

THE IMPACT OF CANDIDATE SELECTION ON MASS ELITE IDEOLOGICAL CONGRUENCE:

THE CASE OF BELGIUM

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ABSTRACT

Candidate selection is a major function exercised by political parties. Yet they differ a lot regarding who selects their candidates, varying on both dimensions of inclusiveness and centralisation. One can wonder whether these variations in the modes of candidate selection do really matter. The paper classifies ten Belgian political parties, for two federal elections – a regular (2007) and an early election (2010) – on a five-points inclusiveness scale summarizing selection modes. Based on this scale, the paper empirically tests the impact of candidate selection modes on the degree of mass – elite ideological congruence, using positions of candidates and voters on the left-right scale and on the authoritarian-libertarian scale. Our results confirm that selection matters. More exclusive selectorates tend to select candidates being ideologically closer to their voters.

INTRODUCTION

The moment when parties have to choose who is going to stand on their electoral lists is crucial. One of the *raisons d'être* of most political parties is to get as many of its candidates to hold office in political institutions through the democratic mechanism of elections. Processes of candidate selection are thus considered as a key moment in the life of a political party and in the wider representational process within the party government type of delegation and accountability (Bergman et al. 2003). Previous empirical research indicates that Belgian parties do not follow the same path when selecting their candidates (De Winter 1988). This research confirms this finding. Still, one can wonder whether these variations in the modes of candidate selection do really matter.

This paper offers an exploration beyond “the secret garden of politics” (Gallagher & Marsh, 1988). We present a comprehensive analysis of candidate selection processes in ten Belgian political parties on the occasion of two federal elections (2007 and 2010, for the Lower House), ranking them on a inclusiveness scale of selection modes. Conducting a parallel study of these two elections is of interest given that one was a regular election while the other was anticipated due to a governmental crisis. Consequently, some parties have adapted their selection mode, what offers interesting variations.

Based on a typology of selection modes, this paper aims at discovering eventual connections between candidate selection modes and the degree of mass – elite ideological congruence. We wonder if candidate selection modes matter regarding substantive political representation, i.e. in terms of ideological, programmatic and issue representation. Contradictory hypotheses have been found in the literature. The paper empirically tests the impact of one on the other, thanks to an analysis of the ideological proximity between candidates to both elections and their voters.

The paper is organised as follows. First we sketch the general features of the Belgian electoral system. After this, we offer some theoretical perspectives both on candidate selection and on mass-elite ideological congruence. The third part explores candidate selection processes in ten parties. A detailed description of the building of the typology is given for 2007, whereas adaptations due to the 2010 anticipated elections are briefly described. Next, we present the way we have conceptualized mass-elite issue congruence, describing the method to measure our dependent variable. Finally, we analyse the impact of candidate selection modes on candidates-voters ideological congruence. We then discuss the results in the last section.

CONTEXTUALISATION

This first section presents some Belgian electoral system features relevant for candidate selection. Since 2003, the number of electoral constituencies for the elections of the House of Representatives has been set to eleven, comprising the ten provinces plus the large constituency Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde. The 150 seats are allocated to the constituencies proportional to their number of inhabitants. District magnitude varies from four to twenty-two. In contrast, in the period between 1945 and 1993, the number of constituencies was thirty, with district magnitude varying from two to thirty-three, electing a total of 212 deputies. In many parties, the old constituencies (congruent with the administrative level of the *arrondissement*, which we define in our paper as “subconstituency level”), continue to play an important role in the candidate selection process.

The method of allocating seats to candidates¹ underwent a moderate change in 2000, moving from a quasi-closed to a more open flexible-list PR system with multiple votes. However, in practice, the new system only modestly weakened the ‘iron grip’ of the parties on the selection of the actual deputies.²

While selectorates commonly think in terms of safe, marginal or hopeless places on the lists, the injection of some intra-party competition into the system made places high on the list a bit less safe. Still, for the main parties, the position of head of the constituency list is empirically an ultra-safe position, absolutely independent of one’s preference vote score. But also the election of other candidates ranked high on the list (until the third or fourth place) is usually safe. Hence, intra-party competition focuses on the last seat(s) allotted to a party. The candidates that are really competing with each other are those with marginal or “unsafe” list positions.

Regarding legal requirements in terms of candidate characteristics, since 1994 several national laws were passed that aimed at gradually implementing gender parity, making

¹ Generally, the Belgian electoral system allows for two alternative ways of casting votes (for the House as well as the Senate): a list vote, endorsing the order of candidates on the list that is presented, and/or a preference vote. Every candidate whose number of preference votes reaches the eligibility figure (calculated by dividing the party’s total constituency vote by the number of seats it won, plus one) receives a seat. Usually, only candidates at the top of party lists are elected in this manner. If the head of the list receives fewer preference votes than the eligibility figure, list votes are added to his preference votes until the required figure is reached. This procedure is repeated from the top of the list downwards, until all the party’s seats have been allocated. However, if the list votes are depleted before all the seats have been assigned, then the remaining seats are given to those remaining candidates who have the largest number of preference votes. The 2000 reform decided that only half of the number of list votes cast for a party in a given constituency would be available to upgrade the preference votes of those high up on that party list.

² In spite of the fact that the incidence of preference voting increased from 16 per cent in 1919 to about six out of ten since 1995 (for the House), in practice this system operated as a closed list system, as voters hardly ever managed to alter the ordered list. At the 2003 general election, when preference voting peaked at 67 per cent, 17 deputies were elected ‘out of order’, i.e. bypassing candidates placed higher on the lists (15 in 2007). Of these, eleven would not have been elected under the old system.

alternating gender ranking obligatory by 2007. Moreover, the 2002 law foresaw that from legislative elections of 2007 – i.e. the ones studied in this paper – the first two places of each list have to be occupied by persons of different sex. The effects of these laws were dramatic at all levels of election (Mateo Diaz 2002; Meier 2012) and thus also had an impact on candidate selection.³ The gender quota forced the parties to search for electorally appealing female candidates, which often posed a problem given the fact that traditionally compared to men women tended to be less enthusiastic about being nominated for public office. In fact, male candidates tend to be self-recruiters, while women tend to be actively recruited by the parties to become candidates.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

PERSPECTIVES ON CANDIDATE SELECTION

If we accept the basis assumption that one main objective of political parties is to influence policies of a given polity by occupying elected public offices, candidate selection is a crucial operation of such an organisation. Candidates are indeed the only ones than can become an elected office holder. No one has become a deputy in the Chamber without ever having been a candidate. In this respect, we expect political parties to attach great importance to the selection of their candidates. These people will become a large part of the external image of the party; they will represent the party and talk in its name. Students of party politics should also pay attention to this process. Obviously, candidate selection has consequences on the composition of Parliaments. For the “safe” places – when there is no doubt about the success of the party to win this seat – selectors within the party hold all the cards to decide who will seat. But candidate selection modes also affect the delegation process within modern representative democracy (Rahat 2007) and reflect who holds key power resources within a party (Schattschneider 1942). All in all candidate selection is one the main functions a political party has to realise.

Gallagher and Marsh (1988) have produced an influential work on candidate selection. According to them, candidate selection is “the secret garden of politics”. They mean that candidate selection is a process particularly difficult to understand from the outside. Political parties are reluctant to let outsiders look into their organisation. Our research – that aims at understanding how candidate selection processes occur in Belgian political parties – has frequently ran into this problem of opacity. Political parties do not seem to fully respect what their own statutes prescribe. Digging deeper than an analysis of formal rules is complicated, nor does it guarantees full comprehension. Twenty-five years later candidate selection seems still to remain a secret garden, also in Belgium (Obler 1974; De Winter 1980; De Winter 1988).

³ While before 1995, the proportion of women in the Belgian House of Representatives was always below 10 per cent, in 1999, 24 per cent of deputies were women, 35 per cent in 2003, 37 per cent in 2007, and 39,3 per cent at the 2010 elections.

More recently Rahat and Hazan have investigated in depth and width the selection of candidates. A part of their seminal research is devoted to the development of a typology that categorises selectorates along different dimensions (Rahat & Hazan, 2001). The selectorate is the actor in charge of candidate selection. Selectors can be characterised following several analytical dimensions. The main ones are the degrees of inclusiveness and of centralisation. The degree of inclusiveness measures the number of individual people constituting the selectorate. The most inclusive selectorate is composed by all citizens/voters willing to participate in the nomination of candidates. In Belgium, voters do not participate in candidate selection (and never have). The most inclusive selectorate in Belgium are thus the party membership. This process of selection gives due paying rank-and-file members the opportunity to voice their preferences, to influence, and sometimes even fully determine, the confection of the candidate lists. On the other extreme of the spectrum, the most exclusive selector is the party leader herself. While this is rare, sometimes we find exclusive selectorates comprising several party leaders. Between those two extremes, different formulas exist, such as a party agency specially constituted to select candidates (an “ad hoc committee” or a “list committee”). Another in-between type of selectorate is when delegates of members have the possibility to decide on the lists (usually with a non-binding mandate). Next to inclusiveness, selectorates are often categorized along the centralisation dimension (Lovenduski & Norris 1993). A centralised selectorate operates at the national level, for the whole party. Conversely, a decentralised or localised selectorate intervenes at constituency level, or even at more local level (in Belgium, the *fédérations*) – playing a role for only their constituency’s list or for some places on the list.

Nevertheless candidate selection processes are often more complex than a process involving one (collective) actor. Often the selection does not occur at only one single moment by one single selectorate. Assorted, multistage and weighted candidate selection methods can be discerned (Hazan & Rahat 2010). In the assorted method, different selectorates select candidates. The party ends up with a list where not all candidates come from the same selection process. Most often the difference is made between candidates for eligible places and other candidates, more exclusive selectors being more involved in the selection of the first ones. The multistage method involves different selectorates who select the same candidates, successively. Finally, the weighted method weights the different selectorates’ choices among the same pool of aspirants.

Next to selectorates, candidates are of course the other important actor of the process. Parties themselves or legal rules can limit which citizens have the right to apply for candidacy. The pool of possible candidates can be more or less large, ranging from all citizens/voters to members fulfilling certain conditions (Rahat & Hazan, 2001). Being a member of the party since a certain period of time is for instance a classic condition required by parties, alongside the age of the candidate.

In short, candidate selection process is categorised as the most inclusive if all citizens can apply as aspirants and that a pool of voters selects candidates between the aspirants. The most exclusive process is conversely characterised by a selection by the party leader from within or even outside the party organisation, applying several formal and informal restrictive criteria.

PERSPECTIVES ON MASS-ELITE ISSUE CONGRUENCE

This research aims at going further than a comprehensive analysis of candidate selection. We start an exploration beyond the secret garden of politics by linking candidate selection modes and candidates' issue congruence with voters. The central question of this paper consists of testing if candidate selection modes have an impact on the ideological proximity that may exist between on the one hand, candidates and on the other hand, voters.

There is a long tradition of research on "mass-elite" congruence. Andeweg defined congruence as "the way elected politicians act in accordance with the preferences of their electorate" (2011:39). As he pointed out, the concept does not have a homogeneous conceptualization and operationalization. On the whole, three models of congruence have been explored: mass-candidates, mass-parties, and mass-government. Among the different problems identified by Andeweg, the definition of the representatives, the electors and the methodology are the most important. In the literature, ideological congruence is often measured as the distance between candidates or MPs and voters, parties and voters or government and electors. The research often considers the electorate or the representatives as a whole without considering the existing variance in those "populations". Finally, some of the studies are using the comparison of the median voter and the median representative to measure the congruence. If using this measure is appropriate for some cases, comparing the median voter and the median representative is not necessarily the best methodological tool to compare the mass-elite congruence. If a party is centralized, well organized and cohesive, comparing the congruence with the median position between both types of actors is acceptable. If a party is less centralized and leaves more space to the polarized positions of the elected representatives, using the central tendency may obscure the rich variance within the party and the electorate. This is particularly important if we think about the selection of candidates running for an election (see Pierce, 1999 for example).

If the area of research on mass elite congruence is quite developed, the literature is less extensive on the relation between candidate selection modes and mass-elite congruence. Some research deals with linkage between selection and candidates' ideological characteristics. For instance, Persily (2001) argues that inclusive selectorates produce candidates pursuing positions closer to the median voter. He takes American primaries as an example asserting that, when non-members are involved in the process, selected candidates tend to be more moderate. The party's ideology would be weakened by the participation of non-members in the selection of candidates. This research area falls outside the scope of this paper since we do not study candidates' positions towards the median voter but well towards voters of their own party.

Hazan and Rahat (2010) formulate on theoretical grounds a hypothesis about the relation between candidate selection and mass-elite issue congruence, noting that this must be checked empirically. They assert that the more inclusive the candidate selection process is, the more congruent candidates' ideological stands will be with their voters' opinions. The degree of inclusiveness would be positively related to the degree of congruence between candidates and voters.

Recently, Spies and Kaiser (2012) also investigated this link by analyzing the dynamics of congruence between parties and electorates in 53 parties during thirty years (1970-2000). They conclude their article by “inclusivity dimension (...) is relevant for the degree of representativeness of parties” (Spies and Kaiser, 2012, 16). Their results show that the less inclusive is the mode of selection of candidates, the more congruent are the parties. These results do not go in the same direction as Hazan and Rahat. Spies and Kaiser explain that less inclusive selectorates allow parties to better represent the median voters even if the parties have made reforms concerning transparency, taking candidate selections as an example (see also Andeweg, 2011).

To sum up, we hypothesize that there may be a link between candidate selection modes and mass – elites issue congruence. Both Hazan and Rahat (2010) and Spies and Kaiser (2012) agree on this point. However, because of the empirical research done by Spies and Kaiser, and because Belgium was already included in their paper, we hypothesize that candidates selected by an exclusive pool of selectors are ideologically closer to voters.

H: Less inclusive selectorates select more congruent candidates.

CANDIDATE SELECTION PROCESSES

This section describes the working method used to establish a typology of candidate selection modes, for the 2007 and 2010 Belgian federal elections. The 2007 elections serve as the normal mode, since these were regular elections. Next we describe the adaptations of the process of candidate selection for each party, in case of the 2010 anticipated elections. The section is articulated as follows. First, we give insight into who has selected candidates for the 2007 Belgian legislative elections. Based on a comprehensive exploration of candidate selection processes in ten⁴ Belgian parties, we build a five-categories scale ranging from the most inclusive towards the most exclusive process. Subsequently each party is analysed separately. Finally, changes resulting from the anticipated character of the 2010 elections are analysed.

CATEGORIZING SELECTION MODES (2007)

Candidate selection seems not to be an uncompounded process. On the basis of an in-depth analysis of party statutes, local and national newspapers and candidates' answers to a post-electoral questionnaire, we have managed to get an overall picture of the process of candidate selection in each party for the 2007 general elections. In all parties, the process involves many actors of different kinds. All parties apply a multistage selection process, what certainly complicates the analysis. We have however built a 5 categories-scale into which all Belgian political parties fit. This scale is used in the second part of the paper that aims at linking candidate selection mode and candidates-voters issue congruence. The next paragraphs evoke the methodological steps we followed in

⁴ In 2007, only nine parties were explored because of the cartel CD&V – N-VA which was splitted after these elections.

order to end up with the 5-categories scale. Subsequently we will further specify in the particularities of the selection process for each party.

Ten parties are taken into account in our research for 2007. First the four main ideological families are analysed, namely socialists, Christian-democrats, liberals and greens from each side of the Belgian “linguistic border”. In addition, next to these eight parties, two rightist parties are examined: the Flemish nationalist party Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie (NVA) and the Flemish-separatist far-right party (Vlaams Belang). The Flemish ultraliberal and populist Lijst Dedecker (LDD)⁵ and the Francophone far right party (FN) have been excluded, as well as the small left “post-independist” party (Spirit) given the lack of relevance of these parties in terms of electoral results, the lack of party statutes or the low number of respondents in the 2007 candidate survey.

Our exploration starts with a detailed analysis of party statutes in force in 2007. For each party, we have determined which actors are involved in the selection process. Name and/or function of actors have been depicted. In case of multiple actors, the composition of the assembly or the committee has been identified. Next, the decision-making level at which each actor operates was distinguished – being either national, constituency or sub-constituency level. We have ended up with a range of selectors categorized as more or less inclusive and more or less (de-)centralised. Since selectors may play a role at different times of the selection process, it is relevant to distinguish between the different steps of the full selection process. Three main phases have been found. The first phase concerns the actor holding the power to propose a list composition (the so-called *model list*). In the second phase we find the part of the selectorate that ratifies the final list of candidates to be presented at the elections – i.e. the selectorate that has the final word. Between these two phases is situated a third type of actor (but not present in all parties, and empirically scarcely used) that has the possibility to “evoke” the list. This power of evocation can vary from a clear-cut veto right to the power to make suggestions for modifications. However, in many parties processes are far more complex than this simplistic three-phase picture. Yet we have tried to categorize each party according to these categories. Finally, one has to take into account that some differences exist between constituencies, as in some parties the national party rules regarding candidate selection are complemented by constituency (or even subconstituency) party rules. Our final decision has taken these divergences into consideration. However, we built our typology on the definition of a single unique selection procedure for each party based on its empirical predominance, focusing on the two main phases, namely the proposition of the list and its adoption.

The phases and actors drawn from the statutes have been compared to answers from candidates to a post electoral questionnaire sent out in the aftermath of the 2007 Belgian

⁵ The LDD won 5 seats at the 2007 federal elections (3,3% of the total). In 2010 only one MP flew the LDD’s flag in the Parliament. Furthermore his party is not suited for inclusion in our analysis given its atypical selection mode (operated by the party leader himself alone) and incoherencies regarding issue congruence.

federal elections (n=284)⁶. The Comparative Candidate Survey⁷ (included two multiple-choice questions: one concerning their main selector – being members, delegates, leaders or another actor – while the other asked the decision-making level – from subconstituency, over constituency to the national level (and other). The analysis of respondents’ answers showed a surprising and worrying heterogeneity. Respondents from a same party and running in the same constituency gave different answers. In addition, some answers did not match at all with what could be expected according to the statutes. Some of these inconsistencies may be linked to the ambiguity of the question asked. Some may have focused on the selectorates that compose the model lists, some on those that approve the model lists. In order to understand these inconsistencies, both local and national press has been consulted in the period running up to the June elections (from January to June 2007). When available, information produced by candidates has also been collected (e.g. from personal blogs). On the basis of this crosscheck of information, it has been possible to allocate a definite answer of the predominant selection mode in each party (see table 1).

Table 1: Candidate selection modes (four-variable table)

	Proposition		Adoption	
	Selectorate	Level	Selectorate	Level
Ecolo	party leadership	at constituency level	Members	at constituency level
PS	party leadership	at subconstituency and constituency level	a party delegate conference	at constituency level
cdH	party leadership	at constituency and national level	Members	at constituency level
MR	party leadership	at constituency and national level	party leadership	at constituency level
Groen!	party leadership	at constituency and national level	Members	at constituency level
sp.a	party leadership	at constituency level	a party delegate conference	at constituency level
CD&V	party leadership	at constituency level	Members	at constituency level
VLD	party leadership	at constituency level	Members	at constituency level
N-VA	party leadership	at constituency and national level	extended party leadership	at national level
VB	party leadership	at constituency and national level	extended party leadership	at national level

⁶ We sent out 1158 questionnaires to candidates for the 2007 House elections (including all effective candidates and a number of substitute candidates (*suppléants/opvolgers*) equal to the number of Representatives elected at the previous elections on a party list with a minimum of three for the new parties). The overall return rate was 35.1% and quasi-proportional in terms of elected and non-successful candidates.

⁷ See

http://www.comparativecandidates.org/sites/default/files/CCS_CandidateQuestionnaire_20070220.pdf

This four-variable table contains some non-discriminating and/or superfluous information. In order to be able to analyse parties on the basis of the candidate selection process, the next step aims at reducing this data to retain only discriminating information. The first column – the actor proposing the model list – does not discriminate among parties. All parties give the power to pre-select candidates to a small number of persons holding responsibilities at constituency level. Nonetheless, the level of power involved in the proposition stage discriminates. For some parties the national level plays a role next to the constituency level. This role consists mainly in choosing the heads of lists or at least choosing candidates for the eligible, safe places. Taking into account that party leadership plays a role in all parties at the proposition level, we will only consider variation regarding the decision-making level. Concerning the final approval of the list, the type of selectorate perfectly coincides with the level of the decision. Approval by the members, a party delegates conference and the party leadership are always situated at the constituency level, whereas selection by the extended party leadership occurs only at the national level. The fourth column – the level of power of the adoption – is therefore superfluous. Given these considerations the four variables can be reduced to two variables without losing precious information (see table 2).

Table 2: Candidate selection modes (two-variable table)

	Proposition	Adoption
Ecolo	Party leadership at constituency level	members at constituency level
PS	Party leadership at subconstituency and constituency level	party delegate conference at constituency level
cdH	Party leadership at constituency and national level	members at constituency level
MR	Party leadership at constituency and national level	party leadership at constituency level
Groen!	Party leadership at constituency and national level	members at constituency level
sp.a	Party leadership at constituency level	party delegate conference at constituency level
CD&V	Party leadership at constituency level	members at constituency level
VLD	Party leadership at constituency level	members at constituency level
N-VA	Party leadership at constituency and national level	extended national party leadership
VB	Party leadership at constituency and national level	extended national party leadership


Again some patterns appear when analysing the two-variable table above. Categories for proposition perfectly co-occur with categories for adoption. Only when members ratify the final list of candidates, the mode of proposition of the list varies across parties. Two patterns emerge: parties where the national level intervene, and parties where the constituency level remains free from national interference. Splitting the category of members in two – and keeping the others alike – leads us to the final single variable table, summarizing the whole information into only five categories (Table 3).

Table 3: Candidate selection modes (final table)

	Selection mode
Ecolo	Members at constituency level
PS	Party delegate conference at constituency level
cdH	Members at constituency level + national party leadership
MR	Constituency and national party leadership
Groen!	Members at constituency level + national party leadership
sp.a	Party delegate conference at constituency level
CD&V	Members at constituency level
VLD	Members at constituency level
N-VA	Extended national party leadership
VB	Extended national party leadership

These five candidate selection modes used by Belgian political parties for the 2007 federal elections follow an ordinal logic. Our reduction of variables on the basis of practice in 2007 allows us to combine Hazan and Rahat (2010) candidate selection dimensions of inclusiveness as well as centralisation into a single ordinal scale. The most exclusive selection mode is when only leaders select. The Francophone liberal party (Mouvement Réformateur, MR) fits this category. Its selectorates is rather exclusive, probably because of its cartel nature. In 2007 this party was made of four parties running together under the name of the MR-federation. This situation required a specific coordination between leaders from each cartel component where at the top of the federation an agreement was reached between the leaders of each component regarding the distribution of eligible places between the four components in six constituencies. The second category fits to two Flemish nationalist parties (N-VA and VB). Their selectorate is larger than a party executive but is not made of local sections' delegates. The party council includes presidents of provincial section, (old) MPs, provincial deputies or co-opted members, in addition to members of the party executive. Both socialist parties (*Parti Socialiste*, PS and *socialistische partij.anders*, sp.a) do not call on direct members participation, but select candidates through a rather inclusive selectorate, namely a conference of members' delegates. The larger the local section in terms of members, the larger the number of delegates sent to the conference. Socialist parties constitute the third category. The fourth and fifth categories are dedicated to parties whose members have a say in the selection of candidates. *Groen!* and cdH are part of the fourth category. Their selection process is slightly less inclusive than in the last category given that national leaders have the right to "keep an eye" on and if necessary intervene with the selection process. Finally, the most inclusive selection mode is when constituency members ratify the list via a so-called "poll". Three parties (Open VLD, Ecolo and CD&V) belong to this category.

Figure 1: five-category scale of candidate selection inclusiveness (2007)



SELECTION BY LEADERS

Only rightist parties belong empirically to this category. MR, N-VA and VB call neither on members nor on delegates to select candidates. Selectorates are composed by leaders in a more or less exclusive way, depending on parties.

The MR is a special case, as it is a federation of several parties. This situation requires a centralized selection process and probably explains the absence of a poll. It is certainly risky to let members decide on the list composition since the size of the four components of the federation is different (with a predominance of the old Liberal party, PRL). Less than three months before Election Day, presidents of each component gathered to decide on the leading constituency candidates (heads of list). On the six lists to be made for the Chamber, one top position has been given to the leader of the FDF and another one to a member of the MCC. Each head of list has then been charged to compose her own list, under the supervision of presidents of the party components. Final lists have been presented two months before the elections.

The N-VA, the Flemish nationalist party was in 2007 still in cartel with the CD&V, the Flemish Christian-democratic party. Intense negotiations were held between parties' top leaders in order to decide on eligible places, the N-VA getting a more than fair amount – given its score at the previous elections – eligible or marginal places. Inside the N-VA, choices were made first at constituency level and then at national level. The constituency board composes a project of model list that is to be approved by the constituency council. Both organs are rather exclusive: they count only party leaders (mainly incumbents). The party council ratifies then the list by a simple majority. The party council is made up by the “enlarged” party leadership: national party leaders, constituency presidents and secretaries, all incumbents at regional and national level, the chief editor of the party newspaper, the general director, etc. If the party council does not agree on the list, the party executive takes the initiative to propose a new list to the council.

The *Vlaams Belang*, the Flemish far right party, also uses a rather centralised procedure. The party executive is responsible for the proposition of the list (to be decided by consensus). The constituency level (through the constituency executive) interferes in the process only by advising the national level. Both organs are highly exclusive: only party

leaders and incumbents are part of it. The national party council adopts the final list by consensus. If they do not manage to decide by consensus, they can decide by a simple majority of votes. This council is similar to the N-VA council. Party leaders at national and constituency level, incumbents and even co-opted members (by two thirds) sit in this party council. The composition of VB lists started already five months before the elections.

SELECTION BY DELEGATES

Only the two socialist parties use this method of selection (PS and sp.a). This particularity could be due to their mass party hierarchical model of democracy by delegation. Especially in the PS this model may lead to “local barons” holding a considerable power. As detailed in the next paragraphs, the PS uses a more decentralised process than the sp.a where the national level can interfere (even if its power remains limited).

The francophone socialist party PS offers a lot of room for manoeuvre to constituency and even subconstituency leaders. The national party statutes hardly mention anything about candidate selection procedures. We have to further investigate the statutes of each *fédération*⁸ to fully understand the process. In theory a poll could be organized if the constituency congress⁹ decides to do so. However, while the PS remained for a long time the champion of holding a poll (De Winter, 1988), we have found no trace of the poll in the PS. In fact, by now a federal committee (i.e. at subconstituency level) composes the model list. Delegates, next to national party leaders that reside in the federation, are part of this committee. Members elect 35 delegates that have to represent all communes of the (sub)constituency. In the three constituencies containing several subconstituency *fédérations*, presidents of the *fédérations* decide together on the final model list. The congress constitutes the last step when delegates from local sections approve the list. Delegates¹⁰ have the right to vote only if their local section has gathered their general member assembly of before the congress. The different delegate congresses took place three months before the elections.

Flemish socialists (sp.a) have a slightly more centralised process than their francophone counterparts. Decisions taken at constituency level are subjected to the recommendation of the national party executive. The constituency board decides first on a model list: in 2007 this was done around three months before the elections. If the national executive does not agree with a list (e.g. because the list does not respect the party statutes or the party interests¹¹), a commission of arbitration¹² is set up. In case of parity of votes, the constituency board decides. The national president enjoys an evocation right and can ask the national political executive to discuss the list. Finally, a constituency delegate

⁸ PS federations are subconstituency organisations corresponding to constituencies (federations) used before 1995. The number of federations varies from one to five federation(s) per current constituency.

⁹ A general conference of delegates, organized at constituency level

¹⁰ The size of the delegation for each local section depends on their number of members.

¹¹ These two conditions are stipulated in the statutes.

¹² Six delegates from the national political board and six delegates from the constituency board compose the commission of arbitration. Both boards decide on who goes to the commission.

conference is held (i.e. the congress). Each section can send one delegate per 200 members.

SELECTION BY MEMBERS

Among parties allowing their members to participate in the selection of candidates for legislative elections, two groups emerge. On the one hand, the national level does seem to have intervened in the process of *Groen!* and the cdH. On the other hand, we have found no traces of a national intervention in the process for the Ecolo, CD&V and Open VLD.

Groen!, the Flemish ecologists, started their candidate selection very early¹³. Already seven months before the elections the party leader announced at her New Year reception the names of the chief (i.e. eligible) candidates. Five months before the elections they organised an assembly where members had the possibility to confirm the choice of the party top about chief candidates in each constituency. This method is certainly highly centralised, which is quite unusual for this party cherishing the principle of “*basisdemokratie*”. Afterwards a poll has been organised on the whole list, in each constituency.

The francophone Christian-democrats (centre démocrate Humaniste, cdH) use a three-step process. A special constituency committee¹⁴ prepares a model list. These special constituency committees were set up less than five months before the elections. The national political executive enjoys an evocation right that allows it to propose a model list, without the constituency special committee having any chance to appeal. Members ratify the model list by a majority of casted votes. If members do not agree on the list, they can put a rank order amongst candidates and the final list is based on calculation of votes earned by each candidate. We have not found any occurrence of such re-ordering.

Ecolo has probably one of the most complex selection modes. The process is multistage as well as assorted, meaning that many actors are involved and that processes are different according to the type of place on the lists. Strategic (i.e. eligible and marginal) places are singled out. These places are, according to Ecolo’s statutes, places being more eligible or visible during the campaign. An ad hoc committee (the federal list committee¹⁵) decides on the number and the localisation of the strategic places. The federation council (assembly of delegates at the national level) has to adopt the proposition made by this ad hoc federal list committee. In short, the selection process *per se* consists of two main steps. First, the constituency list committee decides on a model list. Second, the constituency assembly (i.e. open to all members) adopts the list by 2/3 of casted votes. If the list is rejected, the list committee has to propose a new list, still to be adopted by members but only by the absolute majority of votes. The federation council

¹³ This is probably linked to their poor electoral score in 2003 when they did not manage to capture a single seat in the House.

¹⁴ The special committee is made up by a delegation composed in function of half the amount of inhabitants and half the amount of party members. Committee members are appointed by constituency leaders. Consequently, we do not consider this committee as a delegate committee.

¹⁵ This committee is composed by national party leaders, but cannot comprise candidates on strategic places.

has an evocation right. This organ can invalidate the list – which would force the list committee to propose a revised list. According to the press, the process has been without problems. All Ecolo constituency assemblies approved the lists with more than 80%. Many were already held four months before Election Day.

Flemish Christian-democrats (Christen Democratisch & Vlaams, CD&V) use a decentralized selection process. Members intervene after a pre-selection by constituency leaders. The constituency board decides on a model list in consultation with sub-constituency leaders, and representatives of the party's three socio-economic factions. (Smits 1986; De Winter 1988) Members get then the possibility to approve the list through a poll. The decision about the model list occurred two months before the election and the poll took place nearly one month before Election Day. No trace of refusal by the members was found. A particularity of CD&V in 2007 was their cartel with the Flemish nationalists (N-VA). Due to this association of parties, the process was even more centralised than usual, in that leaders had to agree on the repartition of candidates of each cartel components for the eligible places (a cartel agreement that generously guaranteed one safe place to the N-VA in each of the six Flemish constituencies).

Lastly, Flemish liberals (Open Vlaamse Liberalen en Democraten, Open VLD) use a three-step decentralized process. A working group¹⁶ prepares the selection by ranking candidates on a first draft of a model list. Aspirants excluded from this list, but that eventually may be added to the list if it were to be rejected by the members, are listed in alphabetical order at the bottom of the model list. The constituency board determines the final model list. Members are then called to vote in decentralised voting stations. If no majority is reached, the board calls a second vote. The board can either proposes the same list as before, or a modified list. Members have the possibility to vote on the model list or to re-order candidates. In this last case, the list is finally composed by counting which candidate has got the most votes for each place on the list. Nonetheless this situation does not seem to have occurred in 2007. Regarding the timing, the boards have decided three months before the elections. According to the statutes, the poll has to take place five weeks before the mandatory deposit of lists (occurring one month before election day).

All in all, even if five parties allow members to directly intervene in the selection of candidates for legislative elections, rank-and-file members do not seem to use this power to overthrow the model list. This suggests that leaders either at the constituency level only or at both constituency and national level that compose the model lists are the main decision-makers in constituting the lists. Yet one can consider that leaders – when preselecting candidates on a model list – keep in mind that members must agree on the list and eventually can reject and alter their elitist choice. The power of members to reject and alter the model list, and the fact that such rejection hardly ever occurs, may equally well indicate that the elites usually anticipate well their members' preferences.


¹⁶ This working group must be composed by at least half non-incumbents and at least half persons not being candidate. The constituency board, at the suggestion of the constituency chairperson, chooses working group members.

What can be concluded after having detailed the real-world candidate selection processes in each party for the general elections (for the Chamber), is that every ideological family has approximately the same selection process. Greens and Christian-Democrats are inclusive. Socialists use delegate congresses. Rightist parties select in a rather exclusive way. Only liberals differ in this respect. The Flemish Open VLD tends to be inclusive¹⁷ while the Francophone MR tends to be exclusive. This difference can be explained by the cartel nature of the MR whereas the Open VLD consists of only one party.

ADAPTATIONS APPLIED AT THE 2010 ANTICIPATED ELECTIONS

On 22 April 2010 the Flemish liberal party (Open VLD) decided to break away from the six party governmental coalition. After some attempts to revive the coalition, the King accepted the government resignation on April 26. On May 6 Parliament decided to hold anticipated elections on June 13. Political parties had to present the final version of their lists on May, 14 at the latest. Hence, they had to recruit and select candidates in just three weeks, while in 2007 they had months to do so. Accordingly, processes of candidate selection have been affected by this shortage of time. Consequently, the positions of some parties on the scale of inclusiveness are different in 2007 and in 2010. The same working method has been applied to place parties on the scale. Requirements in party statutes regarding early elections, answers from candidates to a post-electoral questionnaire (n=343)¹⁸ and local and national newspapers have been consulted to get an as comprehensive as possible idea of how it worked to compose electoral lists in the first two weeks of May 2010.

Figure 2 : five-category scale of candidate selection inclusiveness (2010)



The next paragraphs concisely describe the changes triggered by the anticipated nature of the 2010 elections, for each party ranging from the most exclusive procedure towards the most inclusive. The same ten parties are taken into account in this analysis.

¹⁷ This can be due to their desire to become a “party of the citizen” (“burgerpartij”).

¹⁸ Questions asked in 2010 were exactly the same asked in 2007. We sent out 1066 questionnaires to candidates for the 2010 House elections (including all effective candidates and a number of substitute candidates (suppléants/opvolgers) equal to the number of Representatives elected at the previous elections on a party list with a minimum of three for the new parties). The overall return rate was 42.5% and quasi-proportional in terms of elected and non-successful candidates.

The Francophone liberals MR have not changed their procedures, probably due to the very exclusive nature of their regular candidate selection procedure (only constituency leaders and national leaders plus the heads of list play a role). This selection mode does not force the party to change the rules in case of anticipated elections. In fact, their statutes do not mention any special rule to be followed in case of early elections.

In 2007 two parties belonged to the second category, namely “extended party leadership”. These two parties have not changed their procedures. N-VA and VB still select their candidates through the intervention of a broad national council made of leaders at various levels. The Francophone Christian-Democrats, however, use a more exclusive procedure in case of early elections. Their statutes describe the specific procedure *in extenso*. No poll is organised anymore. The national political board has the final say on the lists. This body, composed by leaders and MPs, is similar to the broad national council that decide in the N-VA and VB.

In 2007, both socialist parties used the third mode of selection. In 2010, the sp.a used a procedure similar to the 2007 regular elections. A constituency congress, i.e. a conference of delegates, makes the final decision on selecting candidates. The CD&V used an analogous procedure in 2010. Lists were endorsed by a vote at the national political board – a body constituted by delegates. This party has therefore restricted the scope of its selectorates, because regular members do not participate anymore in case of early elections.

The second to last category is almost inclusive. Members still vote on the lists but some leaders at the national level also play a role. *Groen!* already belonged to this category in 2007. This party also has the most institutionalised procedure in case of early elections since a party document is entirely dedicated to it (but only time limits are adjusted). In contrast *Open VLD* leaders did not have any formal power to influence lists in 2007, while in 2010 the national party board designated the heads of lists, on a proposal from the party president. This procedure is thus more exclusive and centralised.

Finally, two parties used a fully inclusive method, even if elections were anticipated. *Ecolo* already organised a poll in 2007, but at this election the Francophone socialists (PS) used the same method as their Flemish sister party, i.e. a constituency congress composed of delegates. Yet the media reported in a detailed way that in 2010 the PS commonly used a member poll, often mentioning the number of participants and the outcome of the member vote. Hence, this party is the only one having made its selection process more inclusive, in spite of the time pressures.

To sum up six parties out of ten stay in the same category between 2007 and 2010. Four parties have selected their candidates in a different manner, among which three are more exclusive (cdH, CD&V and Open VLD) and one more inclusive (PS). The general trend goes towards more exclusiveness, what is not surprising given the lack of time parties faced.

DOES CANDIDATE SELECTION MODE MATTER?

This section tests our main hypothesis. We explore the impact of selection modes on mass – elite issue congruence. We first discuss our methodology and data, and then our results. We analyse two elections: the 2007 Belgian federal elections (regular) and the 2010 Belgian federal elections (anticipated due to the fall of the government). For both, we focus on the Lower House, i.e. the Chamber of Representatives.

STUDYING MASS – ELITE ISSUE CONGRUENCE

Does candidate selection modes matter in terms of mass – elite ideological congruence regarding substantive political representation, i.e. in terms of ideological, programmatic and issue representation? Hazan and Rahat (2010) hypothesize that the more inclusive is the candidate selection process, the more congruent are voters and candidates. On the other hand, Spies and Kaiser (2012) empirically showed that the contrary seems to be the case. They empirically analysed 58 parties and their electorates showing that less inclusive selectorates are associated to higher congruence between parties and voters. We want to test whether this finding can be confirmed for the Belgian case. Although the Belgian case was included in their analysis (but only for five parties), we want to verify if their conclusion holds if we are using a different scale of inclusiveness and another measure of issue congruence.

We have calculated for each party the degrees of congruence between voters and candidates on the left – right scale (going from 0 to 10) and on a 5-points scale, which refers to the authoritarian – libertarian dimension. Studying “many-to-many” ideological proximity, each party’s degree of congruence is calculated following Andeweg’s method. The idea is to calculate the “common area under the curve”. This is obtained by taking the lowest percentage between candidates’ and voters’ position for each point of the scale. Adding these percentages give the amount of shared positions (Andeweg, 2011). We have calculated this percentage for each dimension and the final degree of congruence is in fact the mean of the two percentages. A higher percentage would therefore mean a high degree of congruence whereas a percentage close to zero would imply a lower congruence between candidates and voters.

Table 4: Degrees of congruence for each party

Flemish parties			Francophone parties		
	2007	2010		2007	2010
CD&V¹⁹	65,42	73.93	cdH	59,72	80.98
Open VLD	56,97	71.04	PS	37,71	55.67
Vlaams Belang	77,11	69.12	MR	59,59	77.15
Groen!	38,19	54.87	ECOLO	45,37	52.85
sp.a/ (SPIRIT)	51,52	60			
N-VA		79.22			

In order to calculate these percentages of congruence, we had to use two surveys for each year. For 2007, we based candidates' positions on the Comparative Candidate Survey, which was held that year. 284 House candidates running for the 2007 elections returned the questionnaire sent out the week after the election. On voters' side, we used the European Social Survey (round 4) that was launched in late 2008 and was accomplished in the beginning of 2009. There is indeed a quite large delay between the two surveys, but we needed voters' choice for the 2007 federal elections. Analysing ESS Round 3 data²⁰ the same way, we find no major differences in our results. The number of respondents for Belgium is 1091. As written here above, we wanted to calculate congruence on several dimensions. Unfortunately, the comparability between ESS and CSS is small as we were able to focus only on two dimensions: left-right self-placement on the one hand and one question related to immigration. The wording and the scale are almost identical regarding the first one but are different but comparable for the second²¹.

In 2010, we have also based our candidates' positions on the Comparative Candidate Survey (CCS) that was accomplished that year. 343 House candidates responded to our survey. 1085 voters' positions were drawn from the ESS Round 5 (2010). Again, due to a lack of comparability between the two surveys, we had to focus only on the two same dimensions. However, compared to 2007, we had almost the same wording and the very same scales for both questions²².

¹⁹ In 2007, CD&V and N-VA formed a cartel to compete for the federal elections. However, because we were not able to distinguish between CD&V and N-VA voters, we had to exclude N-VA for 2007. We thus have a small bias because of the small number of N-VA voters included in our sample of CD&V voters. For the 2010 elections, they were not running together, we thus have a separate measure.

²⁰ This wave of ESS was held in late 2006, early 2007 but asked the party's respondent choice for the 2003 elections.


²¹ CCS wording is « Immigrants are good for Belgium's economy » with a scale going from « Strongly agree » to « Strongly disagree » in 5 points. The question asked in ESS Round 4 was « Would you say it is generally bad or good for Belgium's economy that people come to live here from other countries? » and the scale goes from 0 « Bad for the economy » to 10 « Good for the economy ».

²² Left-right self-placements for candidates and voters were asked on an 11-points scale. The question used to investigate the authoritarian – libertarian dimension was “People who break the law should be given stiffer sentences” for candidates and “People who break the law should be

Thomassen (2012) argues that one needs to calculate congruence on different dimensions. In his article, he shows that the left – right dimension cannot cover every issue in the Netherlands, some being uncorrelated with the left – right spectrum. Although some scholars consider the left-right dimension as being a ‘super-issue’ (Inglehart, 1984) covering all other kind of issues, we do not believe this is sufficient for the Belgian case. As Thomassen shows, the authoritarian – libertarian dimension seems to be correlated with the left – right dimension at the elites’ level but it is not case for voters (Thomassen, 2012). In fact, when we plot candidates’ and voters’ preferences of each party on the two dimensions that we are investigating, we see clear differences. Parties located on the left are quite congruent on the left – right axis, but when it comes to the authoritarian – libertarian scale, we see a different pattern.

In order to illustrate our methodology for testing our hypothesis, we present two graphs for two quite different parties (the graphs for other parties are not presented for reasons of space).


Graph 1: Distributions of MR’s candidates (n=26) and voters (n=82) for “Stronger judgements for illegal acts”



Graph 1 presents the distribution plot for MR’s candidates and voters in 2010 for the question linked to the authoritarian – libertarian scale. This clearly shows that MR, being a right-wing party with a strong exclusive selectorate, has a near perfect congruence between its voters and candidates. Our measure of congruence indicates a 90.52% of common area, which is the highest score for all parties. This score may be explained by the fact that right-wing parties are obtaining higher scores on that dimension (Thomassen, 2012), and by our hypothesis being the fact that their exclusive selectorate would imply higher congruence.

given much harsher sentences than they are these days”. Both scales are in 5-points going from “Agree strongly” to “Disagree strongly”.

Graph 2: Distributions of Ecolo's candidates (n=31) and voters (n=54) for "Stronger judgements for illegal acts"



On the other hand, graph 2 shows the distributions for ECOLO's candidates and voters on the same question, also in 2010. Clearly, the graph shows a low level of congruence (46.84%) for ECOLO. In the francophone green party, elites are more left wing than their voters, and its selection mode is highly inclusive. These two examples tend to confirm our hypothesis. We will explore this hypothesis more systematically below.

The two dimensions used in this paper are apparently useful to correctly understand the ideological proximity between candidates and voters. However, as showed by Costello et al. (2012), three dimensions are useful in order to interpret policy preferences. We have indeed taken into account only two out of the three dimensions. The third one, which refers to European integration, was impossible to implement due to a lack of data.

CANDIDATE SELECTION AND MASS-ELITE IDEOLOGICAL CONGRUENCE

In order to test our hypothesis, we have decided to gather into one sample the observations for 2007 (n=9) and observations for 2010 (n=10). In effect, samples were too small to allow us to reach satisfactory levels of significance. We thus have a sample of 19 Belgian parties. Each observation has its own level of congruence and its own position on the inclusiveness scale. In some cases, parties have a different level of inclusiveness of the selectorate, because as said before, the 2010 federal elections were anticipated, some parties having particular procedures in this case.

Looking at *Spearman* correlation between our two variables, we find a significant negative relationship meaning that the degree of inclusiveness of the selectorate is indeed correlated to the degree of mass – elite issue congruence. In fact, we see that when the selectorate becomes more inclusive, candidates and voters become less congruent. In effect, we find a significant Rho of -.549 indicating that the relationship is quite strong even though we have a small number of observations.

Table 5: Spearman correlation table

Spearman correlation		Congruence	Inclusiveness
Congruence	Correlation coefficient	1.000	-.549
	Sig.	.	.020
	N	19	19
Inclusiveness	Correlation coefficient	-.549	1.000
	Sig.	.020	.
	N	19	19

Hence, it seems that we can confirm the hypothesis formulated above for the Belgian case: candidate selection mode does matter for substantive representation. Moreover, the hypothesis expressed by Spies and Kaiser (2012) seems to be verified for the Belgian case, even when using a more in-depth measure of inclusiveness and congruence. The more exclusive is the electorate, the more congruent candidates and voters are. It seems then that the theoretical assumption of Hazan and Rahat (2010) does not hold in the Belgian case.

Unfortunately, our research is clearly limited by several constraints. First of all, we would need more cases, i.e. more parties and more comparable surveys, to build a proper measure of the relationship between our variables. Although the Belgian party system is the most fragmented in Western Europe, we are still limited in terms of units of analysis. In addition, the voter survey nor the candidate survey allows us to verify our results at the level of the eleven constituencies due to often insufficient numbers of candidates to make a credible voter/candidate match per party.

Secondly, this research is also limited by our measure of the degree of congruence. We know that the left – right spectrum and the authoritarian – libertarian dimension are relevant in calculating mass – elite issue congruence, but we cannot limit ourselves to these dimensions. Citizens cast their informed vote not only regarding the left – right dimension but also on important issue dimensions that rose up lately. As showed previously, the libertarian – authoritarian dimension cannot be fully covered by the left – right dimension on the voters’ side and on elites’ side. Another relevant dimension that has a significant impact on the degree of congruence is the European dimension as elites and voters have very different views on the subject, and these are not correlated with the left – right dimension nor the authoritarian – libertarian (Costello et al. 2012). These limitations have to be considered for further research on the subject, especially given the fact that the Belgian polity is characterised by multiple cleavages and issue dimensions. Apart from the left-right divide, there is the traditional predominant Flemish/Francophone divide, the waning catholic/secular divide, and the new GAL-TAN dimension (De Winter, Swyngedouw & Dumont, 2006).

CONCLUSION

Our journey has delivered some interesting results. Digging deeper into the “secret garden of politics” (Gallagher & Marsh, 1988), it seems however it is full of “muddy waters”. There is indeed a need to crosscheck information in order to get a comprehensive view on how selection works within parties. This can be explained by the fact that candidate selection is a complex process, with different stages varying in decisional impact. Furthermore, different rules might apply for the selection of eligible and non-eligible candidate on a same list. This creates large problems for case studies as well as comparative research on the effect of candidate selection due to variation in candidate selection procedures in terms of selectorates at different phases, of their impact and even of time pressures in case of anticipated elections.

We have noticed that Belgian political parties select their candidates for legislative elections quite differently. In 2007, half of them called on members to adopt the final list of candidates while two decided using members’ delegates. The rest – nearly all right-wing parties – employed a rather exclusive procedure, meaning that a more or less extensive leadership selected candidates. Early elections held in 2010 have led to some changes in parties’ selection procedures. Three parties have restricted the size of their selectorates while one party has increased it. Nonetheless it seems that one must stay cautious because totally inclusive processes are an illusion since no party gives full power to its members. In fact, in nearly all parties a smaller group prepares a model list on which members, delegates or sub-leaders vote and hardly ever change the proposed model list. Consequently degrees of inclusiveness are relative and maybe even misleading.

The paper addresses the question of the potential impact of the candidate selection modes on candidates/voters ideological congruence. Contradictory hypotheses have been found in the literature. We hypothesised that the more exclusive is the selectorate, the more congruent are candidates with their voters. Our results, based on candidates’ and voters’ position on the left-right scale and on one question related to the authoritarian-libertarian dimension, confirm the hypothesis. Note that the degree of association between candidate selection modes and mass/elite ideological congruence is relatively strong, and statistically significant.

Our research reveals that selection has an impact on the ideological proximity and that candidates selected by a small group of selectors are more congruent with their voters than candidates selected by a large group (i.e. mostly members). This could be explained by the fact that there could be stronger connections between party leaders and the party electorate, e.g. through the media. On the one hand, party leaders would be better informed on electorate’s preferences and might then want to choose candidates in a strategic way. On the other hand, voters are informed mainly through the media and would thus be informed by the party leader(s), influencing them in their ideological preferences. Another explanation could be that party leaders would be more pragmatic

than party members. Party leaders – vote-seeking actors – would select candidates that better match with the targeted electorate whereas party members would tend to be “ideologists”. These reflections would benefit from empirical testing within the framework of further research.

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Data

Comparative Candidate Survey (2007) - Belgium. UCLouvain

Comparative Candidate Survey (2010) - Belgium. UCLouvain

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