia	1923	1932	0
Andalusia	1933	1935	1
Andalusia	1936	1981	0
Andalusia	1982	1995	1
Andalusia	1996	2003	0
Andalusia	2004	2010	1
Andalusia	2011	2018	0
Andalusia	2019	2020	1
Aragon	1868	1870	0
Aragon	1871	1873	1
Aragon	1874	1919	0
Aragon	1920	1922	1
Aragon	1923	1932	0
Aragon	1933	1935	1
Aragon	1936	1976	0
Aragon	1977	2020	1
Asturias	1868	1873	1
Asturias	1874	1918	0
Asturias	1919	1922	1
Asturias	1923	1932	0
Asturias	1933	1935	1
Asturias	1936	1981	0
Asturias	1982	1998	1
Asturias	1999	2018	0
Asturias	2019	2020	1
Balearic Islands	1868	1873	1
Balearic Islands	1874	1919	0
Balearic Islands	1920	1922	1
Balearic Islands	1923	1932	0
Balearic Islands	1933	1935	1

Sub-state community	From	To	Score
Balearic Islands	1936	1976	0
Balearic Islands	1977	1982	1
Balearic Islands	1983	1995	0
Balearic Islands	1996	2003	1
Balearic Islands	2004	2010	0
Balearic Islands	2011	2018	1
Balearic Islands	2019	2020	0
Basque Country	1868	1872	0
Basque Country	1873	1873	1
Basque Country	1874	1919	0
Basque Country	1920	1922	1
Basque Country	1923	1932	0
Basque Country	1931	1933	1
Basque Country	1934	1981	0
Basque Country	1982	1985	1
Basque Country	1986	1988	0
Basque Country	1989	1995	1
Basque Country	1996	2003	0
Basque Country	2004	2010	1
Basque Country	2011	2018	0
Basque Country	2019	2020	1
Canary Islands	1868	1872	1
Canary Islands	1872	1932	0
Canary Islands	1933	1933	1
Canary Islands	1934	1935	0
Canary Islands	1936	1936	1
Canary Islands	1937	1976	0
Canary Islands	1977	1994	1
Canary Islands	1995	1999	0
Canary Islands	2000	2003	1
Canary Islands	2004	2006	0
Canary Islands	2007	2014	1
Canary Islands	2015	2018	0
Canary Islands	2008	2020	1
Cantabria	1868	1873	1
Cantabria	1874	1932	0
Cantabria	1933	1935	1
Cantabria	1936	1976	0
Cantabria	1977	1981	1
Cantabria	1982	1995	0
Cantabria	1996	2003	1
Cantabria	2004	2010	0
Cantabria	2011	2014	1
Cantabria	2015	2018	0
Cantabria	2019	2020	1
Castile and León	1868	1873	1
Castile and León	1874	1918	0
Castile and León	1919	1922	1
Castile and León	1923	1932	0
Castile and León	1933	1935	1
Castile and León	1936	1976	0
Castile and León	1977	1981	1
Castile and León	1982	1995	0
Castile and León	1996	2003	1
Castile and León	2004	2010	0
Castile and León	2011	2018	1
Castile and León	2019	2020	0
Castile-la Mancha	1868	1873	1
Castile-la Mancha	1874	1919	0
Castile-la Mancha	1920	1922	1
Castile-la Mancha	1923	1932	0
Castile-la Mancha	1933	1933	1
Castile-la Mancha	1934	1976	0
Castile-la Mancha	1977	1995	1
Castile-la Mancha	1996	2003	0

Sub-state community	From	To	Score
Castile-la Mancha	2004	2010	1
Castile-la Mancha	2011	2018	0
Castile-la Mancha	2019	2020	1
Catalonia	1868	1870	0
Catalonia	1871	1871	1
Catalonia	1872	1872	0
Catalonia	1873	1874	1
Catalonia	1875	1930	0
Catalonia	1931	1933	1
Catalonia	1934	1935	0
Catalonia	1936	1936	1
Catalonia	1937	1979	0
Catalonia	1980	1981	1
Catalonia	1982	2010	0
Catalonia	2011	2016	1
Catalonia	2017	2020	0
Extremadura	1868	1873	1
Extremadura	1874	1918	0
Extremadura	1919	1922	1
Extremadura	1923	1930	0
Extremadura	1931	1936	1
Extremadura	1937	1976	0
Extremadura	1977	1995	1
Extremadura	1996	2003	0
Extremadura	2004	2010	1
Extremadura	2011	2018	0
Extremadura	2019	2020	1
Galicia	1868	1873	1
Galicia	1874	1919	0
Galicia	1920	1922	1
Galicia	1923	1932	0
Galicia	1933	1935	1
Galicia	1936	1976	0
Galicia	1977	1981	1
Galicia	1982	1995	0
Galicia	1996	2003	1
Galicia	2004	2010	0
Galicia	2011	2018	1
Galicia	2019	2020	0
La Rioja	1868	1873	1
La Rioja	1874	1932	0
La Rioja	1933	1935	1
La Rioja	1936	1976	0
La Rioja	1977	1985	1
La Rioja	1986	1995	0
La Rioja	1996	2003	1
La Rioja	2004	2010	0
La Rioja	2011	2020	1
Madrid	1868	1873	1
Madrid	1874	1932	0
Madrid	1933	1935	1
Madrid	1936	1982	0
Madrid	1983	1990	1
Madrid	1991	1995	0
Madrid	1996	2003	1
Madrid	2004	2010	0
Madrid	2011	2020	1
Murcia	1868	1873	1
Murcia	1874	1918	0
Murcia	1919	1922	1
Murcia	1923	1931	0
Murcia	1933	1936	1
Murcia	1937	1976	0
Murcia	1977	1978	1
Murcia	1978	1981	0

Sub-state community	From	To	Score
Murcia	1982	2003	1
Murcia	2004	2010	0
Murcia	2011	2020	1
Navarre	1868	1872	0
Navarre	1873	1873	1
Navarre	1974	1918	0
Navarre	1919	1921	1
Navarre	1922	1932	0
Navarre	1933	1935	1
Navarre	1936	1978	0
Navarre	1979	1986	1
Navarre	1987	1999	0
Navarre	2000	2003	1
Navarre	2004	2010	0
Navarre	2011	2018	1
Navarre	2019	2020	0
Valencia	1868	1873	1
Valencia	1874	1918	0
Valencia	1919	1922	1
Valencia	1923	1932	0
Valencia	1933	1933	1
Valencia	1934	1935	0
Valencia	1936	1936	1
Valencia	1937	1981	0
Valencia	1982	2003	1
Valencia	2004	2010	0
Valencia	2011	2020	1
León	1868	1873	1
León	1874	1930	0
León	1931	1935	1
León	1936	1976	0
León	1977	1992	1
León	1993	1995	0
León	1996	2020	1
Cornwall	1801	1805	0
Cornwall	1806	1809	1
Cornwall	1810	1829	0
Cornwall	1830	1841	1
Cornwall	1842	1845	0
Cornwall	1846	1852	1
Cornwall	1853	1854	0
Cornwall	1855	1866	1
Cornwall	1867	1867	0
Cornwall	1868	1868	1
Cornwall	1869	1885	0
Cornwall	1886	1886	1
Cornwall	1887	1904	0
Cornwall	1905	1922	1
Cornwall	1923	1923	0
Cornwall	1924	1929	1
Cornwall	1930	1950	0
Cornwall	1951	1964	1
Cornwall	1965	1969	0
Cornwall	1970	1974	1
Cornwall	1975	1978	0
Cornwall	1979	1990	1
Cornwall	1991	2015	0
Cornwall	2016	2020	1
England	1801	1806	1
England	1807	1808	0
England	1809	1834	1
England	1835	1840	0
England	1841	1846	1
England	1847	1851	0
England	1852	1855	1

Sub-state community	From	To	Score
England	1856	1857	0
England	1858	1892	1
England	1893	1894	0
England	1895	1916	1
England	1917	1921	0
England	1922	1929	1
England	1930	1934	0
England	1935	2020	1
London	1801	1805	0
London	1806	1809	1
London	1810	1829	0
London	1830	1841	1
London	1842	1845	0
London	1846	1852	1
London	1853	1858	0
London	1859	1866	1
London	1867	1867	0
London	1868	1874	1
London	1875	1884	0
London	1885	1892	1
London	1893	1894	0
London	1895	1905	1
London	1906	1921	0
London	1922	1929	1
London	1930	1934	0
London	1935	1970	1
London	1971	1978	0
London	1979	1990	1
London	1991	1989	0
London	1990	1997	1
London	1998	2020	0
Ireland	1801	1805	0
Ireland	1806	1809	1
Ireland	1810	1829	0
Ireland	1830	1841	1
Ireland	1842	1845	0
Ireland	1846	1852	1
Ireland	1853	1854	0
Ireland	1855	1866	1
Ireland	1867	1867	0
Ireland	1868	1874	1
Ireland	1875	1879	0
Ireland	1880	1886	1
Ireland	1887	1891	0
Ireland	1892	1895	1
Ireland	1896	1904	0
Ireland	1905	1921	1
Northern Ireland (Nationalists)	1921	2020	0
Northern Ireland (Unionists)	1801	1807	1
Northern Ireland (Unionists)	1808	1808	0
Northern Ireland (Unionists)	1809	1830	1
Northern Ireland (Unionists)	1831	1833	0
Northern Ireland (Unionists)	1834	1835	1
Northern Ireland (Unionists)	1836	1840	0
Northern Ireland (Unionists)	1841	1846	1
Northern Ireland (Unionists)	1847	1851	0
Northern Ireland (Unionists)	1852	1855	1
Northern Ireland (Unionists)	1856	1857	0
Northern Ireland (Unionists)	1858	1859	1
Northern Ireland (Unionists)	1860	1864	0
Northern Ireland (Unionists)	1865	1865	1
Northern Ireland (Unionists)	1866	1865	0
Northern Ireland (Unionists)	1866	1868	1
Northern Ireland (Unionists)	1869	1873	0
Northern Ireland (Unionists)	1874	1880	1

Sub-state community	From	To	Score
Northern Ireland (Unionists)	1881	1884	0
Northern Ireland (Unionists)	1885	1892	1
Northern Ireland (Unionists)	1893	1893	0
Northern Ireland (Unionists)	1894	1905	1
Northern Ireland (Unionists)	1906	1907	0
Northern Ireland (Unionists)	1908	1908	1
Northern Ireland (Unionists)	1909	1915	0
Northern Ireland (Unionists)	1916	1916	1
Northern Ireland (Unionists)	1917	1921	0
Northern Ireland (Unionists)	1922	1929	1
Northern Ireland (Unionists)	1930	1934	0
Northern Ireland (Unionists)	1935	1945	1
Northern Ireland (Unionists)	1946	1950	0
Northern Ireland (Unionists)	1951	1964	1
Northern Ireland (Unionists)	1965	1969	0
Northern Ireland (Unionists)	1970	1974	1
Northern Ireland (Unionists)	1975	1975	0
Northern Ireland (Unionists)	1976	1976	1
Northern Ireland (Unionists)	1977	1978	0
Northern Ireland (Unionists)	1979	1997	1
Northern Ireland (Unionists)	1998	2006	0
Northern Ireland (Unionists)	2007	2007	1
Northern Ireland (Unionists)	2008	2009	0
Northern Ireland (Unionists)	2010	2020	1
Scotland	1801	1834	0
Scotland	1835	1841	1
Scotland	1842	1845	0
Scotland	1846	1852	1
Scotland	1853	1854	0
Scotland	1855	1866	1
Scotland	1867	1867	0
Scotland	1868	1874	1
Scotland	1875	1879	0
Scotland	1880	1886	1
Scotland	1887	1891	0
Scotland	1892	1895	1
Scotland	1896	1904	0
Scotland	1905	1922	1
Scotland	1923	1928	0
Scotland	1929	1935	1
Scotland	1936	1944	0
Scotland	1945	1951	1
Scotland	1952	1963	0
Scotland	1964	1970	1
Scotland	1971	1973	0
Scotland	1974	1979	1
Scotland	1980	1996	0
Scotland	1997	2010	1
Scotland	2011	2020	0
Wales	1801	1833	0
Wales	1834	1835	1
Wales	1836	1840	0
Wales	1841	1846	1
Wales	1847	1851	0
Wales	1852	1855	1
Wales	1856	1857	0
Wales	1858	1859	1
Wales	1860	1864	0
Wales	1865	1866	1
Wales	1867	1867	0
Wales	1868	1874	1
Wales	1875	1879	0
Wales	1880	1886	1
Wales	1887	1891	0
Wales	1892	1895	1

Sub-state community	From	To	Score
Wales	1896	1904	0
Wales	1905	1922	1
Wales	1923	1923	0
Wales	1924	1924	1
Wales	1925	1928	0
Wales	1929	1935	1
Wales	1936	1944	0
Wales	1945	1951	1
Wales	1952	1963	0
Wales	1964	1970	1
Wales	1971	1973	0
Wales	1974	1979	1
Wales	1980	1996	0
Wales	1997	2010	1
Wales	2011	2020	0

Source: coded by the author based on official elections results.

Particularity: when the national political space can be considered regionalised, the leading government party of the language community is taken.

Appendix 23. Condition coding for governments' reliance on regionalist support

Sub-state communities	From	To	Score
Brussels (Flemish)	1830	1976	0
Brussels (Flemish)	1977	1978	1
Brussels (Flemish)	1979	1987	0
Brussels (Flemish)	1988	1991	1
Brussels (Flemish)	1992	2013	0
Brussels (Flemish)	2014	2018	1
Brussels (Flemish)	2019	2020	0
Brussels (Francophone)	1830	1976	0
Brussels (Francophone)	1977	1980	1
Brussels (Francophone)	1981	2020	0
Flanders	1830	1976	0
Flanders	1977	1978	1
Flanders	1979	1987	0
Flanders	1988	1991	1
Flanders	1992	2013	0
Flanders	2014	2018	1
Flanders	2019	2020	0
German-sp. Community	1925	1940	0
German-sp. Community	1945	2020	0
Wallonia	1830	2020	0
Wallonia	1974	1977	1
Wallonia	1978	2020	0
Andalusia	1868	2020	0
Aragon	1868	2020	0
Asturias	1868	2020	0
Balearic Islands	1868	2020	0
Basque Country	1868	1995	0
Basque Country	1996	1998	1
Basque Country	1999	2020	0
Canary Islands	1868	1995	0
Canary Islands	1996	2004	1
Canary Islands	2005	2017	0
Canary Islands	2016	2018	1
Canary Islands	2019	2020	0
Cantabria	1868	2020	0
Castile and León	1868	2020	0
Castile-la Mancha	1868	2020	0
Catalonia	1868	1930	0
Catalonia	1931	1933	1
Catalonia	1934	1935	0
Catalonia	1936	1936	1
Catalonia	1937	1992	0
Catalonia	1993	1998	1
Catalonia	1999	2003	0
Catalonia	2004	2008	1
Catalonia	2009	2020	0
Extremadura	1868	2020	0
Galicia	1868	2020	0
La Rioja	1868	2020	0
Madrid	1868	2020	0
Murcia	1868	2020	0
Navarre	1868	2020	0
Valencia	1868	2020	0
León	1868	2020	0
Cornwall	1801	2020	0
England	1801	2020	0
London	1801	2020	0
Ireland	1801	1884	0
Ireland	1885	1886	1
Ireland	1887	1891	0
Ireland	1892	1895	1
Ireland	1896	1909	0

Sub-state communities	From	To	Score
Ireland	1910	1915	1
Ireland	1916	1921	0
Northern Ireland (Nationalists)	1921	2020	0
Northern Ireland (Unionists)	1801	1995	0
Northern Ireland (Unionists)	1996	1997	1
Northern Ireland (Unionists)	1998	2016	0
Northern Ireland (Unionists)	2017	2019	1
Northern Ireland (Unionists)	2020	2020	0
Scotland	1801	2020	0
Wales	1801	2020	0

Source: coded by the author based on official elections results and government data.

Appendix 24. Condition coding for sub-state communities' secessionist threats

Sub-state communities	From	To	Score
Brussels (Flemish)	1830	2020	0
Brussels (Francophone)	1830	2020	0
Flanders	1830	1917	0
Flanders	1918	1918	1
Flanders	1919	2020	0
German-sp. Community	1925	1940	0
German-sp. Community	1945	2020	0
Wallonia	1830	2020	0
Andalusia	1868	2020	0
Aragon	1868	2020	0
Asturias	1868	2020	0
Balearic Islands	1868	2020	0
Basque Country	1868	2020	0
Canary Islands	1868	2020	0
Cantabria	1868	2020	0
Castile and León	1868	2020	0
Castile-la Mancha	1868	2020	0
Catalonia	1868	1933	0
Catalonia	1934	1934	1
Catalonia	1935	2016	0
Catalonia	2017	2017	1
Catalonia	2018	2020	0
Extremadura	1868	2020	0
Galicia	1868	2020	0
La Rioja	1868	2020	0
Madrid	1868	2020	0
Murcia	1868	2020	0
Navarre	1868	2020	0
Valencia	1868	2020	0
León	1868	2020	0
Cornwall	1801	2020	0
England	1801	2020	0
London	1801	2020	0
Ireland	1801	1921	0
Northern Ireland (Nationalists)	1921	2020	0
Northern Ireland (Unionists)	1801	2020	0
Scotland	1801	2020	0
Wales	1801	2020	0

Source: coded by the author based on his case studies and the following justifications

Sub-state community	Year	Justification
Flanders	1918	On 22nd December 1917, the Council of Flanders called for a unilateral declaration of independence and on 28th March 1918, an independence document was elaborated and addressed to the German occupying officials.
Catalonia	1934	On 6th October 1934, the Catalan president Lluís Companys proclaimed an 'independent Catalan state within the Spanish Republic'. The formulation was purposively ambiguous but taken very seriously by the Spanish government.
	2017	On 1st October 2017, a referendum on the independence of Catalonia was held despite being having been previously suspended by the Constitutional Court. An independence motion was passed on 27th October 2017 by the Catalan parliament.


Appendix 25. Condition coding for sub-state communities' size

Sub-state community	From	To	Score
Brussels (Flemish)	1830	1896	0
Brussels (Flemish)	1897	2020	1
Brussels (Francophone)	1830	1896	0
Brussels (Francophone)	1897	2020	1
Flanders	1830	2020	1
German-sp. Community	1925	1940	0
German-sp. Community	1945	2020	0
Wallonia	1830	2020	1
Andalusia	1868	2020	1
Aragon	1830	1896	1
Aragon	1897	2020	0
Asturias	1868	2020	0
Balearic Islands	1868	2020	0
Basque Country	1868	1965	0
Basque Country	1966	2020	1
Canary Islands	1868	2020	0
Cantabria	1868	2020	0
Castile and León	1868	2020	1
Castile-la Mancha	1868	2020	1
Catalonia	1868	2020	1
Extremadura	1868	2020	0
Galicia	1868	2020	1
La Rioja	1868	2020	0
Madrid	1868	2020	1
Murcia	1868	2020	0
Navarre	1868	2020	0
Valencia	1868	2020	1
León	1868	1910	1
León	1911	2020	0
Cornwall	1801	2020	0
England	1801	2020	1
London	1801	2020	1
Ireland	1801	1921	1
Northern Ireland (Nationalists)	1921	2020	0
Northern Ireland (Unionists)	1801	1859	1
Northern Ireland (Unionists)	1860	2020	0
Scotland	1801	2020	1
Wales	1801	1902	0
Wales	1903	2020	1

Source: coded by the author based on the population data comprised in the regional GDP database (Appendix 10)

Specification: When dichotomising sub-state communities' size, I had to decide where to put the distinctive threshold. When looking at the data distribution summarised in Appendix 25bis, one can see that the absolute sizes are not really suitable because they increase importantly throughout time. Relative sizes, in turn, are much more stable. Setting the threshold at 5% of population share seemed suitable for three reasons. First, it corresponds to a significant part of the population that can be considered important for state elites. Secondly, when comparing relative and absolute sizes, the case with the smallest absolute size of those with a relative population share of 5% or more had 435 060 inhabitants (Brussels in 1897). This comes very close to the population of the smallest EU member state, Malta (441 543 people in 2020), and signifies that a sub-state community qualified as 'large' in my research is large enough to correspond to an independent state. Thirdly, very few cases travel from below the 5% threshold above and vice-versa.

Appendix 25bis. Distribution of sub-state communities' relative and absolute size



Appendix 26. R functions facilitating change-based case disaggregation and the analysis of necessity with CBIs

CBI.df()

Disaggregate a data frame that comprises chronologically ordered data based on change-based intervals (CBIs).

a) Usage

```
CBI.df <- function(data, cases, year, outcome, conditions, end){
   cond_and_outc <- c(outcome, conditions)
   new.df <- data[!duplicated(data.table::rleidv(data[, cond_and_outc])),]
   new.df <- new.df[c(cases, year, outcome, conditions)]
   new.df[new.df == "NA"] <- NA
   new.df$From <- new.df[[year]]
   new.df$To <- c(tail(new.df$From, -1), NA)
   new.df$To <- new.df$To - 1
   new.df$LagedCases <- c(tail(new.df[[cases]], -1), "End")
   new.df$To[new.df[[cases]] != new.df$LagedCases] <- end
   new.df <- na.omit(new.df)
   new.df[[outcome]] <- as.numeric(new.df[[outcome]])
   Column.list <- c(cases, "From", "To", outcome, conditions)
   new.df <- new.df[Column.list]
   new.df <- as.data.frame(new.df)
   return(new.df)
}
```

b) Arguments

data	A data frame with chronologically ordered data that is suitable for a QCA analysis
cases	Column comprising the case labels
year	Column comprising the yearly intervals (other units are possible if they are numerical and coherent)
outcome	Column comprising the outcome condition
conditions	Column comprising the conditions under analysis
end	Numerical value indicating the last interval of the observation

c) Example of the call in the illustrative analysis

```
RP_ARS.df <- CBI.df(Data_Total, cases="SSCommunity", year="Year",
                    outcome="RP_ARS",
                    conditions=c("S_DIS", "E_DIS", "P_GRI", "PRO_A", "PRE_A", "ASY_D ",
                                 "ASY_A ", "DEMO", "SIZE "),
                    end=2020)
```

CBI.AoN()

Disaggregate a data frame that comprises chronologically ordered data based on change-based intervals (CBIs) and conduct a subsequent analysis of necessity for the conditions based on which the data frame was disaggregated. The subserSubset() function stems from Dusa's (2018, 2019) QCA package.

a) Usage

```
library(QCA)

CBI.AoN <- function(data, outcome, conditions, incl.cut=0.85, cov.cut=0, ron.cut=0.45){
   cond_and_outc <- c(outcome, conditions)
   CBI.data <- data[!duplicated(data.table::rleidv(data[, cond_and_outc])), ]
   CBI.data <- CBI.data[c(outcome, conditions)]
   CBI.data[CBI.data == "NA"] <- NA
   CBI.data <- na.omit(CBI.data)
   CBI.data <- as.data.frame(CBI.data)
   superSubset(CBI.data,
               outcome = outcome,
               conditions = conditions,
               incl.cut = incl.cut, cov.cut = cov.cut, ron.cut = ron.cut,
               relation = "necessity")
}
```

b) Arguments

data	A data frame with chronologically ordered data that is suitable for a QCA analysis
outcome	Column comprising the outcome condition
conditions	Column comprising the conditions under analysis
incl.cut	Minimal consistency of necessity score retained (stems from the QCA package), default = 0,85
cov.cut	Minimal coverage of necessity score retained (stems from the QCA package), default = 0,00
ron.cut	Minimal relevance of necessity score retained (stems from the QCA package), default = 0,45

c) Example of the call in the illustrative analysis


```
CBI.AoN(Data_Total,
        outcome="RP_ARS",
        conditions=c("S_DIS", "E_DIS", "P_GRI", "PRO_A", "PRE_A", "ASY_D",
                     "ASY_A", "DEMO", "SIZE"))

                                inclN   RoN   covN
-------------------------------------------------
1  DEMO[1]                     0.949  0.525  0.209
2  S_DIS[2]+PRO_A[1]           0.923  0.456  0.183
3  S_DIS[2]+ASY_A[1]           0.872  0.460  0.174
4  P_GRI[3]+PRO_A[1]+PRE_A[1]  0.872  0.584  0.215
5  P_GRI[3]+PRO_A[1]+ASY_A[1]  0.923  0.483  0.190
-------------------------------------------------

CBI.AoN(Data_Total,
        outcome="RP_ARS", conditions=c("DEMO"))

         inclN   RoN   covN
----------------------------
1  DEMO  0.949  0.530  0.440
----------------------------
```

Appendix 27. Conception of the longitudinal QCA with flexible outcome driven lag using Microsoft Excel



Legend
(A) Data imported from the database of the analysis
(B) Flexible outcome driven lag, calculated automatically based on the (C) manually specified conditions under analysis
(D) Case chart displaying for each path (1-10) which cases are consistent (green), contradictory (red), uncovered (grey) and irrelevant (white)
(E) Parameter chart displaying the solution consistency and coverage, as well as the paths' consistency, raw coverage, unique coverage, lag mean and lag standard deviation

Appendix 28. Minimisation notes for the QCA of when regionalist party demands arise

Cases for path 1	S_DIS	E_DIS	P_GRI	PRO_A	PRE_A	ASY_D	ASY_A	DEMO	SIZE
Cat_1907, Cat_1976	2	1	3	0	0	1	0	1	1
Cat_1931	2	1	3	0	0	0	0	1	1
Bsq_1976	2	0	3	0	0	1	0	1	1
Sco_1934	2	0	3	0	0	1	1	1	1
Gal_1931, Gal_1977	2	-1	3	0	0	1	0	1	1
Fla_1919, Fla_1954	2	-1	3	0	0	0	0	1	1
Bsq_1918, Bsq_1931, Nav_1918, Nav_1931	2	0	3	0	0	1	0	1	0
Nav_1976, CIs_1976	2	0	3	0	0	0	0	1	0
NIN_1921	2	-1	3	0	1	1	0	1	0
GsC_1929	2	-1	3	0	0	1	0	1	0
CIs_1932	2	0	3	1	0	1	0	1	0
Directional expectation	2←1←0	1*-1←0	3←2←1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0
Intermediate solution	2		3					1	
-									
Cases for path 2	S_DIS	E_DIS	P_GRI	PRO_A	PRE_A	ASY_D	ASY_A	DEMO	SIZE
Ire_1832, Ire_1870	2	-1	3	0	0	0	0	0	1
Gal_1931, Gal_1977	2	-1	3	0	0	1	0	1	1
Fla_1919, Fla_1954	2	-1	3	0	0	0	0	1	1
Directional expectation	2←1←0	1*-1←0	3←2←1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0
Intermediate solution	2	-1	3						1
-									
Cases for path 3	S_DIS	E_DIS	P_GRI	PRO_A	PRE_A	ASY_D	ASY_A	DEMO	SIZE
Wls_1925	2	-1	2	0	0	1	1	1	1
Val_1982	2	0	2	1	1	1	1	1	1
Ast_1987	2	0	2	1	1	1	1	1	0
Val_1932	2	0	2	1	0	1	0	1	1
BIs_1932	2	0	2	1	0	1	0	1	0
GsC_1971	2	-1	2	1	0	1	1	1	0
Cor_1967	2	-1	2	0	0	1	1	1	0
BIs_1977	2	0	2	0	0	1	0	1	0
Directional expectation	2←1←0	1*-1←0	3←2←1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0
Intermediate solution	2		2			1		1	
-									
Cases for path 4	S_DIS	E_DIS	P_GRI	PRO_A	PRE_A	ASY_D	ASY_A	DEMO	SIZE
BFr_1971	1	1	2	1	0	1	1	1	1
Wln_1964	1	0	2	0	0	1	0	1	1
Directional expectation	2←1←0	1*-1←0	3←2←1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0
Intermediate solution	1		2			1		1	1
-									
Cases for path 5	S_DIS	E_DIS	P_GRI	PRO_A	PRE_A	ASY_D	ASY_A	DEMO	SIZE
Ara_1978, Can_1978	1	0	2	1	0	1	0	1	0
Leo_1986	1	0	2	1	0	1	1	1	0
Directional expectation	2←1←0	1*-1←0	3←2←1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0
Intermediate solution	1		2	1		1		1	
-									
Non-covered cases	S_DIS	E_DIS	P_GRI	PRO_A	PRE_A	ASY_D	ASY_A	DEMO	SIZE
NIU_1922	1	-1	0	0	1	1	1	1	0
NIU_1998	1	-1	3	1	1	1	0	1	0
Eng_2010	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1
Ext_1980	0	-1	2	1	0	1	1	1	0
Rio_1982	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
And_1976	0	-1	2	0	0	1	0	1	1

Appendix 29. Minimisation notes for the QCA of when regionalist party demands increase

Cases for path 1	S_DIS	E_DIS	P_GRI	D_FRU	ASY_D	ASY_A	NREQ	I_DISS	R_COM	GVM_P	DEMO	SIZE
Cat_2015	2	1	3	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Wls_2003	2	-1	3	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1
Fla_1936	2	-1	3	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Directional expectation	2←1←0	1*-1←0	3←2←1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0	0←1	1←0	1←0
Additional simplifying assumption	2	1+-1	3	1	0					0	1	1
Intermediate solution	2	1+-1	3	1						0	1	1

Simpl. ass.: The asymmetrical demand coding in Fla_1936 stemmed from the GsC_1929-1940 but there were no spillovers from the latter to the former.

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Cases for path 2	S_DIS	E_DIS	P_GRI	D_FRU	ASY_D	ASY_A	NREQ	I_DISS	R_COM	GVM_P	DEMO	SIZE
Ire_1917	2	-1	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Directional expectation	2←1←0	1*-1←0	3←2←1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0	0←1	1←0	1←0
Intermediate solution	2	-1	3	1						0		1

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Cases for path 3	S_DIS	E_DIS	P_GRI	D_FRU	ASY_D	ASY_A	NREQ	I_DISS	R_COM	GVM_P	DEMO	SIZE
GsC, 1977, GsC_1984, GsC_1990, GsC_1994, GsC_2002	2	0	2	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0
BFr_1990, BFr_1994, BFr_2002, BFr_2014	1	1	2	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1
Leo_1988	1	0	2	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0
Leo_1997	1	0	2	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0
BIs_1995	2	0	2	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	0
Eng_2016	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1
Directional expectation	2←1←0	1*-1←0	3←2←1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0	0←1	1←0	1←0
Intermediate solution			1+2		1	1				0	1	

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Cases for path 4	S_DIS	E_DIS	P_GRI	D_FRU	ASY_D	ASY_A	NREQ	I_DISS	R_COM	GVM_P	DEMO	SIZE
Ast_1997	2	-1	2	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	0
Val_1997	2	0	2	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1
GsC_2014	2	0	2	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	0
Ara_1997, Can_1997	1	0	2	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	0
Wln_1971	1	-1	2	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	1
And_1997	0	-1	2	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1
Ext_1997	0	-1	2	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	0
Rio_1997	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	0
Directional expectation	2←1←0	1*-1←0	3←2←1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0	0←1	1←0	1←0
Intermediate solution			2+1		1	1	1			0	1	

Non-covered cases	S_DIS	E_DIS	P_GRI	D_FRU	ASY_D	ASY_A	NREQ	I_DISS	R_COM	GVM_P	DEMO	SIZE
NIN_1982	2	-1	3	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
NIU_2007	1	-1	3	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
NIU_2017	1	-1	3	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
Gal_1997	2	-1	3	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	1
Fla_1977	2	0	3	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	1
Fla_1985	2	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1
Fla_2002	2	1	3	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1
Gal_2016	2	-1	3	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	1

Appendix 30. Minimisation notes for the QCA of when regionalist party demands disappear

Cases for path 1	S_DIS	E_DIS	P_GRI	D_REAL	STR_R	GVM_P	DEMO	SIZE
Cat_1923, Cat_1937	2	1	3	0	0	0	0	1
Bsq_1923, Bsq_1937, CIs_1937, Nav_1923, Nav_1937	2	0	3	0	0	0	0	0
Val_1937	2	0	2	0	0	0	0	1
BIs_1937	2	0	2	0	0	0	0	0
Ire_1852, Gal_1937	2	-1	3	0	0	0	0	1
Directional expectation	0←1←2	0 ←1*-1	0←1←2←3	0←1	1←0	1←0	0←1	0←1
Addit. simpl. assumption					1	1	0	
Intermediate solution							0	

Simpl. ass.: During the two Spanish dictatorships, strategic reposition and government participation had nothing to do with the disappearing of regionalist party demands.

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Cases for path 2	S_DIS	E_DIS	P_GRI	D_REAL	STR_R	GVM_P	DEMO	SIZE
Rio_2015	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0
And_2016	0	-1	2	1	0	0	1	1
Ext_2015	0	-1	2	1	0	0	1	0
Directional expectation	0←1←2	0 ←1*-1	0←1←2←3	0←1	1←0	1←0	0←1	0←1
Addit. simpl. assumption	0			1	0	1		
Intermediate solution	0			1	0			

Simpl. ass.: I expect the absence of government participation to be the consequence rather than the cause of the electoral decline.

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Non-covered cases	S_DIS	E_DIS	P_GRI	D_REAL	STR_R	GVM_P	DEMO	SIZE
Fla_1946	2	-1	3	0	0	0	1	1
GsC_1945	2	-1	2	0	0	0	1	0
Wln_1981	1	-1	2	0	0	0	1	1
Eng_2019	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1
NIU_1980	1	-1	3	1	0	0	1	0

Appendix 31. Minimisation notes for the QCA of when traditional party demands arise

Cases for path 1	S_DIS	E_DIS	P_GRI	PRO_A	PRE_A	ASY_D	ASY_A	R_THR	DEMO	SIZE
Cat_1907, Cat_1931, Cat_1976	2	1	3	0	0	1	1	1	1	1
Bsq_1976	2	0	3	0	0	1	0	1	1	1
Bsq_1931	2	0	3	0	0	1	0	1	1	0
Nav_1976	2	0	3	0	0	1	0	1	1	0
Fla_1964	2	0	3	0	0	1	0	1	1	1
Gal_1932	2	-1	3	1	0	1	0	1	1	1
Direct. expectation	2←1←0	1*-1←0	3←2←1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0
Add. simp. assumption	2		3			0		1	1	
Intermediate solution	2		3					1	1	

Simpl. ass.: The presence of a regionalist threat and of asymmetrical demands can be considered redundant here.

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Cases for path 2	S_DIS	E_DIS	P_GRI	PRO_A	PRE_A	ASY_D	ASY_A	R_THR	DEMO	SIZE
Gal_1977	2	-1	3	0	0	1	0	0	1	1
CIs_1932	2	0	3	1	0	1	0	0	1	0
CIs_1977	2	0	3	0	0	1	0	0	1	0
Nav_1931	2	0	3	0	0	1	0	0	1	0
Direct. expectation	2←1←0	1*-1←0	3←2←1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0
Intermediate solution	2		3			1			1	

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Cases for path 3	S_DIS	E_DIS	P_GRI	PRO_A	PRE_A	ASY_D	ASY_A	R_THR	DEMO	SIZE
Wls_1925	2	-1	2	0	0	1	1	0	1	1
And_1977	0	-1	2	0	0	1	0	0	1	1
Direct. expectation	2←1←0	1*-1←0	3←2←1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0
Intermediate solution		-1	2			1			1	1

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Cases for path 4	S_DIS	E_DIS	P_GRI	PRO_A	PRE_A	ASY_D	ASY_A	R_THR	DEMO	SIZE
GsC_1968	2	-1	2	1	0	1	0	0	1	0
Ast_1978, BIs_1932, BIs_1978	2	0	2	1	0	1	0	0	1	0
Val_1932	2	0	2	1	0	1	0	0	1	1
Val_1978	2	0	2	1	0	1	0	0	1	1
Cor_1998	2	-1	2	1	0	1	1	0	1	0
BFl_1971	1	1	3	1	0	1	1	0	1	1
BFr_1971	1	1	2	1	0	1	1	0	1	1
Ara_1978, Can_1978	1	0	2	1	0	1	0	0	1	0
Mur_1978	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	0
Mad_1978	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	1
Rio_1978	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	0
Ext_1978	0	-1	2	1	0	1	0	0	1	0
CyL_1978, ClM_1978	0	-1	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	1
Direct. expectation	2←1←0	1*-1←0	3←2←1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0
Intermediate solution		≠ 0		1		1			1	

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Non-covered cases	S_DIS	E_DIS	P_GRI	PRO_A	PRE_A	ASY_D	ASY_A	R_THR	DEMO	SIZE
Cat_1871	2	1	3	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
Val_1871	2	0	2	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
Gal_1871	2	-1	3	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
Ast_1871, BIs_1871	2	-1	2	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Ara_1871	1	0	2	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
Mur_1871	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Leo_1871	1	-1	2	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
Can_1871	1	-1	2	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
And_1871	0	1	2	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
ClM_1871	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
Rio_1871	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Mad_1871	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
Ext_1871	0	-1	2	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
CyL_1871	0	-1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
Ire_1885	2	-1	3	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Sco_1885	2	0	3	0	0	1	0	0	0	1

Bsq_1868	2	0	3	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Nav_1868	2	0	3	0	0	1	1	0	0	0
Bsq_1901	2	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
Nav_1901	2	-1	3	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
Wln_1968	1	0	2	1	0	1	0	1	1	1
NIN_1950	2	-1	3	0	1	1	1	1	1	0
NIU_1945, NIU_1962	1	-1	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	0

Appendix 32. Minimisation notes for the QCA of when traditional party demands increase

Cases for path 1	S_DIS	E_DIS	P_GRI	ASY_D	ASY_A	NREQ	I_DIS	R_THR	DEMO	SIZE
Cat_1997, Cat_2010, Sco_2007, Sco_2014	2	1	3	1	1	0	0	1	1	1
Fla_1992	2	1	3	1	0	0	0	1	1	1
Fla_1999, Fla_2007	2	1	3	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
Fla_1977	2	0	3	1	0	0	1	1	1	1
Bsq_1996	2	0	3	1	0	0	0	1	1	1
Fla_1985	2	0	3	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
Wls_1999	2	-1	3	1	1	0	1	1	1	1
Wls_2013, Wls_2015	2	-1	3	1	1	0	0	1	1	1
Directional expectation	2←1←0	1*-1←0	3←2←1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0
Intermediate solution	2		3					1	1	1

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Cases for path 2	S_DIS	E_DIS	P_GRI	ASY_D	ASY_A	NREQ	I_DIS	R_THR	DEMO	SIZE
GsC_1977	2	-1	2	1	1	0	1	1	1	0
Wln_1971	1	-1	2	1	0	1	1	1	1	1
Directional expectation	2←1←0	1*-1←0	3←2←1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0
Add. simpl. assumption	1^2	0	2	1	0		1	1	1	
Intermediate solution	1^2		2	1			1	1	1	

Simpl. ass.: In GsC_1977, economic disparities were never mentioned as relevant factor for the increase of autonomy demands and those related to institutional dissatisfaction did not solely involve prerogatives already detained by other sub-state communities (having an own executive).

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Cases for path 3	S_DIS	E_DIS	P_GRI	ASY_D	ASY_A	NREQ	I_DIS	R_THR	DEMO	SIZE
GsC_2011, Ast_1988, BIs_1988	2	0	2	1	1	0	0	0	1	0
GsC_1984, GsC_1990, GsC_1994, GsC_2002	2	0	2	1	1	0	0	1	1	0
Nav_1987, Nav_2007	2	0	3	1	1	0	0	1	1	0
BFr_1990, BFr_1994, BFr_2002, BFr_2014	1	1	2	1	1	0	0	1	1	1
BFl_1990, BFl_1994, BFl_2002, BFl_2014	1	1	3	1	1	0	0	0	1	1
Ara_1988, Can_1988	1	0	2	1	1	0	0	0	1	0
Mad_1988	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	1
CyL_1988	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1
Rio_1988	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	0
Ext_1988	0	-1	2	1	1	0	0	0	1	0
ClM_1988	0	-1	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1
Mur_1988	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	0
Directional expectation	2←1←0	1*-1←0	3←2←1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0
Intermediate solution		≠ 0		1	1				1	

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Cases for path 4	S_DIS	E_DIS	P_GRI	ASY_D	ASY_A	NREQ	I_DIS	R_THR	DEMO	SIZE
Wln_2014	1	-1	2	1	0	1	0	0	1	1
Wln_1971	1	-1	2	1	0	1	1	1	1	1
CIs_1997	2	0	3	1	1	1	0	1	1	0
BIs_1997	2	0	2	1	1	1	0	1	1	0
Val_1997	2	0	2	1	1	1	0	0	1	1
GsC_2014	2	0	2	1	1	1	0	0	1	0
Ast_1997	2	-1	2	1	1	1	0	0	1	0
Ara_1997, Can_1997	1	0	2	1	1	1	0	0	1	0
Mur_1997	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0
Gal_1997	2	-1	3	1	1	1	0	1	1	1
ClM_1997	0	-1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1
And_1997	0	-1	2	1	1	1	0	0	1	1
Ext_1997	0	-1	2	1	1	1	0	0	1	0
CyL_1997	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1
Rio_1997	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0
Mad_1997	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1

Directional expectation	2←1←0	1*-1←0	3←2←1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0
Add. simpl. assumption		0		1	0	1			1	
Intermediate solution				1		1			1	

Simpl. ass.: The rationale of the increases followed non-requested increases that were independent of sub-state communities' distinctiveness and independent of the statutes obtained by other sub-state community(ies) that led to the generalized conferral.

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Non-covered cases	S_DIS	E_DIS	P_GRI	ASY_D	ASY_A	NREQ	I_DIS	R_THR	DEMO	SIZE
Bsq_1936	2	0	3	1	0	0	0	1	1	0
Nav_1871	2	0	3	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
Bsq_1871	2	0	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Wln_1981, Wln_1990, Wln_1994, Wln_2002	1	-1	2	1	0	0	0	0	1	1

Appendix 33. Minimisation notes for the QCA of when traditional party demands disappear

Cases for path 1	S_DIS	E_DIS	P_GRI	ASY_D	ASY_A	R_THR	DEMO	SIZE
Cat_1923, Cat_1937	2	1	3	1	1	0	0	1
Bsq_1923, Bsq_1937, CIs_1937, Nav_1923, Nav_1937	2	0	3	1	1	0	0	0
Val_1937	2	0	2	1	1	0	0	1
BIs_1937	2	0	2	1	1	0	0	0
Gal_1937	2	-1	3	1	1	0	0	1
Dir. exp.	0←1←2	0 ←1*-1	0←1←2←3	0←1	0←1	0←1	0←1	0←1
Add. simpl. ass.						1	0	
Int. sol.							0	

Simpl. ass.: The disappearing of traditional party demands during the two Spanish dictatorships would also have occurred in the presence of regionalist threats.

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Covered but to be explained separately	S_DIS	E_DIS	P_GRI	ASY_D	ASY_A	R_THR	DEMO	SIZE
Cat_1876	2	1	3	1	1	0	0	1
Bsq_1876	2	0	3	1	1	0	0	0
Gal_1876	2	-1	3	1	1	0	0	1
Ast_1876, BIs_1876	2	-1	2	0	0	0	0	0
Ara_1876	1	0	2	1	1	0	0	1
Mur_1876	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	0
Leo_1876	1	-1	2	1	1	0	0	1
Can_1876	1	-1	2	0	0	0	0	0
And_1876	0	0	2	1	1	0	0	1
ClM_1876	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	1
Rio_1876	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Mad_1876	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1
Ext_1876	0	-1	2	1	1	0	0	0
CyL_1876	0	-1	1	1	1	0	0	1
Val_1876	2	0	2	1	1	0	0	1
Nav_1876	2	0	3	1	1	0	0	0

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Non-covered cases	S_DIS	E_DIS	P_GRI	ASY_D	ASY_A	R_THR	DEMO	SIZE
NIU_1998	1	-1	3	1	1	1	1	0
NIU_1949	1	-1	0	1	1	1	1	0

Appendix 34. Minimisation notes for the QCA of when autonomy statutes arise

Cases for path 1	S_DIS	E_DIS	P_GRI	ASY_A	SYM_C	R_THR_N	R_THR_R	TP_SUP	EXP_S	REL_R	DEMO	SIZE
Cat_1932	2	1	3	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Cat_1936	2	1	3	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Sco_1998	2	1	3	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1
Fla_1971	2	0	3	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1
Ire_1921	2	-1	3	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1
Cat_1979, Cat_2018	2	1	3	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1
Bsq_1936	2	0	3	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0
Bsq_1979	2	0	3	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1
Wls_2011	2	-1	3	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1
Directional expectation	2←1←0	1*-1←0	3←2←1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0
Additional simplifying assumption	2		3		0	1	1	1			1	
Intermediate solution	2		3			1	1	1			1	

Simpl. ass.: The symmetrical conferrals in some cases where the consequence and not the cause of the autonomy statutes obtained by these sub-state communities.

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Cases for path 2	S_DIS	E_DIS	P_GRI	ASY_A	SYM_C	R_THR_N	R_THR_R	TP_SUP	EXP_S	REL_R	DEMO	SIZE
And_1981	0	-1	2	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1
Nav_1982	2	0	3	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	0
CIs_1982	2	0	3	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	0
Val_1982	2	0	2	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	1
BIs_1982	2	0	2	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	0
Ast_1981	2	0	2	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0
Gal_1981	2	-1	3	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	1
Ara_1982	1	0	2	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	0
Can_1982	1	0	2	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0
Mur_1982	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	0
Mad_1982	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1
Rio_1982	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	0
CyL_1983	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1
Ext_1983	0	-1	2	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	0
ClM_1982	0	-1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	1
Directional expectation	2←1←0	1*-1←0	3←2←1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0
Additional simplifying assumption		≠ 0		1	1			1	0		1	
Intermediate solution		≠ 0		1	1			1			1	

Simpl. ass.: In the tiny case of Rio_1982, the conferral was independent of expected electoral success.

Non-covered cases	S_DIS	E_DIS	P_GRI	ASY_A	SYM_C	R_THR_N	R_THR_R	TP_SUP	EXP_S	REL_R	DEMO	SIZE
Bsq_1868	2	0	3	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Wln_1971	1	-1	2	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1
NIN_1921	2	-1	3	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0
NIU_1921	1	-1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
NIU_1998	1	-1	3	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0
NIN_1998, NIN_2007, NIN_2020	2	-1	3	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	0
NIU_2007	1	-1	3	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	0
NIU_2020	1	-1	3	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0
BFl_1990	1	1	3	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1
BFr_1990	1	1	2	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	1
GsC_1984	2	0	2	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	0

Appendix 35. Minimisation notes for the QCA of when autonomy statutes increase

Cases for path 1	S_DIS	E_DIS	P_GRI	ASY_A	SYM_C	R_THR_N	R_THR_R	TP_SUP	EXP_S	REL_R	DEMO	SIZE
Cat_1997	2	1	3	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1
Cat_2010, Sco_2012, Sco_2016	2	1	3	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1
Fla_1990, Fla_2014	2	1	3	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Fla_2002	2	1	3	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1
Fla_1981, Fla_1994	2	0	3	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1
Bsq_1996	2	0	3	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1
Wls_2014, Wls_2017	2	-1	3	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1
Directional expectation	2←1←0	1*-1←0	3←2←1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0
Additional simplifying assumption	2	0	3	0		1	1	1			1	1
Intermediate solution	2		3			1	1	1			1	1

Simp. ass.: In Sco_2012, Sco_2016 and Cat_2010, the increases were not related to spillovers from other sub-state communities and can be expected to have occurred without the sub-state communities' economic strength.

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Cases for path 2	S_DIS	E_DIS	P_GRI	ASY_A	SYM_C	R_THR_N	R_THR_R	TP_SUP	EXP_S	REL_R	DEMO	SIZE
CIs_1997	2	0	3	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0
BIs_1997	2	0	2	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	0
BIs_1992	2	0	2	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	0
Val_1997	2	0	2	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	1
Ast_1992	2	0	2	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	0
Gal_1997	2	-1	3	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	1
Ast_1997	2	-1	2	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	0
Ara_1992, Ara_1997, Can_1997	1	0	2	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	0
Can_1992	1	0	2	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0
Mur_1992, Mur_1997	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	0
Mad_1997	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	1
Mad_1992	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1
CyL_1997	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	1
Rio_1997	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	0
CyL_1992	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1
Rio_1992	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0
Ext_1992	0	-1	2	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	0
And_1997	0	-1	2	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1
Ext_1997	0	-1	2	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0
ClM_1992	0	-1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	1
ClM_1997	0	-1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1
BFl_2014	1	1	3	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	1
BFl_1994	1	1	3	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1
BFl_2002	1	1	3	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1

BFr_1994	1	1	2	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	1
BFr_2002, BFr_2014	1	1	2	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	1
GsC_1990, GsC_1994	2	0	2	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	0
GsC_2002	2	0	2	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	0
GsC_2014	2	0	2	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0
Directional expectation	2←1←0	1*-1←0	3←2←1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0	1←0
Additional simplifying assumption			0	1	1			1			1	
Intermediate solution				1	1			1			1	

Simpl. ass.: In Rio_1997, the enlargement was not grievance related.

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Non-covered cases	S_DIS	E_DIS	P_GRI	ASY_A	SYM_C	R_THR_N	R_THR_R	TP_SUP	EXP_S	REL_R	DEMO	SIZE
NIN_2011	2	-1	3	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	0
NIU_2011	1	-1	3	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0
Wln_1981	1	-1	2	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1
Nav_1987, Nav_2007	2	0	3	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0
Wln_1990, Wln_1994, Wln_2002, Wln_2014	1	-1	2	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	1
BFl_1995	1	1	3	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1
BFr_1995	1	1	2	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	1
GsC_2000, 2005	2	0	2	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	0
GsC_2019	2	0	2	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0

Appendix 36. Minimisation notes for the QCA of when regionalist autonomy statutes disappear

Cases for path 1	S_DIS	E_DIS	P_GRI	ASY_A	S_THR	R_THR_N	R_THR_R	TP_SUP	EXP_S	REL_R	DEMO	SIZE
Cat_1934, Cat_2017	2	1	3	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1
Directional expectation	0←1←2	0←1*-1	0←1←2←3	0←1	1←0	0←1	0←1	0←1	0←1	0←1	0←1	0←1
Additional simplifying assumption					1				1	1		
Intermediate solution					1							
Simpl. ass.: The secessionist threats were so substantive that the government would have withdrawn the statute even in the presence of expected electoral success and reliance on regionalist support.												
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Cases for path 2	S_DIS	E_DIS	P_GRI	ASY_A	S_THR	R_THR_N	R_THR_R	TP_SUP	EXP_S	REL_R	DEMO	SIZE
Cat_1937	2	1	3	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
Bsq_1937	2	0	3	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Directional expectation	0←1←2	0←1*-1	0←1←2←3	0←1	1←0	0←1	0←1	0←1	0←1	0←1	0←1	0←1
Additional simplifying assumption						1	1		1	1	0	
Intermediate solution											0	
Simpl. ass.: The abolition of the autonomy statutes during the two Spanish dictatorships would also have occurred in the presence of regionalist electoral threats, expected electoral successes and there was no truly necessary reliance on regionalist support.												
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Non-covered cases	S_DIS	E_DIS	P_GRI	ASY_A	S_THR	R_THR_N	R_THR_R	TP_SUP	EXP_S	REL_R	DEMO	SIZE
Bsq_1876	2	0	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
NIN_1972	2	-1	3	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	0
NIN_2003	2	-1	3	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	0
NIN_2017	2	-1	3	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	0
NIU_2017	1	-1	3	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	0
NIU_2003	1	-1	3	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0
NIU_1972	1	-1	3	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	0

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When sub-state communities demand and obtain autonomy

A comparative analysis of sub-state mobilisation and restructuring in Belgium, Spain and the United Kingdom

When do sub-state communities demand autonomy and when do states accept to confer it? This question is at the centre of the present dissertation, which examines under which conditions sub-state mobilisation and sub-state restructuring have occurred and influenced each other in three typical cases of centrifugal sociological decentralisation: Belgium, Spain and the United Kingdom. Through a reassessment of sociological, economic, institutionalist, functionalist and rational-choice factors that the literature had found relevant, the research systemically compared in which combination of these factors autonomy demands and statutes of sub-state communities arose and evolved. In order to do so, a refined measurement of sub-state autonomy called *Sub-state Autonomy Scale* (SAS) was created and a new variant of Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) that is suitable for longitudinal comparisons was developed.

The results of the analyses indicate that the rise and increase of autonomy demands and statutes were driven by a combination of sociological (and economic) and rational-choice factors for strongly distinctive and aggrieved sub-state communities. For sub-state communities with weaker distinctiveness and grievances to which the demands and statutes of the former have spilled over, combinations of sociological, functionalist, institutionalist and rational-choice factors were found relevant. These dynamics can be interpreted as two 'waves' of centrifugal sociological decentralisation, the first of which came with autonomy demands and statutes in sub-state communities with strong sociological distinctiveness that incited a second wave among sub-state communities with weaker (albeit present) forms of distinctiveness, as well as their own extension.

For the mutual influence of sub-state autonomy demands and statutes, the findings indicate that what has been called the 'paradox of federalism' cannot be fully resolved because both the conferral and non-conferral of sub-state autonomy lead to an increase of autonomy demands. Yet, the non-conferral can be expected to lead to a greater exacerbation of autonomy demands in large and strongly distinctive and aggrieved sub-state communities, while the non-conferral of autonomy in smaller or less distinctive and aggrieved sub-state communities appeared leading to the persistence of the autonomy demands that conferrals could have accommodated.

When thinking about the longer-term perspectives, four plausible scenarios of how the first two waves of centrifugal sociological decentralisation could evolve are sketched-out: partial de-federalisation, quasi-confederalisation, independence and differentiated de- and re-federalisation.

Taken together, the thesis shows when and how factors from different theoretical stands interact when leading to the rise and evolution of autonomy demands and statutes. This allowed to develop a cross-theoretical frame for the interpretation and analysis of sub-state mobilisation and restructuring through what was called 'the three waves of centrifugal sociological decentralisation'.

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