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THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF IMAGES

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During the Middle Ages, the Church, especially in the West, never stopped wanting to classify the image as a symbol, in order to avoid as far as possible any danger of idolatry – that is, of confusion between image and model. It was therefore a matter of casting a modest veil over the materiality of the image, which was all too likely to attract the gaze of the viewer; this of course was expected to fade into the background to allow the *translatio ad prototypum*¹ – that is, to allow the gaze to move toward the model. From this perspective, the *dictum Gregorii*, drawn from the famous letter of Gregory the Great to the iconoclast bishop Serenus of Marseille, was to be the *doxa* for more than a millennium in matters relating to the Christian imagery: “In it [painting], the illiterate read. Hence, and chiefly to the nations, a picture is instead of reading (*lectio*).”² The image here plays the role of language, able to stand in for the sacred text in order to serve those who do not have access to it. We should note that it was this idea of the image which was the foundation for research in Christian iconography, and was to leave a profound impression on our understanding of the functions of the medieval image, whose principal goal was to teach Christian doctrine and to inculcate the story of Salvation.³ Our way of “naturally” interpreting images in terms of meaning is historically deeply rooted in our way of thinking.

From representation to presence

Throughout the Middle Ages the image played a number of roles which research has attempted to reveal in all its complexity. The present chapter aims to give an account of the various research perspectives for images that are to be found in the field of historical anthropology. These perspectives are characterized by what might be called a critical standpoint toward iconography, a criticism that highlights what at first sight seems to escape an iconographic “reading” but which ultimately can be integrated within a broadened iconographic perspective. As a reaction to the logocentrism that sees the image as a text to be read, the pendulum has tended to swing the other way and research has shifted attention from meaning to the material presence of images. Images appear as objects endowed with a certain power,⁴ a feature that short-circuits the classical metaphysics of representation, whose tendency is to reduce representation to a disembodied sign or as an imitation of reality that has a symbolic or mimetic meaning. In this respect it is possible to speak of a return to presence instead of representation. This is probably a reaction to

the increasing dematerialization of images in contemporary society, the very term "image" now tending to make us forget its material density.⁵

The presence of the image, especially in the Middle Ages, has never been as isolated as a work of art hanging in a museum might be (and yet is such a work really isolated, the museum itself being a frame that locates the work of art?); the image or object is always located in a specific place and within a network of other artifacts, gestures, words, sounds, smells . . . After considering the nature of the work, it is therefore necessary to go beyond its immediate frame to understand it within a network of relationships that are thus fashioned around it and because of it. In this way, the idea of the image as the object, also forming a knotwork of social actions and interactions with it being at one and the same time the object and the means.⁶ Turning away from iconographic and stylistic approaches, research has attempted to understand the uses and practices to which an image can give rise. From this, a body of thought on the functions of the image and on its power to bring about actions or reactions has developed.

From the *material turn* to the *performative turn*

The image does not simply produce actions or reactions; it can also act. This is where it touches on the question of performance. Nobody has spoken of the *performative turn* – a new emphasis on what, since Alfred Gell, has also been called the *agency* of the image.⁷ While it had long been recognized that the image could arouse an emotion, an emotion which in turn was able to provoke a motion,⁸ such as prayer, conversion, or donation – in this respect, we may say that the image is performative insofar as it engages the spectator in a performance – it is even possible to say that images are effective only when they are performed, in the sense of the *performing arts*; it still remains to be understood how certain actions and intentions particular to the human being can be applied to the image. In other words, how is it possible to understand the image as agent – that is to say, as an object endowed with an ability to act and not simply as a thing to be manipulated or interpreted as a passive transporter of ideas? To put it simply, if an image can make us cry, how can it cry itself, or how can we believe that it might cry? This move from the material turn to the performative turn characterizes a series of research projects carried out in a wide variety of fields, all of which attempt to go beyond what images tell us or show us toward what they want. This echoes the title of a book by W.J.T. Mitchell,⁹ whose work is interested in the life of images, and above all in the "needs, desires and demands they embody"¹⁰ and what animates them; in short, this work is interested in what we want from images.

Alongside Mitchell's seminal work, a leading place must be reserved for the anthropology of art devised by Alfred Gell,¹¹ which has inspired a series of studies, all of which examine the reasons we react to images as if they were alive. The anthropologist considers images as actors in social life, as mediators in social processes. Gell distinguishes "primary agents" – namely, human beings – from "secondary agents" – that is, the artifacts by which primary agents distribute their agency when interacting with the world. This is therefore a purely relational notion with no ontological content. Gell speaks of an "art nexus" to designate this system of actions, intended to change the world rather than encode it.¹²

One cannot fail to notice that this new interest in the life and performance of images, in what they do rather than what they represent, has in large part been initiated by medievalists. They were among the first to shift attention from the presence of the image-object toward the image as body,¹³ thus locating their research in the vast field of the anthropology of images, the idea for which grew out of the assimilation of image and human being, with *image agency* merging with *human agency*. In wishing to endow representation with presence it was all the confusion between the image and its model that attracted research attention. While breaking with a certain

symbolic paradigm that reduced the image to the level of a sign, this research perpetuated another paradigm that underlies the history and theory of representation: that of mimesis based on the idea of resemblance, however schematic this resemblance might be. To take up the typology of the different modalities of "Bildakt" developed by Horst Bredekamp, it is possible to speak here of "substitutive Bildakt," which rests on a logic of substitution between image and model.¹⁴

The prototypical example of this kind of confusion is of beliefs relating to miraculous images. Images that can move, cry, speak, bleed, heal, or drive away the Devil in effect constitute the paradigm of images that act. Christian image theory called this power that animates images by the term *virtus*, and it was established from the outset that this power was not intrinsic to them but transmitted by divine power.¹⁵ According to Christian doctrine, this power was thought to travel from the model through the image, or else to inhabit the image temporarily according to popular beliefs, or to communicate with it through contact with holy material, especially relics, or even through a suitable ritual such as consecration. "Thus, *virtus* is a quality of the image, or the image is its vehicle, or it inhabits the image, or it is bestowed upon the image, or it is experienced and communicated by the image."¹⁶

Naturalist and culturalist approaches

Since the image was clearly not endowed with autonomous life and had no intrinsic power, the question of its powers naturally shifted to the question of belief in these powers, belief which can be deduced from the kinds of reaction images aroused, from the most extreme, such as adoration or destruction, to the most common, such as lighting a candle before them. Taking up a favorite idea from Marcel Mauss, an idea which he applied to magic, it might be possible to say that the efficacy of the image is the result of and not the reason for us believing in its powers.¹⁷ But what causes or supports this belief? What is acting in or through this kind of image? Two kinds of answers have been made to these questions: one naturalist, the other culturalist. The first says that belief in the power of the image is anchored in human nature, inscribed within the structures of the human mind. In this respect it has been possible to speak of a universal anthropological or even psychological characteristic. This naturalist approach encourages an enquiry with no chronological and geographical restriction into the way mankind, through its instinct for imitation, tends to attribute action or life to images. In other words, human beings have the cognitive ability to merge the image and the person or subject it resembles. The image thus derives its power essentially from the viewer, who projects on to it his or her own intentions. This is the viewpoint adopted by David Freedberg in his *The Power of Images* of 1989¹⁸ and which he subsequently extended into the field of the neurosciences. Even if he defends himself against the criticism of having neglected the contextual elements that play a part in the living presence of images, he encourages historians and anthropologists to "develop an argument on the cognitive schemas which underlie this or that reaction and which are subject to the pressures of the context."¹⁹

The culturalist approach consists in investigating all the contextual – that is to say, cultural – circumstances at work so that an image may become active.²⁰ As opposed to a claimed universality, precise historical reasons are invoked, reasons that are essentially social in origin. To distinguish it from "an internalist concept of agency," which holds that belief in the powers of the image "is triggered by factors that develop out of the interiority of the person, thoughts, desires, intentions, etc.,"²¹ Gell speaks of the "externalist idea" that attributes these powers to a given socioreligious context. This explains in part why a particular image becomes activated in specific circumstances. As we have seen, Gell firmly locates himself in this perspective by seeing images as actors "in a network of social relationships." In other words, the reasons for belief are to be sought other than in the psyche of the viewer, and especially in the social forces acting through the image, which Mitchell has referred to as "ventriloquism."

This culturalist perspective is found in a broad swath of art historical research inspired by cultural and visual studies, in which “the image is more often than not seen as a representation, a visual construct that betrays the ideological agenda of its makers and whose content is susceptible to manipulation by its receivers.”²² Hence, it is a matter of seeing “around the edges of images in order to determine the social forces responsible for their ideological agendas’ and “of identifying the political commitments of those who make and consume them.”²³ The stress is thus laid on the operators of the image, those who make it act, who make it active, and even more on those who are activated by it – that is to say, manipulated by those who are pulling the strings. On the grounds that the efficacy of an image can be measured only by the responses it arouses or provokes, reception studies largely seem to have dominated research that has adopted this culturalist point of view, which saw the image as an instrument in the service of a power or an ideology, or as the medium serving to challenge this same power.

Intrinsic image-act: the power of ornament

In emphasizing the upstream (conditions of creation) and even more so the downstream (modalities of reception), both naturalist and culturalist points of view have tended to obscure the intrinsic being of the image as a factor that can activate its power. Hence the appeal from G. Bartholeyns and T. Golsenne that “In order to analyse the performance of image, we need to turn less towards the reaction of spectators than towards the image itself, in its own materiality, in the pragmatic conditions of the manifestation of its iconic power.”²⁴ In this regard Bredekamp speaks of “*intrinsiche Bildakt*” (intrinsic image-act) to account for the intrinsic power of images. The presence in question here is no longer that of the referent in the image or of the forces manipulating it, but that of the image itself, and it matters little whether this is anthropomorphic.²⁵ It is a matter of recognizing images as real actors “possessed of sovereign agency separable from their handling or their perception by people.”²⁶ In contrast to Alfred Gell, who saw manufactured objects as a crucible of social relationships, and to Hans Belting, who investigated the relationships between iconic medium and human body,²⁷ Bredekamp attempts to grasp a principle of life (*Eigenleben*) in images that can no longer be seen conceived as a direct extension of the human body or society, but as a force (*Eigenkraft*) emanating naturally from images themselves, a force that can act on the body as on society.²⁸ It is possible to speak of figural forces, to use the terminology of Louis Marin,²⁹ while Bredekamp prefers to speak of *Potentia* or *Latenz* to designate these latencies activated at a precise moment or in particular circumstances. To see the image as a force is in fact to take an interest in power as potential, in potentiality – that is to say, in the entirety of what the image is able to bring about. What then are the characteristics of this latent force, and what activates or intensifies it, what contributes to its performance and to its efficacy? “What power enables an image, when it is seen or handled, to spring out of latency into an outward effect on sensation, thinking, and action?”³⁰

Apart from the image’s presence as object and its resemblance as body, scholarly attention has been directed mainly toward its ornamentation, a dimension that seems to have escaped the field of iconography, of meaning, and of representation.³¹ This new interest has also had the result of reintroducing the issue of the aesthetic dimension of images, a dimension that must not be reduced simply to the philosophical sense of beauty but to which it is necessary to restore the etymological sense relating to sensibility. The anthropology of the image and the *visual studies* have attempted to deconstruct the aesthetic approach to the work of art so that other modes might be considered,³² or rather other forms of reaction suppressed or sublimated by the aesthetic reaction, with the consequence that this dimension has been neglected in research. Now, the power of images can be brought back to the question of their sensible force, whatever may

have been thought of the split between the age of the image and the age of art or between the cult of the religious image and culture of the artistic image. "For it is perhaps, in the context of a pragmatic analysis of its means, through its aesthetic quality (its intensity of appearance), that the image, whether work of art or devotional image, can become effective."³³

These principles have been applied especially to sacred images, with special attention given to the sumptuous nature of their workmanship, the issue here being to know what role this played in belief in the powers of these images. Images reputed to be miraculous were extensively embellished, from the lavish material used to adorn them to the altarpiece, the chapel, or even the church dedicated to it, not to mention the numerous *ex voto* offerings surrounding it (Fig. 13.1).



Figure 13.1 Michelozzo di Bartolomeo (attr.) and Pagno di Lapo Pertigiani, tabernacle for the SS. Annunziata (c. 1340), 1448–49, Florence, SS. Annunziata.

It was out of respect for the subject represented that they were honored with decorations – that is to say, honor was expressed in material terms. It is possible to speak of a natural willingness to adorn them as a reminder that these ordinary images have extraordinary virtues. While texts of the period emphasize the fact that this addition of beauty was not the origin of faith but a witness to it, practice partly contradicts theory by showing that it was also tangible proof of the efficacy of the cultic image. As Freedberg recognizes, decoration serves to “aesthetically differentiate,”³⁴ its efficacy lying, among other things, in its “visual particularity.”³⁵ But he also emphasizes the fact that this feature is not the cause of the efficacy. In fact, according to Freedberg, belief in the power of miraculous images was at the most stimulated by the ornamental “layers”:

Could one say that apparently rude or plain images [. . .] work only because of the splendor in which they are housed? Apparently not. We only have to read the many accounts, often contemporary with their discovery, of how they work while they are still outside in the cold, hanging on a tree, or pathetically painted on some shabby street corner. They work before the fancy or elevated forms of enshrinement or decoration were applied to them.³⁶

As Golsenne maintains, it is possible to say that “the efficacy of cult images is not aesthetic but ‘magical.’ Its power does not produce a feeling of beauty, or disinterested pleasure, but it acts on the body and its humours.”³⁷ In contrast to Freedberg, however, Golsenne emphasizes the fact that for the faithful, all the decorative apparatus that exalts the image demonstrates the image’s miraculous power; for the historian-anthropologist, the power to confer miraculous value on the image is due to this decorative apparatus. Although the embellishments seem simply to honor an object of value – in reality they confer value on this object, in a relationship which is equivalent to that which links the reliquary to the relic. As Jean-Claude Schmitt has proposed, for the believer it is the relic that makes the reliquary. For the anthropologist, however, “it is the reliquary that makes the relic,” in the sense that it supplies the institutional and visual proof of the relic’s authenticity.³⁸ This analogy between image and reliquary – which has a certain historical pertinence if we refer to the statue-reliquaries of the eleventh and twelfth centuries through which a kind of “revolution” in the Christian image was performed – has the merit of emphasizing the essential connection that links the image to its ornamentation. It is therefore possible to extrapolate and speak of the *agency* of precious materials used to decorate sacred images. This is the hypothesis offered by Golsenne, who writes, “The adornment does not follow the miracle but makes possible the belief that a miracle has been performed by means of such an image.”³⁹ He adds, “a cult image is not effective, magical, on its own”; “the adornment produces this life which is lacking in the venerated image, makes it attractive; [. . .] gives it a surplus of existence.”⁴⁰ But placing the accent in this way on votive adornments as the main animators of the image and activators of belief has the consequence of putting the image itself in parentheses. If it goes without saying that the image in itself has no effective power, except in belief, the aesthetic dimension should not be reduced to that of the artistic value of the image. The unsophisticated, even “primitive,” appearance of many miraculous images not only was recognized as a sign of their antiquity and therefore as proof of their sacrality (in that the origin of these images has been lost in the mists of time) but also generated a visual impact that can be likened to what anthropologists have written about African “fetishes.”⁴¹ Their immutability and rusticity, not to mention their “primitive” quality, were only intensified by the contrast with the artistic adornment that gave them life. Their artistic “poverty” takes nothing away from their aesthetic power – that is to say, the emotional impact they generated and that the sumptuous embellishments extended.

In the end, the question that must be answered is to see if this attention to the power of images surpasses, or even puts paid to, iconographic analysis. Rather than opposing “effects of sense” and “effects of presence,” meaning and performance, it would be preferable, as J. Baschet advocates, to consider the areas of overlap between the two: “The work does not simply transmit a meaning to be decrypted; it also produces an effect. This dimension must be integrated within an iconographic approach, since it is true that meaning offers itself through the effect produced by the work.”⁴² The way in which materiality affects meaning needs to be considered, and the way in which meaning is conveyed and often transformed by the force of the image, but also by the ornamental apparatus accompanying it and bringing it before the viewer, also needs to be examined. The internalist explanation (how the image becomes a space in which the human psyche is projected) and the externalist explanation (how the image comes to be socially empowered) need to be combined without forgetting their formal characteristics. In the same way, an anthropological history of resemblance and a historical sociology of performance need to be joined together. Staying with J. Baschet, it is possible to speak of “active forms and meanings”:

Within such configurations, the power of the image-object depends just as much on the presence it confers on painted figures, on its ornamental superabundance, as it does on an overload of meaning whose very excess contributes to producing an effect of sacrality and to the efficacy which may thus go together with it.⁴³

Notes

- 1 Basil the Great, *De Spiritu Sancto*, 18, 45, in PG 32, col. 149. Originally intended to clarify the relationship of the Father and Son in the Trinity, this formula was adopted by the theology of the image to describe the type of adoration owed to the latter. See G.B. Ladner, “The Concept of the Image in the Greek Fathers and the Byzantine Iconoclastic Controversy,” *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 7 (1953), 3–34.
- 2 “in ipsa legunt qui litteras nesciunt; unde praecipue gentibus pro lectione pictura est.” Gregory the Great, *Registrum Epistolarum*, XI, 13, *Ad Serenum Massiliensum Episcopum*, in *Corpus Christianorum*, 140A, 874, *The Letters of Gregory the Great*, translated, with introduction and notes, by John R.C. Martyn (Toronto, 2004). C.M. Chazelle, “Pictures, Books and the Illiterate: Pope Gregory I’s Letters to Serenus of Marseilles,” *Word & Image*, 6 (1990), 138–53. L. Duggan, “Was Art Really the ‘Book of the Illiterate’?,” *Word & Image* 5 (1989), 227–251. J.-C. Schmitt, “Écriture et image: les avatars médiévaux du modèle grégorien,” in *Théories et pratiques de l’écriture au Moyen Age*, ed. E. Baumgartner and C. Marchello-Nizia (Paris, 1988), 119–28. R. Recht, “Une Bible pour illettrés? Sculpture gothique et ‘théâtre de mémoire’,” *Critique* 586 (1996), 188–206. M. Gougaud, “Muta praedicatio,” *Revue bénédictine* 42 (1930), 168–71.
- 3 See J. Baschet, *L’iconographie médiévale* (Paris, 2008); see especially the introduction “Pour en finir (vraiment) avec la Bible des illettrés,” 26–33.
- 4 Jérôme Baschet has chosen to speak of the “image-object” as a reminder “that images, and particularly those of the Middle Ages, are inseparable from their materiality, but also from their thing-ness, understood as the quality of being sovereign, eluding at one and the same time the representation and functionality of the object.” J. Baschet, “Images en acte et agir social,” in *La Performance des images*, ed. G. Bartholeyns, A. Dierkens, and T. Golsenne (Brussels, 2010), 10.
- 5 See K. Moxey, “Visual Studies and the Iconic Turn,” *Journal of Visual Culture* 7 (2008), 131–46. J. Wolff, “After Cultural Theory: The Power of Images, the Lure of Immediacy,” *Journal of Visual Culture* 11 (2012), 3–19. H.U. Gumbrecht, *The Production of Presence: What Meaning Cannot Convey* (Stanford, 2003).
- 6 See, in particular, the actor-network theory elaborated by B. Latour: *Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network Theory* (Oxford, 2005).
- 7 A. Gell, *Art and Agency: An Anthropological Theory* (Oxford, 1998).
- 8 It is possible to refer for example to the antique tradition of the *imagines agentes* – that is, images that were striking in their beauty, ugliness, colors, and associations.

- 9 "The interpretation of images would be decentered in favor of an investigation of the authority and affect of images. This would lead back, of course, to the issue of overestimation and visual superstitions. The question for art historians in that case would be, not 'what pictures mean?' but 'what do pictures want?'" W.J.T. Mitchell, "What Is Visual Culture?," in *Meaning in the Visual Arts: Essays in Honor of Erwin Panofsky's 100th Birthday*, ed. I. Lavin (Princeton, 1995), 544.
- 10 W.J.T. Mitchell, *Cloning Terror: The War of Image, 9/11 to the Present* (Chicago, 2011), xix.
- 11 Gell, *Art and Agency* (as in note 7).
- 12 See C. van Eck, *Art, Agency and Living Presence: From the Animated Image to the Excessive Object* (Leiden, 2015), 45–52. P. Descola, "La double vie des image," in *Penser l'image II: Anthropologie du visuel*, ed. E. Alloa (Paris, 2015), 131–45.
- 13 J.-C. Schmitt, *Le corps, les rites, les rêves, le temps: Essais d'anthropologie médiévale* (Paris, 2001). J.-C. Schmitt, *Le Corps des images: Essais sur la culture visuelle au Moyen Âge* (Paris, 2002). H. Belting, *An Anthropology of Images: Picture, Medium, Body*, trans. T. Dunlap (Princeton, 2014). J. Wirth, *Qu'est-ce qu'une image* (Geneva, 2013), especially chapter V: "La performativité de l'image?."
- 14 H. Bredekamp, *Theorie des Bildakts: Über das Lebensrecht des Bildes* (Berlin, 2010).
- 15 I would like to thank Gil Bartholeyns for letting me know of his forthcoming contribution ("The Dynamis of the Medieval Imago: An Unrecognized Topicality") to the *Dynamis of the Imago: For an Archeology of Potentialities* volume, the result of the research initiative cosponsored by Collège d'études mondiales and Gerda Henkel Stiftung and directed by Chiara Cappelletto et Emmanuel Alloa.
- 16 G. Bartholeyns, "The Dynamis of the Medieval Imago" (as in note 15).
- 17 M. Mauss, *A General Theory of Magic* (London, 2005).
- 18 D. Freedberg, *The Power of Images: Studies in the History and Theory of Response* (Chicago/London, 1989).
- 19 This quotation comes from the preface for the French translation of *Le Pouvoir des images*, trans. A. Girod (Paris, 1998), 5.
- 20 See J. Goody, in his *Representations and Contradictions: Ambivalence towards Images, Theatre, Fictions, Relics and Sexuality* (Oxford, 1997).
- 21 Gell, *Art and Agency* (as in note 7), 126.
- 22 Moxey, "Visual Studies and the Iconic Turn" (as in note 5), 132.
- 23 Moxey, "Visual Studies and the Iconic Turn" (as in note 5), 142.
- 24 G. Bartholeyns and T. Golsenne, "Une théorie des actes d'images," in *La Performance des images* (as in note 4), 19.
- 25 "It should be clear that, with its living images, its automata, and its biofacta, the Schematic Image-Act encompasses the patterns of thought and action for images that live through [human] bodies, through auto-motion, and through biological constitution. The Substitutive Image-Act, in contrast, does not evoke the living components of images; rather, it exchanges images and bodies for one another. In this way, effects are attained by direct means – sometimes deadly means in the case of destructive media." Bredekamp, *Theorie des Bildakts* (as in note 14), 328, trans. B. Kitzinger in her review of the book for the CAA.reviews (September 2014) CrossRef doi:10.3202/caa.reviews.2014.103.
- 26 Bredekamp, *Theorie des Bildakts* (as in note 14), 51; B. Kitzinger (as in note 25).
- 27 Belting, *An Anthropology of Images* (as in note 13).
- 28 Kitzinger (as in note 25).
- 29 The opposition between a classical philosophy of the image as representing something and the image that makes something, which possesses a specific "force," had already been clearly stated by Louis Marin: "Hence the attempt to grasp, by returning to the 'originating' question, the being of the image, not by returning it to being itself, not by making of the being of the image the pure and simple, and cognitively insufficient, or even deceptive image of being, its *mimeme*, but by examining its 'virtues', as would have been said in the past, its latent or manifest forces, in short, its efficacy, if this were even known. The being of the image, in a word, is its force." L. Marin, *Des pouvoirs de l'image: Gloses* (Paris, 1992), 10.
- 30 Bredekamp, *Theorie des Bildakts* (as in note 14), 52.
- 31 See J.-C. Bonne, "Ornementation et représentation," in *Les images dans l'Occident médiéval*, ed. J. Baschet and P.-O. Dittmar (Turnhout, 2015), 199–212; J.-C. Bonne, "De l'ornemental dans l'art médiéval (VIIe–XIIe siècle): Le modèle insulaire," in *L'image: Fonctions et usages des images dans l'Occident médiéval*, ed. J. Baschet and J.-C. Schmitt (Paris, 1997), 185–219.
- 32 See "Visual Culture Questionnaire," October 77 (1996), 25–70. R. Dekoninck, "Un conflit de valeurs: L'histoire de l'art aux prises avec les *Visual Studies*," in *L'art en valeurs*, ed. R. Dekoninck and D. Lories (Paris, 2011), 341–55.
- 33 Bartholeyns and Golsenne, "Une théorie des actes d'images" (as in note 24), 23.

- 34 Freedberg, *The Power of Images* (as in note 18), 110.
- 35 Freedberg, *The Power of Images* (as in note 18), 120.
- 36 Freedberg, *The Power of Images* (as in note 18), 110.
- 37 T. Golsenne, "Parure et culte" in *La Performance des images* (as in note 24), 74.
- 38 Schmitt, *Le Corps des images* (as in note 13), 284.
- 39 Golsenne, "Parure et culte" (as in note 37), 82.
- 40 Golsenne, "Parure et culte" (as in note 37), 83.
- 41 M. Augé, *Le Lieu objet* (Paris, 1988), 30-33.
- 42 J. Bascher, "Inventivité et sérialité des images médiévales: Pour une approche iconographique élargie," *Annales Histoire, Sciences Sociales* 51 (1996), 106.
- 43 J. Bascher, "Images en acte et agit social," in *La Performance des images* (as in note 24), 13.