

United Nations/Framework Convention on Climate Change. (2015). *Adoption of the Paris Agreement*, 21st Conference of the Parties. United Nations, Paris, France.

Warren, M. (1996). "What Should We Expect from More Democracy?" *Political Theory*, 24, 2, 241–270.

4 The historical evolution of EU climate leadership and four scenarios for its future

Hayley Walker and Katja Biedenkopf

Introduction

The European Union (EU) has evolved into a key player in international climate governance, not just in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) negotiations but also in the broader field of global climate governance, including financial support for vulnerable countries as well as bilateral and multilateral diplomatic outreach. This chapter traces the EU's historical evolution as a climate leader and ponders its future by sketching four imaginable but accentuated scenarios. The real course of action will likely be somewhere between these sketches and combine elements of different scenarios. Much depends on the United States of America (USA) and whether its change of policy under President Donald Trump will trigger a ripple effect, which could lead to a lowering of other countries' climate ambitions or to a defiant reaction by others, increasing their ambition. Yet, much also depends on the EU and its ability to weather domestic turbulence and remain a strong international climate leader. Signs of a strengthened EU–China partnership provide a glimmer of hope.

International negotiations and global governance rely on individuals and jurisdictions to take the lead and drive the process. The presidency of different negotiation rounds can provide additional impetus but ultimately, in a party-driven process, leadership should derive from the negotiating parties. Presidencies generally fulfil the role of mediators while negotiating parties can pursue ambitious positions and actively push for them, for example, by persuading others. Moreover, countries hold the key to implementation of international agreements. By adopting ambitious policies and promoting them skilfully at the international level, leaders can steer the negotiation process. With the implementation of the goals of the Paris Agreement on climate change still quite uncertain and its dependence on ever-increasing ambition levels from all countries, the demand for climate leadership has never been higher.

Actors can exert leadership in different ways: by developing innovative ideas and solutions, by implementing ambitious measures to establish an example, by convincing others to adopt ambitious practices through diplomatic skills and by using structural power to compel change (Andresen and Agrawala 2002; Young 1991; Parker and Karlsson 2010; Wurzel and Connelly 2011; Skodvin and

Andresen 2006; Malnes 1995; Underdal 1991; Liefferink and Wurzel 2017). In this chapter, we focus on *positive* leadership, which aims at increasing the level of climate policy ambition and pushing for outcomes that promote a global good (Underdal 1994). *Negative* leadership, which pursues the lowering of climate policy ambition, is not included and considered *laggardship* rather than *leadership*. Academic literature on leadership has evolved over the past two decades and recent conceptualizations differentiate four distinct types: cognitive, exemplary, entrepreneurial and structural leadership (Liefferink and Wurzel 2017). Each of the leadership types describes a different mechanism of how an actor can attract followers, thereby influencing an increase of climate policy ambition.

The four climate leadership types describe different activities. *Cognitive leadership* describes the production of innovative ideas that redefine interests and provide possible solutions. *Exemplary leadership* is the implementation of innovative ideas and ambitious measures. It can demonstrate the ambitious measures' feasibility and can boost the leader's credibility and legitimacy in international negotiations. *Entrepreneurial leadership* is exerted by convincing other actors through diplomatic skills to change their behaviour and increase their climate policy ambition so as to facilitate compromise. *Structural leadership* is derived from the position that leaders occupy in a system, which can provide them with leverage over other members of that system. The leader has power over followers and can exert pressure on them. This includes economic power but can also refer to the position of a large GHG emitter without whom an international climate agreement would not be effective (Liefferink and Wurzel 2017; Oberthür and Groen 2015).

Engaging in one single type of leadership activity could theoretically generate followers but a leader more likely employs a combination of leadership activities. The four types can be complementary and amplify each other. As outlined in this chapter, the EU strengthened its leadership performance by venturing into multiple leadership types and fortifying its initial cognitive leadership with improved exemplary and entrepreneurial leadership (Oberthür and Roche Kelly 2008; Underdal 1994, pp. 184–185). Yet, not all factors that determine the EU's successful climate leadership are under its direct control. The EU can improve its production of ambitious and innovative ideas for international negotiations (cognitive leadership), adopt ambitious domestic climate policy to lead the way (exemplary leadership), devise active persuasion and diplomatic outreach strategies (entrepreneurial leadership) and exploit its (limited) structural leadership; but the success of these activities also depends on external factors to which the EU must adapt (Oberthür and Groen 2015; Oberthür 2011).

The following section traces the historical evolution of the European Union's climate leadership, which began with cognitive leadership in the relative absence of exemplary, entrepreneurial and structural leadership. Over the course of time, the EU strengthened its credibility by adopting increasingly ambitious domestic climate policy and more recently enhanced its climate diplomacy and used its structural power as a major donor of climate finance. The chapter then proceeds to a short description of the contours of contemporary EU climate leadership

before pondering possible future scenarios in a world that has been rocked by numerous shocks, most notably the economic crisis, rising populism and isolationism, and the election of Donald Trump as US President. This challenging context can provide either an opportunity for strong EU climate leadership, if it brings its domestic house in order, or an impediment to EU leadership due to domestic turbulence and international loss of momentum. The concluding section provides our interpretation of the four scenarios.

The historical evolution of EU climate leadership

Since the inception of international climate governance and the UNFCCC, European countries and increasingly the EU as a single actor have promoted ambitious positions in the various negotiation rounds (Oberthür and Roche-Kelly 2008). With regard to attracting followers, however, the EU's success has fluctuated over time as a result of both internal as well as external factors and is marked by adjustment to the changing context and learning from experience.

Cognitive leadership consistently runs through the EU's international climate role. During the negotiations to establish the UNFCCC in 1992, European countries advocated setting a legally binding treaty commitment to stabilize greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions at their 1990 levels by the year 2000. This target is indeed included in the treaty, however, in the form of an aspirational goal without legal status. The EU was forced to concede to other developed countries, particularly the USA on this demand (Bäckstrand and Elgström 2013; Oberthür 2011). This partial success was replicated five years later during the negotiations to establish the Kyoto Protocol under the UNFCCC auspices. The EU achieved its desired outcome of legally binding greenhouse gas emission reduction targets for developed countries but, to achieve this goal, it was forced to make concessions to the USA. These included the use of market-based mechanisms such as the Clean Development Mechanism, which allowed wealthy developed nations to purchase emission reduction credits from other parts of the world instead of reducing their own emissions. During the Kyoto Protocol negotiations, the EU also demonstrated early signs of exemplary leadership by accepting the largest emissions reduction target: an 8% reduction on 1990 levels by 2010 (Bäckstrand and Elgström 2013; Oberthür 2011; Van Schaik 2012).

The subsequent years marked a high point in EU leadership at the international climate negotiations. The US withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol in 2001, which created a vacuum that the EU filled by ramping up its entrepreneurial leadership. The EU is largely credited for its diplomatic efforts to ensure agreement over the implementation rules of the Kyoto Protocol, known as the Marrakesh Accords, in 2001. Once again, the EU was required to make concessions in order to retain the support of other developed countries (Bäckstrand and Elgström 2013; Oberthür 2011; Van Schaik 2012) but over the coming years the EU was praised for saving the Kyoto Protocol, which had been declared 'dead' by US National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice (Bäckstrand and Elgström 2013). Most notably, in 2004, the EU employed structural leadership to secure the entry into force of the

Protocol by ensuring Russian ratification in exchange for EU concessions on Russia's bid to join the World Trade Organization (Bäckstrand and Elgström 2013; Oberthür 2011, Van Schaik 2012).

The Kyoto Protocol's period of legal force was due to expire in 2012, and so in the 2007 negotiations, the EU successfully pushed for the launch of a new process to establish a post-2012 agreement to be concluded by 2009 at the latest, known as the Bali Roadmap (Van Schaik 2012). The Bali Roadmap did not, however, meet all of the EU's demands. The EU had called for the creation of a global agreement that would overcome the bifurcation between developed and developing countries. In the face of considerable opposition from developing countries, the issue was put aside to be resolved at a later date (Bäckstrand and Elgström 2013; Oberthür 2011; Schunz 2015). The question remained unresolved by the 2009 deadline and the disastrous negotiations that took place in Copenhagen marked a nadir for EU climate leadership and for multilateral climate governance in general. The EU pursued cognitive leadership as in earlier negotiation rounds by advocating a legally binding agreement, the peaking of global emissions by 2020 and global emission reductions by 50% on 1990 levels by 2050.

In the advent of the 2009 Copenhagen COP, the EU had made significant progress with regard to its exemplary leadership, adding credibility to its negotiation demands. It had made considerable progress in developing and implementing comprehensive and ambitious domestic climate policy. Its decoupling of economic growth from GHG emissions and progressively more ambitious policies increased the EU's credibility on the international stage and allow it to lead by example (Oberthür and Roche-Kelly 2008; Van Schaik 2012). The EU's climate and energy package of 2008/2009 passed before the Copenhagen summit and was the most ambitious in the world at that time (Parker et al. 2017). However, this exemplary leadership was unsuccessful at Copenhagen since it did not result in attracting followers (Schunz 2015), arguably due to a lack of entrepreneurial leadership by engaging with and taking into account the other negotiating parties.

In terms of entrepreneurial leadership, the EU's ambitious position was not shared by other parties and the EU did not succeed in persuading them. The resulting Copenhagen Accord contained no emission reduction targets, had no legal force and was not even adopted by the Conference of the Parties but merely 'taken note' of as parties could not reach a consensus (Groen et al. 2012; Oberthür 2011; Van Schaik 2012). The EU found itself sidelined during the last crucial hours of the conference and did not even have a seat at the table when the final text was negotiated behind closed doors between BASIC countries (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) and the USA that had newly reengaged in the process under the Obama administration (Bäckstrand and Elgström 2013; Herrero and Knaepen 2014; Parker et al. 2017; Schunz 2015). The EU failed to adapt to the new world order in which countries like China and India had risen. It attempted to employ structural leadership through offering financial incentives to countries in exchange for accepting its vision for post-Kyoto climate governance

and it attempted to employ exemplary leadership through its ambitious pledges. However, its diminished position in the global climate system and its decreasing share of global GHG emissions undermined these modes of leadership.

The EU's capacity to speak with one voice at multilateral negotiations and conduct itself as a unified actor had been a challenge in the earlier climate negotiations and was identified as one of the contributing factors to the EU's failure as an entrepreneurial leader at the Copenhagen COP. The demands of internal coordination meant that the EU was unable to spend sufficient time conducting climate diplomacy and other forms of outreach to negotiation parties, which would have been necessary to influence, broker and form coalitions, thus exerting entrepreneurial leadership (Oberthür 2011). In Copenhagen, divergent preferences among member states caused conflict on certain issues (Groen et al. 2012; Schunz 2015) and the usual system of cohesive coordination between environment ministers broke down when the negotiations moved to the level of heads of state (Keukeleire and Delreux 2014), who failed to coordinate both among themselves and with the Swedish EU Presidency (Van Schaik 2012).

Recognizing its failure to act as entrepreneurial leader, the EU improved its climate diplomacy strategy over the following years, acknowledging that an elaborate outreach strategy that engages with and understands other negotiation parties' positions is crucial. The EU started adapting to the new state of affairs in global climate politics and engaged in coalition building with progressive developed and developing countries (Bäckstrand and Elgström 2013; Biedenkopf and Walker 2016; Oberthür and Groen 2017; Parker et al. 2017). The EU is credited with modest goal achievement in the negotiations that took place the following year and resulted in the Cancun Agreements (Groen et al. 2012; Oberthür 2011; Schunz 2015; Van Schaik 2012) and with more significant success at the 2012 negotiations which launched the Durban Platform, a new negotiation track with the aim of adopting a global agreement applicable to all parties by 2015 (Bäckstrand and Elgström 2013; Parker et al. 2017; Schunz 2015). In exchange for this success, the EU was required to reverse its earlier refusal to sign on to a second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, which was on the brink of expiry. This was considered by some as the 'recovery of the EU's leadership after Copenhagen' (Bäckstrand and Elgström 2013, p. 1380) due to its critical role as entrepreneurial leader through building bridges between opposing camps. This new role for the EU was applied successfully in the run-up to and during the 2015 negotiations in Paris on a new global agreement. The EU built alliances with other progressive nations that came to be known as the *High Ambition Coalition* and which is credited with raising the level of ambition of the final outcome (Oberthür and Groen 2017). The Paris Agreement reflected most of the EU's preferences, yet in a compromise version: it is a global treaty with mitigation commitments from all parties, and although the process of submitting increasingly ambitious mitigation targets is binding, the achievement of these targets is not legally binding as the EU had wished.

The EU's climate leadership has fluctuated over the course of time and is marked by adjustment to the changing context and learning from experience.

The EU's historical climate leadership has been shaped not only by its own performance as an actor, but also by other key actors, most notably the USA. The USA first withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol and then reengaged in the UNFCCC process. The effect of this on EU climate leadership was profound in both cases. In the first case, US withdrawal not only left a leadership vacuum for the EU to fill, but also left the EU with by far the greatest share of emissions under the Kyoto Protocol. It held the most structural power under the bifurcated system. This period coincided with a peak of EU climate leadership, as it was credited with saving the Kyoto Protocol and ensuring its entry into force. This served to mask the effects of the EU's falling share of global emissions and the rising influence of emerging economies and developing countries in a global multipolar system of climate politics. When the USA reentered the process, the opposite effect was felt and the EU's declining relevance was amplified in Copenhagen (Oberthür 2011). In the run-up to Paris, the EU and the USA engaged in complementary climate leadership activities, mutually supporting each other's positions to a large extent (Biedenkopf and Walker 2016).

The contours of contemporary EU climate leadership

The EU has evolved and reshaped its leadership in a continuous learning and adaptation process in the international climate negotiations. Internal institutional developments and politics have also contributed to shaping the contours of EU climate leadership. The system of internal coordination, the EU's approach to climate diplomacy and domestic EU climate policy have matured but face challenges in the wake of Brexit and with the lowering of climate ambition in some EU member states. This occurs in a turbulent external context marked by the USA's recent disengagement from international climate governance and its possible consequences.

The EU has streamlined its internal coordination for international representation at the climate negotiations, which is marked by formal and informal features. The European Commission, more precisely its Directorate-General for Climate Action, plays a key role and represents the EU together with the Council whose presidency rotates every six months. To ensure continuity within the Council, a system of lead negotiators and issue leaders was introduced by the 2004 Irish presidency (Oberthür 2011; Van Schaik 2012). The Working Party on International Environmental Issues (WPIEI), expert groups and the so-called *EU Team*, which comprises different lead negotiators and experts from both the Commission and member states are key actors of EU climate diplomacy. The expert groups prepare technical aspects of the EU's position for international negotiation rounds. The WPIEI is an official Council working group and chaired by the EU presidency. It supervises the expert groups and determines the EU's position that builds the basis for the EU Team's work. The EU Team includes the lead negotiators, track coordinators and issue leaders and negotiates on behalf of the EU, except when the negotiations shift to the ministerial level. At this stage, the Commissioner for Climate Action and the responsible minister from

the country holding the EU presidency represent the EU (Delreux 2018). This system enables the EU to negotiate more efficiently than in earlier times. The lower reliance on the EU presidency that rotates every six months and the close cooperation among Commission and Council actors have improved the EU's ability to produce positions ahead of negotiation rounds, speak with one voice and act in a coherent manner. The EU has evolved into an actor that is able to develop ideas and positions, which are the basis for its long-term strength as cognitive leader.

The EU has also taken steps to elaborate a coherent climate diplomacy approach in support of the UNFCCC negotiations. The European External Action Service (EEAS) created by the Lisbon Treaty has developed various climate diplomacy strategies jointly with the Council and the Commission (Council of the European Union 2011, 2013, 2016; European Commission and EEAS 2015; EEAS and European Commission 2011, 2013). In 2012, the EEAS took over the informal *Green Diplomacy Network* that comprised representatives of member state foreign ministries and Commission officials and had originally been designed to mainstream environmental issues into EU member states' diplomacy (Torney and Davis 2018). In spite of capacity restraints and limited resources for climate diplomacy both at the EEAS and in the EU delegations around the world (Herrero and Knaepen 2014), the EU was able to conduct comprehensive and effective outreach in the run-up to the Paris summit that contributed to mobilizing the High Ambition Coalition. Through activities such as the *Climate Diplomacy Day* and *démarches*, a large number of EU Delegations together with member state embassies actively reached out to their host country in support of the EU's negotiation position, fostering support for the international climate negotiations. Coordination practices at third-country level among EU Delegations and member state embassies have been established, yet largely function as information-exchange fora rather than groups that develop joint strategies. In light of these changes, of all the types of leadership, the EU has arguably made the largest leap forward in its entrepreneurial leadership.

In addition, outreach to developing countries is marked by the mainstreaming of climate action in EU development aid, translating into structural leadership. The EU committed to dedicate 20% of its 2014–2020 expenditures to climate-related objectives. Applied to development aid, this signifies an estimated 14 billion Euros of climate-related development cooperation financing (Adelle et al. 2018).

Internal EU climate policy has matured over the past two decades with the ambitious goals for 2030 to reduce GHG emissions by at least 40% compared to 1990 level, source at least 27% of the EU's energy from renewable sources and improve energy efficiency by at least 27%. In contrast to the 2020 EU climate targets, the 40% emission reduction goal excludes offsets and is confined to domestic efforts. A number of legislative proposals to set the EU on track to achieve its goals are currently in the political process. Yet, the politics of the EU's climate policy-making process have proven challenging. The global financial and Eurozone crises of 2008 shook European economies and led to austerity

measures and reluctance to adopt ambitious climate policies. The United Kingdom's exit of the EU will remove a strong and influential supporter of ambitious EU climate policy, tilting the internal EU power balance towards less ambitious member states. Poland has emerged as the leader of a coalition of member states that strive to lower the EU's climate ambition and roll back climate policy (Burns and Tobin 2018). These developments pose increasing difficulties for the EU's signature exemplary leadership.

Additionally, the external constellation of international climate politics has undergone significant changes during the lifetime of the UNFCCC negotiations. The relative position of the EU within this system has a profound effect both on its leadership potential and types available to it. Structural power in climate politics partially derives from one's share of global GHG emissions (Bäckstrand and Elgström 2013). In 1990, the EU was responsible for about 24% of global emissions; this figure has since fallen to under 10%. In contrast, China's share of global GHG emissions has risen over the same period to about 30% and it is joined by other emerging economies that are set to overtake the EU's share of global emissions. These developments have fundamentally altered the power balance in the international negotiations.

This trend has led to another fundamental shift in global climate politics. In the early days of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, a clear bifurcation existed between developed countries, who held responsibility for the burden of climate change, and developing countries who were not subject to any formal obligations. As developing countries continued to increase their share of global GHG emissions, it became clear that action limited to developed countries would not be sufficient and a new paradigm began to evolve in which developing countries would be expected to contribute, and as a result would have a greater say over negotiation outcomes (Bäckstrand and Elgström 2013; Oberthür 2011; Schunz 2015). This context increases the need for entrepreneurial leadership and reduces the EU's capacity to act as structural leader.

These contours of contemporary EU leadership do not point coherently into the same direction. The tremendous institutional and climate policy progress that the EU has achieved points towards continued strong leadership, while the growing internal contestation of ambitious climate policy and the rapidly changing international context point towards diminishing EU leadership. Based on these contradictory signs, we develop four scenarios for future EU climate leadership, all of which are accentuated and exaggerated. They are intended to serve as thought starters for a discussion on how to shape the EU's future role in international climate governance.

Future scenarios for EU climate leadership

The four scenarios take the factors and developments identified in the previous two sections as a starting point and sketch possible future courses of action. The first two scenarios paint a picture of EU leadership loss, while the last two describe strengthened EU leadership. Scenario 1 ponders the risk of internal EU collapse

and scenario 2 the risk of the lowering of ambitions by external actors. Contrary to this, scenario 3 imagines stronger EU leadership unilaterally and scenario 4 joint strong EU–China leadership.

Scenario 1: internal collapse curtails the EU's international role

Domestically, the EU has weathered many crises that threatened to undermine its internal cohesion and leadership capacity at international climate negotiations. One possible future scenario could be a collapse of internal EU ambition as a result of Brexit, economic concerns taking precedence and laggard member states gaining influence. Since 2008, Poland has emerged as the spearhead of a group of EU member states that aim to lower the ambition and scope of EU internal climate policy. Poland will preside over the crucial 2018 international climate negotiations during which the rulebook for the implementation of the Paris Agreement should be decided upon and will host the conference in the coal-mining town Katowice (Mathiesen 2017a). Without the United Kingdom as influential proponent of strong climate policy, the Nordic countries, Germany and France, might not be powerful enough to maintain EU climate policy at the level that is required to achieve the 2030 goals. Germany also faces domestic challenges balancing its exit from nuclear electricity, while at the same time reducing coal, an industry with significant political influence. Germany could lower its stance on ambitious climate policy since it encounters difficulties reaching its own targets and tends to protect its polluting car industry. This would result in the loss of the EU's exemplary leadership with severe repercussions also for its entrepreneurial and cognitive leadership. Without walking the talk, the EU's credibility would be lost and with this its influence on other countries. The lowering of domestic ambition would also lead to the scaling back of climate finance and diplomacy efforts as part of the EU's external action and development cooperation. The collapse of internal EU climate policy would trigger the implosion of the EU's international climate leadership.

Scenario 2: international domino effect creates unsurmountable hurdles

EU climate leadership is threatened on the one hand by internal implosion and on the other by the explosion of external dynamics, making the context too challenging for the EU to exert leadership alone without sufficient allies. On 1 June, 2017, President Trump announced the USA's withdrawal from the Paris Agreement and has since sent mixed messages with regard to this intention. The fact that the USA sent a reduced delegation to the 2017 UNFCCC negotiation rounds in Bonn indicates that it does not intend to play a significant role going forward in climate governance (Mathiesen 2017b). This pairs with the roll back of domestic US climate policy and the hostile climate-sceptic rhetoric of the US government. US disengagement could have knock-on effects. Other countries could fear losing competitiveness and as a result decide to lower their climate

ambition, normalizing this kind of behaviour. The USA's exemplary laggardship could find followers in the large group of moderately ambitious countries with strong domestic resistance from certain industry groups. Especially, if large economies such as the BASIC nations delay their commitments under the Paris Agreement and backtrack on their pledges in response to the USA's withdrawal, the EU would not be able to singlehandedly turn around international dynamics. This international political context would pose too high a hurdle for any type of EU climate leadership to exert the necessary influence to achieve the goals set by the Paris Agreement.

Scenario 3: rising to the international challenge

The USA's withdrawal from the Paris Agreement and disengagement from the international climate negotiations could equally have the opposite outcome to the negative knock-on effect outlined in scenario 2. European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker said in his 13 September, 2017 State-of-the-Union speech: 'Set against the collapse of ambition in the United States, Europe will ensure we make our planet great again'. While the USA prepares its exit from the Paris Agreement, the rest of the world could remain committed. The EU could get its act together domestically and fill the leadership vacuum created by the USA's disengagement. Similar to the saving of the Kyoto Protocol, US disengagement could act as an external push to unite European countries and provide impetus for all EU member states to recognize and take seriously their responsibility for the future of the earth. In this scenario, climate policy could be one of the policy areas that binds all EU member states together and enables them to develop a vision for the future of Europe. The EU would need to rise to the challenge of filling the vacuum created by the USA mainly through cognitive, entrepreneurial and exemplary leadership since its structural leadership resulting from its share of global GHG emissions continues to fall, but structural leadership via climate and development aid remains part of the EU's toolbox. Forming alliances and building bridges, which have delivered success in recent years, seem crucial in combination with ambitious domestic climate policy and ambitious visions for the international level.

Scenario 4: strengthened EU-China partnership

Singlehanded climate leadership seems the most ambitious scenario. A variant of this continued EU climate leadership scenario is a strengthened EU-China partnership to jointly drive global climate ambition and fill the US-induced vacuum. Recent activity including the publication in 2016 of an ambitious 5-year plan outlining its domestic climate action indicates that China might be ready to assume the mantle of climate leader (Hart et al. 2017). At the same time as the USA announced its withdrawal, the EU and China convened a leaders' summit, where they made clear their intention to cooperate in implementing the Paris Agreement (Gaventa 2017). On 15–16 September, 2017, the EU, China

and Canada convened in Montreal a meeting at ministerial level to maintain the momentum of the Paris Agreement. Thirty-four countries participated. These developments suggest the possibility of a strengthened and crucial leadership role for the EU in partnership with China and possibly some other countries. This would also be grounded in the exercising of a mix of cognitive, exemplary and entrepreneurial leadership by both the EU and China. As the largest single emitter of greenhouse gases, China would also bring significant structural power to the partnership.

Conclusions

The real future will most likely be a combination of elements from the four scenarios. With the implementation of the goals of the Paris Agreement still very uncertain and its dependence on ever-increasing levels of ambition from all countries, the demand for climate leadership has never been higher. Whether the EU can supply the required leadership will depend on a number of factors, not least the global constellation of climate politics and whether the EU is able to devote less time to introspection and more time to observing and adapting to the actions of other players.

In order to ensure the credibility and legitimacy necessary for climate leadership, the EU will need to overcome the political turbulence it is experiencing and bring its house in order. It will also need to deliver on its pledges and continue to implement deep reductions in domestic emissions. This will not be an easy task, given that the low-hanging fruits of emissions reductions have already been harvested. Further mitigation measures will require greater effort and structural changes, yet the EU's past record of learning from experience and adapting to changing circumstances gives cause for optimism.

Nonetheless, the fate of EU climate leadership will also be determined by factors outside of its control; namely its relative position in the international constellation of climate politics. The positions and (lack of) leadership assumed by the USA and China over the coming years will be of critical importance as the details of the Paris Agreement are first negotiated and then implemented. In November 2017, the first COP was held since the USA signalled their intention to withdraw from the Paris Agreement. French President Macron attempted to fill the leadership vacuum by pledging to replace the USA's financial contribution to the IPCC. At the same time, the EU was criticized for its failure to ratify the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol due to Poland's opposition. Germany was hamstrung by domestic negotiations to form a new federal government. Rather than displaying unity, the EU and China found themselves on opposing sides when negotiating the weighty questions concerning how the provisions of the Paris Agreement will apply to developed and developing countries, respectively. China exerted its leadership rather to push for the interests of mid-income countries than for the global climate goals. Meanwhile, a disengaged US administration that failed to provide its delegation with instructions for the COP allowed China the opportunity to assert itself more

forcefully and win key victories that will hold developed countries to account for the mitigation commitments they have already made and for the levels of climate finance made available for developing countries.

While this chapter focuses on state actors, the 2017 climate negotiations in Bonn again highlighted the growing leadership ambition of other actors such as subnational states and cities. A coalition of US subnational actors, NGOs and businesses, led by California governor Jerry Brown and former New York mayor Michael Bloomberg, pledged their continued commitment to the Paris Agreement goals and expressed their leadership ambition. Such actors and developments could play into the hands of continued strong EU leadership.

References

- Adelle, C., Delputte, S., De Roeck, F. and Nicholson, S. (2018). "Environmental instruments in development cooperation: promoting better development and environmental outcomes?" in: C. Adelle, K. Biedenkopf, and D. Torney (eds), *European Union External Environmental Policy. Rules, Regulation and Governance Beyond Borders*. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, Switzerland.
- Andresen, S. and Agrawala, S. (2002). "Leaders, Pushers and Laggards in the Making of the Climate Regime." *Global Environmental Change* 12, 41–51.
- Bäckstrand, K. and Elgström, O. (2013). "The EU's Role in Climate Change Negotiations: From Leader to 'Leaditator'." *Journal of European Public Policy* 20, 10, 1369–1386.
- Biedenkopf, K. and Walker, H. (2016). *Playing to One's Strengths: The Implicit Division of Labor in US and EU Climate Diplomacy*. AICGS Policy Report 64, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD.
- Burns, C. and Tobin, P. (2018). "The limits of ambitious environmental policy in times of crisis," in: C. Adelle, K. Biedenkopf and D. Torney (eds), *European Union External Environmental Policy. Rules, Regulation and Governance Beyond Borders*. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, Switzerland.
- Council of the European Union. (2011). *Council Conclusions on EU Climate Diplomacy*. Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Brussels, Belgium, 18 July 2011.
- Council of the European Union. (2013). *Council Conclusions on EU Climate Diplomacy*. Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Luxembourg, 24 June 2013.
- Council of the European Union. (2016). *Council Conclusions on European Climate Diplomacy after COP21*. Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Brussels, Belgium, 15 February 2016.
- Delreux, T. (2018). "Multilateral Environmental Agreements: a key instrument of global environmental governance," in: C. Adelle, K. Biedenkopf and D. Torney (eds), *European Union External Environmental Policy. Rules, Regulation and Governance Beyond Borders*. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, Switzerland.
- Elgström, O. (2007). "Outsiders' Perceptions of the European Union in International Trade Negotiations." *Journal of Common Market Studies* 45, 4, 949–967.
- European Commission, and European External Action Service. (2015). *Action Plan for Climate Diplomacy*. Brussels, Belgium, January 2015.
- European External Action Service, and European Commission. (2011). *Joint Reflection Paper. Towards a Renewed and Strengthened EU Climate Diplomacy*. Brussels, Belgium, 9 July 2011.
- European External Action Service, and European Commission. (2013). *EU Climate Diplomacy for 2015 and Beyond. Reflection Paper*. Brussels, Belgium, 26 June 2013.
- Gaventa, J. (2017). "EU–China climate statement is a manifesto for a new global order." *Climate Home* www.climatechangenews.com/2017/06/02/eu-china-statement-manifesto-new-global-order/ 22 September 2017.
- Groen, L., Niemann, A. and Oberthür, S. (2012). "The EU as a Global Leader? The Copenhagen and Cancun UN Climate Change Negotiations." *Journal of Contemporary European Research* 8, 2, 173–191.
- Hart, C., Jiayan, Z. and Jiahui, Y. (2017). "Mapping China's Climate Policies." *China Carbon Forum*.
- Herrero, A. and Knaepen, H. (2014). "Run-up to 2015: A moment of truth for EU external climate action?" *European Centre for Development Policy Management Briefing Note* 67.
- Keohane, R. and Victor, D. (2011). "The Regime Complex for Climate Change." *Perspectives on Politics* 9, 1, 7–23.
- Keukeleire, S. and Delreux, T. (2014). *The Foreign Policy of the European Union*. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, UK.
- Kilian, B. and Elgström, O. (2010). "Still a Green Leader? The European Union's Role in International Climate Negotiations." *Cooperation and Conflict* 45, 3, 255–273.
- Liefferink, D. and Wurzel, R.K.W. (2017). "Environmental Leaders and Pioneers: Agents of Change?" *Journal of European Public Policy* 24, 951–968.
- Malnes, R. (1995). "'Leader' and 'Entrepreneur' in International Negotiations: A Conceptual Analysis." *European Journal of International Relations* 1, 87–112.
- Mathiesen, K. (2017a). "UN Climate Conference 2018 Heads to Heartland of Polish Coal." *Climate Home* www.climatechangenews.com/2017/06/01/un-climate-conference-2018-heads-heartland-polish-coal/ 22 September 2017.
- Mathiesen, K. (2017b). "US Sends 'Much Smaller' Team to Climate Talks in Bonn." *Climate Home* www.climatechangenews.com/2017/05/08/us-sends-much-smaller-team-climate-talks-bonn/ 22 September 2017.
- Oberthür, S. (2011). "The European Union's Performance in the International Climate Change Regime." *Journal of European Integration* 33, 6, 667–682.
- Oberthür, S. (2016). "Reflections on Global Climate Politics Post Paris: Power, Interests and Polycentricity." *The International Spectator* 51, 4, 80–94.
- Oberthür, S. and Groen, L. (2017). "Explaining Goal Achievement in International Negotiations: The EU and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change." *Journal of European Public Policy*. DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2017.1291708.
- Oberthür, S. and Roche Kelly, C. (2008). "EU Leadership in International Climate Policy: Achievements and Challenges." *The International Spectator* 43, 35–50.
- Oberthür, S. and Groen, L. (2015). "The Effectiveness Dimension of the EU's Performance in International Institutions: Towards a More Comprehensive Assessment Framework." *Journal of Common Market Studies* 53, 1319–1335.
- Parker, C.F. and Karlsson, C. (2010). "Climate Change and the European Union's Leadership Moment: An Inconvenient Truth?" *Journal of Common Market Studies* 48, 923–943.
- Parker, C.F., Karlsson, C. and Hjerpe, M. (2015). "Climate Change Leaders and Followers: Leadership Recognition and Selection in the UNFCCC Negotiations." *International Relations* 29, 4, 434–454.
- Parker, C.F., Karlsson, C. and Hjerpe, M. (2017) "Assessing the European Union's Global Climate Change Leadership: From Copenhagen to the Paris Agreement." *Journal of European Integration* 39, 2, 239–252.

- Schunz, S. (2015). "The European Union's climate change diplomacy," in: J. Koops and G. Macaj (eds), *The European Union as a Diplomatic Actor*. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, UK.
- Skodvin, T. and Andresen, S. (2006). "Leadership Revisited." *Global Environmental Politics* 6, 13–27.
- Torney, D., and Cross Davis, M.K. (2018). "Environmental and climate diplomacy: building coalitions through persuasion," in: C. Adelle, K. Biedenkopf and D. Torney (eds), *European Union External Environmental Policy. Rules, Regulation and Governance Beyond Borders*. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, Switzerland.
- Underdal, A. (1991). "Solving collective problems: notes on three modes of leadership," in: I. Shihata (ed.), *Challenges of a Changing World: Festschrift to Willy Østeng*. Lysaker, Norway.
- Underdal, A. (1994). "Leadership theory," in: I.W. Zartman (ed.), *International Multilateral Negotiation – Approaches to the Management of Complexity*. Jossey Bass, San Francisco, CA.
- Van Schaik, L. (2012). "The EU's disappointing leadership on climate, or should we be less judgemental?" in: K.E. Jørgesen and K.V. Laatikainen (eds), *Routledge Handbook on the European Union and International Institutions: Performance, Policy, Power*. Routledge, Abingdon, UK.
- Wurzel, R. and Connelly, J. (2011). *The European Union as a Leader in International Climate Change Politics*. Routledge, Abingdon, UK.
- Young, O.R. (1991). "Political Leadership and Regime Formation: On the Development of Institutions in International Society." *International Organization* 45, 281–308.

Section 3

Law