DRIVE
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EGMONT

BEST PRACTICES IDENTIFIED IN PRISON - BASED DRR

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Contents

Introduction

Several overarching goals to detention have been identified in the literature over the decades, such as rehabilitation and the protection of society, along with a series of challenges that have to be addressed and overcome in order for these goals to be met. Over the past few years, the detention and management of VEPs has presented a particular challenge in light of the unprecedented magnitude of that population in many prisons worldwide, but also considering the lack of research on good practices to inform evidence-based policy specific to this category of prisoners. Reaffirming the fundamental requirement of respect of the inherent dignity of the human person and the absolute prohibition of torture or inhuman and degrading treatment in detention laid down in the *United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners* (known as the Nelson Mandela Rules), some international experts' groups have identified a series of good practices on the management of VEPs specifically, such as the UNODC *Handbook on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners and the Prevention of Radicalization to Violence in Prisons* or the Council of Europe *Guidelines for prison and probation services regarding radicalisation and violent extremism*.

The UNODC handbook states first of all the importance of a *"clear legal basis and procedural framework for the detention and management of violent extremist prisoners which complies with obligations under international law, and which clearly delineates the institutions and agencies involved, as well as their respective roles, responsibilities and powers in this area"* (UNODC, 2016, p.10.). Similarly, the RAN *Practitioners' Working Paper on the Approaches to violent extremist offenders and countering radicalisation in prisons and probation* argues furthermore that the well-being of prisoners (promoted notably through humane treatment and a healthy prison environment) is fundamental to ensuring not only prison security, but also the safety of society (UNODC, 2016; RAN, 2016). Staff-prisoner relationships, the possibility of personal development and family contact, efficient policy as well as the clear communication and fair enforcement thereof, are found to be crucial when it comes to lessening risks of radicalisation in prison. On the contrary, frustrations related to poor living conditions and organisation, deprivation of contacts and activities or unfair treatment foster grievances and may influence the inmates' attitudes and behaviour in prison and outside (RAN, 2016). However, a distinct lack of data derived from evidence-based research on the management of terrorist offenders makes it difficult to set good practices in stone and thus, they must be further tested and evaluated.

It should also be noted that although some universal recommendations can be formulated on the basis of existing research, the diversity of political and legal contexts, prison systems and above all, prison capacities, renders any generalisation impossible, and thus requires a tailored approach in each country. Generalisation equally fails when it comes to the characteristics of the VEP population in prison. Specific needs related to gender and age must be taken into consideration, and a diversity of ideological profiles (and thus, for example, propensity or not to recruit other inmates) and individual ways and means of coping with imprisonment – which may differ despite similarities in profile – must not be neglected.

1. Security (in and out of prison)

While prisons have been argued to be fertile grounds for radicalisation ("universities" for terrorists or "hotbeds" for radicalisation), they equally represent a critical opportunity to mitigate the risk posed by VEPs, provided that an adequate approach is adopted and implemented (Council of Europe, 2016).

One of the major concerns in the management of VEPs is undoubtedly security, whether it is understood as safety inside prison facilities and the different forms of security to ensure it (physical, procedural and dynamic, UNODC, 2015), or the safety of society outside. When designing security strategies for the management of VEPs, policy-makers have to address a set of challenges these prisoners pose to other inmates, the prison system and society.

Risk of radicalisation and recruitment in prison has been identified as one of the main challenges and threats to security in the context of the management of VEPs, especially as some groups have strategically considered prisons as a place for training and recruitment (Hannah, Clutterbuck, and Rubin, 2008). Generally speaking, radicalization in prison depends on individual factors of vulnerability and resilience as well as so-called 'push and pull factors' interacting with a broader conducive environment through a complex process shaped by the prison system but also the broader socio-political context outside prison, which can lead an individual towards violent extremism under certain circumstances (Sinai, 2014; Veldhuis, 2016). Next to the radicalization of non-extremist inmates, there is also the risk that some violent extremists who had partly or fully disengaged or deradicalized before entering prison re-radicalize in detention, as a result of a new set of frustrations and vulnerabilities, or under the pressure from other VEPs who seek to recruit or intimidate 'former' extremists. Lastly, individuals who are already associated with a violent extremist group or ideology may further strengthen their views and commitment during incarceration and formally pledge allegiance to a group during their incarceration, or decide to prepare for a violent act upon their release. For the purpose of effective policy design on the management of VEPs, more empirical data is still needed in order to better understand the scope, functioning and consequences of radicalization in prison.

Another crucial challenge is that VEPs can become involved in violent extremists acts in prison – whether the target of the attack is another inmate, prison staff or the prison facility in general – or, in a more indirect way, support violent actions to take place outside prison. Such acts are, however, poorly documented and not always considered as terrorist acts (which could be prosecuted as such) due to legal constrains.[1] The issue of recidivism is of course closely related to this challenge, even though existing research suggests that a majority of released extremist offenders will not return to their old habits[2]. Beyond prison radicalisation and involvement in violent extremist acts, other challenges such as links between terrorism and transnational organized crime ("crime-terror nexus", Basra and Neumann, 2016) facilitated within the prison setting, the strengthening of group cohesion among VEPs, or unrest related directly to different kinds of collective resistance from VEPs (such as refusal to participate in activities or to comply with certain rules) should be addressed.

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[1] https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1071318/terrorism-in-prisons.pdf

[2] According to most studies, terrorist recidivism rates are between 1-10 percent, thus well below the average rates of criminal recidivism, around 50 percent. See notably: Andrew Silke and John Morrison (2020), *Re-offending by Released Terrorist Prisoners: Separating Hype from Reality*, ICCT Policy Brief, The Hague: ICCT; Renard (2020).

While security regimes and relevant categorisation provide a set of responses to these challenges, the effective management of the associated risks can also be addressed through prison intelligence and extensive monitoring.

a. Prison regimes

Security or prison regimes refer to different types of detention regimes used in the management of VEPs. Three main regimes can be distinguished: dispersal, segregation, isolation, or a combination of two or all of these. Each of the regimes and configurations presents a number of advantages and disadvantages, and can be expected to evolve, among others, with prison infrastructure and capacities, size of VEP populations, as well as knowledge on the behaviour of and threat represented by said populations. The possibility to set up and operate separate prison units for the management of VEPs to begin with, largely depends on political and legal context, resources and prison capacities. It must also be noted that there is, as of now, no consensus on which prison regime is most appropriate, and more evidence-based research has to be conducted in order to effectively assess the impact of different regimes on the challenges posed by VEPs.

Dispersal designates the spreading of VEPs among non VEPs within regular prison regimes. The potential advantage of such a regime is that it may encourage VEPs to open up when in contact with other inmates that do not necessarily share their same worldviews. It also limits the ability of the violent extremist group to maintain its structure and cohesion in prison and challenges the narrative of violent extremist groups that VEPs are discriminated against or treated with exceptional measures. In contrast, disadvantages include the risk that VEPs can use this regime to radicalize, recruit or network with other inmates or staff. Furthermore, it potentially means that the management of VEPs is left to non-specialized staff. This regime is for instance used in North Macedonia, where VEPs are scattered in regular prison units.

In a segregating regime, VEPs are concentrated in one or several specialised units and thus separated from all other inmates. Potential advantages include VEPs having limited opportunities to influence other prisoners; it being easier to monitor VEPs and develop specific intervention programmes for them; and staff are potentially specialized for the management of these kinds of inmates. On the other hand, this kind of regime also presents disadvantages such as the risk that VEPs will strengthen ties among themselves and possibly use their time together to maintain their cohesion or prepare illicit activities. Additionally, in the absence of contact with non VEP inmates their ability to be confronted with other points of view are limited; feelings of marginalization or stigmatization may also develop among inmates increasing their frustration and radicalization; and segregation may give VEPs a higher status in the eyes of staff and inmates. Finally, segregation limits their ability to participate in rehabilitation or reintegration programmes. Separate prison wings or units have for instance been established in the Netherlands, Kosovo, Bosnia and Belgium, although most of these countries adopt a mixed policy when it comes to terrorist offender placement.

Finally, VEPs can be completely isolated from all other inmates – VEPs and non VEPs – in solitary confinement. This regime is mostly used in conjunction with dispersal, and is highly controversial given that prolonged solitary confinement is prohibited under human rights law and the Nelson Mandela Rules. Belgium, for instance, has adopted a combination of all three regimes, the majority of VEPs being scattered in regular prison units, with many of them

subjected to individual security measures (temporary isolation) for some time before returning to regular detention.

The Nelson Mandela Rules lay down that prisoners should be subjected to the least restrictive measures necessary for the protection of the public, other prisoners and prison staff ('The United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners', 2015) The need for safety and security, moreover, has to be balanced with the need to comply with Human Rights, and should not compromise the respect of human dignity (for instance, appropriate accommodation and decent living conditions for prisoners), the respect of rights of defence or that of the right to family life. What is more, the UNODC Handbook advocates for the reducing of pretrial detention and imprisonment periods through a review of criminal justice policies, but also through parole, early release and alternatives to imprisonment (UNODC, 2016).

Referring to the RAN WP, it has previously been noted that the well-being of prisoners and the possibility of personal development are key factors in lessening the risks of prison radicalisation. It should thus be highlighted that within the fabric of VEP management strategy in prison, security regime and DRR intervention are closely intertwined, and the former will determine, and in many cases limit, the implementation and/or the effectiveness of the latter. Indeed, strict prison regimes and individual security measures prevent many prisoners convicted of terrorist crimes from partaking in capacity building or recreational activities that promote personal growth and development. This is for example the case in the Netherlands, where the initial 6-week observation period during which the detainee is assessed within the admissions unit of one of the specialised terrorist wings and categorised to be placed, highly limits the person's access to leisure activities and social contacts. Further access to activities once placement is decided upon is determined by the tailored intervention plan and may be limited if the detainee's participation in group activities is deemed "too risky"[3]. The overall scarcity of skill- and knowledge-building activities available in specialised units, such as identified in the Dutch country report, or in the prison system as a whole, such as highlighted in Macedonia, as well as absence of interest on the inmates' part where activities are available, further exacerbate the lack of opportunity to significantly mitigate the risks related to radicalisation, recruitment, engagement in violent extremism after release and recidivism.

While the involvement of family and close contacts has equally been identified as a major factor of disengagement and rehabilitation, individual security measures (isolation) often prevent extensive contacts with family, whether it is through visits or correspondence. Even though conscious efforts are made towards maintaining family relationships, it has to be noted, as raised for instance in the Dutch country report, that systematic body searches after visits discourage detainees – especially women – from accepting visits from family and thus further contribute to their isolation. Balancing the right to family life and risk management is therefore a challenge that must be effectively addressed.

b. Categorisation

When it comes to extremist offenders, prison security regime and prison-based DRR practices go hand in hand with categorisation, as the latter informs and determines the former in most

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[3] DRIVE Dutch country report, p. 13.

countries. The inmates' status and the (different types and levels of) risk they pose will have a decisive impact on the overall risk management strategy adopted in prison.

While designed as a case of evidence-based policy, some important flaws should be flagged. When carrying out categorisation, several important aspects should be taken into consideration.

Despite a multitude of all-encompassing theories and policies on the matter, the category of VEPs is anything but homogeneous, and its inherent heterogeneity should be acknowledged and factored in when planning policy on risk management and intervention. Several types of distinction can be taken into consideration.

A dominant type of categorisation is based on specific risk assessment methods, which help identify risks posed by the inmate to themselves and others, but also in terms of recruiting other inmates or being vulnerable to attempts at recruitment from their part. In this regard, the Council of Europe Handbook identifies three main categories, namely *"(1) those who are ideologues and leaders and who may be radicalising agents; (2) those who are followers and are vulnerable to increasing radicalisation; (3) those who are criminal opportunists and interested in self-gain and affiliate with violent extremists in order to personally benefit in some way"* (Council of Europe, 2016, Principle 31.).

For the purposes of placement and intervention strategy, VEPs can also be categorised based on their criminal status, for instance offenders indicted or convicted for terrorist crimes, and offenders convicted for common offenses at risk of committing violent acts or influencing others to do so. The former category is however not homogeneous itself, as it depends largely not only on what the given legal system has established as a terrorist offense (primary criminalisation), but also on criminal policy strategies and priorities guiding detection, arrest and prosecution of different terrorist offenses (secondary criminalisation). As an example, in countries such as Belgium, a number of Muslim mothers have recently become the target of criminal prosecution and conviction for what has been legally qualified as the financial support to terrorist activity and may spend short periods of time in prison (therefore enrolling in the first category), but can hardly be assimilated to offenders having planned or perpetrated terrorist attacks, nor to foreign terrorist fighters having returned from conflict zones. The latter category can further be divided into those "pre-radicalised" (suspected of having adhered to radical ideologies without committing violent acts) and those radicalised or radicalising in prison. In this regard, the Council of Europe underlines the importance of proper assessment in order to identify which offenders belong to which sub-category (Council of Europe, 2016) and adapt management strategies accordingly.

As it transpires from several country reports such as that of the Netherlands, Belgium, but also Bosnia, these forms of categorisation offer a basis to the decision to place certain inmates in separate units designed specifically for the management of VEPs or to subject them to individual security measures or regimes (essentially, isolation) in order to mitigate risks inherent to the respective categories. The Netherlands, for instance, have adopted a strategy of systematic segregation based on conviction status, placing all persons above the age of 16 indicted for or suspected of a terrorist offense in separate high security prison units, where they remain at least for a 6-week evaluation period during which extensive risk assessment is conducted on the principle of "differentiation" between 'leaders', 'followers' or 'criminal opportunists', with a view to deciding upon definitive placement. Moreover, as per the country report of Bosnia, association of inmates within cells can equally be based on this

distinction. In Belgium, the units designed specifically for the management of VEPs house exclusively those inmates that are deemed highly influential leaders and thus are most liable to resort to proselytism and recruitment, as revealed by risk assessment.

Although VEPs are currently very largely linked to jihadism, it should for example be noted that this is not exclusively the case. In some countries or prisons, political extremist groups such as extreme-right or far-left movements may for instance be the "dominant" VEP groups, fundamentally changing the dynamics in terms, for example, of risks of radicalisation or recruitment, and thus triggering different risk management strategies.

It should finally be noted that the labelling of VEPs brought forth by the identification, categorisation and placement of VEPs in specialised units can potentially have self-reinforcing and counter-productive effects. According to the labelling theory, individuals that have received a distinct label are more likely to strengthen that identity as a result. That labelled identity will also become more salient to others, as the person is perceived through the label. In the context of VEPs, this means that their labelling might actually reinforce their self-perception as a violent extremist, and therefore reduce their chances of rehabilitation. For prison staff, this may create a bias in the perception and interpretation of attitudes and behaviours of VEPs, with likely counter-productive consequences on the management of inmates. In a similar manner, Chantraine and Scheer consider that some aspects of the management of VEPs are "performative", in the sense that they tend to reinforce the phenomenon (i.e. radicalization) that they seek to address (Chantraine and Scheer, 2021; Thompson, 2020).

c. Prison intelligence and monitoring

Beyond security regimes, the categorisation of inmates also informs intelligence and monitoring strategies to the management of terrorist or radicalised offenders, and offers valuable insight into potentially effective disengagement, rehabilitation and reintegration measures to be taken during the prison sentence and ahead of release.

As it is stated in the UNODC Handbook on Dynamic security, *"the risk management of prisoners who are assessed to be a serious escape risk will need to emphasize security routines and measures, while that of prisoners who are assessed to represent a risk to good order may not need to emphasize security so much as efforts to change attitudes and behaviour"* (UNODC, 2016, p.). Extensive knowledge on the different types of VEPs and their respective risk factors (such as the inmates' propensity to recruit or attempt to radicalise other inmates, as well as their own vulnerability and receptiveness to indoctrination) is crucial in ensuring effective risk management and intervention beyond mitigating the risk of escape or unrest in prison. Efforts towards effective security strategies therefore need to include and properly balance not only physical, but also procedural and dynamic security, heavily relying on prison intelligence. The role of staff and the importance of training in detection and information sharing are highlighted (Council of Europe, 2016) and will be developed in this section.

Most papers place special emphasis on the importance of staff in the management of VEPs. Different aspects should be taken into consideration. Firstly, as under-staffing is considered potentially conducive to further radicalization and other challenges linked to VEPs (Neumann, 2010.), the importance of 'enough' staff must be highlighted. Secondly, good management (for instance, sufficient staff), must be combined with adequate professional ethics from the

staff's end, which is in turn highly dependent on working conditions, security and support perceived by the latter. Lastly, staff dealing with VEPs should have access to adequate training tailored to their specific tasks and responsibilities. Over the past few years, several countries have developed specific training programmes for prison staff dealing with VEPs, although the positive impact of these programmes, and perceived added value by the staff, are still to be evaluated.

The RAN WP specifically underlines the importance of staff-prisoner relationships in contributing to security inside and outside of prison and to the prevention of radicalisation by ensuring a smooth information flow while building trust and encouraging personal development and self-respect. This is a key aspect of what the Council of Europe and UNODC call "dynamic security", defined as *"a concept and a working method by which staff prioritise the creation and maintenance of everyday communication and interaction with prisoners based on professional ethics. It aims at better understanding prisoners and assessing the risks they may pose as well as ensuring safety, security and good order, contributing to rehabilitation and preparation for release"*[4] (Council of Europe, 2016, p. 31.). Dynamic security is thus often associated with prison intelligence, as it relies on prison staff establishing positive relationships with and actively collecting relevant information from inmates, information which will in turn inform strategic decisions on different aspects of security as well as intervention and rehabilitative measures (UNODC, 2016).

In this regard, the RAN WP emphasizes the difficulty of assessing risks related to radicalisation through the observation of prisoners' behaviour, since *"[t]he line between 'prison behaviour' (resistance, power struggles, or joining a group for protection) and 'extremist behaviour' (committing violent acts), is often blurred"* (RAN, 2016, p. 9.). What is interpreted as signs of radicalisation may indeed largely overlap with adaptive logics of vulnerable inmates trying to cope with the "pains of imprisonment" (Jones, 2014; Hamm, 2009). Similarly, the paper warns about confusing religious orthodoxy and the (re)discovery of faith in detention with signs of radicalisation and thus producing "false positives" (RAN, 2016, p. 9.). On the contrary, research shows that adopting a belief system or strengthening religious commitment can have significant benefits with regards to dealing with the overall experience of prison, and may even serve the deradicalization agenda (Silke and Veldhuis, 2017). It should also be noted that the increasing tendency to involve prison staff in detection and monitoring (intelligence) can significantly undermine any possibility of trust from the prisoners' side and lead to the latter withholding information from the former, as well as to conscious efforts to diminish signs of indignation or religiousness. Prison systems dealing with VEPs are therefore advised to operate with structured professional assessments and to regularly re-evaluate risks in a dynamic way, relying on contextualised intelligence obtained through evaluation from any and all relevant services gravitating around the individual (Council of Europe, 2016). Religious officers and counsellors can furthermore provide a link between staff and prisoners, offer training and context, and help with interpreting signs.

Many countries have established structured prison intelligence systems with a central information-gathering unit that is in close contact with general intelligence services (RAN, 2016) and collaboratively shares information "with probation services, where they exist, other law enforcement and security agencies, public and private bodies and civil society", deemed

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[4] The definition concludes by indicating that the concept of dynamic security *"should be understood within a broader notion of security which also comprises structural organisational and static security (walls, barriers, locks, lighting and equipment used to restrain prisoners when necessary)."*

crucial to achieving successful disengagement and reintegration of prisoners (UNODC, 2016, p. 20.). This is for instance the case in Belgium, where central prison intelligence unit "CelEx" has been operating since 2015, relying among others on structured observations made by prison staff and the penitentiary psycho-social service, as well as in Kosovo, where an intelligence unit has been established within the penitentiary administration.

The circulation of information is moreover an important component of multi-agency cooperation beyond the prison system, provided that this is done in accordance with national law and human rights standards, in order to build the most comprehensive and accurate picture and to usefully inform decision-making (Council of Europe, 2016). Continuous monitoring and consultation mechanisms such as the Dutch Multi-disciplinary consultation (MDO-TA) and Multidisciplinary Alignment Consultation Resocialization (MAR), or the Belgian "casus overleg" (active in Flanders), offer important platforms of information exchange and joint decision making to stakeholders across the entire range of actors gravitating around VEPs. While this is an important factor when striving to obtain contextualized information on the detainee, differences in mandate, obligations related to professional secrecy and sometimes lack of trust often prevent efficient and productive information exchange between actors and institutions. A clear distribution of and communication on the mandates and competences of each stakeholder, as well as opportunities for informal exchange that help build trust between actors, might lessen this obstacle.

2. Intervention

While we have thus far focused primarily on the objective of security and the protection of society, detention of VEPs should equally serve the purpose of rehabilitation and reintegration of the offender into society. The term *"intervention"* may be used referring to *"any actions or activities which directly or indirectly contribute to the rehabilitation of violent extremists or which prevent offenders from committing extremist offences"* (Council of Europe, 2016, p. 19.), and can be of three types: prevention, rehabilitation and reintegration.

While prevention policies target inmates that have not yet been convicted or suspected of violent extremism or radicalization, rehabilitation focuses on those that are already considered to be radicalized (pre- or prison radicalized) or have been convicted in the context of violent extremism. Two types of rehabilitation programmes can be distinguished (Morrison, Silke, Maiberg, Slay and Stewart, 2021). Firstly, deradicalization programmes aim to achieve that the inmate take distance from violent ideology, seeking a fundamental cognitive shift, and have therefore been heavily criticised in the past. As the RAN Working Paper states, the use of the term deradicalization may for instance have a harmful labelling and stigmatising effect (RAN, 2016) which policy-makers should be mindful of when designing intervention. Disengagement programmes, which seem to be dominant and better invested in the countries examined, on the contrary seek a change in behaviour without necessarily challenging underlying ideologies. What these programmes aim to achieve is that the inmate take distance with violent extremist groups, and cease to view violence as legitimated by ideology. It however has to be taken into consideration that some cases, such as that of financial support provided by parents to their children in conflict zones – in many countries regarded and prosecuted as a terrorist offense – encourage a more critical consideration of the term disengagement itself, since it is difficult to view these convicts as "engaged" in violent

extremism in the first place. Thus, intervention built around the idea of disengagement should equally take into consideration the heterogeneous nature of the VEP category.

While deradicalization and disengagement are often considered as two different approaches, there is increasing evidence that many rehabilitation programmes actually include elements of both, with the aim of pragmatically testing what works best with each individual (Basra and Neumann, 2020, pp. 41-42). As of now, there has been insufficient evidence-based research to determine which type of programme is more effective, although the effectiveness of disengagement may be easier to measure objectively on the basis of behaviour (desistance, refusal to engage in radical action).

Reintegration policies and plans, on the other hand, are not specific to VEPs but are nonetheless crucial to encouraging that inmates distance themselves from extremist ideologies and behaviours and resocialize after prison. Capacity-building activities and vocational training that ensure inmates are relatively well prepared for release, as well as a solid circle of professionals, family and community involved in the reintegration process, are considered to significantly mitigate risk of isolation, further frustration and recidivism after release. Spiritual counselling has been made part of DRR intervention in many countries, presenting a number of significant advantages and challenges equally.

Some countries, such as Belgium, have established specialised multi-disciplinary intervention services for the guidance of VEPs in and outside of prison. These services offer tailored disengagement programmes and help with the reintegration process, mainly by working closely with the inmate and their family, and providing context to probation courts when early release is requested.

As previously discussed in a different context, access to these activities may however be greatly limited for different reasons, one of which being strict security regimes or individual measures that may hinder participation and hold back the involvement of family and close contacts who may support the inmate's reintegration process. It should be added that social workers available for this kind of intervention are a precious but rare commodity in many countries, further restricting DRR opportunities for VEPs. Finally, participation in such interventions in prison is often voluntary and may simply be refused by inmates for a range of reasons, such as a fundamental refusal to cooperate with prison authorities, a fear to be stigmatized, or even as a result of peer-pressure from other VEPs. Indeed, in the same way as refusal can be interpreted as a sign of radicalization, acceptance to take part in VEP-specific intervention equals accepting the VEP label itself, along with its consequences.

Key recommendations

1. Create a clear legal basis and procedural framework for the detention of violent extremist prisoners clearly defining objectives, roles and responsibilities, and strive for the most effective communication on and fair enforcement of set rules.
2. Make conscious choices regarding prison regimes based on extensive knowledge of needs and priorities obtained through evidence-based research, and a realistic evaluation of capacities and context.
3. Apply conscious categorisation of inmates for effective risk management, keeping in mind the heterogeneous nature of the VEP category and the risks of labelling.
4. Apply categorisation in order to define intelligence and monitoring strategies, as well as identify potentially effective disengagement, rehabilitation and reintegration measures for the respective categories.
5. In the prison-environment, apply the least restrictive measures necessary and ensure access, as far as possible, to skill-building and recreational activities in order to efficiently prepare for reintegration.
6. Actively involve family and close contacts in the preparation of reintegration, for instance by reconsidering highly restrictive or intrusive security measures such as prohibition of phone calls and post-visit body searches.
7. Place special emphasis on staff and staff-prisoner relationships, notably through training and the fair treatment of prisoners.
8. Practice dynamic security with multi-actor intelligence in order to obtain relevant and contextualised information on the detainee, while creating opportunities for informal exchange that help build trust between actors.
9. Strive for an effective circulation of information through structured prison intelligence and multi-agency cooperation, while clearly distributing mandates and competences, and communicating on rights and obligations (for instance related to professional secrecy) of each stakeholder.
10. Define an adequate intervention strategy (based on the objectives of disengagement and/or deradicalization) and place particular emphasis on reintegration policy, relying not only on vocational training and support from family, but also psychological, social and spiritual counselling carried out by in-prison social services as well as extremism- and radicalisation specific infrastructures.

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