

SIXTH FRAMEWORK PROGRAMME

PRIORITY 7

“Citizens and Governance in a Knowledge based Society”



Deliverable 9

*“Community Conflicts
and Modes of Conflict Resolution in Europe:
A Typology”*

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PEACE-COM

*Peace Processes in Community Conflicts:
From Understanding the Roots of Conflicts
to Conflict Resolution*

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1. General Introduction

The first deliverable of this work package, which provided a review of conflict dimensions as identified through case study reports (produced by experts) and a review of the literature on conflicts, concluded on a few questions for further research:

- first, that these conflict dimensions could sometimes be understood as features of conflicts, or as issues explaining their emergence or persistence, or even as causes. In other words, rather than explaining the reasons for conflicts to emerge, some dimensions in fact describe what is currently the most salient or visible stake. For instance, the fact of denying citizenship to a whole section of the Russian speaking population in Estonia did not cause the conflict – it is rather one expression of it – but has certainly become a central conflict issue; the same can be said about fertility rates in Northern Ireland, which have gradually become an important issue in the conflict opposing Catholics and Protestants, but are certainly not at its roots. The reverse can be applied to dimensions that focus on the emergence of conflicts: while they clearly provide explanations on the emergence or persistence of conflicts, they do not say anything on their actual issues, on what conflicts are about. For instance, saying that political elites play a fundamental role in the conflict in Belgium does not tell us anything about the real content of the opposition between Walloons and Flemish communities. In PEACE-COM, we have subsequently chosen... not to choose between causes and issues of conflicts, but rather to focus on what actors thought important for explaining the current shape of the conflict, and on the divergences that may exist between explanations put forward. This deliverable is grounded on such an approach;
- second research question posed by D1, the fact that these various dimensions have very different implications and meanings on the ground, both for the actors and in terms of conflict resolution. In other words, saying for instance that socio-economic issues are essential in a conflict can both point towards discriminating policies generating mistrust, and to socio-economic differentials accused by a favoured community of hampering its own development. Such a perspective has been developed in D10, dealing with actors' discourses. We subsequently focus in the first section of this deliverable on divergences between actors' and experts' views on conflicts, which point at a major challenge for future research on conflicts;
- third, perhaps even more importantly, that the impact of these various dimensions varies according to the specific settings of the conflict, and in particular according to the other dimensions they are interacting with. In other words, saying for instance that religion plays a central role in a given conflict does not necessarily mean that it has a strong escalating or de-escalating impact, and that this conflict is bound to be violent, or on the contrary of a limited scale. These variations linked to the specificities of each conflict have been taken into account in the setting up of the monitoring system, as explained in D13, but the detailed investigation of these variations falls within the scope of this deliverable, and will be the focus of the second part of this deliverable;
- fourth, that several dimensions appeared to be more salient than others, but with no clear pattern (at the time D1 was written): such was the case of cultural and linguistic differences, of identity questions, of territory, of socio-economic issues, or of neighbouring states and bordering communities. D8, produced in the framework of WP2, gives us some hints on dimensions that are more recurrent than others;
- fifth, that none of these dimensions seemed enough in itself to explain either the emergence or the persistence of conflicts. Indeed, in all cases covered by this project,

several dimensions interact and have to be taken into account in order to understand what is really going on. Here again, D8, thanks to the QCA methodology, and the Systematic Case Descriptions produced by case study teams, gives us some answers on key configurations of dimensions likely to provoke escalation or de-escalation of conflicts;

Another major research question falls within the scope of this deliverable: the assessment of the impact of the process of European integration on these conflicts, and more specifically the evaluation of the impact of tools designed at the European level, in order to deal with these conflicts. As part of this analysis as been already undertaken in the framework of D12, this deliverable specifically ambitions to analyse how accommodation policies, as well as macro-processes such as Europeanisation, internationalisation or trans-nationalisation, have to be taken into account in order to understand the evolution (in terms of escalation or de-escalation), of conflicts. As D13 has shown, accommodation policies or the Europeanisation process are to be fully considered as conflict dimensions themselves. The third section of this deliverable therefore details a few examples demonstrating how diverging patterns of Europeanisation or of internationalisation tightly interact with conflict patterns on the ground.

2. Reviewing Conflict Dimensions

The first objective of this deliverable is to produce an assessment, and subsequently to revise, the conflict dimensions that had been identified in D1. These dimensions had been selected thanks to a review of the literature on conflicts, and to case study reports prepared by expert teams. In the literature on conflicts, authors indeed advance diverging theories on the emergence of community conflicts in Europe, putting the stress on different factors, reasons or dimensions, as key explanations, with various combination possibilities. In D1, we had classified these explanations in 12 main groups, which in some authors' books and articles in fact overlap or even merge, or are sometimes divided into further categories. These 12 main groups were then confronted to case studies, in order to see which dimension appeared in which case, with which saliency.

We had been careful to stress the need to read each dimension in relation to the others, as none of them is able to provide an overall and encompassing explanation for the emergence or endurance of conflicts. Each conflict dimension simply stresses one or two factors as the main "cause" of community conflicts, without denying that some other factors may also intervene.

However, the confrontation of this table of conflict dimensions with further research (esp. questionnaires, interviews and further fieldwork) pointed at the need to refine or even significantly modify some of these dimensions, because some of them either do not seem to have the relevance given to them in the literature, or because they needed further qualification. The process of refinement of conflict dimensions is summarised in the section below.

2.1. The relevance of dimensions

As already noted in D4, some dimensions described in D1 seem more relevant than others. The colour scheme used in the table at the end of D1 gave an indication about the relevance of a given dimension for a case study. Dark grey boxes signalled high relevance, light grey boxes moderate relevance. A white box indicated that the dimension was not thought as present in the case being studied. Based only on the number of dark grey boxes, it is possible to rank the dimensions by their rating, both individually and in an aggregate fashion. The rates associated with each dimension may vary between 1 and 12, 1 if the dimension appears in one case only, 12 if the dimension appears in all twelve cases covered by the project.

The following scores, based on the table in D1, can be observed:

Very relevant dimensions:

- Culture/Language (9)
- Territory/Land (7)

Moderately relevant dimensions:

- Socio-economic (4)
- Identity claims (3)
- Elite manipulation (3)
- Access to citizenship (3)
- Neighbours, diasporas, borders (3)

Less relevant dimensions:

- Religious differences (2)

Very relevant cluster:

- Moderately relevant clusters:

- Less relevant cluster:

However, as underlined in D10, opinions about the relevance of dimensions vary according to the person you are talking to. Data collected through questionnaires, as well as through Synthetic Case Descriptions prepared by expert teams, point at some degree of divergence in the ways the relevance of dimensions is assessed. The following table, provided in D10, illustrates these divergences.

[illegible]

Neighbours, Diasp, border	1 0?			2 1	OK	OK	1 ?	OK	0 0 til 2004
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Key to the Table

OK: When data gathered through case study reports, questionnaires and SCD is similar

Red figures indicate a discrepancy between case study reports, questionnaires and SCD data.

In red, first line: data gathered through questionnaires

In red, second line: data gathered through SCD

0 indicates an absence of the dimension at stake

1 indicates that the dimension is moderately relevant

2 indicates that the dimension is highly relevant

Significantly, this table shows strong variations in the appraisal of the relevance of dimensions, and illustrates clearly that most of these conflicts are also conflicts about what the conflict is about. However, some dimensions seem to be less controversial than others: such is the case of religious differences (only two cases of divergence) and of culture/language differences (only three cases of divergence). One can make the hypothesis that these dimensions are less contentious because they refer to “obvious” or highly visible cleavages between populations, that are easily grasped by both actors on the ground and experts. On the contrary, some dimensions like elite manipulation, political access and centre-periphery cleavage are more contentious, a fact which is not really surprising as these dimensions are political ones. They are therefore more likely to be the focus of diverging opinions.

On average, actors in conflict give more importance than experts to most dimensions, especially identity claims, socio-economic differences, territory, centre-periphery cleavage and elite manipulation. This finding is more difficult to explain, as it may be related to various elements: first, as we have just seen, actors in conflict often disagree on what the conflict is about, and therefore put the focus on diverging explanations or features of the conflict, whereas experts, even if they do not always agree, tend to stick to a few key explanations; second, there may be a scientific bias – possibly inferred by the methodology used in PEACE-COM – towards the reduction of the conflict to a series of “key causes”, to the detriment of other causes seen as secondary, even if they seem highly salient in the eyes of the actors on the ground; third, experts and actors on the ground may differ in their understanding of what a “relevant dimension” is. In other words, actors on the ground may have mistaken “relevant” for “present”.

This discrepancy between actors’ and experts’ appraisal of the situation on the ground poses several challenges both for future research and for the setting up of peace programmes, especially because most accommodation policies deal with what experts judge as the most important issues in each conflict. If there is a strong divergence between the experts’ judgement, and the opinions held by the actors on the ground, then the policy is more likely to fail. In addition, PEACE-COM as well as other research projects has shown that taking the actors’ views into account is crucial both for the understanding and the resolution of conflicts. Most of these conflicts are also interpretation conflicts, and it is quite obvious that the actors’ perceptions, even if biased in the eyes of experts, are to be taken seriously. PEACE-COM results therefore plead for a systematic integration of actors’ views and perceptions in the conception and implementation of peace programmes, which should also be more bottom-up, as underlined in D12.

It is also interesting to note that the interpretation of some case studies covered by the project is more contentious than others. According to the case study at stake, there are between 4 and 9 (out of 12) dimensions which are assessed differently by actors and experts. The apparently less contentious cases are the Belgian and Cypriot cases, with only 4 dimensions interpreted differently by actors and experts, whereas the Sandzak and Vojvodina cases display 9 contested dimensions. Explaining such a trend is not easy, but one may think that these last two conflicts are also those which are the less documented amongst our sample. They can also be depicted as “fuzzy” situations, where the positions of the actors on the ground are so dependent on external variables (esp. the future status of Kosovo and the negotiations for an EU accession).

In any case, reasons for divergences should be the focus of future research, as they may explain controversies and unexpected consequences of policies designed to accommodate these conflicts.

2.2. Revising the Table and Including New Dimensions?

2.2.1. Europeanisation as a fully fledged dimension of conflicts?

As explained in D13, in PEACE-COM the concept of Europeanisation does not refer primarily to the European construction and integration, but to the process through which the European dimension has an impact on the conflict situation. Such links between the evolution of community conflicts and the Europeanisation process can be sorted in a typology:

Firstly, Europeanisation refers to the accession or association negotiations for countries which are not part of the EU yet. The literature on conflicts stresses the de-escalating role of such negotiations, yet they only concern a few cases in the conflicts covered in PEACE-COM; moreover, the Cypriot case exemplifies the fact that accession negotiation do not alone lead to a final settlement in a community conflict.

Secondly, the EU can be actively involved in helping parties in conflict reach a settlement, either by acting as a third-party mediator, or by promoting accommodation policies aimed at mitigating tensions. The allocation of so-called “peace funds” is often one of the most visible aspects of such involvement of the EU in the conflict. It is not limited to member states and not even to the periphery of the EU.

Thirdly, the Europeanisation process can be assessed in the implementation at the national and local level of European policies in member states. The most relevant are policies pertaining to the protection of minorities and minority languages on the one hand, since they change the normative framework within which member states deal with their minorities. On the other hand, redistributive policies such as structural funds can also play an important part in improving the economy of regions impoverished by conflicts. Other policies may also have an impact by modifying the structural or discursive environment where the conflict takes place, such as the policies promoting gender equality or women’s rights: yet the literature on conflicts seldom gives any indication on how these policies may impact on the escalation or de-escalation of community conflicts per se.

Lastly, the Europeanisation process includes a change in how actors involved in a community conflict frame the situation in order to include the European level, which in turn allows them to develop strategies directed at European institutions. This orientation can be assessed in the representations of key actors such as the elites, or in political mechanisms such as the tendency of political parties to mobilize not only at the national, regional and local level, but also at the European level – for instance by belonging to a Eurogroup at the European Parliament. It is important to note that such facts do not necessarily refer to peace factors: for instance, parties representing one side in a community conflict may find themselves reinforced by teaming with like-minded parties at the European level.

From this typology, one can draw several conclusions regarding the impact of the Europeanisation process on community conflicts:

- the Europeanisation process concerns both regions within and outside the EU, although not with the same mechanisms;
- it includes both institutional changes and symbolic aspects through the transformation of representations and discourses;
- the Europeanisation process is not to be mistaken for a peace factor. In many cases, it may even lead to an escalation of a community conflict, either by empowering local actors to continue the conflict or by not providing them with the aid and tools that they would need in order to bring about a settlement;
- the Europeanisation process should be fully included as a dimension of conflicts, as its impact is partly independent from the other conflict dimensions previously identified.

2.2.2. Accommodation policies as part of the conflict cycle

Firstly, it is important to note that accommodation policies are supposed to have a de-escalating effect on conflicts: however, several examples well documented in D8 and D12 show that they sometimes have an escalating effect, for instance by polarising the actors on the ground. Moreover, the absence or presence of accommodation policies is also a major factor explaining the evolution of a given conflict. In many instances, the absence of accommodation policies has provoked an escalation of the conflict, while well-designed and encompassing policies have obviously had a soothing effect. In addition, the implementation of accommodation policies provokes a repositioning of the actors on the ground, either vis-à-vis the actor(s) or organisation(s) implementing the accommodation policy, or vis-à-vis the content and aims of the policy itself, or both. In this perspective, many conflicts cannot be understood without taking into account the actors involved in these policies, like, say, the UN in Cyprus or the OSCE in Estonia.

Data gathered through the various PEACE-COM work-packages show that some types of accommodation policies are more likely to become part of the conflict cycle than others. Such is the case of intervention and peace keeping operations, but also of negotiation and mediation policies. Initially, intervention and peace keeping operations were meant to provide the conditions for establishing a ceasefire, and to monitor and report on each side's military activity. They introduced buffer zones, demilitarized areas, and sometimes disarmament of belligerents. But international peace-keeping operations have changed drastically in recent years, with a trend toward operations that blur the distinctions between peace-keeping, postwar societal reconstruction, and forceful intervention (Zisk, 2004; Bhatia, 2003). To the traditional problems associated with peace-keeping (choice and timing of operations, perceived partiality of intervening forces, cost and dangerousness of missions, etc.), new challenges have therefore emerged, testifying for the new, more ambitious mission of peace-keeping operations, such as a higher risk of freezing conflict situations, an increased cost of missions, and a change of the political balance inside the countries torn apart by war, peace keeping forces becoming part of the conflict pattern. In a series of cases covered by PEACE-COM, it is for instance difficult to say whether the "freezing" of the situation (as in the case of Cyprus) and the impossibility to bring about a lasting settlement is actually due to the international intervention, or to the belligerents themselves, or both.

In the same manner, negotiation and mediation policies can also become part of the conflict patterns, because they can be instrumentalized by some political actors, who manoeuvre in order

to gain as much as possible. The main danger lies in violence, which can interfere with process at all stages, during pre-negotiations when belligerents try to optimise their negotiating positions, during negotiations when necessary compromises generate the emergence of dissident groups and spoilers, and of course after negotiations, from the part of parties opposing the peace treaty.

In the same perspective, some external actors initiating or implementing these accommodation policies are more likely to be considered by actors on the ground as actors of the conflict itself. Such is the case of motherlands/ fatherlands: Turkey and Greece in Cyprus, Albania in Kosovo, BiH in Sanjak, Ireland and Great Britain in Northern Ireland, to quote only but a few examples. It is also the case of some international organisations such as the UN in Cyprus or in Kosovo. This trend is particularly obvious when the initiative of the implementation of accommodation policies has been taken by these external actors, whose interference has not been sought for by local actors. Interestingly, as we have seen in D12, the European Union in itself generates on average less negative reactions than other international organisations, and remains seen as an external actor by players on the ground, as shown in the example of Northern Ireland or the Basque Country, where it is mostly praised for its funding programmes.

In existing literature on conflicts, accommodation policies are treated as external factors to the conflict, as independent variables that adapt to the conflict situation. PEACE-COM research shows that the adaptation works both ways, and that conflicts, or more precisely actors in conflict, adapt their actions, discourses and claims to accommodation policies too. In that sense, accommodation policies affect the shape, type and evolution of conflicts.

What is more, accommodation policies do not always accommodate. In many instances (documented in D12), accommodation policies have led to an intensification or an escalation of a given conflict, as shown in the case of Kosovo, or of Northern Ireland during the second half of the seventies. In some other cases, the effect of accommodation policies is at best disputable.

In that sense, we think that accommodation policies in their various shapes, whether initiated and implemented by national actors only, or by international organisations, should be treated as full dimensions of conflicts rather as “solutions” administered independently and neutrally.

2.2.3. The need to refine some dimensions

At a more general level, further work produced within the three years of the PEACE-COM project calls for a refinement of some dimensions as defined in D1:

- First, questionnaires and further analysis point towards some kind of overlap between political access and access to citizenship, whereas the security dilemma dimension (which initially had been associated with political access) seems to refer to completely diverging situations and claims. We therefore propose to associate political access and access to citizenship, and to consider as separate the issue of security (security dilemma) which takes into account the issue of the level of violence, and threat of violence, in a given conflict;
- Second, in D1 we had associated dimensions related to Diasporas, border communities and motherland/fatherland. While Diasporas and border communities admittedly refer to relatively close processes and actors, there are strong differences between on the one hand actors involved in Diasporas or bordering communities, and on the other hand motherland/ fatherland involvement, as shown in the next section of this deliverable. We therefore propose to distinguish these two types of processes.
- third, after having studied in detail the impact of globalisation on conflicts (see next section), we argue that there is a strong difference, again both in terms of actors and processes, between on the one hand globalisation and on the other hand the aftermath of

WWI & WWII and decolonisation, which had originally been put together as ‘global processes’. We thus propose to distinguish them;

- fourth, according to our findings documented in D12, and as it has been summarised and argued in the previous section, accommodation policies, and actors initiating and implementing them, should be considered as a full conflict dimension, impacting on the shape, evolution, escalation and de-escalation of conflicts. For obvious reasons, we have included the “accommodation policies” dimension in the political clusters, but it is worth keeping in mind that they may be initiated and implemented by external actors;
- finally, we argue (and this has also been documented in the previous section as well as in D12), that due to the specificity of our sample of case studies which were chosen in the European Union or its vicinity, Europeanisation should also be included as a full “external” dimension of the conflicts covered here.

What is more, some dimensions need to be fine-tuned. Such is the case of territory, which appears as a dimension in 11 out of the 12 conflicts covered by the project. The use of the territorial rhetoric by the conflicting parties illustrates, both at the internal and external level, the “*reversal of the principal of territoriality*” explained by Bertrand Badie (1995: 102 & following). Badie identifies the “*end of the territories*” (Ibid.) as the main cause of challenging of the national-state model. Territory is becoming the principal marker of identity, the natural prolongation of one group's identity, erasing the political ideal of the Nation-State. Nation-States are being challenged by territorial claims. According to Badie, such evolution leads to the ethnicization of the world and the creation of Ethnic States or Ghetto States (Ibid: 103). Territory is thus a whole and complex dimension on its own and must be separated from the socio-economical dimension. In terms of issue, the territorial dimension refers to the challenging of the State's sovereignty. Stephen Krasner has clustered sovereignty into four main dimensions (Krasner, 1999). The *domestic sovereignty* which is internal, *interdependence sovereignty* is linked to the capacity of a State to control transnational movements. *International legal sovereignty* is the rule that a State recognizes another State. The last type of sovereignty, the *Westphalian sovereignty*, is the notion that States have the right to determine autonomously their own domestic authority structures. The corollary is the principle of nonintervention within a State's internal affairs. According to this typology, the territorial dimension can be divided into two main components. The first component refers to the claims made by a community within a Host-State. They can be either claims for *autonomy*, in a broad meaning, and as a challenge to the domestic sovereignty or claims for *Secession*, closely linked the principle of self-determination (Heraclides, 1997; Talbott, 2000; Chazan, 1991). The difference between autonomy and secession comes from the challenge to territorial integrity. Autonomy, as a technique of internal organization, is an elastic concept that may refers to different degrees and forms of autonomy (federalism, consociation and so)¹. But autonomy does not suppose any challenge to State's sovereignty and supposed the maintenance of allegiance to central authority. At the same time, it is true that the recent development of paradiplomatic relations by regions constitute defies States' sovereignty (Massart-Pierard, 2004; Boulanger, 1997: 40). Secession, on the other hand, constitutes a direct challenge to international legal and Westphalian sovereignty because secessionist movements defies the principle of territorial integrity² such as in Transnistria. The final aim of secession is the grant of international legal and Westphalian sovereignty.

1 Autonomy is used here as a generic concept referring primarily to the centre/periphery issue. See ROKKAN S., URWIN D.W. (eds.), *The Politics of Territorial Identity. Studies in European Regionalism*, Sage, London, 1982; KINGA G., *Minority Governance in Europe*, Series on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues, Vol.1, Budapest, 2001.

2 « Self-determination and secession in constitutional law », Report adopted by the Venice Commission at the 41th meeting, Venice, 10-11 December 1999.

But State's sovereignty can be also challenged by the external territorial claims, mainly irredentist claims (Chazan, 1991), made by external conflicting parties such as Diasporas, bordering communities or kin-States. This is the third component of the territorial dimension. Irredentism, as we understand it, encompasses both territorial and cultural claims. For instance, Hungary's politics with respect to Hungarians living outside of Hungary's territory may be seen as a kind of interference into internal affairs. The program of the Government Office for Hungarians minorities Abroad includes "supporting Hungarian beyond the borders so that they can find prosperity, enforce their rights, keep their language and culture where they were born, reunification of the Hungarian nation within the framework of the enlarging European Union"³.

Our research therefore calls for a further qualification of the territorial dimension either as autonomist claims, secessionist claims, or irredentism.

Taking into account all proposed changes, the revised list of dimensions should thus look as follows:

Identity Dimensions	Religious differences
	Identity Claims
	Culture / Language
Socio-Economic and Geographic Dimensions	Socio-Economic Differences
	Population Shifts
	Territory (Autonomy, Secession, Irredentism)
Political Dimensions	Centre-Periphery
	Political Access and Access to Citizenship
	Elite Manipulation
	Security Dilemma
	Accommodation Policies
"External" Dimensions	Decolonisation, Aftermath WWI & WWII
	Globalisation
	Europeanisation
	Motherland/ Fatherland, Neighbouring Countries
	Diasporas, Bordering Communities

To conclude briefly this section, the in-depth scrutiny of our case studies shows that some dimensions pointed out in the literature as main causes for conflicts in nowadays Europe are not necessarily considered as such both by players on the ground, and by experts. In addition, some dimensions that are traditionally depicted as "external", such as globalisation or motherland/fatherland are in fact more or less internalised, because they impact on positions and representations held by actors in conflict, and sometimes even become actors of the conflict. For instance, it is clear that Europeanisation and accommodation policies are actual dimensions of conflicts and ought to be treated as such: not only can accommodation policies occasionally contribute to conflict escalation when policies happen to have counter-productive results, but their absence can cause conflict escalation in some cases.

3. Assessing the Impact of Conflict Dimensions

As we have already seen, actors and observers of a given conflict may hold diverging views on what the conflict is about, what are its main causes, issues, actors and stakes. What is more, they may also assess in diverging ways the impact of conflict dimensions, some assessing for instance positively the interference of motherlands/fatherlands, while some others may see this interference as detrimental. These divergent views can obviously be partly explained by the ideological, political, economical, etc. situation in which the actor is embedded, as shown by D10. Our political opinions or our economic situation strongly affect our perception of reality, and thus lead to “positioned” views and beliefs.

However, the comparison between cases implemented in PEACE-COM clearly shows that in some cases, a specific factor has, or has had, a conflict-decreasing impact, while the same factor apparently has, or has had, a conflict-increasing impact in another setting. This has for instance been shown in D12 in the case of some accommodation policies or of the intervention of an external player. Does this discrepancy derive from biased perceptions of what this factor is about – in other words, do the concerned actors mean the same thing when they use the same word, like say, territory in Cyprus? Does our research imply that most conflict dimensions can have both escalating and de-escalating impacts, depending on the ways they are dealt with? Or should we also take into account the specific situation in which each conflict dimension is set, and more particularly the other dimensions with which it interacts?

In order to clarify these points, we will use below two telling examples.

The first example is religion, identified as a “cultural” dimension in D1. We have already seen in D1 that no straightforward conclusion should be taken concerning the impact of religious differences, without a closer look at the real influence of clergy and faith in the conflict, and at the extent to which actors in conflict frame it in religious terms. D1 has also shown that even in cases, like in Northern Ireland, where the conflict is framed, both by internal and external actors, in religious terms, religion is not necessarily the main issue or cause of the conflict. In this section, we will see that religion can both be an escalating or de-escalating factor, depending not only on the content of the religious doctrine itself, but also on the nature and position of religious actors, on their perceptions of the situation, as well as on other factors this religious dimension is interacting with.

The second example is globalisation, identified as an “external” dimension in D1. In D1, we had concluded on the difficulty to assess the real impact of globalisation on conflicts, because indicators of globalization are difficult to trace, as globalisation involves complex patterns and processes which impact on political, economical and cultural levels at the same time. Contrary to what was stated in D1, globalisation is not simply an “external” dimension of conflicts, it is also a highly internalised factor, in its consequences but also in the actors’ perceptions and discourses. In order to understand its real impact on conflicts, one should thus disaggregate the ‘globalisation’ factor into a series of dimensions which would allow to take into account its economic, political, cultural, etc. aspects.

3.1. Religions and Conflicts – Towards a Framework for Analysis

3.1.1. Where are we starting from?

Religion, which had long been a cause of conflicts prior to the 18th century, has recently reappeared as an important factor at the international level. With the decrease in influence of secular ideologies such as socialism, the parallel resurgence of faith in many parts of the world, as well as the rise in ethnic or communal wars, and not to mention Muslim fundamentalism and its

terrorist avatars, religion has come back as a major focus of attention for specialists in international relations (Haynes, 2004). Recent research shows that many conflicts continue to be religious, that religious conflicts tend to be more intense than non religious ones, and that there has been an overall increase in the number of religious conflicts (conflicts in which at least one of the parties sees religion as one of the main stakes) since the end of the Second World War (Fox, 2004a: 70). Ethnic conflicts in particular are most likely to be religious, and wars between different religions are far more common than fundamentalist attacks on secular States. Since 1945, religions, and religious differences, are therefore amongst the most common factors of internal or internationalized conflicts.

Such trends, which seem to contradict secularization and modernization theories, without really validating the ones predicting a general “Clash of Civilizations”, have generated the idea in public opinions that conflicts with a strong religious dimension were necessarily more savage, brutal and backward than others: “Religious nationalisms invoke particularly troubling images of strife, hatred, and violence, often for good reason. The recourse to religion as a means to redefine national community can and has led to violence of staggering proportions” (Puri, 2004: 172). The trouble is that religion can also be inimical to nationalism and conflict, and that it can be used as a soothing element in deteriorating situations or peace processes (Ibid: 193). What is more, there are many instances of religiously plural societies that do not fall into conflict, and that manage to reach a balance satisfactory for the major part of the populations.

This seemingly unpredictable impact of religions on societies and on political processes has to be put in relation with their inherent complexity and ambiguity, and with the fact that they are highly diverse and mutable systems, that can be understood either as cultural entities, sociological systems, institutions or communities, to mention only but a few of their multiple facets. Each of these facets can in turn refer to a multiplicity of processes, as demonstrated by Simmel (1955: 158): “[The] sociological significance of religion reflects its dual relationship to life. On the one hand, religion stands in contrast to the whole substance of human life; it is the counterpart and the equivalent of life itself, aloof from its secular movements and interests. On the other hand, religion takes sides among the parties in the secular life, though it had elevated itself above the world of affairs as a matter of principle. As such religion is an element of secular life alongside all its other elements; it becomes involved in the multitude of changing relationships though at the same time it rejects this involvement. As a result a remarkable involution occurs. The disavowal of all social ties, which is evidence of a deep religiosity, allows the individual and his religious group to come in contact with any number of the other groups with whose members they do not share any common interests. And the relationships again serve to distinguish and to determine the individuals concerned as well as the religious groups”.

There have been many attempts to classify and clarify those many dimensions of religions, putting the stress either their doctrinal content, on their structure, on the context they are part of, etc., and to try to relate them to the eruption of conflicts. Amongst these tentative classifications, Jonathan Fox (1999b: 445-452) has listed several basic functions of religion in politics, society and conflicts: first, it provides a meaningful framework for understanding the world; second, it provides a system of values and models of behaviour that are coherent with this framework; third, it organizes communities of believers through the setting up of formal institutions; finally, it develops an ability to legitimize actors, actions and institutions. Starting from this relatively simple classification, we can note that when it comes to analyzing its relationships with conflicts, religion can refer to two different and complementary meanings: first, religion is *a symbolic and cultural framework* which can be used as a social link, and which presents striking resemblances with ethnicity or nationality. This framework can be used as a mobilization tool in conflictual situations: religions can become substitutes for political identities, they can legitimize violence, sanctify a political struggle, point to a scapegoat, boost communitarian pride, encourage fanaticism and build an image of the other as a threat, etc. Second, religion is also *a structuring*

element both for the community of believers, and for the society as a whole. This means that religions are also institutions that structure and divide societies, for instance by nurturing segregated schooling systems, by favouring the maintenance of dedicated newspapers and political parties, etc. But above all, it means that religions are also social, cultural and political actors who can intervene in the public sphere, enter in competition with political elites, and develop in their own bosom different if not contradictory strategies.

The challenge posed by this section is not to develop an analysis of these two meanings of religions in conflictual settings, as such an analysis has already been conducted (See, amongst others, Fox, 1999b; Kowlewski, Greil, 1990; Williamson, 1990; Lincoln, 1985; Lewy, 1974), but to try to overcome three classical shortcomings of existing theories or frameworks for analysis regarding the relationships between religion and society: first, the fact that most of these theories focus on one part of the question only (mostly how religion contributes to conflict ignition or escalation or on the contrary how religion might contribute to conflict management or resolution), as if both questions were not linked; second, the fact that very few of those theories (with the notable exception of Fox in his various publications) have tried to adopt a dynamic approach fully integrating religion in the cycle of conflict; third, the fact that research on religions and conflicts has, for the most part, either rested on specific case studies without trying to link those to a general framework for analysis, or adopted a quantitative approach admittedly very useful for understanding general trends and patterns, but not really informative when it comes to understand complex and contradictory relationships that are often at play at the local level.

As a result, this section uses a comparative and qualitative perspective, and aims at putting in relation three categories of elements which refer to specific tools for analysis:

- First, a content element (religion as a symbolic and cultural framework, religion as a mobilization tool) which requires to look not only at religious texts, but also at their actual translation by religious authorities, and at the way they are taken up and adapted at the grassroots level;
- Second, a sociological element (key role of elites, competition between religious and political elites, etc.) which requires to look at the position of the Churches in society, at their internal divisions, at their relationships with other actors in conflict, etc.;
- Third, a dynamic and contextual dimension (elements of background, escalation or de-escalation phase, juridical and constitutional elements, etc.), which commands to analyze how the two preceding elements evolve, change and interact over time.

The question addressed by this section is not to determine whether there are a lot of 'religious' conflicts or not, or whether this figure is increasing or decreasing, but rather to try to understand what kind of processes are at play when conflicts have a religious dimension. Does religion play any role in the development of conflicts, and if yes, through which processes and patterns, and how do these evolve over the course of conflicts? Can we go beyond the dichotomy root cause/triggering factor and, most importantly, beyond the usual cleavage that is made between religion causing conflicts and religion being instrumentalized by other conflicting actors?

For the sake of clarity, this section will follow a dynamic structure modeled on the conflict cycle: it will first analyze how religions can be underlying causes of conflicts, before examining how religions can contribute to increase the level of violence and intensity of a given conflict; the last part of this section will focus on how religion can contribute to decrease the level of violence and intensity of conflicts, or how it can play a role of containment.

3.1.2. Religions as underlying causes of conflicts

One of the main characteristics of religions is that they tend to shape the opinions of their followers in coherent value systems, and can thus give birth to worldviews relatively closed to each other. Religious groups, especially when belonging to a monotheist tradition, are at the same time identity groups with rather rigid borders. Derriennic (2001) and Reynal-Querol (2002) give two explanations for this phenomenon: first, because monotheisms have a rich and complex cultural content, that allow them to be the bearer of collective identities, with their own world vision, system of values, way of life, etc.; second, because many religions, and in particular monotheisms, have an exclusive character, a characteristic that explains why authors like Huntington, or Max Weber long before him, feared the ‘War of Gods’: “Following Huntington, one of the most important causes of future conflict among civilizations is that their characteristics and differences are less mutable and, therefore, more difficult to reach agreements and solve than political and economic differences. More than ethnicity, religion discriminates and differentiates humans in a sharp and exclusive way, even more than belonging to a country would do” (Reynal-Querol: 31). These tendencies are embedded in the fact that religions generally try to avoid contacts between their followers and others, both formally and informally, for instance by maintaining different habits in terms of food or marriage, which render mixed marriages very difficult and institutionalizes endogamy. It is therefore no surprise that in most systems of belief, changing religion is almost always the most important sin. These elements facilitate the constitution of groups with coherent and sometimes mutually exclusive worldviews, which can then be instrumentalized by identity entrepreneurs. Fundamentalism in particular is characterized by its attempts to create sharp boundaries to the religious community through the building of a dualistic and Manichean world view. When Manichaeism is at its peak and seems to materialize in the presence of another religious group presented as the incarnation of evil, the risk of escalation into an open conflict seems then to increase dramatically. This is probably one of the reasons why religiously fragmented societies seem less prone to conflicts than those where only two religious groups oppose to each other.

Another aggravating factor lies in the control, by Churches, of a series of other social and cultural institutions that play a central role in the socialization of individuals. For instance, worldviews sustained by religious beliefs can be propagated by segregated schooling systems and networks of cultural activities that maintain believers in an integrated and cohesive cultural world. It was for instance the case in Cyprus even before the de facto partition of the island, where the development under Ottoman rule of a dual system in education corresponding to the Muslim and Orthodox Churches was a powerful factor that helped sustaining religion-based cultural identities. A very similar pattern has been at play in Northern Ireland since the creation of the province in 1921, where Protestant and Catholic Churches have been deeply involved in educational and cultural activities. The school system is almost entirely segregated along religious lines – with the exception of a few integrated schools that host less than 4% of pupils – and the Churches coordinate various networks in the fields of culture, sport or social help: “the Churches are not just general labels attached to political parties but also the context of the apparently minute aspects of cultural life. (...) The Churches are not simple institutions with members whose members change their hats in other parts of life. They are also communities of people whose whole lives are lived in the light of their Church experiences and knowing. Thus when they are in the workplace, in pubs, bringing up children, or whatever they may remain partly in Church” (Morrow, Birrell, Greer, O’Keeffe, 1994: 3-4). In these circumstances, the influence of Churches is more far-reaching than if they had confined themselves to the realm of the spiritual and ritualistic, they become powerful agents of the social fabric of communities, and they even impact on the identities of those who do not go to Church and/or do not believe in God.

When this process is pushed at its maximum, when religion superimposes itself on other kinds of cleavages, religion becomes a very powerful ethnic marker. In many conflicts where religion is

involved, one can indeed find that religion has played a preeminent role in defining social and cultural identities. In the Balkans for instance, there has long been a relative symbiosis between some religious and ethnic identities, which has only become obvious to outsiders when Yugoslavia broke up, and when the conflict erupted. Northern Ireland is also a very good example of such a pattern, as the two communities whose members belong to different religions are also divided on other matters, such as national allegiances, culture, history, and access to political and economic power. These divisions are mutually reinforcing. Even though the conflict is not the result of antagonistic religious beliefs or of the activities of religious zealots, religion continues to inform identities, provide values, organize activities and help structure social life. It also engages more or less directly in political debate. In those configurations, the social and relational dimensions of religion are at least as important as the supernatural and ritualistic (Mitchell, 2004: 250).

In these processes, the role of Churches as institutions is paramount, but different patterns are at play, according to whether the religion enjoys an official status or not. Paradoxically, in the Northern Irish case, it is the fact that the Catholic Church was not given any official status when the province was created in 1921, and on the contrary that the various Protestant Churches could be more easily identified with the governing authorities, that explains the somehow greater role the Catholic Church plays in the everyday life of many Catholics, through the existence of great variety of social organizations and networks: "As an institution, the political profile of the Roman Catholic Church is much higher than that of any Protestant Church. In the absence of a State to which many Catholics owe their unconditional allegiance, the Church has become the main institutional organizer" (Morrow et al: 260). The position of Churches as institutions therefore does not only depend on the content and characteristics of religion itself, but also on historical patterns that affect their place in societies.

In addition, following Terence McCaughey (1993: 130-132), we might distinguish between two models of relationships between religious institutions and States: on the one hand, religious institutions might adopt a 'Church' attitude, by acting as the *cultus publicus*, and by trying to instill their values into the public sphere and the State; on the other hand, they might adopt a position of retreat, a 'Sect' attitude, whereby they decide to live apart from the world and from worldly politics. According to the attitude that is adopted, religions will or will not be the support for a specific political project. When two religions have the ambition of acting like a 'Church', as the *cultus publicus*, then a conflict is more likely. The position that is adopted by the religious institutions does not seem to depend on the doctrinal content of the religion, but rather on the context in which religious groups are embedded. More specifically, it appears that a threat posed on the existence of a given religion pushes its clergy to enter the political field in order to defend itself. This is particularly obvious in two kinds of settings: first, when a specific religious group is victim of discriminations and of segregation because of the nature of its faith (Fox, 2000a; Fox, 2000b). The group that is discriminated against is likely to develop grievances which are then articulated and put forward by religious elites, and which can constitute the basis for protest and rebellion. Discriminatory treatments were for instance common in colonization phases, where the religions of indigenous populations were often despised and repressed by colons. The Irish example is again very telling, as Catholics were openly discriminated against by Protestants, Protestants being traditionally identified with British settlers, while Catholics embodied the 'local' population. This discrimination was particularly fierce from the 17th to the 19th century, a period which is crucial for understanding the inextricable link that has been forged between Catholicism and Irish nationalism (Morrow et al.: 240). As a consequence of this process, in nowadays Northern Ireland, the correlation between religion and political choices is still very high, and directly stems from this history of discrimination. The division between the two religious groups has crystallized in diverging political projects, which remain nearly unchanged today, with most Protestants voting for unionist parties (in favour of maintaining the union with Great Britain),

while the great majority of Catholics vote for nationalist parties (in favour of the reunification of the island).

The second type of instance which can lead to the development of political projects by religious institutions is when there is a significant modification in the existing political equilibriums, which in turn provokes a reshuffling of power positions in the society, threatening guaranteed incomes. In Cyprus, such a process has been at play at the beginning of the 20th century, as a consequence of British annexation. For centuries, Orthodox Christian and Muslim inhabitants of the island had lived together, side by side, mostly in mixed settlements in peace, as distinct religious communities. In the course of Ottoman rule (1571-1878), religion and religious institutions were the crucial actors whose missions were to maintain the distinct identities of their communities. If Churches as institutions clearly had extensive political powers, thanks to the *millet* system⁴ by which different religious groups were granted certain local autonomy in specific community affairs, they had not yet developed contradicting political projects. As soon as Cyprus had been under his control, the Ottoman Sultan had entitled the Orthodox Church to represent local Christians. Throughout the Byzantine era, the Archbishop of Cyprus became the *ethnarch* serving as the 'community leader' of Christian population. The Ottoman State recognized this status of the Archbishop in the second half of the seventeenth century. The Orthodox Church was also granted an imperial *berat*, which empowered it with certain powers in such issues as marriage, commerce, inheritance, and ownership. Despite intense interaction between the communities of Cyprus, the *millet* system served to keep them separate because it gave each community opportunity to exist in the political system not only as a cultural group but also an institutional entity. The *millet* system also served to provide a distinct identity for Muslim population, since Muslim inhabitants shared the same religious faith as with the Ottoman ruling elite. With the imposition of British annexation in 1914, the elites in both communities, however, began to air conflicting views on particular areas of country politics. The 'legal status' of the island was the most important issue electrifying political atmosphere. Influenced by the Greek war of independence, the Orthodox Church of Cyprus and the Greek speaking political elite began to articulate their sympathy to the idea of *enosis*⁵, while the Muslim political elite began to express its sympathy towards the restoration of the Ottoman supremacy in the island in response to this unionist claim.

From this first overview, we can conclude that even if Churches do not always take directly part in conflicts, they sometimes play the role of background or underlying causes, as they create the favourable environment in which solidified and coherent groups can oppose to each other. This is of course not to say that religions always lead to the eruption of violence, but simply that, when a certain number of circumstances are met, such as a binary division of groups in a given society, they give birth to specific configurations in which conflict is likely to erupt. Another important element is that when it comes to understanding the role of religion as a background factor for conflicts in multicultural societies, at least three types of analysis should be implemented: first, an analysis of the doctrinal content of religions, in other words how religions position themselves as systems of values and worldviews, likely to oppose to each other; second, through a socio-political approach, an analysis of religious institutions and of religious actors, who might be lead to carry on to the public sphere the claims and aspirations of their followers; third, through an historical and dynamic approach, an analysis of the context in which religions are embedded, its evolutions and how they impact on the position of religious groups in the given society.

⁴ Millet system was a kind of classification of Ottoman subjects based on religious beliefs.

⁵ Enosis means unification of Cyprus with mainland Greece.

3.1.3. Religions as escalating factors

The question is now to understand through which mechanisms religions can actually contribute to the escalation of conflicts. Some studies have already traced relations between religions and international interventions (Fox: 2001), between religions and nationalism leading to collective violence and more specifically to terrorism (Armstrong, 1997), between religions and State failures (Fox: 2004a), or between religions, ethnic nationalism and revolutionary wars (Fox, 1999b; Fox: 2004b). All these studies show that religion is in no way the only factor explaining the eruption of conflict, that its influence might vary greatly in time (hence the importance of adopting a dynamic approach), but that it can nevertheless have an escalating influence on conflict, and that the presence of religion as a major dividing criterion between groups increases the level of violence and intensity of conflicts.

However, there is no simple link between religion and escalation of conflicts, as religion may influence the development of conflicts in a number of ways, which are partly cross-cutting. Moreover, as we shall see, religion can, at a given point in time, be both a factor of escalation and a factor of appeasement of the very same conflict. Maïla (2004: 40-41) for instance lists three main functions of religion in conflictual environments: first, religion can be a substitute for political identities in crisis, and become a federating element; second, religion can help legitimizing violence, by sanctifying the struggle in the name of God; in this case, religion is instrumentalized as an instrument of power; third, religion can be used as a factor in mobilization, by mobilizing basic emotions such as fear and threat. More specifically, Crettiez (2006: 107-124) has also put in evidence the strong link that seems to exist between nationalisms and religions. Nationalisms and religions, he argues, have a similar functioning, that we can map through rituals and practices that bear some similarities, but also through discourses and values such as appeal to sacrifice, search for authenticity, and missionary dimensions. He contends that these links can be explored in two respects, first in the religious logic of nationalism, and second in the nationalist logic of religion. The religious logic of nationalism can be traced mostly through rituals and liturgy (such as the sacredness of the nation, of its origins, of certain nationalist rites, of nationalist burials, etc.), through a certain cult of authenticity that nationalism entertains (for instance the national community is always presented as unique in its origins, with a unique ancestor from which its specific identity derives), through a sanctified quest for a mission (a future that has to be fulfilled), and through mechanisms such as communitarian comfort, whereby the national community is a source for cohesion and integration especially in an ever changing environment. Most nationalist ideologies present in contemporary ethno-national conflicts indeed display those characteristics, as shown in the cases of Serbian nationalism in ex-Yugoslavia, of Republican nationalism in Northern Ireland, or of Basque nationalism in Spain. Nationalist propaganda sanctifies the fighters, who endorse all the clothes of divine emissaries fulfilling a sanctified mission, and who are regarded as such by a significant (though diminishing steadily in the cases of Basque and Irish nationalisms) share of the community they are part of.

In some other instances, like in the case of nationalisms in the Israel/ Palestine conflict, (which was not within the scope of PEACE-COM and therefore could not be studied further), the links between religion and nationalism seem even more inextricable, as if groups in conflict could not really differentiate the defence of their religion and the fight for their 'national rights'. This can be partly explained by the complementary aspect of the link developed by Crettiez between nationalisms and religions, namely the nationalist logic of religion. In conflicting situations, and more specifically when religion as an institution is threatened, it tends to adopt a nationalist stance. By prescribing an identity to members of a given community, and by becoming a quasi-substitute for national identities, religion can then legitimize and even sustain and exacerbate nationalist violence, insofar as it gives it a framework for legitimization. It becomes a tool for mobilization, and strives to strengthen the endangered identity by finding a scapegoat – usually the 'other' community. It nurtures the idea of an immediate and total threat embodied by the

‘other’, and it therefore comforts fanaticism and racism. Finally, it gives an indisputable certainty to the nationalist struggle which thus becomes a mystic duty, as apparent in many contemporary ‘national liberation’ struggles.

What is difficult to assess is whether religion (content element), and religious actors (sociological element), are the primary agents for the eruption of conflict, or if they are just instrumental, if they just accompany its development. Evidence from the case studies shows that in fact both processes are often at play, at various degrees according to the context. Religion can indeed be used as a support for political mobilization, and play an *inspirational role*, as defined by Puri (198): “Religion can be a central aspect of nationalist movements, but not without active political intervention (...). [It] can help shape the aims of nationalist movements”. In other words, religion can be at the origin of various nationalist movements, for instance by originating the creation of a political movement or party – as shown by the case of the DUP (Democratic Ulster Party) in Northern Ireland, a radical unionist party that has been set up in 1971 by the Reverend Dr. Ian Paisley who has also created his own Church, the Free Presbyterian Church; in this specific case, the main objectives of the party are political and not religious, even if the rationale for sustaining those political objectives is ultimately the preservation of Protestantism in this corner of Ireland. There are many explanations for this intrusion of religion into politics, like the perception by a specific community of believers of a challenge or a threat posed to its religious values and beliefs by the increasing visibility or presence of another religious group. The response will then often be aggressive or even conflictive, as shown by the concept of holy or just war.

At a more indirect level, religion can also take an active role in the development of a political movement or ideology. Ivekovic (2002) for instance shows, with the case of ex-Yugoslavia, how religion and xenophobic nationalism can reinforce each other. More specifically, the case study report prepared by the expert team shows that ethnic conflicts in the territory of former Yugoslavia seemed to have increased the religious consciousness of populations to such an extent that it is difficult to decide what, from religion or nationalism, came ‘first’. In the not very well known case of the Sandžak region in Serbia for instance, a relatively limited conflict opposes Orthodox Serbs and Muslim/ Bosniak communities, with Serbs referring to the pre-Ottoman period to claim sovereignty over the region, while Bosniaks refer to four and a half centuries of Sandžak having existed as a Turkish territory within Bosnia. Both parties to the conflict see each other as the enemy to their ethnic and cultural self-essence that is jeopardized by the political and economic expansion of the other community. Since the beginning of the nineties, the number of worshippers has increased significantly, in the Serbian Orthodox as well as Muslim communities. The Serbian Orthodox Church and the Islamic Community of Sandžak do not have mutual conflicts nor do they officially interfere with political relations of actors at the local level, but they indeed indirectly support certain political programs. In that respect, the Serbian Orthodox Church has a very strong nationalistic wing, while the Meshihat of the Islamic Community of Sandžak, on its part, supports the Memorandums released by the Bosniak Ethnic Council of Sandžak. This Council is directed by Sulejman Ugljanin, who is often depicted by Serbs as a secessionist and Islam fundamentalist, as an enemy of the State and of the Serbs. On the other hand, the Muslim community in Sandzak is not formally involved in politics and does not support ethnic Muslim political actors, but supports higher autonomy for ethnic Muslims, with the aim to provide wherewithal for maintaining the Muslim culture. In this case, even though religion does not seem to be the main reason for the conflict and for political mobilization, the increased religious consciousness of local populations has generated its own dynamic of estrangement and dissociation from other groups, and provides support for diverging political projects. This ability of religion to build links with political projects and actors refers to its capacity to articulate non religious grievances of ethnic groups (Fox: 1999a). This capacity obviously varies according to the context and to the fact that religion is at the centre of the conflict or not – if religion is the main issue, then grievances are likely to be linked to religious

matters only. This means that, a bit paradoxically, it is mainly when the conflict is not primarily religious that religions are the most likely to intervene in worldly matters, in the political or social realms.

But religion can also be instrumentalized by political actors, and be used as a source of legitimization for their ideologies or projects. This is what some authors have called the *instrumental role* of religion: “In some cases, nationalisms are not inspired by religion as much as they seek religious justification, religious symbolism, and religious interpretations to garner support for their cause” (Puri: 197). As providers of values, beliefs, myths and models, religions are abiding sources of references and legitimacy for political movements. They are also models that can be mimicked through dedicated rituals and ceremonies whose main aim is to sanctify the nationalist/ethnic/liberation struggle. Carrying the fight in the name of God indeed allows fighters to present it as immemorial and morally superior. Religions are very powerful fighting reasons, as they can lead individuals to kill and die for a just cause. The fact that religion is not the main stake is not even relevant, as any attack on a symbol or territory to which the group is attached is assimilated to an attack on its religion, and vice versa. In this respect, the Kosovo case is very telling, insofar as one of the main reasons why Serbs are opposed to its independence is the fact that it is considered as the cradle of the Serbian nation, as testified by the presence on its soil of numerous Orthodox monasteries. One should thus beware of simplistic explanations, as religion can be used as a tool for differentiating and opposing communities, even if it is not at the centre of the current conflict. Another non European but telling example can be found in India where deadly inter-communal riots have been opposing Hindus and Muslims, but where religious violence is best interpreted as a way to polarise the electorate, as a tool in a political struggle orchestrated by political actors (Robin, 2004: 35). There are here obvious links with the creation of India and Pakistan, where religious differences have been politicized, and ethnicity re-imagined as religious affiliation and made the basis for political sovereignty. We can thus see that religion as a doctrinal content can have both direct and indirect effects on the escalation of a given conflict, most notably when it is instrumentalized by political actors.

As far as the role of religious elites in escalation of conflicts is concerned (sociological approach), close attention has to be paid towards the structure of relationships between Churches and political elites, and its evolution. Three kinds of configuration, obviously not mutually exclusive, may lead to the involvement of religious elites in conflicts. First, religious elites can get involved because of the challenge to one’s religion posed by another religious group, a challenge to which political elites do not seem to respond adequately. In this case, the threat to a specific religion seems serious enough to provoke the involvement of religious leaders in contentious politics. A strident example can be found in the Northern Irish case, where some Protestant leaders active in the political field, like the above mentioned Ian Paisley, have not hesitated to recourse to theology to demonize their political adversaries, as explains Myrtle Hill: “Following a tradition stretching back through the centuries, Paisley identifies the Papacy as the Antichrist, and interprets any threat to Ulster’s Protestant and British heritage as part of a conspiracy predicted in the biblical prophecies. Thus the Treaty of Rome, which heralded the formation of the European Economic Union, was perceived as a religious and political confederacy predicted in Daniel 2:1-45 and Revelation 17 – a papist superstate. Closer relations between Dublin and London, within this context, even led to Margaret Thatcher being dubbed an agent of the Antichrist” (2001: 52). In this case, political events are read through a religious lens, which puts them in ‘coherence’, relates them to an age old (and therefore seemingly plausible) worldview, and gives religious leaders utmost legitimacy to take up the challenge and get involved in the political field.

The second kind of configuration where religious elites can play a role in conflict escalation is when they take part in a conflict in order to support and reinforce the legitimacy of their political ‘camp’. In this configuration, religious elites can take part directly in the course of a conflict either as political actors, in which case they may enter in competition with secular politicians of their

own camp, or as religious leaders per se. The Northern Irish example is here again very telling, as the Protestant clergy has always played an important role in politics, and several most prominent unionist leaders are Protestant ministers⁶. Orange (Protestant) societies such as the Orange Order play also a fundamental role in the political, economic, social and cultural life in the province, to such an extent that up until recently, a Protestant politician not belonging to the Orange Order had next to no chance to get elected. Numerous other examples can be found during the breaking down of Yugoslavia, during which for instance the Orthodox hierarchy and priests were highly active, and toured the territories controlled by the Serb forces in order to encourage them (Ivekovic: 525). In this perspective, the inextricability of religion and nationalism was reinforced by a double move: not only did Serbian nationalists use religion as a legitimizing tool, but religious leaders did also directly engage their legitimacy and power of influence in order to sustain them. In this case, religious leaders were openly supporting Serbian nationalism, but without entering directly the political scene, a relative position of retreat that did not diminish their influence, as one may argue that the impact of their involvement might have been stronger precisely because they did not enter a field where their legitimacy might have been put into question.

Third, the involvement of religious elites might be provoked by a change in the balance of power that is threatening their position, or the position of the community they represent, in the given society. As we have seen when we looked at the reasons that might be leading a religious institution to develop a political project, Churches, especially when they want to maintain a high public profile, are likely to feel threatened by any political or institutional change impacting on their own competencies. In this perspective, Churches might decide to enter the political field, and hence, become active in a conflict, in order to preserve their position, and not necessarily out of theological or doctrinal reasons. In Cyprus for instance, religious elites have played a key role in the escalation of the conflict between the two communities. During the early years of British rule, the Orthodox Church, as well as Muslim leaders, indeed began to insist on maintaining certain traditional rights to which they were entitled during Ottoman era, such as political representation of Christian population of the island by Orthodox bishops. British colonial rule had indeed challenged the role of traditional institutions which had once served to maintain distinct cultural identities, and religious elites reacted by reasserting their role of “natural” leaders of the two communities. The will of Churches to maintain a system that fitted their specific wishes led to them to develop or support contradicting political options, and become leading actors in the subsequent conflict, as shown by the example of Makarios on the Greek Cypriot side, who was elected in 1950 Archbishop of Cyprus (he was therefore not only the official head of the Orthodox Church in Cyprus, but also the *Ethnarch*, the de facto national leader of the Greek Cypriot community) and then elected President of Cyprus in 1960. This example clearly shows that it is the imposition of new political institutions and rules by the British in 1914 that generated a feeling of fear and threat on the part of religious institutions, which then decided to counteract by reaffirming their grip on ‘their’ respective communities. Sometimes these processes of political change are accompanied by economic trends which destabilize local populations, inciting them to turn to their religious leaders for explanation and comfort. Such a combination of changes has been recently visible in Northern Ireland, where the Protestant community had to face both a change in the political system that they were dominating, and at the economic level, with the decline of the industries in which they were traditionally employed: “With the Northern Ireland political scenario facing inevitable change, it is perhaps not surprising that the vulnerability of the increasingly marginalized should seek justification and comfort in the language of the faith that promises retribution and reward, and a prophetic doctrine which throughout history and across nations has provided a refuge” (Hill: 54).

⁶ However, contrary to what happened for instance in Latin America, in Northern Ireland no member of the Catholic clergy has ever stood for political office.

At an ideological level, this involvement of religious elites in the course of a conflict can take different shapes, which are not mutually exclusive, like revolutionary messianism, militant religious nationalism, or support for a revolutionary upheaval (Fox: 1999b). In all these cases theology is conveyed in order to provide two sets of legitimization: first, the legitimization for the involvement of religious leaders in temporal politics; second, the legitimization of a specific political project which is meant to allow the survival of the religion both at the doctrinal and at the institutional levels.

So if religions can undoubtedly contribute to the increase in intensity and violence of conflicts, this contribution may follow various patterns, which can be mutually reinforcing. Both religious contents and religious elites can be at the origins of the eruption of conflict (inspirational role), or can be instrumentalized by other types of actors, mostly political and military (instrumental role). However, in many cases it remains difficult to decide whether religion can be considered as a root cause, as a triggering factor, or even simply as an issue of current conflicts. In this perspective, it seems that a good understanding of conflicts requires that we pay attention both to historical causes and current issues, as complex interaction processes are at play between them. Another complexity lies in what we could call the shifting temporality of causes: one of the main characteristics of contemporary conflicts is indeed that they feed themselves constantly, they are self-perpetuating, start-up conditions giving birth to new conditions and paradigms in the framework of which new grievances can develop. This peculiarity poses a great challenge to analysis, because some processes which are rightly pointed out as the root causes of a conflict, like, say, religious discrimination during the phase of colonization in Ireland, may be a lot less relevant than other dimensions for characterizing or even understanding its current shape.

3.1.4. Religions as soothing factors

If the involvement of religions in conflicts both as underlying elements and as escalating factors is indubitable, this overview of the possible relationships between religions and conflicts would be incomplete if we did not also look at the ways in which religions can, on the contrary, be either obstacles to the eruption and escalation of conflicts, or conciliatory factors that can be used for appeasing them. Surprisingly however, most of the theoretical literature dealing with the relationships between religion and conflicts, or more generally with religion in international relations, tends to be rather schizophrenic, either focusing on the aggravating impact of religions on conflicts (dominant approach in political science and in international relations), or on the major role that religious leaders can play in peace and reconciliation processes (dominant approach in peace and conflict studies). But when it comes to looking at specific case studies, one has to admit that both processes can be at play, sometimes even at the same time. As testified by the Northern Irish, Israel/Palestine, or Bosnian cases, religious leaders can both be at the forefront of the fighting, and of peace initiatives at a certain point in time, and a Church which has actively taken part in the escalation of a given conflict can, at a later stage, play a major role in its appeasement. Theoretical frameworks understandably grapple with this complexity and seemingly contradictory patterns, and struggle to integrate them in a common approach. As complex and highly diverse sets of beliefs and values, most religions include both peaceful and violent tendencies. Many elements in religious doctrines are ambivalent, and can be interpreted in ways that might foster violence or tolerance. In the same manner, religious actors and institutions are highly diverse, and may be cut across by different, if not completely diverging, interests and opinions regarding involvement in politics and in conflicts. What is more, these attitudes and interests may evolve in the course of time, and according to the evolution of the context; thus explaining why religious leaders who were deeply involved in the eruption of a conflict are now taking an active part in its resolution, and vice versa.

As far as the content of religions is concerned, one should obviously recall that religions are

amongst the main sources of legitimacy for States and governments, and thus of stability. Some authors like Lincoln (1985) have shown that religions could adopt different types of attitudes towards the political environment there are embedded in: they can either resist it, rebel against it, or support the status quo. In this last case, religion as an institution may oppose itself to conflict, insofar as it supports the existing political regime, in return for non-interference or support by the State. Churches as institutions have a strong inertia and can use their various networks and power of influence in order to contain discontent on the part of their believers. This ability of Churches to provide legitimacy to governments is consistent with the fact that they can also use it to legitimize the fight of opposition and rebellion movements, hence the importance, for secular governments, to institutionalize some form of official recognition and participation of Churches in the public sphere. In this case, religions are not so much factors of appeasement than factors of containment, as shown by many examples in the Third World, where religion is used as a means to contain claims by impoverished and desperate populations.

Religions can also have a containing effect when religious cleavages and meaningful cleavages at political level don't coincide or coincide only partly, thus rendering more problematic both the instrumentalization of religion by political actors, and the involvement of religious leaders at the political level. One of the most interesting cases in that respect is the case of Muslims in Bosnia. As shown by Friedman (in Mojzes, 1998: 1-9), even if Bosniak Muslims used to distinguish themselves from Serbs or Croats before the breaking up of Yugoslavia, they did not think of themselves as anything more than a religious minority, and, when asked to choose a national identification for census purposes, they usually chose "nationally undetermined" or "Yugoslav". This reluctance to choose a specific national and political identity, coupled with a relatively high tolerance for ethnic diversity, apparently did not completely fade away with the eruption of the war: "Even during the contemporary carnage visited upon Bosnia and Herzegovina by rampaging Serbs and Croats as well as Muslims, many Bosnian Muslims have persisted in clinging to the idea of a multinational, secular, European country" (Ibid: 7-8). At the same time, this decoupling of religious and national identities is probably one of the main explanations for the fate of Bosnia, which remains nowadays one of the most ethnically diverse (even if far from peaceful and stable) Balkan State.

As far as the role of religions in conflict settlement and conflict resolution is concerned, it is quite common to point that religions are generally committed to values of peace and tolerance, at least in their founding texts. History also gives us plenty of examples where religious leaders have successfully intervened as mediators in conflicts, in Latin American conflicts or elsewhere (Gopin, 1997: 1). But what about the role of religion as a de-escalating factor when religion is part of the elements that divide two groups or nations in conflict? Theories on the relationships between religions and conflicts give us very few hints on this question. As we have seen, existing research shows that when religion is one of the main issues of a given conflict, grievances articulated by religious institutions are likely to deal with religious matters only, and when on the contrary religion is not at the centre of the conflict, then religious institutions are likely to get involved on non-religious issues (Fox: 1999a). This suggests that in cases of conflicts with a strong religious dimension (where one of the main elements of opposition or incompatibility of interests is religion itself) religions might not be playing a major role in peace processes, except as far as interreligious dialogue or ecumenical activities are concerned. Case studies examined in PEACE-COM seem to suggest that it is indeed the case. In many instances where religion is one of the main dividing factors between opposing communities, religious elites have launched ecumenical activities at the grassroots level, such as ecumenical prayer groups, and have drawn on sacred texts and ethical precepts designed to favour peaceful coexistence between different religious groups, in order to make suggestions for political and cultural settlements. They have however not been very often at the forefront of the main peace initiatives, and have rather stayed in the background of peace discussions, striving to create a favourable context for peace by

denouncing in everyday sermons the use of religion for legitimizing atrocities, or by trying to demonize other religious groups. In Northern Ireland for instance, the highest authorities of Catholic and Protestant Churches support a programme called Education for Mutual Understanding (EMU), whose aim is to encourage better community relations. As we have seen previously, most Protestant and Catholic pupils in Northern Ireland are educated apart from each other and have few opportunities to meet and to learn to trust each other. The EMU programme was set up in 1983, as a set of cross-curricula themes, but also of activities and objectives that should be addressed by all teachers of all subjects throughout each stage of education. Amongst these objectives stand the need to foster respect for self and others, to understand and deal creatively with conflict, to raise awareness of interdependence between groups, and to understand cultural diversity. Beyond this specific example, it is worth noting that religions can play a major role in de-escalation when Churches authorities modify their attitudes towards another religion in general – such as, for instance, the change in the Catholic Church's attitude towards Judaism over the past decades. These general changes might impact dramatically on patterns of relationships between religious groups.

But here the sociological approach of religions seems of utmost importance, as it is very often the religious leaders who may be respected personalities both in their own communities and outside, who are able to give the major impetus for often painful and difficult changes. These religious leaders can play a very important role in conflict resolution insofar as they often are charismatic leaders who have a great influence on religious adherents, and who are generally trusted by politicians and other religious officials alike. They can mobilize values such as empathy or sanctity of life in order to convince their fellow believers of the righteousness of a peace process, and then convert an agreement concluded at the elite level into genuine changes at the grassroots level. This involvement of religious elites in peace processes can take two major forms, with top-down and bottom-up processes. For instance in Bosnia both the Catholic and Orthodox Churches have tried to foster ecumenism and religious dialogue, by inviting the main representatives of their clergies to enter into joint discussions. Initiatives have also been launched in order to facilitate interreligious dialogue at the grassroots level, for instance with the creation of the International Center for Promoting Interreligious Dialogue, Justice and Peace, “Zayedno” [Together] in Sarajevo the 10th December 1991 (Marko Oršolić in Mojzes: 262-268).

In addition, one should not forget that there may also be divisions within religious communities on the use of violence, or on the degree to which a religious group is threatened by another. Churches, as any major social institution, are highly diverse, and composed of various traditions whose attitude towards other groups may vary a lot. For instance Croat Catholicism, at the time of the dissolution of Yugoslavia, was grossly divided between a radical wing which was supporting the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), and a more moderate wing which did not wish to take part in politics. In that sense, the ‘Church’ attitude, leading to an increased involvement of Churches in the public sphere, coexisted with the ‘Sect’ attitude, leading them to adopt a position of neutrality and of retreat, as depicted by McCaughey (1993). This example clearly shows that diverging attitudes and strategies can coexist to a certain extent in a single religious institution, at a certain point in time. And when religious elites refuse to be associated to political matters, and try to distance themselves from politicians who instrumentalize them, religion might have a soothing impact on conflict.

In addition, it would be highly misleading to generalize for instance the attitudes of the lower clergy to all levels of authorities inside the Churches. Research has indeed shown, as in the cases of Bosnia or of Northern Ireland, that the lower clergy, which is usually closer to believers, tends to be more involved in conflicts but also in trust-building measures. In ex Yugoslavia bishops have encouraged their siblings to defend their ‘ancestral lands’ (Ivekovic: 525), but in Northern Ireland they have been organizing ecumenical meetings and workshops bringing together members of opposing religious groups, and trying to find a way forward (Cooney, 1997: 77-78).

If the higher ecclesial authorities seem to generally favour a more moderate attitude, there is therefore no general pattern as far as the lower clergy is concerned. On the whole, it is more involved in temporal matters, and also more intensively and deeply involved, whether in actual fighting or in peace initiatives. This multilevel character of most religious institutions explains the puzzling fact that religions may be at the same time engaged in a conflict, and in discussions trying to solve it.

Another element of complexity lies in the fact that, as other important social actors, Churches and religions become part of the on-going cycle of conflict, once it has erupted. In other words, Churches and religions impact on the development of conflicts as much as conflicts impact upon them. Despite their claim of standing largely outside of temporal matters, Churches are highly permeable institutions, both in terms of structures and of values. This permeability explains that the Churches' positions regarding a specific conflict or political system might evolve over time, notwithstanding doctrinal precepts. In addition, as cultural entities, religious systems are affected by more general cultural changes, like for instance, especially in the Western World, the steady decrease of faith and practice, or more largely by what has been called a secularization process. Despite being highly controversial, paradoxical and diverging according to the geographical area – to the point that it is actually difficult to know whether secularization has decreased, or not, the potential for religious conflict (See for instance Fox, 1999b: 435-438) – the effects of secularization and modernization seem very real. For instance, in contemporary Europe, secularization has induced changes in the discourses of the main (Christian) Churches, which seem now more oriented towards the private sphere. And even in cases of conflicts which were at some stage framed in religious terms, as in the case of Cyprus, nowadays religion does not seem to be a central conflicting issue anymore, as if communities did not 'need' religion anymore to make their differences clear, and as if politics had adequately taken over for defending their claims. In the northern part of the island, the mosques do not have a determining role in political or economic life, and as far as Turkish Cypriot political parties are concerned, the mosques do not have a say on the political development of the island. In the southern part, even if the Orthodox Church remains a powerful actor, a similar process of secularization seems to be at play, with a relatively low visibility of religious arguments on the political scene.

Assessing the impact of religions and of religious actors on the development, escalation and soothing of conflicts thus requires understanding the interplay between different kinds of elements, in particular the doctrinal content (which can itself be further disaggregated into what the founding texts say, how religious authorities interpret them in the light of the current context, and how these interpretations are understood and translated at the grassroots level), the sociological dimension of Churches (their status in society, their attitude towards worldly matters and their internal divisions), and the evolution of the context in which they are embedded (in particular the changes that are likely to affect their position in a given society). In most of the cases examined here, those elements have different, sometimes contradicting, impacts on the development of conflicts, and no simple and general rule can be drawn. Conflicts are always multi-causal and evolving, and religions as well as religious actors may be considered as root causes, as triggering or as soothing factors, or all at the same time. An adequate framework for analysis of the impact of religions on conflicts should therefore be multidimensional, dynamic and multileveled, in order to grasp and account for this complexity.

3.2. Blame it on the global: Assessing the role of globalization in the escalation or de-escalation of community conflicts in Europe

It has been so far difficult to assess what exact role is played by globalization in the evolution of community conflicts in Europe, since the literature offers both theories of the escalating role of globalization and – less frequently – of the pacifying role of international exchanges and of “sweet commerce”. If the argument that globalization has damaging consequences on socio-economic inequalities in “the South” is widespread, which leads some authors to conclude that it contributes to fuelling local community conflicts, the same argument can hardly be translated in countries which seem to benefit from the globalization process. The political consequences of globalization are also more difficult to track in a context marked by the Europeanisation process. At the same time, globalization is mobilized in the discourses of various actors engaged in community conflicts or dedicated to solving them – with a content which may vary a lot: while some actors think of globalization as a positive step towards the stabilization of an open, peaceful society, some others are very close to the critical views of the “global justice movement”, in which some of them participate.

How can one account for the escalation and – in some cases – de-escalation of community conflicts, especially in Europe? The review of the literature shows that various dimensions have been pointed at in order to explain why community conflicts divide some societies today – such as contradictory claims over the same territory, religious divides or the exclusion of one group from conventional political participation. The question has also been examined of why community conflicts erupt in the first place, and the array of root causes which have been cited included historical aspects – such as a colonial past – , as well as cultural or socio-economic ones. Since the root cause of a conflict may not be what actors engaged in it fight over today, it has been possible to ascribe to conflicts wide explanations largely disconnected from what local actors experience. Such attempts are motivated by the assumption that some phenomena are not visible by people who suffer from them, including because the system of action is in fact not limited to the actual territory where the conflict is taken place. Answers ought then to be sought elsewhere, in realms not directly connected to the manifestations of the conflict itself.

Globalization fits very well this definition because, like class struggle or the clash of civilizations, it is defined as a universal process which can be concretely traced in a variety of empirical situations. Globalization has been since the 1990s a major *explicandum* mobilized by politicians, the media as well as by social scientists in order to explain a number of social transformations, including the escalation of community conflicts. The objective of this section will therefore be to analyse the global dimension of community conflicts in Europe. After having decomposed globalization as a whole in a series of dimensions, this section will provide a critical analysis of the theoretical models linking globalization with community conflicts in a European setting, and will address how such models are appropriated by the various actors engaged in conflicts or dedicated to their de-escalation.

3.2.1. Diverging accounts of globalization: multi-faceted perspectives according to different points of view

The amount of scientific as well as political accounts of globalization has risen enormously since the 1980s. A great deal of this literature has aimed directly or indirectly at defining what globalization is. This literature is far from homogenous, and in fact opposite schools of thought – such as liberal or Marxist ones – have produced their own interpretation of globalization, often with a contentious intent. To begin with, one must note that fundamental questions about globalization still divide scholars aiming at understanding it, the major one being whether

globalization actually exists. It is connected to the other question of whether any of the phenomena described under the name of globalization is actually new, or whether we should consider globalization as a core aspect of human development which may have begun in prehistoric times. This section will not take sides in these controversies for it is dedicated to drafting theoretical landscapes of globalization, that is to delimitating situations where globalization is often expected to play a part.

Within the terminology of “globalization”, several dimensions can be identified which are relevant when one tries to analyse the evolution of community conflicts: firstly, globalization is mostly understood as an economic process which includes both the liberalization and deregulation of markets, the increasing volatility of capital and the rising mobility of transnational firms, and the imposition by such supranational organizations as the IMF, the World Bank or the WTO of a set of (neo-)liberal economic policies. The latter aspect is connected to a second dimension of globalization, which is a political one: as a process in which global processes and global actors gain prominence, globalization would limit the possibilities for national reform and policymaking. Not only would this be damaging to democracy, it would also contribute to the increase in global and even regional socio-economic inequalities. Lastly, globalization would include a transformation of how actors perceive the space in which they act: actors mobilized in community conflicts, even if they are more concerned with local changes, would tend to think about their struggle in more global terms, and they would increasingly search for transnational alliances and support.

Globalization as an economic transformation

In their most common form, arguments analysing globalization describe it first and foremost as an economic trend. Accounts of globalization as an economic phenomenon⁷ often cover the same aspects: authors begin with the long history of the transformation of transnational economic exchanges and fluxes since the Middle Age and discuss the amount and geography of such exchanges at different times, as well as the factors explaining their increases or decreases. Specific attention is paid to the rise of financial capitalism and the increase in direct investment abroad. Such themes are covered as the transformations of transnational firms which tend to stretch their strategies but also their organizational structure globally. Global strategies of firms are tied to the interconnectedness of markets, increasingly deregulated and therefore subject to global trends.

Such accounts have generated a great amount of criticism. Among the most prominent ones can be found the arguments of sceptic economists, who point out that the image of the “global interconnectedness of economies” is in fact far from being accurate: “one may find the fact amusing that the theme of globalization was born when three major economic zones were constituted (in Northern America, Europe and South East Asia” (Boyer 2000: 43, my translation). Globalization is not stretched evenly across the globe, as such authors as Saskia Sassen have pointed out: it concentrates in certain places such as global cities, and leaves entire zones outside of its direct effects. Geographical accounts of economic globalization point to the fact that not only does it not erase inequalities of salaries across the globe, it actually contributes to enhancing them.

Critical accounts of economic globalization have also, in the Braudelien tradition, concentrated on historical trends in capital accumulation in order to comment on the newness of globalization (Friedman 2003). The object under study is the world system, which means that different categories of interactions – not only economic, but also political and cultural ones – are considered in a long-term perspective. In these theoretical accounts of globalization, the accent is

⁷ Such as the one of Jacques Adda (2001)

put on how global trends affecting the world system help creating hierarchies among nation-states: “The modern world-system can be understood structurally as an intersocietal hierarchy composed of economically, culturally and militarily dominant core societies (themselves in competition with one another) and dependent peripheral and semiperipheral regions, a few of which have been successful in improving their positions in the larger core/periphery hierarchy, while most have simply maintained their relative positions.” (Chase-Dunn and Niemeyer 2007). Such theory finds its roots in the Marxist tradition and therefore highlights relations of domination across the globe which may be mediated by economic exchanges but may also take other forms.

Globalization as a cultural transformation

Domination is the key problematic of most studies of the cultural aspects of globalization. Here globalization is often equated with the imperialism of dominant societies and economies – first and foremost the American one - which are in a position to export their cultural goods to dominated or peripheral areas of the world system. When considering how globalization impacts on cultures, arguments may describe a dream of interconnectedness or a nightmare of homogenization (Tomlinson 1999). The critique incorporates two distinct aspects: firstly, it denounces the takeover of much of the world by a hegemonic power which does not only resort to economic and military arguments, but also to acculturation to its aesthetic values in order to enforce its power. Secondly, discourses criticizing cultural globalization often have a negative view of the intrinsic quality of the dominant culture which is being exported via its commodities. Using such metaphors as the “McDonaldization of the world”, they frequently oppose the masses of soulless cultural goods exported by the US to the unique and distinctive artefacts present in traditional societies (Warnier 1999). Globalization is here considered to be a threat to the possibility for minorities and indigenous peoples to reproduce themselves in time, because their culture will soon be overwhelmed by this trend towards the Americanization or Westernization of the world. Even if such accounts do not claim that there is a hierarchy between cultures, they certainly rank cultural products according to the Benjaminian notion of aura, and globalized cultural goods come last.

Opposed to this pessimistic view of cultural globalization, some authors who, like Warnier, are to be found within the discipline of anthropology, see in globalization an opportunity for increasing the possibilities for cosmopolitanism and hybridity in the world. For them, periods marked by globalization or at least by an increase in transnational exchanges – such as the glory days of colonial empires – where also periods in which an increased cultural creativity and innovation was to be found, including among people suffering from these geopolitical situations. The fact that an increased number of people were exposed to cultural traditions different from their own led to new forms of cultural expression, and to cultural recombination such as the ones to be found in Creole cultures. Transnational cultural domination is not here opposed to the rooted quality of traditional societies: on the contrary, processes of cultural transnationalization and hybridation are seen as opportunities to transcend parochial views of national or regional cultures. Empirically, a major aspect to be considered in this field has been the cultural practices of diasporas, which show that such cultural innovations have not been limited to a transnational upper class, but have indeed concerned either colonized area or migrants (Appadurai 1996). Transborder and transnational cultural practices – including popular culture realms such as sports, TV or music - have posed a challenge to the traditional understanding of culture as being tied to a national state formation and/or to a precise localization in space. In this view, belonging to a cultural group may not equate with living in a specific location which this group may claim its own, since such group may be stretched in various places in First World centres as well as Third World peripheries.

Globalization as a collapse of the nation-state

Such decoupling of cultural belonging with localization in a nation-state which is being experienced by transnational diasporas is but one argument which analyses globalization as a threat to the nation-state itself. Globalization is often blamed by its nationalist opponents to undermine the sovereignty of the nation-state in key realms, such as the power to design economic or welfare policies. This argument actually encompasses two aspects. Firstly, globalization would enhance competitions between states and even between regions because of the increased volatility of capital and the rapidity of corporate decision-making with regards to the organization of production. Investors such as transnational firms evaluate precisely the comparative advantages and disadvantages of national settings for their investment, and will chose areas where taxes and wages are lower, where public support is given to R&D, etc. (Carroué 2002). For this reason, policymaking going against these interest would automatically result in investors fleeing a country, thereby limiting the scope of policies to liberal ones (an argument often shared by liberal commentators as well). Secondly, the limitations placed upon national policymaking result also from the rise of various supra-national institutions either global or regional, which are understood either to raise the cooperation between states and the level of interconnectedness between policymaking practices, or to undermine the autonomy of weaker states to the benefit of hegemonic powers such as the US. Here again, the discussion of the political implications of globalization end up with discussing issues of hierarchies between states and how they impact on the balance of power. Such authors as Michael Hardt and Toni Negri have even considered globalization to create the conditions for a new political form – the Empire – to rise, even though it is bound to be challenged by the power of the multitude (2000).

Interestingly, such discussions – which again are certainly not areas of consensus between various schools of thought – have contributed to shed light upon the nature and role which the nation-state is supposed to have in the first place. By discussing its historicity (Held and McGrew 2002: 9-24) and its territoriality (Agnew 2005), arguments pertaining to the impact of globalization on nation-states have paved the way for discussions of its intrinsic frailty and contingency. By noting for example that “the claim of the modern state to an overarching role is a relatively novel one in human history” (p.10), David Held and Anthony Mc Grew emphasize the fact that the almighty power of the nation-state with regards to policymaking in a specific territory may have been overrated in an argument designed to promote and legitimize state powers instead of describing them. Globalization would here play a relatively minor role of fragilizing nation-state construction which may not have been very solid in the first place, such as the ones resulting from decolonization.

Globalization as a phenomenological transformation

Most accounts of globalization produce a global view of the world transformation: when they describe situations of hegemony, or the changes affecting the world system, they remain dedicated to encompassing worldwide effects in one argument. Yet one may consider how globalization impacts on perceptions of the world. Following David Harvey (1990), one may argue that globalization has produced a shared representation of time-space compression: such transformations in technical environments as the rapid spread of Internet access points or cheap airfares have made facilitated international communications and travels in the same way that they had been affected during industrial revolutions (Friedman 2003). Therefore, geographical distance may not considered to be an obstacle to communications anymore, thereby allowing a growing number of people to interact globally and instantaneously with others if they wish to do so. Postmodern philosophers such as Paul Virilio (2002) have argued that globalization produces a feeling that the world is actually shrinking which for him causes claustrophobia. In the same

line of argumentation, specific events such as the death of Princess Diana or 9/11 have been considered to have been “global” ones inasmuch as they have been simultaneously received by billions of households in the world, who have shared emotions – at least, shock – across the globe.

It is obviously not very difficult to find fault within such arguments, since they tend to assume that such experience of time-space compression is shared by everyone in the same fashion. Not only do they assume that the content of global communications are received in the same way everywhere, they also tend to ignore that such concrete elements of globalization – in their view – as Internet access are not available to everyone, as they follow some class, gender and geographical cleavages. Similarly, international travels do not concern everybody in the same fashion: the rootedness of a great number of people is still part of the landscape of globalization, as Friedman argues (2003), and their localized experiences clash with the representations of a transnational class which claims to be freed from such burdens as nationality and assumes a deliberately cosmopolitan view on the world. However, while the feeling of time-space compression does not affect everybody in the same fashion, it is possible to conceptualize globalization as a phenomenological experience concerning a growing number of people, although not in similar ways. Not only should one distinguish between the worldviews of the transnational elite discussing such shared experiences as the quality of hotels or airports in various places, and of the rural or urban poor bound to remain localized.

Some groups have seen their perception of space and their understanding of territories affected by transnational processes: changes affecting the perception of diasporas and of actors engaged in mobilizations are particularly important to take into account when one aims at analysing community conflicts. Firstly, diasporas are examples of groups for which the experience of interconnectedness with people living in distant places is most real. This feeling materializes in specific practices, which include cultural ones in the host countries – in realms such as language, religion, but also holidays, music, etc. – as well as exchanges and repeated contacts with the Motherland or Fatherland. Particularly, diasporas may remain strongly concerned about politics in their country or region of origin and meddle with them, which allows us to point at concrete transnational political practices. The example of the Irish-American diaspora shows that such processes have been taking place since the XIXth century, which again raises question about the newness of the phenomena described. The Irish diaspora in the United States has been very active in the Northern Irish conflict, and it has had an important impact both on the development of the conflict and on the peace process (Arthur 1991).

Yet Irish-Americans exemplify how transnational political practices simultaneously rest on two different outcomes of geographic distance: firstly, it does not prevent people for caring about a place and for putting together mobilizations aimed at having their effect there. In this sense, arguments about a shrinking world make sense, since there is definitely a feeling of closeness with the theatre of action underlying diasporic political practices. Secondly, this feeling is compatible with considerable distortions in the diasporas’ perceptions of the situation in their country of origin. The distance here is not only geographic, but it may also be a distance in time, since diasporas tend to stick to romantic and dated perceptions of their homeland. Their understanding of the situation going on there is likely to be affected by a variety of biases, such as a tendency to perceive the local situation in stereotypical ways or a feeling of guilt, especially when it lives in better economic conditions in the host country than the people remaining in the homeland.

The same argument can be made about actors engaged in transnational mobilizations who are particularly concerned by this phenomenological change. It can be demonstrated that activists engaged in the so-called Global Justice Movement not only frame their political claims with reference to the process of globalization, but also tend to construct their strategies in global terms. Therefore, it is no surprise that groups mobilized in Europe or in the US consider that they should place their actions abroad, especially in places which they consider are significant in

political terms. Such places are characterized by the fact that they exemplify situations of extreme injustice which can be easily generalized according to broad ethical principles, such as the fight against imperialism or for equal rights. Obviously, areas disputed by actors engaged in community conflicts may correspond very well to this definition. This case exists for instance when the conflict is considered to exemplify a situation of injustice or imperialism or colonialism of such scale that non-intervention would be perceived as renouncing essential political principles defended by the organization. Such is the case for instance for the Israel/Palestine conflict, which is considered by most French organizations belonging to the global justice sphere to be an essential aspect of any anti-neoliberal and anti-imperialist struggle. The existence of such representations is obviously limited to a few conflicts and it is correlated to how high they rank in the media agenda, since conflict events which receive a lot of media attention play a triggering role in prompting the intervention of NGOs. Involvement in a community conflict is also conditioned by symbolic and discursive as well as by material aspects, as we will see.

Firstly, only conflicts which can be framed in ways easily generalized in broad political interpretations receive the attention of social movements such as those involved in the global justice sphere. This can be explained by the fact that their involvement in conflicts abroad is in fact considered as a step in a more global action, such as the fight for minority rights, social justice or gender equality. Secondly, involvement in a community conflict abroad is directly tied to the kind of concrete action which can be designed in support of actors engaged in the conflict, which again stems from the existence of a representation according to which distance is not a problem for putting together a political action in a territory. For instance, some actors in the global justice movement value direct action above all other means and repertoires of action: for them, it is paramount that their involvement in the conflict should be directly connected to an action in the field. On the other hand, many social movement organizations or NGOs do not conceive their involvement in the conflict in any other ways than fundraising and publicity given to the cause, by organizing conferences, concerts, etc. These representations act as a limiting factor to the involvement of NGOs in community conflicts, but they also encourage participation in campaigns and direct interventions, when such means of action are available.

Therefore, an outcome of considering globalization as a shift in perspectives and worldview which renders easier the possibility to think in global terms as well as to act from a distance is that it can be empirically traced in the transformation of the horizon of political actors, who develop a transnational vision. It leads us to consider globalization from the point of view of various actors, and therefore to discuss its impact on the representations of specific groups. This does not mean that we are bound to discuss the global views of yet another transnational class: such global political perspective may be born by actors which are not necessarily frequently flying cosmopolitans. It is also accompanied by a need for the territorialization of their action, which manifests itself in a geography of places attracting global attention, while others are left to their localized fate.

Globalization as a negative myth

Lastly, following this analysis of globalization in phenomenological terms, one may consider globalization not as a process materializing in various dimensions, but as a representation shared by specific actors and thereby manifesting itself cognitively and discursively. The ideological component of globalization has been repeatedly denounced: for instance, anti-capitalist or “alterglobal” activists have pointed to the fact that globalization is mostly used by economic elites as an excuse to promote neo-liberal policies both at the national and at the supra-national level. This critical argument has been shared by authors who, like Serge Cordellier (2000), are wary of the fact that globalization should not be considered as a natural global process as unstoppable as

tectonic moves: not only does globalization include actors, one can even identify mobilizations made by these in order to promote their liberal worldview.

Some like Jonathan Friedman have remarked that the ideological component of globalization is not limited to economically liberal politics but can also be traced in accounts of cultural globalization celebrating the advent of a cosmopolitan world society: “A great deal of [the literature on globalization] has been of a celebratory nature and much of it has even taken on a self-conscious millennial pose. The latter is expressed in a dichotomization of world history (...) into a past defined with an array of terms linking what appears as the bunker mentality of nation-state thinking – homogeneity, ethnic absolutism, racism, indigenism, essentialism – all of which express closure and can in themselves be understood as the source of evils of the modern world” (2003: vii). While it is difficult to consider that economic aspects of globalization have been celebrated – indeed, globalization is in most cases described by political actors as an issue to be tackled, including by neoliberal policies – it is however clear that cosmopolitan views of the process of globalization tend to see it as a much lesser evil than nationalism, which tends to be associated with an aggressive attitude towards neighbours and minorities.

A key aspect of political discourses on globalization is that they often comprise the same elements: the fear that unregulated markets will plunge previously wealthy countries in crisis, that democratic states will be challenged from the outside with global processes, but also from the inside with the rise of regional or minority claims, that cultures will disappear in a worldwide process of homogenisation. A frequent element also mentioned is the rise in conflicts and violence. Because there is no simple definition of the globalization process, it is possible to trace its effects in various and sometimes opposite aspects – such as the growing Americanisation of cultures but also the rise of potentially violent subcultures and minorities. Globalization acts here as a myth, that is a widely used signifier which can be linked to a variety of significations. According to Roland Barthes (1957), while the myth does not conceal the truth, it somehow manages to prevent seeing it by not making reference to anything but itself. Because in discourses on globalization, the references to conflicts are not used in any other way than to comment on globalization, it is possible to argue that globalization and conflicts are somehow linked without providing a clear explanation of why and how. Since globalization encompasses many phenomena – world-system theory for instance incorporates the discussion of colonial empires in its study of globalization –, it is quite possible to reinterpret the literature on conflicts with a globalized perspective, and to blame it all on globalization. We will see now how one may however introduce globalization in the explanation of evolutions affecting community conflicts.

3.2.2. Bringing globalization in the analysis of community conflicts

It has been so far difficult to assess what exact role is played by globalization in the evolution of community conflicts in Europe, since the literature offers both theories of the escalating role of globalization and – less frequently – of the pacifying role of international exchanges and of “sweet commerce”. If the argument that globalization has damaging consequences on socio-economic inequalities in “the South” is widespread, which leads some authors to conclude that it contributes to fuelling local community conflicts, the same argument can hardly be translated in countries which seem to benefit from the globalization process. The political consequences of globalization are also more difficult to track in a context marked by the Europeanisation process. At the same time, globalization is mobilized in the discourses of various actors engaged in community conflicts or dedicated to solving them – with a content which may vary a lot: while some actors think of globalization as a positive step towards the stabilization of an open, peaceful society, some others are very close to the critical views of the “global justice movement”, in which some of them participate. We will examine what kind of arguments have been made in

order to support the claims that globalization has an effect on community conflicts, before assessing how globalization may be seen as a conflict dimension.

Arguments linking globalization and community conflicts

When the role of globalization vis-à-vis community conflicts is considered, it is often to point at its negative effects. Conflicts are generally considered to be the most striking example of the evil or failure of globalization. Yet, some authors have examined the argument according to which globalization provides incentives for peace.

- Does globalization lead to an escalation of community conflicts?

As we have seen, when globalization is seen as a multifaceted danger, conflict is seen as the inevitable outcome of situations of extreme tension created by global changes. In many discussions of globalization, conflicts are but a striking example of the problems posed by this new economic and political environment, and not much attention is paid to the dynamics of conflicts themselves. Inter-state and intra-state conflicts are for instance not much differentiated, since conflicts are here the marker of a more general discontent or the outcome of hegemonic projects. Such problems as the fact that conflicts existed before globalization arose are in many cases evacuated by an historical extension of the significance of globalization, such as is the case in world-system theory. Similarly, political claims by actors engaged in conflicts are disregarded and the differences between conflicts overlooked, thereby allowing choosing a quantitative and additive analysis of “conflict” or “violence” over a comparative strategy. Interestingly, this additive view of violence does not treat in separated ways the violent acts of state actors and the ones of paramilitary groups, and also agglomerates interpersonal violence – such as violence against women or children in the family – and organized violence. Even though one may argue with Michel Wieviorka (2004) that violence is not a resource that can be mobilized exactly like other symbolic ones and that therefore violent means of action contain something more than their instrumental outcome, it is difficult to consider that violence as a general and abstract category would result from globalization, and that it would manifest itself in a variety of empirical situations so different from each other.

Jonathan Friedman has examined the rise in violence in relation with the constraints that globalization posits on states: “This is a situation in which there is increasing violence of various kinds, in which the character of the violence is increasingly based on processes of fragmentation of former political units and on the intensive incorporation of the new fragments into regional and global circuits of control and finance by both state and nonstate actors.” (Friedman 2003: xiv). The key element linking globalization with the rise in various forms of violence is the concept of fragmentation, which leads to new ways in which actors affected by globalization negotiate their identities: “[fragmentation] relates the decline of modernist identification to an increase in ‘rooted’ forms of identity, whether regional, indigenous, immigrant-ethnic or national.” (ibid.: 7) In this view, globalization is not a threat to rooted cultures: it contributes to producing them by rendering less plausible the universal projects of modern nation-states which it renders more fragile. The promises made to minorities of becoming fully integrated in the national community – generally as an underclass - do not appeal to them as much as the possibility to claim a publicly recognized identity on their own. Therefore, states tend to play a lesser part in identity formation than communities in an era of globalization. While this argument works well in explaining the rise of indigenous and separatist movements in countries where such strong and universal state projects have taken place – such as in France or in the UK -, it is much more difficult to adapt it to so-called weak states or to states devoid of such overarching national ideology.

- Does globalization offer opportunities for peace settlements?

Because the tone of the literature on globalization is largely pessimistic, arguments linking globalization to peace have been much less numerous than the ones predicting a general rise in violence and conflicts. Guy Ben Porat (2006) is a notable exception to this rule, since he examines in a comparative and historical perspective how globalization can not only create favourable conditions for national projects from the part of excluded minorities, it may also provide incentives for peace. He agrees with Arrighi and Silver (1999), to whom he borrows much of his theoretical analysis of globalization, that it has not begun in the 1980s as many economists claim, but that a first globalization has taken place during the last decades of the XIXth century, and that it was marked by the decline in the hegemony of the British empire. This specific situation has produced several outcomes: the rise in migrations has created powerful diasporas as the British state was being territorially challenged in many parts of its colonial empire. Ben Porat sees in this conjunction of factors the reason why Irish nationalism as well as Zionism rose during this period.

However, globalization may have different outcomes: he argues that globalization can create opportunities for nationalist claims in the Israeli and Irish case, but that the economic side of globalization and its strong focus on liberal economic policies also creates arguments for peace, as local business communities start valuing foreign investment over the continuation of conflict. Since the economic incentives of globalization are tied to the free flow of goods and capital, economic actors become less concerned with territorial claims than with securing their access to global markets: "Intractable national conflicts are often the result of competing claims for exclusive rights over a certain territory. Therefore, if territoriality is the source of zero-sum intractable conflicts, the 'unbundling' of territoriality' associated with globalization could be the *deus ex machina* that resolves them. Globalization, in other words, could offer the new economic incentives and political institutions that would change the priorities of those involved in intractable territorial conflicts and incline them towards compromise. Optimism (or pessimism) regarding globalization's consequences depends, of course, on perceptions of what globalization actually means. For some authors, globalization is a clement end of the nation-state in favour of a 'borderless world' where the supposedly pacifying logic of the market reigns, but for others it signifies a global crisis manifested in local outbursts of violence and the intensification of conflicts within and between states." (Ben Porat 2006: 2). A major flow of this theoretical model appears clearly here, which is that globalization can work both ways, and that if commentators of community conflicts try to predict their likely outcome using globalization theory, their diagnostic will ultimately depend on whether they consider this process to be a good or a bad thing. In his comparison of the successful case of Northern Ireland and of the not so successful case of Israel/Palestine, Ben Porat turns to how evenly peace dividends are distributed in order to understand current situations in both areas, and therefore departs from globalization theory.

When globalization is considered in its relation to peace processes, it is difficult to bridge the gap between the concrete manifestations of globalization and the experience of conflicts. Business elites in countries where community conflicts take place may provide the link between the experience and discourse on globalization and the conflict, and Ben Porat shows that they tend to plead for an acceleration of peace processes because they fear that the conflict will ruin promising business perspectives: they are right about this for the geography of direct investment abroad shows that zones where conflicts take place are much less attractive to foreign investors than secure and peaceful areas (Carroué 2002). Business elites even sometimes engage in concrete mobilizations in order to influence governments to adopt a conciliatory attitude and engage negotiations towards a settlement. Yet community conflicts, because they polarize societies, have effects in many realms of experience including national trade and work relations, and here

business elites are not only helpless spectators of the conflict but actual actors since they too are members of one community or both. They reproduce divides between communities when they refuse to engage in business relations with companies led by members of the other community or when they hire the latter only in unqualified positions. Therefore, it is difficult to understand the pleas made by some Unionist businessmen interviewed by Ben Porat that business should overlook community divides in another way than mere lip service. The mythical nature of globalization makes it possible for actors who know these arguments to accurately formulate them, but it does not mean that their everyday practices will be affected in any way. One could even argue that globalizing arguments and sectarian ones can converge when the conflict helps creating a reservoir of poorly paid workforce defined along ethnic lines.

Lastly, business elites are seldom the most decisive actors in peace processes, as Ben Porat shows and as the PEACE-COM research confirms (see D6 on actors). Even if they were fierce partisans of globalization and liberalism and were more concerned about lowering taxes and liberalizing markets as well as about creating an attractive environment to foreign investment than about the conditions of living of their communities, their influence appears to be much less decisive than the one of national institutional and political actors, primarily governments and major parties. Even though their economic power is far from negligible in conflict-torn areas which tend to be poorer than peaceful ones, their symbolic power is much less developed than the one of actors directly engaged in the conflict such as paramilitary groups. For this reason, their action as the visible hand of globalization tends to be more discreet in community conflicts than the one of other political actors.

Globalization is seldom a visible dimension of community conflicts

This remark brings us to the issue of how the effects of globalization over community conflicts can be empirically assessed⁸. The economic dimension of globalization is the one to which the most concrete indicators may be tied, since it is quite easy to measure investment flows, to count openings of branches or franchise of transnational companies, or even to determine whether such institutions as the IMF, the World Bank or the WTO have taken any interest in the region being considered. Two problems arise: firstly, it may not be possible to push the demonstration much further than noticing that areas where community conflicts take place tend to belong to impoverished zones left outside of the global flows of financial capital characterizing globalization. Secondly, such argument is valid for violent conflicts taking place in Third World countries but is not easily applicable in European countries, where the interventions of the above mentioned international institutions have much rarer.

Arguments linking globalization with the collapse of the nation-state face the problem of the competition of other explicative models in international relations. Situations where states have collapsed in Europe – namely the Soviet and the Yugoslav ones – have impacted on conflicts in ways that can be more easily accounted for by considering regional processes than global ones. A more promising direction is the one which traces the increased frailty of states under the situation of globalization in how sub-state actors tend to appeal to international institutions directly for their cause. When they succeed in doing so, such international institutions as well as such global powers as the US can effectively meddle in the local situation and impact on national policies vis-à-vis the conflict. This can take the form of an actual military intervention such as the presence of UN forces in the Cypriot case or of giving momentum to negotiations such as in the case of the impact of the Clinton administration in bringing about the Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland. In the case of community conflicts taking place in Europe, the Europeanisation process

⁸ Interestingly, the reverse argument of whether community conflicts could play a part in the globalization process seems not to have been considered so far.

can be seen to have concrete effects such as the addition of additional regulations pertaining to how members states ought to manage community conflicts. Important steps here are the ratification of EU Charters and documents such as the 1992 Charter for Regional and Minority Languages or the 1995 Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, or the enforcement of recommendations pertaining to the fair treatment of minorities in the EU, such as the recommendations of the High Commissioner on National Minorities or the European Convention of Human Rights. Other forms of impact can be traced besides these normative regulations of minorities, such as the allocation of EU structural funds to the region where the conflict is taking place, which may even get the status of Euroregion, or the involvement of the EU as a third-party mediator. Yet the problem here arises of whether we are still dealing with the effects of globalization, or with the ones of another process, namely Europeanisation. Simply equating both – as some anti-neoliberal commentators have done – considerably weakens the explicative power of globalization theory.

Concerning the effects of cultural globalization on community conflicts, we have seen that the normative character of much literature on the subject makes it difficult to translate it into concrete indicators. The assumption that the circulation of Western or American cultural goods has a homogenizing effect on local cultures has been contradicted by anthropological accounts of how such goods are appropriated in specific cultural settings. Similarly, it is difficult to tie the resurgence of regional cultural practices such as speaking vernacular languages to the threat posited by global acculturation when it is can be clearly explained by a reaction to the hostile attitudes of the majority community and the state – as can be showed, in the Basque case, by the uncompromising attitude of the Franco regime towards the practice of the Basque language. On the contrary, globalization can be seen as a facilitator for actors engaged in community conflicts when one considers the role played by diasporas in encouraging these cultural practices. Therefore, a promising direction in order to assess the effects of cultural globalization on community conflicts is to consider how transnational cultural practices have impacted on community conflicts.

However, even if some triggering, escalating or de-escalating factors in the conflict may be analyzed as resulting from globalization – such as the rise in unemployment in de-industrializing areas such as Northern Ireland –, it remains difficult to link them directly to the conflict itself. Unemployment may be understood in relation with other factors such as sectarian discriminations which feed on local representations and processes. Therefore, rather than trying to re-analyse many dimensions of conflict as resulting from globalization, as it has been done when religious or political tensions were understood as the outcomes of globalization, it is preferable to analyze global aspects as coming from outside the country and as materializing the possibilities for direct interference from the part of outsiders, namely as international. We can distinguish between political and economic aspects. On the political side, the internationalization of a conflict may then be used as a proxy to analyse the role played by globalization. If the internationalization of community conflicts refers to a situation in which institutional actors become involved in the conflict, one may also take into account other kinds of actors – such as public opinions – who may exert an indirect influence on these institutional actors for them to become involved. Globalization theory made clear that global effects could be assessed in direct interference from the part of supra-national institutions as well as in transnational mobilizations in support for a cause which may be local – such as a community conflict. Yet it also reminds us that global processes seemingly devoid of actors such as capital flows may have a big impact especially on societies divided by conflicts. Therefore, it is also necessary to consider socio-economic indicators – such as the Gini index for measuring income inequalities (Friedman 2003), or the variety of exported goods –, in order to assess the potential effects of the inclusion of the local economy in global markets.

Conclusion: Assessing the role played by globalization in the representations and strategies of actors engaged in community conflicts

This overview of the literature on globalization in relation with the analysis of the evolutions of community conflicts has led us to propose two areas to be taken into account if one intends to point at the specific role played by globalization on community conflict. The first one is the involvement of international actors, and we should choose a large definition of these. They may be institutional actors such as international governmental organizations or INGOs, or non-institutional actors such as diasporas and public opinions. The second one is how well the local economy is performing in the global conjuncture, not only because economic aspects directly affect the lives of people engaged in the conflict, for instance when unemployment creates the biographical availability to join a militant group, but also because it affects how well the country will rank in the competition between countries and areas which characterizes globalization. One may argue that this last aspect fuels trends according to which the area will attract international attention or not – in the form of economic aids if the area is considered to be in a very impoverished situation or of investments if opportunities are perceived by business actors.

Yet, if factual indicators are a necessary first step in order to assess the presence of globalization-related phenomena in a conflict, we have seen that it was not possible to stop there and ignore how globalization can be assessed in representations and ideologies, which means taking the perceptions and discourses of actors engaged in the conflict into account. Such elements as the facts that some actors engaged in the conflict try and appeal to international actors, or frame the conflict in global terms are also important markers of globalization. They are generally disregarded by globalization theory, which tend to deliberately overlook the level where people feel and act. While representations are usually ignored, ideologies are either considered to be vectors of hegemonic intentions or a by-product of power relations at the global level which local actors cannot grasp.

Not only does globalization theory pay little attention to actors, it even provides an array of reasons why agentic dimensions should be reframed as structural processes. Globalization, when it is used as the main *explicandum*, leads for instance to systematically downplaying the active role played by international actors in community conflicts. The effects of globalization on states are considered to determine their involvement in a community conflict. On the one hand, globalization structurally weakens states and therefore renders them more fragile to community conflicts. On the other hand, globalization encourages situations of hegemony – or, as in the argument made by Arrighi and Silver (1999), situations of declining hegemony – which lead hegemonic powers such as the US to take an active part in community conflicts, whether they want it or not. Globalization is considered also to impact on diasporas, who are drawn to take an active role in the conflictive politics of their homeland. This trend towards transnationalization is considered to affect all political actors, and since globalization describes a situation in which politics become transnational, so the argument goes, therefore actors tend to mobilize at the transnational level. Theoretical accounts of community conflicts centered on globalization therefore tend to downplay the impact of mobilizations of local actors in order to raise support to their cause.

If we want to avoid the circular arguments which are so often the danger of globalization theory – such as the idea that globalization leads actors to be the vectors of globalization –, we ought to pay attention to how the worldviews of actors engaged in community conflicts affect their actions. Do they think that bringing international actors to take an active interest in the conflict is necessary? Are they concerned that the conflict will diminish the possibilities that the country would attract foreign investors? Do they fear that international competition and delocalizations will take away their jobs? Do they believe that they should participate in transnational movements such as the Global Justice one in order to promote their cause? Here we may distinguish between two aspects: firstly, actors engaged in community conflicts may understand their local situation in

relation with other international issues – such is the case for instance in the Northern Irish example of the many parallels drawn by actors on both sides with the Israel/Palestine conflict – or they may blame the conflict on international processes such as decolonization or global economic factors. This boils down to analyzing what part is played by international factors in how key players in the conflict frame it. Secondly, actors engaged in community conflicts may perceive opportunities at the international level and design their strategies to accommodate foreign actors. This does not necessarily mean that they will start traveling to distant places and become members of the transnational class: such strategies may take the form of trying to appeal to international public opinions or segments of it through the Internet. Such as been the case for Northern Irish Unionist, who have – unsuccessfully – tried to raise support from the Ulster Scot diaspora in the US by developing Internet websites dedicated to their cause. In this case, the perception of opportunities outside the borders of Northern Ireland was directly tied to the fact that the Republican adversaries had successfully mobilized in the US for a long time. A good indicator to assess whether an actor engaged in conflict designs strategies at the international level is the networks that he or she entertains around the world.

These two aspects of the globalization of actors' representations are not necessarily connected to each other. A global understanding of the situation may remain at the ideological level and not translate into means of action, while repertoires oriented towards international audiences and networks may reflect an instrumental perception that opportunities exist outside the regional borders, and that globalization places them at the reach of actors engaged in community conflicts.

Conclusion of the section

At a more general level, these two examples of religion and globalization as dimensions of conflicts show that one should not conclude too rapidly on the escalating or de-escalating impact of a specific dimension. Assessing the impact of a specific dimension on the development, escalation and soothing of conflicts requires understanding the interplay between different kinds of elements, most notably the representations held by the actors, and the interaction with other dimensions, for instance the evolution of the context in which they are embedded. In most cases examined in PEACE-COM, these elements have different, sometimes contradicting, impacts on the development of conflicts, and no simple and general rule can be drawn. Conflicts are always multi-causal and evolving, and all dimensions may be considered as root causes, as triggering or as soothing factors, or all at the same time. An adequate framework for analysis of conflicts should therefore be multidimensional, dynamic and multileveled, in order to grasp and account for this complexity.

4. Europeanisation and Internationalisation: Towards New Patterns of Involvement?

While D12 has focused on the impact of Europeanisation as a process, this deliverable specifically ambitions to understand how Europeanisation and internationalisation of conflicts happen, namely how they can be understood as the result of strategies designed and implemented either by players on the ground or by international organisations. We also seek to explore various paths of internationalisation of conflicts, and various configurations in which European institutionalised actors have an impact in the evolution of a given conflict. For these purposes, this last section is further divided into two sub-sections. The first section seeks to understand how internationalisation happens and how it interacts with conflict patterns on the ground. The second and last sub-section of this deliverable examines the accommodation policies designed and implemented by international actors active in the field of conflict management in Europe, and tries to assess their effects on conflicts patterns.

4.1. Explaining patterns of internationalisation

Explaining the causes and means of involvement of international actors in community conflicts has been so far somewhat of a puzzle for scholars. Community conflicts appear at first glance to be extremely localized: embedded in local politics and history, they feed themselves on imaginaries of conflictive neighborhoods. A first explanation to this situation lies in the fact that the existence of a contested territory is a key dimension in many community conflicts. Here it is the material conditions of living of the concerned communities that are at stake, and that explain that their coexistence is leading or has led in the past to an open or underlying confrontation. Territorial conflicts, according to authors like Walter (2003) or Toft (2003), are the most intractable of all, as territory is often seen as indivisible, and bears a romantic meaning – such as in the case of Kosovo being considered to be the cradle of the Serbian people. The focus on territorial aspects of community conflicts has therefore raised interest in the study of interfaces between territories held by adverse communities, such as neighbourhoods in cities where both communities are present. Community conflicts appear to exist primarily at the local level also because it is the one where political claims are formulated, even in a situation marked by globalization and increased political opportunities at the transnational level. If nation states are the primary agents of the construction of a transnational political space, then actors engaged in community conflicts at the regional level have very little opportunity to reach this space. They are therefore bound to remain very much localized.

However, the observation of the panel of community conflicts included in PEACE-COM shows that in many cases they are not entirely cut from transnational politics, far from it. Notably, transnational social movements show the opposite sight of actors mobilizing in solidarity with local actors engaged in community conflicts.

The Northern Irish conflict provides us with a vivid example of such transnationalization of conflict. Since the outburst of the so-called “troubles” at the end of the sixties, while Unionists have not been successful in attracting transnational support, the Republican movement, whose main representative is the political party called Sinn Féin, but whose structure is in fact highly diversified, has been particularly skilled in doing so. Since several decades, it has been acting as spokesman for the nationalist community, especially during dramatic and highly publicized events such as the Bloody Sunday in 1972, the Republican Hunger Strikes in 1981, or the signing of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998. It has also managed to some extent to build a transnational network of support with like-minded structures, such as Herri Batasuna in the Basque Country. Similar – successful, even if less sustainable – attempts to attract international attention and

support have also been launched by other civil society actors, such as the peace movement during the seventies.

But besides these prominent examples which have mainly drawn on international outrage, much more concrete displays of solidarity have existed and strengthened, and are nowadays embodied in stable networks of cooperation, exchange and communication.

This section concentrates on how actors engaged in a community conflict construct such transnational support from the part of various international actors: firstly, this includes the specific issue of how they try and appeal to national governments and international institutions to intervene in their favor at the international level. But the construction of transnational support is not only directed at these institutional actors, and the involvement of civil society actors and the general public is much prized and encouraged. We will see that the support which they expect is in many cases connected to interventions performed by states or by international institutions, even though such institutions may not be the direct targets of the activities deployed in order to raise transnational interest in the conflict. For the sake of clarity, we will leave out the relationship that actors engaged in community conflicts develop with Motherlands or Fatherlands (i.e. the UK and the Irish Republic in the Northern Irish case), because of their specificity. When we notice that not all actors engaged conflicts try and appeal to people and organizations abroad, the first question that arises is the one of the causes of internationalization of conflicts. What are the factors explaining that some community conflicts have raised more international attention than others? We will here consider a typology of actors initiating such internationalization.

However, even in highly internationalized conflicts, not all actors succeed equally in attracting international interest. While some actors, such as the Republicans in the Northern Irish case, have been successfully engaged in transnational politics, their Unionist counterparts have found it much more difficult. Our hypothesis is that the nature of discourses put forward by actors engaged in community conflicts in order to raise international support has a key impact on the success or failure of such attempt. This does not mean that discourses are political artifacts which actors engaged in community conflicts can shape in a purely instrumental fashion, for these discourses reflect political imaginaries which render meaningful the struggles for which support is sought. Yet actors mobilizing for peaceful or armed initiatives actively construct representations of them putting forward their better selves in order to appeal to specific audiences. We ought here to distinguish between peaceful actors and actors engaged in military actions because they do not face the same constraints in terms of how their discourses can appeal to various international audiences. Lastly, it is important to consider the means used in order to convey such meanings to international audiences, which asks the question of the nature of networks mobilized for raising support for actors engaged in community conflicts.

4.1.1. The causes behind internationalization processes of community conflicts

A primary explanation of the internationalization of community conflict has been focused on the role played by international factors which heavily impact on conflicts. The involvement of international actors is then seen as inevitable, as the conflicts themselves are created by international configurations. These 'external' dimensions of community conflicts, as described in details in D1, are exogenous factors that may have fuelled or even caused the concerned conflicts. Here it is an event, action or actor located outside the geographical borders where the conflict is taking place, that is held responsible for the emergence or endurance of opposition. Two broad types of explanations are dominant in this field, the first one focusing on big geopolitical changes and events that have occurred since the beginning of the XXth century, the second one on external actors who have a strong link with (be it geographical, cultural or political) or even a responsibility for the conflict situation.

Geopolitical Changes

Firstly, one can consider conflicts as a result of decolonization, globalization and aftermath of WWI and WWII: this concerns mainly “decolonization”, “democratization” or “transition” wars and conflicts. Conflicts here are linked to geopolitical transitions; they sometimes result from the resurgence of ancient hatreds kept under control by colonialism and / or the Cold War. Globalization has also been accused by numerous authors to provoke identity withdrawals and community conflicts, because it entails the erosion of the state’s autonomy (Kaldor, 1999).

Globalization

As explained in details in the previous section, most authors working on nationalism or ethnic phenomena stress the importance of globalization processes for understanding the rise of sub-state nationalisms, regionalisms or community-based mobilizations (Guibernau, 1999). For many authors communal opposition is indeed often linked to globalization and transition to market economy, for instance in Eastern Europe. Beverly Crawford (1998: 4-5) argues for instance that globalization and liberalization are “triggers” for cultural conflicts: “transition to the market and the pressures of globalization – increased demands for industrial competitiveness and rising external debt that weakens the state’s capability and willingness to allocate resources – are associated with high levels of conflict and even violence”. Economic reforms and institutional transformations bring about new rules and norms as well as power shifts, and break old “social contracts” on which the distribution of resources were grounded. Guy Ben Porat (2006) argues that globalization can create opportunities for nationalist claims in the Israeli and Irish case, but that the economic side of globalization and its strong focus on liberal economic policies creates arguments for peace, as local business communities start valuing foreign investment over the continuation of conflict.

One of the main troubles that these theories are facing is the fact that indicators of globalization are difficult to trace, as it involves complex patterns and processes which impact on political, economical and cultural levels at the same time. This leads authors to use wide metaphors, such as Mary Kaldor (1999: 71) who argues that globalization has broken up the ‘vertically organized cultures’ on which ‘modern’ nationalism was founded. Another issue is that globalization, when it is used as the main *explicandum*, leads to systematically downplaying the active role played by international actors in community conflicts. The effects of globalization on states are considered to determine their involvement in a community conflict. On the one hand, globalization structurally weakens states and therefore renders them more fragile to community conflicts. On the other hand, globalization encourages situations of hegemony – or, as in the argument made by Arrighi and Silver (1999), situations of declining hegemony – which lead hegemonic powers such as the US to take an active part in community conflicts, whether they want it or not. Globalization is considered also to impact on diasporas, who are drawn to take an active role in the conflictive politics of their homeland. This trend towards transnationalization is considered to affect all political actors, and since globalization describes a situation in which politics become transnational, so the argument goes, therefore actors tend to mobilize at the transnational level. Theoretical accounts of community conflicts centered on globalization therefore tend to downplay the impact of mobilizations of local actors in order to raise support to their cause.

Decolonization

The effects of decolonization, that are often linked to globalization processes both theoretically and empirically, are easier to trace and assess. Ignatieff (1999: 7) for instance stresses the importance of decolonization factors, that often lead to the disintegration of states or of political structures that used to provide a link between different cultural groups: “even the long-standing,

apparently adamant antipathies of the ethnic war zones turn out, on closer examination, to be expressions of fear created by the collapse or absence of institutions that enable individuals to form civic identities strong enough to counteract their ethnic allegiances. When individuals live in stable states – even poor ones – they do not need to rush to the protection of the group. It is the disintegration of states, and the Hobbesian fear that results, that produces ethnic fragmentation and war”. For instance, the impact of colonization in Cyprus has been particularly interesting and strong during the first half of the XXth century, as it has generated diverging affiliations and political options on the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot sides. The Russian occupation of Estonia, and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet System that occurred at the beginning of the nineties, triggered another kind of configuration, as the enforced russification of the Estonian society was replaced by policies of ‘re-estonianisation’ of the society with are supported at the popular level.

However, examples of decolonization wars, or wars linked to some form of imperialism are relatively scarce in nowadays Europe. This does not mean that some of the conflict situations or problems that we are facing are never linked to some kind of colonial heritage or imperialism, but rather that this does not appear to be very often a predominant factor explaining the persistence of tensions. For instance, if the decolonization paradigm has certainly been used by nationalist actors in Corsica, Northern Ireland or the Basque Country, it does not explain why these conflict situations persist nowadays. If the discourse framing a given community conflicts in colonial or post-colonial terms can be very effective to raise support internationally because it fits perfectly within a broader “decolonization” master frame, we should not deduce that the internationalization of conflicts is a mechanical result of current or past situations of colonization.

Finally, it must be stated that many community conflicts can be seen as ‘rest-overs’ or ‘unfinished business’ from the first and/ or the second world war. Gellner (1995) for instance has shown that, because the two world wars have brought the disintegration of the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires, and subsequently the emergence and strengthening of the area of influence of the communist ideology, numerous conflict situations have been artificially frozen. In many European countries, irredentist nationalisms have thus been kept under control, or made subordinate to the outcome of the Cold War. As a consequence, the collapse of the Soviet Empire allowed for the defrosting of those claims and conflict situations. These historical roots of conflicts can explain why certain states will take an active interest in conflicts occurring within their current or former perimeter of influence, yet once again we should beware of mechanical explanations to such involvement.

Europeanisation

Community conflicts in Europe may appear to become “naturally” internationalized, or at least Europeanized, because of their taking place within the EU. Stetter, Albert and Diez (2006) have identified four main paths through which the EU can impact on conflicts, depending on whether the perturbation is driven by concrete interventions of EU actors, or through the discursive, legal and institutional framework of the EU: Path 1 (compulsory impact) refers to a direct approach of “carrots” and “sticks” used by the EU in order to solve a conflict; Path 2 (enabling impact) relates to the more indirect influence of the institutional and discursive framework of the EU, through the *acquis communautaire* and the socialization of policy-makers into a European discourse; Path 3 (connective impact) refers to financial or organizational support for peace-building related activities; Path 4 (constructive impact) relates to the more long-term change of conflict identities enabled by the introduction, under the impulsion of European integration, of new discursive frameworks. This detailed approach of the various levers the EU can use in order to impact positively on conflicts is useful for our purposes, even though those levers are mainly

“top-down” instruments (apart from Path 4), and “work” obviously better on territories and populations which are already integrated in the Union, or are likely to be so in the near future – a perspective which is far from given as far as several of examples of conflicts taking place on the European continent are concerned, like Kosovo, Sandzak, Vojvodina of the northern part of Cyprus. These various paths suggest that European integration should help pacifying conflicts characterized first and foremost by political and socio-economic dimensions, and that it should impact positively in the long-term on other dimensions.

As far as direct instruments and concrete schemes are concerned, Coppieters et al. (2004) distinguish two types of actions the EU can undertake in order to settle a conflict: first providing a framework for resolving constitutional issues, and second acting as a mediator or supporting mediation efforts between conflict parties. They then distinguish between three levels of impact of EU institutions and policies: first, at the level of legal and administrative structures of domestic institutions; second, at the level of domestic economic, social or security policies; third, at the level of societal changes in general. It is quite obvious that in cases of protracted and complex conflicts such as the Cyprus or the Northern Irish case studies, no sustainable peace can be envisaged without changes affecting all these three levels. In the case of Cyprus, it is even disputable whether the EU can effectively provide a framework for the resolution of the conflict, especially since it has allowed the accession of the southern part of the island, and therefore cannot use its multi-level system of governance as a pattern for a solution on the island. In other words, proposing a joint sovereignty over the island can no longer be an option, and the two community's mutually exclusive conceptions of statehood have been reinforced rather than undermined. In other cases such as the Northern Irish or the case of South Tyrol, the impact has been much more positive, as Europeanisation has allowed for an increased economic integration of all parties concerned, and as facilitated contacts between conflicting parties.

This Europeanisation of community conflicts thus stems from several aspects of EU institutions. Firstly, the Europeanisation process entails for member states the addition of additional regulations pertaining to how they manage community conflicts. Important steps here are the ratification of EU Charters and documents such as the 1992 Charter for Regional and Minority Languages or the 1995 Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, or the enforcement of recommendations pertaining to the fair treatment of minorities in the EU, such as the recommendations of the High Commissioner on National Minorities or the European Convention of Human Rights. Besides these normative regulations of minorities, the Europeanisation of community conflicts may stem from the allocation of EU structural funds to the region where the conflict is taking place, which may even get the status of Euroregion. Such has been the case for Northern Ireland: in the early 1990s, the region was granted an “Objective One” status by the EU which entitled it to high priority support because its per capita GDP was below 75 percent of the EU average (Ben Porat 2006: 219). EU fund allocation also includes “peace funds”: indeed, interviews made during the PEACE-COM project with actors engaged in community conflicts in Europe show that these are the first aspect of EU intervention that are being considered by them, and greatly appreciated. Last but not least, the Europeanisation process offers actors engaged in community conflicts new possibilities for involving international actors in the conflict: recourses can be made by various actors of the conflict to European institutions in order to bring about changes, and the EU can intervene as a third-party actor. The Europeanisation process therefore appears to be an essential structural factor impacting on the internationalization of community conflicts.

External actors: Neighbouring countries and diasporas

Scholars have also focused on conflicts caused by such external factors as neighbouring countries, diasporas and bordering communities. Community conflicts can be created and

sustained by neighbouring countries competing for territorial control and favouring allegiance of one of the communities in opposition. Closely related to the question of decolonization, neighbouring countries often play an important role in enacting or sustaining community conflicts. Their motivations and degree of implication can vary a lot. They are sometimes competing for territorial control and are thus favouring allegiance of one of the communities in opposition; or they can be used by communities in conflict themselves as a way of legitimizing their secessionist claims; finally, the presence of diasporas coming from neighbouring countries, and whose cultural and political connections are seen as threatening and undermining the legitimacy of the central state, can also be an important dimension of conflicts, because these countries can feel entitled to intervene and intercede in favour of them. Even if this involvement is not very important, it can cause a state of tension in the wider population, and make relations between neighbouring countries more difficult, as shows the case of the Hungarian diaspora in the Vojvodina region. These kinds of claims and strategies are further reinforced and legitimized when communities are living in border regions, and / or in two countries at the same time. The case of South Tyrol for instance perfectly illustrates the case of a territory disputed by two bordering countries, and whose fate has long been depending on other factors than the will of its population. For this reason, particular attention should be paid to efforts made by actors engaged in a conflict towards people or organization situated in neighbouring countries.

External factors can also take the shape of diasporas that have settled in distant countries, especially when they are economically well-off and politically influent, as in the case of Irish-Americans in the second half of the twentieth century. As diasporas have various ties to the direct actors in the conflict, they are the primary targets of these appeals to international involvement. In the case of the conflict in Northern Ireland in particular, the Irish Diaspora in the United States has been having an important impact both on the development of the conflict and on the peace process. This ambiguous impact relates to the various ways in which diasporas might get actually involved, or might be used for legitimizing strategies by actors in conflict. Scholars have indeed argued that diasporas can impact negatively on the development of a given conflict, by leading to its escalation, but that they can also help resolving it: "There are plenty of examples of both types of diasporas to support either view. Importantly, different interpretations of diasporas depend on the view of the beholder. Irresponsible long distance nationalists for some are freedom fighters for others" (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2006: 2). Diasporas can for instance contribute to conflict escalation by funding weapons, or by lobbying in support of a liberation struggle both in their new country of residence, and in their country of origin. This is very clearly what has happened in the Northern Irish case, with organizations like Sinn Féin or Noraid which have campaigned in the US in order to raise funds for financing Republican activities. However, as stressed by Cochrane (2007: 8) diasporas can also transmit the values of pluralism and democracy, and act as mediators between their home and host societies.

4.1.2. Different patterns of internationalization in community conflicts

From this preliminary review of external dimensions of community conflicts, we can draw two conclusions: firstly, if we are to understand internationalization patterns of community conflicts, we must privilege approaches focusing on where the initiative for such intervention comes from. Secondly, external interventions and influences can be classified according to the level of intervention and to the degree of institutionalization of actors originating them. Since actors engaged in community conflicts will appeal in different fashions to these actors, this leads us to establishing a typology of such mobilizations. We can distinguish several cases: at the supra-national level, institutional actors include the UNO, the OSCE, the Council of Europe, etc. These are actors whose intervention is most expected in community conflicts, especially violent ones. INGOs and some transnational social movements such as the Women in Black, who have been active in various conflicts, notably Israel/Palestine and Bosnia, also take an active interest in

many community conflicts, although with different expectations and outcomes. At the national level, state actors are key players in community conflicts, but non-state actors play also an important role: NGOs come first to mind, yet the role of non-institutional actors such as opinion leaders and public opinions in general are essential. More specifically, within the broad categories of NGO and public opinion, we ought to distinguish diasporas and their community-oriented organizations.

Foreign states and supra-national institutions

Interference in community conflicts may be prompted any of these international actors themselves, who decide for various reasons to take an interest in the conflict. Yet we will see that actors engaged in community conflicts are not entirely foreign to the framing and circulation of such arguments. The most classical case, which we will not study here, is the one in which such international actors are foreign governments: here the interference takes the form of third-party mediation in community conflicts. Such mediation activity may be welcomed by one or several actors engaged in community conflicts – as in the case of the mediation of the US in the Northern Irish conflict (Kennedy Smith 1997, Guelke 1996) – but it may also be unwanted by local actors, which then tend to see third party mediators as “nosy neighbors” (Gleditsch and Beardsley 2004) trying to impose their way to handle the conflict in an authoritarian fashion. The role of neighboring countries, as well as the one of key international actors such as the US, is here paramount. There may also be mediators, intervening in order to help reaching settlements – Switzerland or Norway have repeatedly played that part. However, one notices that such involvement is in most cases all but gratuitous: mobilized third party actors are generally either states where diasporas originating from the region in conflict live, or neighboring states. A channel is therefore necessary in order to get such involvement, and such channel may be in itself an artifact produced by stakeholders in the conflict, as the case of the influence of Irish Americans in the Northern Irish conflict shows.

In the case of supra-national institution, a similar pattern can be found. While the roles of the UN in the Cyprus conflict or of the Council of Europe in the Belgian conflict have been essential, their involvement is not the sole product of the concrete situation at stake in the conflict itself: intervention is here not directly linked to such indicators as the death toll. International involvement in community conflicts is much more directly tied to representations of the state where the conflict takes place, and it depends largely on whether the conflict is considered to be an internal affair or not, which equates to a labeling activity performed by international actors about community conflicts. Such labeling is based on various elements which cannot be boiled down to one single dimension. The structural situation in which the conflict is embedded plays a part in its construction, if several Motherlands or Fatherlands are involved in the conflict. For instance, it can be argued that the Northern Irish conflict has been international by essence since the Partition and the creation of the Irish Republic, which has involved a new state actor in the conflict resolution, alongside the UK. In such situations where the conflict does not oppose state institutions to regionalist rebels but actually involves several states, the international dimension appears to automatically supersede interpretations of the conflict as an internal issue.

A last structural factor appears to be also essential in this labeling activity: the capacity of the state where the conflict takes place to solve it in an effective fashion. When the state is weak – for instance because entire parts of the national territory are in fact out of its control –, the internationalization of the conflict is much more likely. In fact, it can be argued that it is easier for other international actors to decide to get involved in community conflicts involving weak states: for instance, international intervention is in this light much easier in Serbia rather than in

the UK, which is perceived to be a strong state capable of handling situations of crisis between communities by itself.

Yet, even these structural factors are not entirely devoid of active agency on the part of actors engaged in the community conflict. Some actors engaged in community conflicts have played an active part in prompting a change in representation which would help international actors to get involved in the conflict, by reframing the conflict from an international issue to an international one. For instance, Northern Irish Republicans have managed to change this representation in order to sustain an involvement of the American government, through the channel of an active mobilization of the Irish American diaspora. Others actors have not been so successful, as the cases of the Corsicans or the Basque show: both are still perceived as an internal issue to be solved by the French and Spanish states respectively. EU institutions do not automatically play an active part in community conflicts in Europe, and in fact their involvement depends on the initiatives made by local actors in order to appeal to them: therefore, such indicator as the Europeanisation of elites engaged in community conflicts is essential in order to understand the role played by the EU integration on conflicts. The attitudes of local political parties are to be considered here, since some of them join groups at the European parliament, even though they may oppose the process of European integration. Such is the case of the very Eurosceptic Unionist DUP in Northern Ireland: the Europeanisation of its modes of action aims at preventing the process of European integration from bringing about a hidden pro-Republican agenda.

NGOs and civil society organizations

At the level of NGOs and INGOs, the initiative to get involved in community conflicts may stem from the actors themselves, if they perceive the conflict to be extremely severe or very important in political terms. The latter case exists for instance when the conflict is considered to exemplify a situation of injustice or imperialism or colonialism of such scale that non-intervention would be perceived as renouncing essential political principles defended by the organization. Such is the case for instance for the Israel/Palestine conflict, which is considered by most French organizations belonging to the global justice sphere to be an essential aspect of any anti-neoliberal and anti-imperialist struggle. The existence of such representations is obviously limited to a few conflicts and it is correlated to how high they rank in the media agenda, since conflict events which receive a lot of media attention play a triggering role in prompting the intervention of NGOs. However, involvement in a community conflict is conditioned by symbolic and discursive as well as by material aspects, as we will see.

Firstly, only conflicts which can be framed in ways easily generalized in broad political interpretations receive the attention of social movements such as those involved in the global justice sphere. This can be explained by the fact that their involvement in conflicts abroad is in fact considered as a step in a more global action, such as the fight for minority rights, social justice or gender equality. Secondly, involvement in a community conflict abroad is directly tied to the kind of concrete action which can be designed in support of actors engaged in the conflict. For instance, some actors in the global justice movement value direct action above all other means and repertoires of action: for them, it is paramount that their involvement in the conflict should be directly connected to an action in the field. On the other hand, many social movement organizations of NGOs do not conceive their involvement in the conflict in any other ways than fundraising and publicity given to the cause, by organizing conferences, concerts, etc. These representations act as a limiting factor to the involvement of NGOs in community conflicts, but they also encourage participation in campaigns and direct interventions, when such means of action are available. Here we find again the role of actors engaged in the conflict, who play a key

role in framing the conflict in terms suitable to their NGO audiences and in providing opportunities for them to participate in adequate actions.

Public opinions

Lastly, the level of public opinion abroad is essential to consider in order to explain the participation of international actors in community conflicts. The role of the Irish American diaspora has been examined in relation to both the continuation of the Northern Irish conflict – for instance when the connection between Noraid and the financing of the IRA was examined (Horgan and Taylor 1999) – and the peace process, for instance to explain the commitment of the Clinton administration to facilitating and bringing momentum to the peace process. However, public opinions, including those defined as diasporas, do not take spontaneously an active part in community conflicts in their homeland: here it is important to consider the specific role played by opinion leaders such as journalists, researchers, moviemakers, artists, or religious leaders. Because of their specific position vis-à-vis certain segments of public opinion, they are capable of promoting certain views on the conflict, of raising outrage and to some extent of prompting action with regards to the conflict, especially in the form of fund-raising. The main task which they perform is to create narratives on the conflict which allocate the roles of the good and the villains to specific actors, thereby promoting a biased and emotionally charged view of the conflict situation. By insisting on such *topoi* as the courage of the combatants or the helpless victims, as we will see further, they reconfigure the perceptions that public opinions have of the conflict, and raise awareness of the fact that the conflict is still going on today.

For these reasons, actors engaged in community conflicts often pay close attention to keeping good relations with such opinion leaders. The case of researchers on issues related to Northern Ireland is here particularly clear. While Republicans have managed to secure close relations with leading academic opinion leaders, for instance in the left-oriented part of French academia in the 1970s and 1980s, Unionists have found themselves much more isolated, and have identified it as a weakness in a conflict which they fought was increasingly not only fought locally, but also outside of Ulster and in symbolic fashion. The creation of the Ulster Political Research Group was a tentative answer to this isolation, as it was founded in order to promote research on the political history of Ulster. As a research organization attached to the UDA, a paramilitary Unionist organization, it aims at facilitating research on Unionist politics and at creating political solutions. It is financed by European Peace Programs, which has caused a scandal because of accusations of indirectly financing the UDA. In the same fashion, the tentative to promote research on “Ulster Scots” descendants in the US – that is, the descendants of Northern Irish Protestants – aimed at fostering the same feeling of belonging and connectedness that Irish Americans feel towards Republicans, so far with little success.

Lastly, the care given by actors engaged in community conflicts to promoting a good image of themselves to public opinions is not only reserved to those abroad. There are various reasons why actors engaged in community conflicts wish to appeal to international supports and internationalize their struggle, including internal ones. In NI, references to international supports and partners as well as comparisons with other cases (such as Israel/Palestine) are used in order to legitimate certain political decisions and objectives. Such references can also trigger self-confidence and reinforce beliefs that one’s actions are indeed what they should be.

4.1.3. Internationalization as a convergence of interests and discourses

The range of discourses

Appeals to internationalization obviously succeed when actors embedded in conflict manage to raise awareness at the international level through discourses that are specifically designed for attracting attention of international or transnational actors. Actors in conflict have thus developed a whole range of possible discourses that can be used in different international settings and scenes, and whose main aim is to lead international or transnational actors to think that it is their best interest or even utmost duty to intervene. Schematically speaking, we can differentiate between five types of discourses, which appeal to different types of international/transnational actors.

Discourses appealing to international institutions are primarily organized around the values of legality, of the rule of law, and of human rights. They appeal to justice and to the setting up of a lawful order that would be in line with the founding texts of the international system, mainly the UN Charter. Some classical principles such as the right to self determination are also used, despite the fact that since the end of the main decolonization process in the 1960s, such appeals have nearly never been successful. However if such discourses may have some impact on international institutions' decisions in situations like the East Timor in Indonesia, actors in community conflicts in Europe have hardly been able to develop them, because the decolonization paradigm (in the framework of which the exercise of the right to self determination has been legitimized) is thought as not being relevant anymore. In other words, separatist or irredentist claims in Europe are mainly interpreted as internal affairs for European states, in which international institutions do not want to interfere, especially if the State in question is not considered as being a "weak" one.

A second category of discourses is made up of discourses directed at motherland/fatherland states. These discourses focus on the value of responsibility, on feelings of culpability, and sometimes also on geo-strategic arguments. In the Northern Irish case, both Catholics and Protestants have been asking their respective "motherland/fatherland" to help them, using a mix of culpability (Northern Catholics having been 'abandoned' by their brothers in the South, Northern Protestants having defended the glorious British heritage in Ireland), of legal arguments (the situation in Northern Ireland being interpreted as a rest-over of the British colonization in Ireland, as being 'suspended' between Britain and the Republic of Ireland), and of appeals to responsibility. If culpability and responsibility certainly are primary incentives for public opinions in motherland/fatherland countries, it has to be said that very often legal and strategic views command the intervention, or non intervention, of state actors – as testified for instance by the fact that the British conservative party has long been supporting the unionist cause in Northern Ireland because of electoral reasons, the unionist elected representatives being included in the Tory parliamentary group.

A third category of discourses is aimed at diasporas. It develops romantic images of the homeland, of an Eden that has been left behind and that embodies a mystified past. It also plays on feelings of culpability for having left a part of the family, or friends there, especially for migrants whose economic situation in the host country is a lot better than in their country of origin. As shown by many authors (see for instance for the case of the Irish diaspora Coogan, 2000), diasporas tend to hold on to idealized images of their homeland, to which nationalist movements tend to stick as much as possible. The most trivial parts of the struggle are euphemized, and the stress is put on its most romantic and heroic aspects. The propaganda developed by Sinn Féin in the US perfectly illustrates this point, with a clear focus on the historical and cultural aspects of the Northern Irish conflict.

Discourses directed at like-minded actors make up a fourth category. Here the focus is put on solidarity, on the building of international links on the bases of common causes (workers,

freedom fighters...). The idea is to exchange good practices, to discuss political options, latest political developments, but also to build networks of solidarity through which mobilization or support can be developed, and which can foster the exchange of information, but also sometimes of weapons and of various other resources. Networks of nationalist movements have thus been developed in Europe and in the rest of the world, and there are numerous opportunities for nationalists to meet, such as the *Journées Internationales de Corte* organized by the nationalists in Corsica, and to which other nationalist movements regularly participate.

Finally, there are discourses directed at the international public opinion, which play on images of injustice and of suffering. They recourse to emotions, and build an image of the community in conflict as a universal victim. The military aspects of the conflict, except when they convey images of repression and brutality against the community itself, are downplayed, and the stress is put on human rights violations, on deprivation, discrimination and injustice. It is a moral and normative discourse, that asks the international public opinion to act as a witness or as a counter weight against state policies. Its efficiency is obviously decupled in cases of conflicts to which, like in the Northern Irish case, the western public opinion is likely to identify itself, thanks to cultural and geographical proximity.

What appears from the examination of these various categories of discourses, is that interest can be raised through specific discourses, but that internationalization does not automatically derive from them. It stems from a convergence between the interests of at least some of the actors in conflict, and the interests of other international/ transnational actors. In the Northern Irish case for instance, the increasing involvement of the European institutions has been allowed by a convergence between the interests of Republicans who wanted to “de-UKise” the conflict, and a shift in the representations of the conflict held by the British government, not to mention the positive impact of European funds for peace. In this perspective, the intervention of European Union was perfectly timed, and has corresponded to a convergence of opinions between different actors, such as the nationalists, the British and Irish States, international organizations, and public opinions in Britain, the Republic of Ireland and many other European countries. It has to be noted that the shape of this internationalization, and not only its actual existence or not, is partly determined by perceptions at the international level, for instance by perceptions on the ability of a given state to deal with a conflict. A NATO or a NU intervention in Northern Ireland would have thus been unlikely, whereas a specific funding program for peace activities launched by the European Union is considered as being perfectly acceptable. Such a pattern is very common in Europe, as shown by the Belgian case, where the highly conflictual case of the French speaking community living in the periphery of Brussels has been carefully and discretely dealt with by the Council of Europe, because of an enduring taboo against international intervention in “developed” countries.

The impact on agendas and priorities: the example of the Northern Irish conflict

Rearranging the agenda in order to appeal to international actors

The adaptation of discourses to various international actors logically provokes shifts in terms of priorities and agendas, because the international actors’ centers of interest obviously differ from those of actors in conflict. For instance, support to Sinn Féin in the US has been mostly based on a misunderstanding: it has resulted from an exploitation of the romantic image of “homeland” as it is imagined by Irish-Americans. Fund-raising activities rested on these stereotypes and avoided making obvious the connection with arms purchase, which was the intended output. Sinn Féin communication in the US therefore emphasized the cultural aspect of the struggle (which at the time was a secondary objective) instead of the military one. Indeed, cultural aspects of the Republican cause became important only after the Troubles. Even though the Republican objectives were clearly political and economic, these were downplayed when Republicans sought

support from Irish-American organizations and individuals. Descriptions of the tragic situation of Republicans insisted on the socio-economic deprivation of this discriminated community, and especially on the suffering of the wives of imprisoned combatants who were supposedly left without support.

Sinn Féin managed to present its cause in a way that triggered compassion and a sentimental attachment to an imagined homeland. This description left out the parts which complicated the image of a people fighting for its cultural survival, including the fact that support to reunification was waning in the Republic of Ireland. The means used by Sinn Féin matched these discourses: they tended to downplay the military aspects of the struggle (except for a tiny minority of very radical Irish-Americans mobilized for the Republican movement) and highlighted cultural aspects: playing the Irish harp or flute, dancing, and St Patrick's day festivities, for popular culture; but also Irish literature and poetry (both aspects tied to the survival of the Gaelic language).

On the level of organizations, such actors as Noraid exemplify how support can be drawn from putting forward the figure of political prisoners leaving behind helpless families. On the other hand, St Patrick's Day festivities offered an occasion to sell paraphernalia and collect money. All these discourses and activities therefore produce a distorted image not only of the situation on the ground, but also of the actual objectives of actors in conflict themselves.

Obsidional discourses tend to be less audible from the part of international audiences

Another lesson than we can draw is that some discourses are more likely to be heard and to raise concern at the international level than others. In particular, those actors whose situation can be easily transferred, or understood in the framework of a contemporary legitimate paradigm (such as a fight for equal rights) have a much easier access to the international scene. Contrary to their Republicans counterparts, Northern Irish Loyalists have found it much more difficult to draw support from international actors. Their legitimizing discourse, which describes Ulster Protestants as a chosen people bound to rule wisely the contested territory, is hardly acceptable for international audiences. It is deeply religious and cultural, and even has some ethno-racial aspects to it. Until recently, Loyalists have established links or compared themselves only to people with whom they felt an historical affinity, such as South Africa Afrikaners or Israeli. Even though a significant number of people of Ulster Protestant descent live in the US, they have not managed so far to raise support from their part on a similar level than Republicans for Irish-Americans.

Internationalization thus also derives from the ability of actors in conflict to make their ideologies, claims and discourses fit the contemporary values, paradigms and priorities, both in terms of policies and in terms of cultural norms.

Mobilizations for peace appeal specifically to the international community

Finally, the case of mobilizations for peace appears to be specific. It can be argued that mobilizations for peace become easily transnational, because they promote a discourse compatible with the expectations of international actors (either IGOs or INGOs). They can establish networks with like-minded organizations operating at the transnational level, which will in turn allocate resources to peace-oriented actions in theaters of conflicts. Their discourses and actions at the international level are structured around three main elements:

- appeal to general ethical principles (human rights)
- promote cross-sectarian dialogue

- highlight their capacity for grassroots peace initiatives (Anderson 2000)

Yet this discourse may scarcely be audible in very polarized societies or (as in the Northern Irish case) may only be successful at certain historical moments – such as during the Civil Rights movement - before undergoing a severe depletion. For instance the success of the Peace People, crowned by a Nobel Prize for Peace, appears today to have been rather short-lived, probably because of the specificity of the pacifist stance and the difficulty to adapt it to the changes underwent by the Northern Irish society since the Good Friday Agreement in 1998: while such discourse focusing on peace appears to be very relevant in violent conflicts, it fails to raise support from the part of public opinions, both domestic and abroad, when the death toll decreases and leaves room to more invisible, insidious forms of symbolic violence resulting from the conflict.

Conclusion: Turning legitimizing discourses into support: do networks matter?

Having established that different discourses impact in various fashions on international audiences, we now turn to the question of how such support is actually channeled into concrete help.

The role of diasporas in community conflicts and conflict resolution has been frequently pointed at, based on theories of imagined communities or of cultural aspects of globalization. Yet not all international actors mobilized for a community conflict are diasporic in nature, and on the other hand diasporas are themselves constructed thanks to a set of shared symbols (celebrations, festivals, etc.) and to lively networks. Therefore, by looking at the international networks mobilized by actors engaged in community conflicts, we can understand how they concretely communicate their discourses. The nature of these networks differs according to the kinds of international actors which are linked to actors engaged in community conflicts.

Networks with diaspora organizations build on existing interpersonal links, but also on the materialization of the representations which diasporas have of their homelands: for instance, Republican networks have mostly insisted on cultural aspects and have taken advantage of such cultural opportunities as St Patrick's Day in order to reinforce their ties to Irish American networks. When Unionists have tried to also appeal to the American public opinion by establishing networks with organizations of Ulster Scot descent, they have discovered that such organizations did not exist. By facilitating research on Ulster Scot culture and on Ulster Scottish American history and genealogies, they have tried to raise the interest of certain Americans to this aspect of their heritage. Their failure so far to reach this goal can be explained by the difficulty of trying to appeal to unorganized individuals largely unaware of the fact that they should feel connected to the situation of Unionists in Northern Ireland.

Networks linking like-minded organizations – such as those between the IRA and ETA – are mostly informal when they deal with illegal aspects of their struggle, or when they involve illegal organizations. Yet networks may take an open form in some institutionalized events such as the yearly nationalist event in Corsica, the “*Journées Internationales de Corte*” where Sinn Féin and Herri Batasuna are regularly invited. Although officially such meetings are dedicated to theoretical discussions on the future of nationalism, informal discussions indeed browse such topics as arms trade, etc.

Networks with civil society actors have much benefited from the uprising of the global justice movement, since such regular events as the World Social Forums or the European Social Forums are important moments in order to network and gain visibility for a cause tied to a community conflict in an active and lively social movement sector. The level of networking is here directly connected to the dedication of some actors who attend many smaller events of such sorts: for instance at the beginning of the 2000s, “information tables” on the Basque cause offering leaflets

were held by actors sympathetic to Herri Batasuna at many small anti-globalization moments in France. Small organizations supporting Republican politics are located in the same social centers where many leftist and anarchist organizations active in the global justice movement have their headquarters, thereby facilitating informal networking with them. In some cases the same people may be active in both global justice organizations and organizations mobilized in relation with a community conflict: for instance the French Women in Black are mostly composed of women also involved in anti-globalization and feminist movements. Mobilizing for causes related to community conflict is then intertwined with other forms of protest, thereby rendering cross-support, information and resource sharing easier.

The role of various means of communication can eventually be considered in order to shed light upon the question of why certain actors engaged in community conflict manage to network with international actors when other fail. The role of Internet communication has been pointed at in studies of both transnational social movements and diaporas in order to explain how actors in different countries can coordinate their actions on a daily basis. Yet evidence suggests that networks resorting only to Internet contacts are less likely to raise active support than those including also interpersonal ties and trips to foreign countries. For instance, one can stress the importance of international visits made by key representatives of actors engaged in conflicts – such as the ones of Gerry Adams in the US, which were essential in raising support to the Republican cause.

As this brief overview of the role plaid by networks in securing transnational support to actors engaged in community conflicts show, the main issue for them is to try to establish a connection with actors abroad, and to create some proximity with them. Theories of globalization have often stressed out, following the seminal argument made by David Harvey (1991), that one feature of this new paradigm is the compression of time and space. While we should beware of taking such representation too literally, it describes remarkably well the representations of actors engaged in community conflicts who aim at suppressing the distance between their struggle and potential international support. Channels are therefore sought or created in order to maintain this proximity: they may be interpersonal links within diasporas, cultural orientations or symbolic artifacts shared, historical narratives stressing out a common past. Actors engaged in conflicts know that rousing emotions abroad about their cause is their best chance to get foreign governments and international institutions to intervene in their favor.

4.2. The Management of Conflicts at the Pan-European Level: towards a European Specificity?

Let's now put the focus in this last part of the deliverable on the international actors of conflict management, and on the specific tools and co-operation schemes they are developing in order to deal with conflicts appearing or escalating in Europe. Co-operation in the field of conflict management has become an important challenge at the pan European level. Not only States co-operate together, but also International Organizations (IO). In 1999, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) decided to create a Platform for Co-operative Security *“in order to strengthen co-operation between the OSCE and other international organizations and institutions, thereby making better use of the resources of the international community”* (“Charter for European Security”, 1999: 8). Such initiative illustrates the change in International Organizations' strategies. IOs have been developing their interactions and tend to make them more structured and more efficient as a response to global challenges such as community conflicts. Basically, it is now possible to identify a third level of community conflict management, situated at the International Organizations level that includes as well the European Union. This new level illustrates the process of Pan-Europeanisation of community conflicts management, temporally defined as a specific form of top-down internationalisation of community conflicts through the

construction of structured interactions between IOs. The objectives of this section are twofold: first, to give a working definition of Pan-Europeanisation with regard to community conflicts. Secondly, to review the management of several community conflicts in order to draw some conclusions about the link between the kind of community conflicts and the degree of Pan-Europeanisation. Intuitively one can think that a community conflict that challenges States' external sovereignty should initiate a higher degree of Pan-Europeanisation than a community conflict challenging internal States' sovereignty, but, as we will demonstrate, this assumption has to be nuanced. The issue at stake in a community conflict will influence not only the degree of Pan-Europeanisation but as well the configuration of pan-Europeanisation, closely linked to the question of leadership. In that perspective, special attention will be paid to the shifts in leadership between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the European Union (EU) and the Council of Europe (CoE) in the management of community conflicts. In this section, we will try to apply the notion of Pan-Europeanisation to three cases covered by PEACE-COM: the Baltic States with the Russian-speaking minorities, the Roma issue and the conflict in Kosovo.

4.2.1. Defining Pan-Europeanisation of Conflicts

The role of the European Union and the impact of the process of Europeanisation on the resolution of conflicts has been extensively reviewed (Noutcheva et al., 2004) as a corollary of the enlargement of EU's functions in the field of conflict management (De Wilde D'Esmael, 2005). This evolution comes from the progressive adoption of a broader definition of security which includes internal conflicts as a direct threat to peace and security. For instance, in the 2003 European Security Strategy, regional conflicts are identified as key threats. *“Violent or frozen conflicts, which also persist on our borders, threaten regional stability. They destroy human lives and social and physical infrastructures; they threaten minorities, fundamental freedoms and human rights»* (5) At the European level, the conflicts in the Balkans in the 90s have caused a crisis of awareness. European Governments and International Organizations realized that, apart from the direct threat to human rights, these conflicts may create a regional destabilization throughout horizontal escalation (Tranca, 2006); it was the European people's interest to try to prevent such diffusion.

On the European scene, even if EU is now an international actor, it is not the only one active in Europe. The ongoing process of Europeanisation seems to hide the fact that there are many other political International Organizations active in Europe. For instance, in a recent study over the Europeanisation of secessionist conflicts, the authors underline that *“It is [...] critical to bear in mind that emphasizing the EU entails the risk of overlooking other important generators of change in the societies under discussion. In the context of conflict settlement and resolution, other framework organizations and players must be taken into consideration when analyzing the effects of Europeanisation”* (Noutcheva et al.: 5). As a matter of fact, conflict management is as well a competence of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the Council of Europe and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Besides the equivalence in terms of objectives and missions, there is an overlap in terms of members. Many of the States members of the EU are at the same time members of these IOs. The result is a sort of cobweb of relations (Burton, 1972: 19), a network between these two poles of actors⁹. At the same time, the emergence of global commons (such as environment or human rights) or Global Public Goods (Biscop in Ortega: 2005) has profoundly transformed the international scene. The importance of these global challenges on the reconstruction of the relations between international actors have been studied throughout the transnational or pluralistic paradigm that emphasizes the centrality of the concept of complex interdependence. Complex interdependence is characterized by the absence of hierarchy among issues, the minor

9 To be exhaustive, it would be important to add a third pole of actors, composed by all the non-governmental actors, such as international non-governmental organizations and etc

role of military issues and the existence of multiple channels (interstate, transnational and transgovernmental channels) (Keohane, Nye: 24). This situation of interdependence is illustrated by the increased co-operation between IOs in certain field of activities, in particular conflict management. In the *Supplement to the Agenda for Peace* (1995), the General-Secretary Boutros Boutros-Ghali made a specific chapter about the coordination of the UN action with other regional organizations. « *Cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations takes a number of forms. At least five can be identified: (a) Consultation [...] b) Diplomatic support: the regional organization participates in the peacemaking activities of the United Nations and supports them by diplomatic initiatives[...] (c) Operational support: the most developed example is the provision by NATO of air power to support the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslavia. [...]; (d) Co-deployment: United Nations field missions have been deployed in conjunction with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in Liberia and with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in Georgia; (e) Joint operations [...]* ». The conclusion of the General-Secretary on this point stresses that « *If those experiments succeed, they may herald a new division of labour between the United Nations and regional organizations, under which the regional organization carries the main burden but a small United Nations operation supports it and verifies that it is functioning in a manner consistent with positions adopted by the Security Council* ».

At the level of Europe, the same pursue of coherence is about to emerge: in 2003, the Council of the European Union approved its first European Security Strategy drafted by the EU High Representative Javier Solana. One of the main ideas of the EU Security Strategy (ESS) is that “*no single country is able to tackle today’s complex problems on its own.*” Such characteristics appear as well in the vision of the other IOs. In the “OSCE strategy to address threats to security and stability in the twenty-first century”¹⁰, the Ministerial Council affirms that “*No single State or organisation can, on its own, meet the challenges facing us today. Co-ordination of the efforts of all relevant organisations is therefore essential.*” [...] “*The OSCE seeks to expand its relations with all organisations and institutions that are concerned with the promotion of comprehensive security within the OSCE area, and has established regular patterns of consultation at both the technical and the political levels with a number of them, inter alia, the UN, EU, NATO and the Council of Europe.*” The Council of Europe and NATO stress as well in their discourses the need to collaborate with the others International Organisations with regard to common challenges.

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the four Organisations (EU, OSCE, NATO and CoE) have been thus getting closer in terms of purposes, missions, and even members. Moreover, the enlargement of NATO in 2004 and the enlargements of EU in 2004 and 2007, coupled with the deepening process has created an unique situation: four IOs are at the same time in charge of peace and security in Europe. Consequently, they all are legitimate to get involved in crisis that breaks out on the European continent. For instance, they all got involved in the Kosovo's crisis. According to the UN Resolution 1244 (1999), the CoE contributes to the implementation of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), and the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG). The Council of Europe' main tasks deal with human rights protection, election observation, protection of the cultural heritage, reform of the local self-government, crime prevention. At the same time, the mandate of the OSCE Mission in Kosovo encompasses tasks in democracy and governance, election organization and supervision, media affairs, human rights monitoring, rule of law and police education and development¹¹. Before the OSCE Mission in Kosovo, OSCE, acting within the framework of the UNSC Resolution 1199 was leading the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) .¹²NATO intervened in the Kosovo crisis at different

10 “OSCE strategy to address threats to security and stability in the twenty-first century”, Eleventh Meeting of the Ministerial Council, 1 and 2 December 2003, MC.DOC/1/03

11 Decision n° 305, PC.DEC/305, 1 July, 1999.

12 PC.DEC/263; SANS A.L., “L’intervention de l’OSCE dans les Balkans. Heurs et malheurs de la Mission de Vérification au Kosovo (octobre 1998-juin 1999), PSIO Occasional Paper 2, 2004.

moment. NATO first established a special military task force to support the KVM. During the crisis, NATO carried out the military operation *Allied Force*. After the end of the air strikes, a Military Technical Agreement was agreed and permitted the establishment in June 1999. In accordance with the UNSC 1244, the mission of KFOR is « *to establish and maintain a secure environment in Kosovo, including public safety and order; to monitor, verify and when necessary, enforce compliance with the agreements that ended the conflict; and to provide assistance to the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)* ». The European Union is also actively engaged in the reconstruction of Kosovo. UE participates in the UNMIK and the mission of KFOR. Kosovo is actually anchored in the Stabilization and Accession Process (SAP) and the « European Future of Kosovo » is becoming a reality¹³. This quick overview suggests at first glance that, in the Kosovo crisis, there has been a sort of division of labour between the IOs. CoE's role deals with conflict transformation while OSCE has been involved in preventive actions (KVM) and conflict transformation activities (OSCE Mission in Kosovo). With the military task force and the Operation Allied Force, NATO's role is anchored in preventive and resolution actions. The involvement of EU copes with preventive, resolution and transformative actions.

Pan-Europeanisation of community conflicts and contiguous theories and concepts

At the theoretical level, the first distinction to be made is that pan Europeanisation is not Europeanisation. The two concepts sound equal or are quite close to each other but they are two different notions. Europeanisation deals with the European Union. The processes of enlargement and deepening of the EU have given a strong input to conceptualizing Europeanisation. The literature on this subject is huge, in particular because Europeanisation means lot of things. Johan Olsen proposes five meanings of the phenomenon of Europeanisation. For him, Europeanisation means whether 'The changes in external territorial boundaries'; or 'Development of institutions of governance at the European level'; or 'Central penetration of national and sub-national systems of governance'; or 'exporting forms of political organization and governance that are typical and distinct for Europe beyond the European territory"', or 'Political project aiming at a unified and politically stronger Europe' (Olsen, 2001). These propositions illustrate the high pluri-meaning of the concept which refers at the same time to the enlargement process, the institutionalization process, the system of governance, the relations between EU and other international institution and the underlying project of political integration. In order to avoid concept stretching, Radaelli has proposed a working definition, which is now a reference in the field of Europeanisation theory. He defines Europeanisation as “*processes of (a)construction (b)diffusion and c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, 'ways of doing things' and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU decisions and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourses, identities, political structures and public policies*“ (Radaelli, 2000). Pan-Europeanisation is not Europeanisation because the ontological level is different. As underlined by Radaelli, “*Europeanisation would not exist without European integration. But the latter concept belongs to the ontological stage of research, that is, the understandings of a process in which countries pool sovereignties, whereas the former is post-ontological, being concerned with what happens once EU institutions are in place and produce their effects*” (Ibid: 7). The same remark could be addressed with respect to pan-Europeanisation and Europeanisation. Pan-Europeanisation is concerned with the effects produced by the structured interactions of IO s on a specific issue at the level of the Great Europe.

Secondly, pan-Europeanisation is different from political integration. As highlighted by Stanley Hoffman, the processes of political integration is one of the major evolutions that have happened on the international scene since the last decade (Hoffman, 1959: 475). According to Jean Barrea, regional integration is indeed one of the 4 existing modes of international co-operation (Barrea:

13 See Communication from the Commission « A European Future for the Kosovo », COM (2005) 156 Final.

129). Basically, theories of political integration are divided into 4 main approaches; the pluralistic (or transactionalist, or communications) approach developed by Karl Deutsch (1957), the functionalist and neo-functionalist perspective (Mitrany, Haas, Lindberg), the federalist approach developed by Etzioni (1965) and the inter governmental strategy of political integration (For an overview of the theories of European Integration see : Rosamond, 2000; Bussy, Delorme, De La Serre, 1971). Pan-Europeanisation does not refer to a process of political integration – which is a stato-centric process- but it is close to Deutsch's reflection over pluralistic security communities in the sense that the process of pan-Europeanisation of community conflicts may participate to the creation of a more extended pluralistic community at the regional level (Adler, Barnett: 30).

As a third theoretical precision, pan-Europeanisation is not a new version of multi-level governance (MLG). Even if MLG is not a “grand theory”, the apparition of the concept has generated a huge wave of literature but, still, the concept remains weak. Mainly, MLG is a metaphor, used to stress a new reality. “*The point of departure for this multi-level governance (MLG) approach is the existence of overlapping competencies among multiple levels of governance and the interaction of political actors across those levels*” (Marks: 1996) For Rosamond, MLG is an “*attempt to depict complexity as the principal feature of the EU's policy system and [MLG] emphasis on variability, unpredictability and multi-actorness*” (Rosamond: 111) At the end, MLG permits the “*recognition of the multi-levelness*” (Ibid.).

Analyzing Pan Europeanisation of community conflicts the need for a method of analysis

Most of the time, interactions between IO s are not studied through the perspective of organized action. They are analyzed in terms of co-operation, coordination, complementarities and competition. The central point of these studies is generally to make an assessment of the coherence and the efficiency of the so-called partnership and to make some recommendations (Iji, 2005; Esman, Telhami, 1995; Hettne, Soderbaum, 2006; Ricken, 2002; Ghebali, 1998). This kind of analysis is far from permitting a global comprehension of IOs' interactions in the field of community conflict management. As we mentioned before, the emerging division of labour with respect to community conflicts management suggests that the IOs' interactions are getting more structured. This perspective changes radically because the focus is not on explaining the individual actions of an actor but to understand the problems related to the construction of an organized action at the level of IOs. In that sense, the theory of international regime gives some interesting concepts. Since the apparition of the concept, the literature has been abundant in order to better understand this phenomenon. However, international regimes remain difficult to comprehend because of a weakness in analytic terms. Such weakness has been already pointed out by scholars like Susan Strange or Oran Young (Strange in Krasner, 1983: 337-354; Young, 1982. Hence, a lot of efforts have been made in order to provide a better analytic framework of analysis (Hasenclever, Mayer, Rittberger, 1996; Haas, 1980; Donnelly, 1986). The question of the definition, the conditions of emergence, and transformation, the dynamics and the diversity of forms of international regimes has been the heart of the reflection on this phenomenon. Even if several definitions have been proposed (from very broad to more specific) (Tooze, 1990), Stephen Krasner's definition is now consensual. He defines an international regime as ‘*a set of implicit or explicit principles; norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations. Principles are beliefs of fact, causation and rectitude. Norms are standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice*’ (Krasner, 1983). Basically, international regimes are the institutionalised form of international co-operation (Barrea: 129).

The theory of regime can be very useful to analyze International actors' (States and non-States actors) organized actions but one of the main problems remains the weakness in analytic and conceptual terms, even if some authors have provided very interesting taxonomies of

international regimes¹⁴. Moreover, international regime theory focuses on legal agreement between international actors in a specific issue-area; such focus does not enlighten the relations of power between members of a regime. For instance, the international management of the Roma issues creates obviously an informal division of labour that comes from both the specificities of the IO involved and the informal relations of power related to the maintenance of leadership at the international level. In sum, the theory of international regime is not sufficient to analyze the intrinsic logics of an international organized action. At the same time, there is no fundamental incompatibility between the existence of an international regime and of an organized action (even a system of action). In other words, a European minority regime may exist next to an organized action but the former will be related to the existence of *formal* and *institutionalized* forms of co-operation whereas, the latter illustrates the existence of *informal* forms of interactions.

On the contrary, the framework proposed by Michel Crozier and Erhard Friedberg looks very interesting for analysing this kind of action. The focus is on the actor and the theory is based on the hypothesis that the actions of an actor can be explained by both the logic of its action – its strategies – and the context of action. The central point of Crozier and Friedberg's viewpoint is to analyze the conditions and the consequences of a specific and contingent context of action. In *L'Acteur et le système, les contraintes de l'action collective* (1977), Crozier and Friedberg analyse the organized action. The idea of the study is that the organized action is nothing but natural. It is a social construction, that is “*specific solutions, that, relatively autonomous actors, with their resources and their particular capacities, have created, invented, implemented, in order to resolve the problems caused by the organized action, among others, the most fundamental, the problem of cooperation. These solutions are created in order to accomplish common objectives, in spite of divergent orientations*” (Ibid: 15-16).

The four principles of Crozier and Friedberg's reflection are the following:

1. The actor is strategic and has a zone of autonomy;
2. The rationality of the actor is limited;
3. Power is a relation of exchange that actors negotiate;
4. Interactions between actors result in the constitution of an *action system* more or less stable.

In their essay, Crozier and Friedberg analyze in the first two parts the phenomenon of organization, but they propose to transpose, in a third part, the theory from the organization, a formal construction, to a more general situation, a system (Ibid: 228). The notion of system, as used by the authors, has nothing to do with the concept of system as developed by David Easton. In the analysis, the concept of system of organized action does not refer to an empirical scheme (Ibid: 242). On the contrary, it is used, here, in order to reveal the existence of actor's specific “games”. The existence of such games may lead to an action system, defined as “*A structured human entity that coordinates each parties share by using a stable game plan. The entity maintains it's stability by adjusting its game plan with other game plan regulations*” (Ibid: 286). An action system is thus always a specific solution created to resolve the problems related to the organized action, the interdependence, the co-operation and the conflict. The difference between the existence and the non-existence of an action system depends, according to Friedberg, on the characteristics of the games. He defines four degrees (Friedberg, 1993: 166) : 1/ the degree of formalization and codification of the regulation; 2/ the degree of finalization of the regulation that refers to the

14 See for instance the analysis of the Human rights regime made by DONNELLY J., *International Human Rights: A Regime Analysis*, International Organization 40, n°3, pp 599-642. The author defines four (or eight) type of international regimes in the case of international human rights. Strong / weak Declaratory regimes, Strong / weak promotional regimes, Strong / weak implementation regimes and Strong / weak enforcement regimes.

existence or non existence of common explicit objectives; 3/ degree of awareness and interiorization of the inter dependence by the actors; and 4/ the degree of explicit delegation of the regulation. This last dimension refers to the existence of integrators, who are actors that regulate the conflicts of interests.

It is possible then to draw a “*genetic sequence*” of the emergence of the action system. A first stage would be the passage from non-co-operation and conflict to coexistence and implicit collusion between the actors. This first stage does not correspond to a first degree of formalization and codification, but means that there is an implicit collusion between the actors. The second stage is crossed when the actors go beyond the collusion and become aware of the benefits of the co-operation. The introduction and the acceptance of the explicit co-operation and its transformation into common objectives illustrate this second sequence. The delegation and the emergence of formalized structures constitute the last stage of the action system.

4.2.2. Mapping Organised Actions of Community Conflict Management

In the light of the precedent chapter, it is possible then to precise our first definition and to define the process of pan-Europeanisation as following :

Pan-Europeanisation is a process by which International Organizations construct an organized action, which may lead to the constitution of an action system, at the pan-European level.

Such definition implies that analysing the pan-Europeanisation of community conflicts may allow recognizing different degrees of pan-Europeanisation. In some cases, the pan-Europeanisation process will be limited to a simple co-ordination of action between actors (low pan-Europeanisation) and in other cases, it will be possible to observe a high degree of pan-Europeanisation when the interactions of the IO are better structured and integrated. The last degree may lead, *in fine*, to the constitution of an “action system”.

Each community conflict has its own logic and differs from another. It is thus of particular interest to try to link the kind of conflict with the construction of the organized action taken by the IO involved in the conflict management. For instance, is there a difference between the organized action taken with respect to the community conflict in the Baltic States and the actions undertaken in Kosovo? This is the question that will be addressed now, as an application of the concept of pan-Europeanisation. From the analysis of three cases of community conflicts covered in PEACE-COM, (the Kosovo conflict, the Russian speaking conflict and the Roma conflict) we will try to draw some conclusions about the question addressed here. The cultural and territorial (internal aspect) dimensions are present in the Kosovo crisis as well as a high degree of violence. The conflict in the Baltic States is rather a political and a territorial (with external interferences) conflict. The Roma case is also interesting. The dimensions present in this conflict are mainly the socio-economical and political dimensions. Using Crozier and Friedberg’s theory, the comparison of the international response to these conflicts will make it possible to determine the impact of each dimension on the ongoing process of pan-Europeanisation. For the three cases, the methodology of analysis will include: a) a quick overview of the IOs’ involvement in the conflict, b) the definition of the problem : is there an organized action ? and c) the first conclusions.

The Russian-speaking Minorities in the Baltic States

The major International Organizations whose activities are concentrated on the European territory have been involved in the case of Russian minorities. The reasons are two-fold: The first reason is that the involvement of the IOs in the Baltic case is geopolitical. The break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991 has created at the same time a huge Russian minority in the former soviet

republics. More than 20 million ethnic Russians live in the « near-aboard » of the newly formed Russia. In the Baltic States, the Russian-speaking minority is as well of great importance: the ethnic composition of the Baltic States shows that, in 1989, 30.3 % of the Estonian population, 34% of the Latvian population and 9.4% in Lithuania was from Russian origin (Zaagman, 1999: 6). The issue of the Russian minority in Estonia and Latvia became then « an important factor in international relations » (Ibid: 1), in particular because of the attitude of the Estonian and Latvian States and the Russian Federation. In Estonia and in Latvia the presence of a large Russian minority became a problem in the 80s and the 90s, just after the independence of the two countries. The presence of the Russian minority was seen as a danger for the re-construction of the national identity and the complete independence from Russia. In both countries, the radicalization of the Language legislation and citizenship legislation (Ibid: 33; See also Yakemtchouk, 2004: 160-168) increased the internal tensions, at the community level, and the external tensions, at the international level. With more than 20 millions Russians living in the « near-aboard » of the Russian Federation, the protection of Russians has always be an objective for the Russian Federation¹⁵. The situation in the Baltic States was about to become a violent conflict. Indeed, the conflict was until this time a relative non-violent conflict, but, according to Rob Zaagman, « *Even though non inter-ethnic violence had taken place, a number of factors made for a volatile mix in both Baltic States : firstly, the existence of domestic tensions between a large minority of mainly Russians without citizenship who has to get used to the post-Soviet realities and a majority determined to preserve and strengthen its own identity; and secondly, increasing international tensions because of the active interest which neighbouring Russia, mainly for geopolitical reasons, was taking in the condition of its kinfolk in Estonia and Latvia* » (op.cit. 1; 16).

The first IO to take an active part in the conflict has been the Conference for Co-operation and Security in Europe (CSCE). The actions taken by the OSCE to resolve the conflict started from the beginnings of the CSCE. But the involvement of the Conference was indirect and constrained by the position of USSR, for whom the problem of the presence of Russians in the Baltic area was only a bilateral question. The action of the CSCE was then paralysed by the mechanism of consensus decision-making. The institutionalization of the CSCE in December 1994 at the Budapest Summit transformed the CSCE into an effective organisation and permitted the organisation to decide and implement long-term missions. The decision to establish long-term missions in Estonia (15 February 1993 – 31 December 2001) and in Latvia (19 November 1993-31 December 2001) illustrated the direct involvement of the CSCE in this region. The Missions were set up under the Rule 4 of the Document of Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE (Moscow 1991) which stipulates that “*A participating State may invite the assistance of a CSCE mission, consisting of up to three experts, to address or contribute to the*

15 For an evaluation of the Russian policy on minorities, see AUPPILA L., The Baltic Puzzle, Russia's Policy towards Estonia and Latvia 1992-1997, Helsingin yliopiston verkkojulkaisut, Helsinki 1999, available at <http://ethesis.helsinki.fi/julkaisut/val/yhtei/pg/kauppila/index.html>, pp 56 and following. See as well RUSSIAN FEDERATION FEDERAL LAW On the State Policy of the Russian Federation in respect of compatriots abroad adopted by the State Duma on 5 March 1999 Approved by the Federation Council on 17 March 1999. Available at [http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2002/CDL\(2002\)076-e.asp](http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2002/CDL(2002)076-e.asp) ; In 1994, President Yeltsin declared to the Diaspora: "Dear compatriots! You are inseparable from us and we are inseparable from you. We were and will be together. On the basis of law and solidarity, we defend and will defend you and our common interests. In the New Year, 1994, we will do this with greater energy and greater resoluteness" ; In a discourse to the Federal Assembly in April 2005, President Vladimir Putin reaffirms that "We consider international support for the respect of the rights of Russians abroad an issue of major importance, one that cannot be the subject of political and diplomatic bargaining. We hope that the new members of NATO and the European Union in the post-Soviet area will show their respect for human rights, including the rights of ethnic minorities, through their actions. Countries that do not respect and cannot guarantee human rights themselves do not have the right to demand that others respect these same rights. Discourse addressed by Vladimir Putin at the Federal Assembly on the 25th of April 2005. Available at <http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/priorities/specevents21892/2000.shtml>

*resolution of questions in its territory relating to the human dimension of the CSCE [...]'*¹⁶. The objective of the Mission in Estonia was to further promote integration and better understanding between the communities in Estonia¹⁷. The objectives of the Mission in Latvia were to address citizenship issues and other related matters and be at the disposal of the Latvian Government and authorities for advice on such issues; to provide information and advice to institutions, organizations and individuals with an interest in a dialogue on these issues; to gather information and report on developments relevant to the full realization of CSCE principles, norms and commitments. In parallel to this kind of action, an independent body was established in 1992 "to identify and seek early resolution of ethnic tensions that might endanger peace, stability or friendly relations between OSCE participating States"¹⁸, the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCMN). The HCMN has been active as well. The situation in the Baltic States fell perfectly under its competencies, in particular because of the risks of escalation. The High Commissioner, Max Van der Stoep, has been active in trying to prevent a conflict escalation by making Recommendations to the States and by promoting dialogue and co-operation (Zaagman: 27 & following).

The Council of Europe (CoE) was established in 1949 by the Charter of Paris. The protection of minorities is a core element for the Council of Europe. The protection of national minorities within the CoE area is guaranteed by the adoption of several juridical mechanisms. The main instrument of protection is nevertheless the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, adopted the 1st of February 1995 and entered into force the 1st of February 1996. This Framework Convention is the only legally binding instrument for the protection of minorities that includes a monitoring mechanism. Estonia, Latvia and the Russian Federation are all members of the CoE and they signed and ratified the FCNM. The situation in the Baltic States has been monitored by the CoE through the mechanism of States Reports and Committee of Ministers Resolutions. In 2002, the Resolution of the Committee of Ministers underlines that "Estonia has made efforts to implement the Framework Convention and to improve intercultural dialogue in Estonia. In particular, it has paid increasing attention to the integration of persons belonging to national minorities, including through the State Integration Program." [...] but "Further efforts are needed in order to promote the process of naturalization, bearing in mind that the number of stateless persons remains high."¹⁹ No resolution has been adopted for Latvia. The Second Resolution of the CM on Estonia pointed out several issues of concerns and recommends to Estonia to make further efforts in the linguistic issue.²⁰ During a country's visit in October 2003, the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Alvaro Gil-Robles, pointed out as

16 "OSCE Human Dimension Commitments: Chronological Compilation", p 107 and following. Available online at http://www.osce.org/odihr/item_11_16238.html

17 The mandate consisted in the following elements :

"establish and maintain contacts with competent authorities on both the national and the local level, in particular with those responsible for citizenship, migration, language questions, social services and employment;

establish and maintain contacts with relevant non-governmental institutions and organizations, including political parties, trade unions and mass media organizations;

collect information and serve as a clearing-house for information, technical assistance and advice on matters relating to the status of the communities in Estonia and the rights and duties of their members;

contribute to the efforts of Estonian national and local authorities to re-create a civic society, *inter alia* through the promotion of local mechanisms to facilitate dialogue and understanding;

keeping in mind the temporary nature of the Mission, consider ways and means of transferring its responsibilities to institutions or organizations representing the local population."

18 See "The Challenges of Change", 3rd CSCE Summit of Heads of State or Government, Helsinki. p 19.

19 Resolution ResCMN(2002)8, on the implementation of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities by Estonia, Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 13 June 2002 at the 799th meeting of the Ministers' Deputies

20 Resolution ResCMN(2006)1 on the implementation of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities by Estonia, Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 15 February 2006 at the 956th meeting of the Ministers' Deputies.

well some gaps in the system of protection of minorities in Estonia²¹ and in Latvia²²

The action of the European Union with respect to the Baltic situations has been concentrated on the period of the fifth enlargement process. Indeed, after the conflicts in the Balkans, the European Union realized that the protection of minorities was a common issue. The European Council in Copenhagen adopted in 1993 the Copenhagen Criteria which include the “respect for and the protection of minorities” as a central element of the admission of new Member States (Tucny, 2000). The European Commission has been monitoring the candidate Countries, through Progress Reports. In spite of the gaps in the method of monitoring (Hugues, Sasse, 2003), the implementation of such conditionality has been a real *plus-value* for the European policy on minorities. With respect to the situations in the Baltic States, the Commission underlined several times in the Progress Reports the situation of Russian minorities.

It could be somehow strange to include the actions of NATO in the case of the Russian minorities in the Baltic Area, given that NATO's first objective is the maintenance of peace and security in the North Atlantic area, as set by the chapter VIII of Charter of the United Nations. The protection of national minorities is not a clear objective of NATO. Nevertheless, the protection of minorities in the Baltic area has become an objective, in particular during the enlargement process in 2004. In January 1994 at the Brussels Summit, Allied leaders reaffirmed that the Alliance was open to membership of other European states. Estonia and Latvia participated to the Membership Action Plan (MAP), a program launched in April 1999 to assist those countries who wish to join the Alliance. According to the MAP, the candidate Country must meet certain objectives and obligations. They are also expected to meet certain political, economical and military goals which include “*that they treat minority populations in accordance with the guidelines of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE); have resolved outstanding disputes with neighbors and had made an overall commitment to the peaceful settlement of disputes;*” The inclusion of minority protection comes from a 1995 Study on NATO enlargement.

The review of the IOs' involvement in the Baltic States does not apparently reveal any formal relations between the actors. Each IO has implemented its own actions according to its mandates and objectives. There is no co-ordination, nor surfacing of an organized action between IOs. Such situation corresponds thus to the first degree identified by Friedberg where the degree of formalization and codification of the regulation is very low, even inexistent. Finally, at the beginning of the conflict, the IOs involved do not have any common interests to co-operate.

At first glance, there is neither organized action nor system of action in the Baltic Case. This conclusion should be nuanced however. It is interesting to consider this case because it is situated at a cross point. The relations between EU, OSCE, NATO and CoE were nothing but structured. This period corresponds thus to a period of double transformation: Transformation of the Organizations and transformation of the international system as a consequence of the end of the Cold War. When the OSCE got first involved, it was still the CSCE. The fourth enlargement of the European Union was about to be launched and the Baltic States were anchored with the Pre-Accession instruments. They became fully members of the EU in May 2004. Estonia and Lithuania became members of the Council of Europe in May 1993 and Latvia in February 1995. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are partners of NATO since 1991, as founding members of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. In parallel to the transformation in the international system, the regional integration in Europe was under process. Some elements seem to indicate that this period corresponds to the emergence of a pan-Europeanized order based on

21 Report by Mr Alvaro Gil-Robles, Commissioner for human rights, on his visit to Estonia 27th – 30th October 2003, Strasbourg, 12 February 2004 CommDH(2004)5.

22 Report by Mr Alvaro Gil-Robles, Commissioner for Human Rights, on his visit to Latvia 5 - 8 October 2003 Strasbourg, 12 February 2004 CommDH(2004)3.

the recognition of the need for and the value of co-operation between IOs. For instance, NATO stated in 1995 that “*The architecture of European security is composed of European institutions (such as the European Union (EU) and the Western European Union (WEU)) and transatlantic institutions (NATO). It also includes the OSCE, whose membership comprises all European as well as North American countries and is thus the most inclusive European security institution [...]*”²³. The Commission Opinion on Estonia's Application for Membership of the European Union underlined that « *In carrying out the assessment required in this connection, the European Commission has drawn on a number of sources of information: answers given by the Estonian authorities to the questionnaire sent to them by Commission staff in April 1996, bilateral follow-up meetings, reports from Member States' embassies and the Commission's delegation, assessments by international organisations (including the Council of Europe and the OSCE (Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe), reports produced by non-governmental organisations, etc.* »²⁴.

In sum, the management of the Russian-speaking minorities' conflict in the Baltic States is obviously not an example of organized action but it is interesting to underline the shift in the leadership. Indeed, CSCE/OSCE has been the first IO involved in the resolution of the conflict. But, since the Baltic States are independent and decided to integrate the European Union, the European Union has taken progressively the leadership in the management of the conflict. The process of EU enlargement has been one of the major lever to help them meeting the “European standards” on the minority issue, in particular thanks to the Copenhagen criteria (Tucny: 62). However, since the Baltic States are fully members of the EU, the situation of the Russian-minorities, which still has to be improved²⁵, has been somehow forgotten. The method used by the Commission to monitor the situation of the minorities has been highly criticized (Hugues, Sasse: 2003). The only institution still active in this field is the Council of Europe. Countries are supposed to provide regularly reports on the implementation of the Framework-Convention on the protection of national minorities. The last follow-up meeting on the implementation of the FCNM in Estonia took place in October 2006 and examined four areas where improvements could be made according to the Second Opinion of the Advisory Committee and Committee of Ministers' Resolution (the Participation of persons belonging to minorities in public life ; The rights of persons belonging to minorities in the field of education Equality and non-discrimination in economic and social life ; Cultural and linguistic diversity in the media and other fields). Finally, the Council of Europe is the only European Institution that has a long-term policy on minorities' question.

Roma peoples in Europe

*“The treatment of Roma both in the European Union and beyond its current borders has become a litmus test of a humane society. The treatment of Roma is today among the most pressing political, social and human rights issues facing Europe.”*²⁶

Roma people is the unique transnational minority in Europe. According to the Council of Europe, Roma minority is the only minority in Europe that has never had territorial claims. According to PEACE-COM's first results described in D1, the main claims of Roma people are

23 Study on NATO Enlargement, September 1995, Chapter 2.

24 Agenda 2000 - Commission Opinion on Estonia's Application for Membership of the European Union, DOC/97/12.

25 See Written Question P6_QE(2007)0855 about the Russian minority in Estonia; Amnesty International reports that “Although some significant steps have been taken in recent years by the Estonian authorities, Amnesty International believes that the current policies fail to constitute a coherent framework within which these ESC rights can be guaranteed for persons belonging to the Russian-speaking linguistic minority.” “Estonia linguistic minorities in Estonia : Discrimination must end”, AI Report EUR 51/002/2006; VAN ELSUWEGE P., “Russian-speaking Minorities in Estonia and Latvia : Problems of integration at the Threshold of the European Union”, ECMI Working Paper n°20, April 2004.

26 “The Situation of Roma in an enlarged European Union”, DG Employment and Social Affairs, 2004,

socio-economical and political. In their countries of residence, they suffer from discrimination, inequalities and difficulties in the access to the political scene. At the pan European level, the Roma issue is quite recent. In the Council of Europe, the Roma and Travellers issue has been at the heart of the Organization's work since 1993. For the CoE, Roma and Travellers issue is situated at the intersection between three main field of activities : the protection of minorities, the fight against racism and intolerance and the fight against social exclusion. The Experts' Committee on Roma, Gypsies and Travellers (MG-S-ROM) set up in 1995 is a body responsible for reviewing regularly the issue. CoE's instruments include legal instruments (such as the European Social Charter (Revised), the Framework Convention on National Minorities and the Charter for Regional or Minority Languages), Recommendations and Education and training programs. Following a French/Finnish proposal, the Council of Europe adopted the idea of created of a Roma association. In September 2004, The European Roma and Travellers Forum (ERTF) was registered in Strasbourg.

At the level of the OSCE, the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights is the body in charge of the Roma and Sinti Issue. As stated in the Copenhagen Document, the OSCE is the first IO that recognized the "*particular problem of Roma*". In 1994, a Contact Point was established within the ODIHR in order to promote "the full integration of Roma and Sinti communities into the societies they live in, while preserving their identity". The main issues treated in the Contact Point include political participation, fight against discrimination and racial violence, education and living conditions.

The European Union is also very active with respect to Roma. Several programs like PHARE or ACCESS (that replaced the LIEN programme) are dedicated to improve the situation of Roma. The Roma issue is also treated through the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights, and the educational and employment issues are treated within the General Directorate Education, Training and Youth and the DG Employment and Social Affairs. During the enlargement process, on the basis of the Copenhagen criteria, the Roma issues has been scrutinized by the European Commission in all the Roma's countries of residence.

The protection and the improvement of Roma's situation is not a direct objective of NATO. However, the KFOR mission in Kosovo and the SFOR mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina have been including activities more or less related to Roma's issues. For instance, one of the KFOR's missions includes providing assistance to the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). KFOR participated to the reconstruction of two schools for Serbs and Roma children in the municipality of Novo Brdo, but, as it is specified "The children are the future of Kosovo - no matter if they are Albanians, Serbs or part of a minority. KFOR's main mission is to establish a safe and secure environment for all the people of Kosovo." (KFOR Chronicle, 2001).

However, in the case of Roma people, IO's implement as well a whole range of common activities. For instance, one of the Council of Europe's body in charge of the Roma and Travellers issue is a coordinator. His tasks is to co-ordinate activities on Roma and Travellers within the Council of Europe; co-operate with other international organisations involved with Roma and Roma-related issues, and in particular with the OSCE/ODIHR/Contact Point for Roma and Sinti Issues and with the European Commission; establish working relations with Romani associations; and advise the Secretary General on policies and problems regarding Roma and Travellers. The 2004 activity report²⁷ mentioned the establishment of an *Informal Group on Roma of the Intergovernmental Organizations* composed of representatives from OSCE/ODIHR, Council of Europe and European Commission. The aim of the Informal Group which was set up in 1999 is to exchange information and to coordinate activities. The report underlines as well that the European Commission's proposal to establish "*a pan-European steering group on Roma issues*

27 Activity report of the Coordinator for Roma and Travellers, 2004. Available at : http://www.coe.int/t/dg3/romatravellers/Coordinator/Report2004_en.asp#P33_1500

involving relevant EU bodies, relevant Council of Europe bodies, the OSCE, Member State governments, representatives of initiatives such as the Decade of Roma inclusion and the European Roma Forum as well as representatives of relevant civil society organisations”²⁸ coincides “both in composition and purposes” with the Informal Group. Therefore, the Co-coordinator’s Report stresses that “*It will therefore be particularly important in the next few months to follow developments within the Community to ensure that the structure and orientation of the Informal Contact Group is used to create the proposed steering body. This would preserve the dynamics which has been created by the Informal Contact Group as well as the continuity of its action.*”. The Council of Europe, the OSCE-ODIHR with the financial support of the European Union decided as well to include in the Stability Pact for Southern Europe a two-year project entitled “Roma under the Stability Pact”. This program aims at addressing the most acute crisis situations; promote the policy development on Roma affairs; and promote the participation of Roma in civil society.

At first sight, these jointly programmes are examples of organized action where interactions between IOs are structured. The interactions between the IOs go beyond a simple co-operation. Unilateral initiatives and policies have been replaced by explicit co-operation and definition of common objectives. As it is explained in the programme, “Another objective of this project is to “maximi[ze] cooperation and complementarity between the three Organisations in the field of Roma-related activities, avoiding overlaps and/or duplication of activities.” And, according to its mandate, the CoE is in charge of the promotion of the policy development on Roma Affairs. ODIHR is in charge of the two others areas. It monitors the situation of Roma in conflict areas such as in 2001 during the crisis in the former republic of Macedonia. OSCE/ODIHR is also in charge, jointly with the UNHCR, of the problem of Roma refugees and Internal Displaced Person (IDP). Its activity includes as well initiatives to create a pan European representation of Roma through the promotion of the establishment of an International Roma representation at the European level.

The Co-ordinator Report’s conclusion underscores that “*In its relations with other international organisations and institutions on Roma issues, the Council of Europe needs to strengthen its relations with the European Union. There is no doubt that the European Union will eventually play an important role in this area. The Council of Europe, with its monitoring bodies, would be the natural partner for the European Union-which is why these monitoring bodies should broaden their reporting on Roma issues.*”. In others words, the development of EU’s activities in the field of Roma issues is seen by the CoE as a potential source of duplication, whereas the co-operation with OSCE/ODIHR is qualified as “excellent” and very constructive. As set up in the 2002 Interim Report of the SSE to the European Commission, “*The division of responsibilities is clearly set out: the Council of Europe is responsible for the promotion of adequate policies toward the Roma, and the OSCE/ODIHR is responsible for resolving the various crises affecting the Roma and promoting the participation of Roma and their mutual co-operation*”. The role of the European Commission is to support financially the Project.

In sum, with respect to the Roma issue, a community conflict where both socio-economical and political challenges are at stake, the IOs’ response is definitively collective but illustrates at the same time the relations of power between the three IOs. The involvement of CoE and OSCE/ODIHR is not recent to the contrary to EU’s involvement. EU considers that “*The European Union is a major actor in the development and the promotion of human rights beyond the borders of the European Union*». The increasing importance of the human dimension of the European integration has produced the need for a better co-operation between CoE, OSCE and Eu. The Third Summit of Heads of States and Governments of the Council of Europe, held in Warsaw in May 2005 emphasized, not only, the need to strengthen the co-operation between the three IOs, but also the specific role that CoE wants to play : “*The Council of Europe will, on the basis of its*

*expertise and through its various organs, continue to provide support and advice to the European Union in particular in the fields of Human Rights and fundamental freedoms, democracy and the rule of law.”*²⁹. Clearly, the Council of Europe wants to remain the reference institution in terms of human rights at the pan European level.

The relations between CoE and OSCE are emblematic of a conflictive relation. At the same Summit held in Warsaw, the Council of Europe recognized “*the need to adapt relations between the two Organizations to the evolving international environment, with due respect for the aims and principles enshrined in the Council of Europe's Statute and the OSCE's Charter for European Security and other agreed documents and decisions of both Organizations*”. The overlap between their mandates and purposes has been underlines several times within both Organizations and the modalities for such improvement are still under debate.

The Conflict in Kosovo

At first glance, the case of Kosovo is very interesting because of the involvement of a plurality of actors. ONU, OSCE, UE, OTAN, UNHCR, ICTY, Red Cross etc... The question addressed in this section is to assess the degree of pan-Europeanisation of this conflict, in order to determine whether there is an organized action, even an action system. In the case of Kosovo, two different situations have to be considered. On the one side, there is the international management lead by the ONU; on the other side, there is the involvement of IO besides the UN-led international management.

The UNMIK implemented by the UNSCR 1244 is a first in itself and can prefigure a new generation of UN conflict management mission (Chevallier, 2002; Del Re in Siani-Davies, 2003), but it is not an example of collective management. The relations between ONU and the others IO are established by the UNSCR 1244 that authorizes under point 7 “Member States and relevant international organizations to establish the international security presence in Kosovo as set out in point 4 of annex 2 with all necessary means to fulfil its responsibilities under paragraph 9 below”³⁰. As set up in the Secretary-General's Report on the implementation of the UNSCR 1244 (1999), there is a hierarchical division of labour, very consistent with the position of the ONU on conflict management and with the competencies and specializations of the IOs involved³¹. The UN Mission is divided into 4 pillars. The ONU is responsible for the civil administration (1st Pillar), the HCR is in charge of the humanitarian aid (2nd Pillar), the democratization and institutions building falls under OSCE responsibilities and the EU is responsible for economic reconstruction³². This mission reflects the hierarchy among the IOs established by the chapter 8 of the UN Charter that deals with regional arrangements.³³

However, beyond the UN-led Interim Mission, it is of particular interest to analyze the involvement of the IOs out of the framework of the UNMIK. The first element to take under

29 Action Plan, Third Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Council of Europe (Warsaw, 16-17 May 2005).

30 S/RES/1244 (1999), 10 June 1999

31 S/1999/672

32 Secretary General 's Report on the MINUK, S/1999/779, 12 July 1999.

33 “The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council, with the exception of measures against any enemy state, as defined in paragraph 2 of this Article, provided for pursuant to Article 107 or in regional arrangements directed against renewal of aggressive policy on the part of any such state, until such time as the Organization may, on request of the Governments concerned, be charged with the responsibility for preventing further aggression by such a state.” (art. 53.1) ; “The Security Council shall at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security” (art. 54)

consideration is the early involvement of the CSCE/OSCE in 1992. The CSCE established its first Long Duration Mission in Kosovo in 1992 in order to promote the dialogue, to collect and provide information about the violations of human rights and to establish a contact point. After the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's refusal of the CSCE's request for extending the mission, the Mission in Kosovo was withdrawn in 1993. Even if the Mission was not a success, the CSCE was the first International Organization to get involved in the conflict. In parallel, it is interesting to pay attention on the collaboration between the OSCE and NATO during the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM). As underlined before, the KVM was under OSCE's responsibility. It was the first time that the OSCE had been in charge of a such important mission. The decision to give the OSCE the responsibility of the Verification Mission is the conclusion of a large process of negotiation between the international community and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Sans: 11-17) where the OSCE appeared finally as the ideal – and more consensual-organization for implementing a verification mission. The framework for collaboration had been negotiated by Javier Solana NATO secretary General and Giancarlo Aragona OSCE Secretary General. The two Organizations have collaborated in the field of the exchange of information and the security of the KVM's verifiers (Sans: 34 & following). The model of collaboration applied during the KVM was also based on the division of competencies between both Organizations. NATO, as a military Organization, was in charge of the security of the verifiers and the OSCE was in charge of the collecting and providing information. In sum, the KVM mission has been, during the Kosovo war, the only joint action established legally by two *equal* organizations out of the authority of the United Nations.

In opposite, the juridical legitimacy of NATO's intervention has been highly criticized. The air strikes operation *Allied Forces* did not have the agreement of the ONU as it had to have in accordance with the chapter 7 of the UN Charter (Legault: 2000). NATO decided this operation on the basis of moral duty. Javier Solana, NATO Secretary-General declared "*Our actions are directed against the repressive policy of the Yugoslav leadership. We must stop the violence and bring an end to the humanitarian catastrophe now taking place in Kosovo. We have a moral duty to do so*"³⁴. Beyond NATO's justification, the intervention of the Alliance is directly related to its transformation in the post Cold War context. Indeed, the 1999 Alliance's Strategic Concept clearly defined conflict management as a new task for the transformed NATO and ethnic conflict is seen as a « new risk » that the transformed NATO has to face³⁵.

Contrary to the first conflicts in the Balkans, the management of the Kosovo conflict illustrates the search for a better coherence in IOs' interactions. With respect to relations of power, the crisis in Kosovo illustrates less the UN leadership in crisis management (Daudet, Mehdi, 1998) than the transformation of the Alliance. Indeed, the 1999 Strategic Concept (re)underlines the role NATO pretends to play: the safeguard of the freedom and security of all its members, that is, peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic area. It is of crucial importance to bear in mind that NATO is a *euro-atlantic* organization based on the transatlantic link that binds the USA security to the security and stability in the European continent (Trepant, 2004). In that context, the intervention of NATO in the Balkans in general and in the Kosovo in particular illustrates not only the "otatisation" of the Balkans which have fallen into NATO's sphere of responsibility (Mongrenier, 2005), but as well the fact that NATO pretends to be *the* most important collective

34 Press Statement by M. Javier Solana, NATO Secretary General following the Commencement of Air Operations, 24 March 1999.

35 « The last ten years have also seen, however, the appearance of complex new risks to Euro-Atlantic peace and stability, including oppression, ethnic conflict, economic distress, the collapse of political order, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. », The Alliance's Strategic Concept, Approved by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington D.C. on 23rd and 24th April 1999.

security organization in Europe (Glume: 22). The others IOs are viewed as simple “contributors”.

In parallel, the role played by the European Union goes beyond its role in the UNMIK. Indeed, since 1997, the relations between Kosovo and the European Union have been strongly developed. In 2005, the European Commission adopted a Communication on the “European future for Kosovo” and two Progress Reports for Kosovo under UNSCR 1244 have been already adopted. The EU perspective for Kosovo is more and more tangible. The EU supports as well the Ahtisaari Plan for Kosovo that promotes the idea of the independence of Kosovo and planned to play an active role in the post status Kosovo settlement³⁶. With the enlargement process, the role of EU with respect to the Kosovo situation is becoming prominent. For instance, the Head of OSCE Mission in Kosovo, Werner Wnendt, declared in February 2007 to the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly Winter Meeting that “*If the status proposal is adopted, this would mean close co-operation and co-ordination with the future Rule of Law mission, at present being prepared by the EU. Besides supporting status implementation, the OSCE Mission could also support further compliance with European standards.*». Some time before, he declared to the Council of Europe that « *The European Union will most probably take a lead role in capacity building of Kosovo institutions. But it will most likely be the OSCE, with a field presence that is already monitoring every municipality in Kosovo, which will be the eye and ears of the International Community.* »³⁷. As in the Roma case, the enlargement of EU's missions seems to be an obstacle for the OSCE that tries to re-affirms the importance of its role in the Great Europe.

The three cases studied here call for several conclusions. First, the study of community conflict management cannot be restricted solely to the analysis of the role of the European Union. It is necessary to take into account, not only the role of all the International Organizations in charge of peace and security, but as well it is necessary to analyze in details the configuration of the interactions between the IOs. Beyond a simple opposition between co-operation and competition, we have defined in this section pan-Europeanisation as a concept referring to the construction by the IOs of an organized action, which may lead to an action system, in the field of community conflict management at the pan European level. With such perspective, the analysis of the relation between community conflicts and the responses of International Organizations is much denser to scrutinize. In the case of the Russian-speaking minorities the international response has been limited to unilateral initiatives. The co-operation between IOs has been more or less inexistent but the leadership has been transferred from the CSCE/OSCE to the EU and the CoE. More interesting is the case of Roma issue in Europe which has initiated an organized response from the International Organizations. Clearly, the greater involvement of the European Union is producing a change in the OSCE and CoE' positions on the pan European scene. In the conflict of Kosovo, besides the official division of labor implemented by the UNSCR 1244, there has been as well another informal form of organized response which tend to restructure the division of labour and the leadership. The primarily conclusion that may be drawn from these cases is that our preliminary hypothesis was credible: the high degree of pan-Europeanisation of the Roma issue suggests that a socio-economical community conflicts may lead to a structured action, even an *action system*, as much as a territorial community conflict. The difference between the two type of management lies in the structure of the collective leadership.

Beyond the conclusions over the cases, we have tried in this section to conceptualize pan-Europeanisation as a tool to better understand the dynamics of community conflicts

36 "Preparing for the future international and EU presence in Kosovo"- Background document prepared by the ICO-EUSR preparation team - EUPT Kosovo - February 2007

37 Speech by Amb. Werner Wnendt, Head of OSCE Mission in Kosovo, 9 February 2006

management. The *plus-value* of the concept is twofold: first it permits to fill a theoretical gap: the interactions between International Organizations are much more complex than the basic opposition between co-operation and competition. The review of the theories of co-operation has shown that the main theories used in IR are not sufficient to analyze in depth the interactions between IOs. Secondly, pan-Europeanisation is very useful to put in the fore front a specificity in the field of community conflict management in the Great Europe. The existence of a third level of management, characterized by a strong degree of interdependence between the IOs, is very particular. Further analysis should permit to make clearer the main characteristics of this level of management.

5. General Conclusion

This deliverable provides conclusions or new insights on four issues:

First, the issue of the relevance of conflict dimensions. There are strong variations in the appraisal of the relevance of dimensions for each conflict, between actors in conflict, which should not come as a surprise, and which illustrates clearly that most of these conflicts are also conflicts about what the conflict is about.

There are also striking discrepancies between actors' and experts' views on the conflicts. Actors on the ground tend to see conflicts as highly multi-causal, whereas experts focus on a limited number of key dimensions. In particular, on average experts give less importance to political dimensions than do conflict actors. Our research therefore pleads for a systematic integration of actors' views and perceptions in the conception and implementation of peace programmes, and for further research on reasons for divergences in experts' and actors' opinions, as they may explain controversies and unexpected consequences of policies designed to accommodate these conflicts.

Second, our research shows that the lists of conflict dimensions provided in the literature, on which D1 was grounded, do not provide a sufficiently adequate and encompassing account of conflicts causes and issues. Taking into account research done on the twelve case studies covered by PEACE-COM, we have subsequently amended the list of conflict dimensions to be taken into account. More specifically, we have reshuffled the existing list by:

- associating political access and access to citizenship, and considering as separate the issue of security (security dilemma), which appears as highly relevant for many conflict actors;
- dissociating Diasporas, border communities and motherland/fatherland. While Diasporas and border communities admittedly refer to relatively close processes and actors, there are strong differences between on the one hand actors involved in Diasporas or bordering communities, and on the other hand motherland/ fatherland involvement;
- dissociating on the one hand globalisation and on the other hand the aftermath of WWI & WWII and decolonisation, which had originally been put together as 'global processes', as they also refer to highly different phenomena, again both in terms of actors and processes;
- including the Europeanisation process as a full dimension of conflicts, as its impact is partly independent from the other conflict dimensions previously identified. Europeanisation can lead to an escalation or a de-escalation of a given conflict, and amongst other impacts, the Europeanisation process can provoke a change in the way actors frame the situation, which in turn allows them to develop strategies directed at European institutions. As such, Europeanisation can both be an issue and a cause of conflicts, as well as a major factor in their development;
- including also accommodation policies as a full dimensions of conflicts. Indeed, conflicts, or more precisely actors in conflict, adapt their actions, discourses and claims to accommodation policies. In that sense, we think that accommodation policies in their various shapes, whether initiated and implemented by national actors only, or by international organisations, should be treated as full dimensions of conflicts rather as "solutions" administered independently and neutrally;
- fine-tuning the territorial dimension by further disaggregating it into either autonomist, secessionist, or irredentist claims.

Third, this deliverable has further explored the escalating or de-escalating impacts of conflict dimensions. It concludes at the need to better research the interplay between different kinds of

elements, most notably the representations held by the actors, and the interaction with other dimensions, for instance the evolution of the context in which they are embedded. In most cases examined in PEACE-COM, these elements have different, sometimes contradicting, impacts on the development of conflicts, and no simple and general rule can be drawn. Conflicts are always multi-causal and evolving, and all dimensions may be considered as root causes, as triggering or as soothing factors, or all at the same time. An adequate framework for analysis of conflicts should therefore be multidimensional, dynamic and multileveled, in order to grasp and account for this complexity.

Finally, this deliverable has shown that the internationalisation trend that can be witnessed in many conflict situations is the result of a convergence between strategies developed by internal and external actors. However, there are several configurations of internationalisation, according to the capacity of local actors to attract international attention, and to the willingness of external actors to intervene or to co-operate. It has to be noted that the shape of this internationalization, and not only its actual existence or not, is partly determined by perceptions at the international level, for instance by perceptions on the ability of a given state to deal with a conflict. A NATO or a NU intervention in Northern Ireland would have thus been unlikely, whereas a specific funding program for peace activities launched by the European Union is considered as being perfectly acceptable. Such a pattern is very common in Europe, as shown by the Belgian case, where the highly conflictual case of the French speaking community living in the periphery of Brussels has been carefully and discretely dealt with by the Council of Europe, because of an enduring taboo against international intervention in “developed” countries.

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